Redefining Handicap: Supreme Court of Washington Affirms Employer's Right in Discrimination Claims Involving Alcoholism

Redefining Handicap: Supreme Court of Washington Affirms Employer's Right in Discrimination Claims Involving Alcoholism

Introduction

The case of Bryce A. Phillips v. The City of Seattle addresses pivotal issues surrounding employment discrimination laws, specifically focusing on whether alcoholism qualifies as a "handicap" under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (RCW 49.60). Bryce A. Phillips, a former plumber for the City of Seattle, was terminated due to excessive unauthorized absences, which were allegedly a consequence of his alcoholism. Phillips contended that his termination violated anti-discrimination laws, prompting a legal examination of the definitions and accommodations related to handicaps in the workplace.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Washington, in an en banc decision dated January 19, 1989, upheld the judgments of both the Superior Court and the Court of Appeals in favor of the City of Seattle. The Court affirmed that alcoholism does not automatically qualify as a handicap under RCW 49.60 and emphasized that determining whether alcoholism constitutes a handicap is a matter of fact to be decided by a jury. Additionally, the Court clarified the proper definition of "handicap" for discrimination purposes, overruling aspects of previous decisions that had inconsistently applied this definition.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment references several key cases that influenced the court’s decision:

  • KIMMEL v. CROWLEY MARITIME CORP. – Initially held that alcoholism was not a handicap, defining "handicap" in a restrictive manner.
  • REESE v. SEARS, ROEBUCK CO. – Followed Kimmel, asserting that only static and permanent conditions qualify as handicaps.
  • Holland v. Boeing Co. – Rejected the notion that employers need only make de minimis efforts in accommodation.
  • SHANNON v. PAY 'N SAVE Corp. – Contradicted the Kimmel and Reese approach by treating "handicap" determination as a factual question.

The Supreme Court of Washington's decision overruled the rigid definitions in Kimmel and Reese, aligning with precedents that advocate for a more inclusive and fact-based determination of what constitutes a handicap.

Legal Reasoning

The Court primarily focused on the proper definition of "handicap" as outlined in the Washington Administrative Code (WAC 162-22-040). The key points in their reasoning included:

  • Administrative Definition Supremacy: Emphasized that the Human Rights Commission's enforcement definition of "handicap" should prevail over its affirmative action definition.
  • Question of Fact: Determined that whether a condition like alcoholism is a handicap is inherently a factual question, best suited for jury determination rather than being decided as a matter of law.
  • Liberal Construction of Anti-Discrimination Laws: Asserted that anti-discrimination statutes should be interpreted broadly to ensure comprehensive protection against unfair employment practices.

The Court dismantled the precedent set by Reese by clarifying that only the affirmative action definition should not be used in enforcement actions, thereby reinforcing that the broader, more inclusive enforcement definition applies in discrimination cases.

Impact

This judgment has significant implications for future cases involving employment discrimination and the classification of disabilities:

  • Broader Protection: By requiring that "handicap" determinations be made by the jury, the decision potentially broadens the scope of conditions protected under discrimination laws.
  • Employer Obligations: Clarifies that employers must engage in good faith efforts to accommodate employees' handicaps, unless it imposes an undue hardship.
  • Legal Consistency: Provides clearer guidelines for courts and juries in interpreting "handicap," promoting consistency in discrimination litigation.

Moreover, the decision calls for legislative consideration regarding the explicit inclusion of conditions like alcoholism within the definition of handicap, possibly influencing future statutory amendments.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Definition of Handicap

A "handicap," under RCW 49.60, refers to a sensory, mental, or physical condition that significantly impairs an individual's ability to perform job-related duties. The Washington State Human Rights Commission (HRHC) provides a detailed definition to guide enforcement:

  • Presence: The condition must be present and be a reason for employment discrimination.
  • Reason for Discharge: The condition must be a direct reason for the employment action taken against the individual.

Reasonable Accommodation

Employers are required to make reasonable efforts to accommodate an employee's handicap unless doing so would cause undue hardship to the business. This involves:

  • Adjusting work schedules.
  • Modifying job duties.
  • Providing necessary assistance or equipment.

Failure to adequately accommodate can constitute discrimination under the law.

Question of Law vs. Question of Fact

A "question of law" pertains to the interpretation and application of legal principles, which judges decide. In contrast, a "question of fact" involves the actual circumstances of the case, which juries determine. In this judgment, whether alcoholism is a handicap was deemed a question of fact, thereby subjecting it to jury deliberation rather than judicial determination.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Washington’s decision in Phillips v. The City of Seattle marks a pivotal shift in the interpretation of "handicap" within the context of employment discrimination. By affirming that the determination of whether alcoholism constitutes a handicap is a factual matter for the jury, the Court broadens the protective scope of RCW 49.60. This ensures that employees with varying conditions receive equitable consideration and that employers are held accountable for reasonable accommodations. The judgment underscores the necessity for legislative clarity on specific conditions and reinforces the principle that discrimination laws should be applied liberally to safeguard employees from unjust employment practices.

Case Details

Year: 1989
Court: The Supreme Court of Washington. En Banc.

Judge(s)

DOLLIVER, J.

Attorney(S)

Abraham A. Arditi, for petitioner. Douglas N. Jewett, City Attorney, and Gordon B. Davidson, Assistant, for respondents.

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