Recognition of Foreign‐Law Enforcement Tips as Sufficient Basis for Probable Cause in Dark Web Child Pornography Investigations

Introduction

The Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Raymond Dugan, 22-4642 (4th Cir. 2025), develops a novel application of Fourth Amendment principles when U.S. law enforcement relies on a tip from a trusted foreign agency to initiate a domestic search. At its core, the case addresses three contested issues:

1. Whether a defendant may compel discovery of a cooperating foreign agency’s investigative techniques;
2. Whether a search warrant based on a foreign tip and an FBI affidavit of probable cause can be upheld when directed at dark‐web child pornography activity;
3. Whether a federal court may exceed the statutory minimum restitution awards for child pornography victims without violating statutory or constitutional limits.

Defendant Raymond Dugan was charged with accessing child pornography via the “dark web” in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2252A(b)(2). The Fourth Circuit affirmed his conviction, the denial of his discovery and suppression motions, and the restitution order. In so doing, it clarified how courts should treat foreign‐sourced tips and the hallmarks of deliberate dark‐web access in establishing probable cause.

Summary of the Judgment

In August 2019, a foreign law enforcement agency with a reputation for reliability notified the FBI that a particular Internet Protocol (IP) address had accessed a hidden, TOR‐only site known as the “TARGET WEBSITE” that trafficked in child sexual abuse and exploitation material (CSAM). Using that IP address, FBI Agent Fleener traced the user to Dugan’s residence in West Virginia. An affidavit detailed the specialized steps required to navigate the TOR network and authenticate on the TARGET WEBSITE (including a mandatory initial posting of 50–100 MB of illicit images), implying intentional engagement with child pornography.

A magistrate judge issued a search warrant for Dugan’s home based on that affidavit. Agents executed the warrant in June 2020, seized Dugan’s computer and digital media, and discovered over 1,200 images of child pornography and records of visits to more than 1,500 TOR sites. Dugan was indicted, moved to compel discovery of the foreign agency’s investigative methods, and sought suppression of the seized evidence. The district court denied both motions, a jury convicted Dugan, and he received 54 months’ imprisonment plus $22,000 in restitution to five minor victims.

On appeal, Dugan argued (1) that he was entitled to discovery of the foreign agency’s internal procedures and any coordination with the FBI; (2) that the search warrant lacked probable cause because it was based entirely on a foreign warrantless search; and (3) that the restitution awards exceeded the statutory minimum without adequate proof of actual losses. The Fourth Circuit rejected each contention:

• His discovery requests were speculative and unsupported by evidence, failing both Brady’s materiality standard and Rule 16(a)(1)(E)’s requirement of a “significantly alter the quantum of proof.”
• The affidavit’s recitation of (a) a reliable foreign tip, (b) a TOR‐only site requiring multiple affirmative steps to access illicit content, and (c) the known retention patterns of CSAM provided a “substantial basis” for probable cause.
• The restitution awards, though above the $3,000 statutory floor in three instances, were within the district court’s broad discretion and followed Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014), in assessing causation and relative contribution to victims’ broader harm.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Fourth Circuit’s opinion invokes a series of Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedents to situate its reasoning:

• Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 83 (1963)): Establishes the requirement that the government disclose exculpatory or impeachment material that is both favorable and “material” to guilt or punishment.
• Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(E): Governs defense access to the government’s evidence if “material to preparing the defense,” requiring more than mere speculation.
• Illinois v. Gates (462 U.S. 213 (1983)): Introduces the “totality of the circumstances” test for probable cause and the “fair probability” standard for searches.
• United States v. Bosyk (933 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 2019)): Explains that deliberate steps to access a TOR hidden service support an inference of knowing, intentional pursuit of illicit content.
• United States v. Sanders (107 F.4th 234 (4th Cir. 2024)): Holds that accessing a TOR‐only child pornography site—requiring software installation, obscure address location, and registration with illicit‐content posting—is enough to establish probable cause.
• Paroline v. United States (572 U.S. 434 (2014)): Provides guideposts for awarding restitution in child pornography cases, requiring causation analysis and granting sentencing courts broad discretion.

Legal Reasoning

1. Discovery and Brady/Rule 16. Dugan sought internal records of the foreign agency’s investigation. The court applied Brady’s three‐part test—favorable, suppressed, material—and concluded that without any factual nexus or proof that the foreign agency was acting at the FBI’s direction, defense counsel’s speculation could not satisfy materiality. Under Rule 16(a)(1)(E), a defendant must show how pretrial disclosure “would enable [him] significantly to alter the quantum of proof” in his favor. Because Dugan offered no affidavits, expert declarations, or leads indicating what the foreign agency had done or any undisclosed agreement, the request amounted to a “fishing expedition,” which Rule 16 forbids.

2. Probable Cause to Search. Agent Fleener’s 52-page affidavit described:

• The foreign tip from a reliable partner identifying Dugan’s IP address accessing a known CSAM dark‐web site;
• Technical details of the TOR network, the anonymity it provides, and the unlikelihood of accidental access;
• Mandatory steps—installing TOR, locating a hidden address, registering with a large illicit‐image upload requirement—all indicators of intent;
• Law enforcement’s understanding that individuals who access and store CSAM typically keep it long‐term and in computer files;
• No evidence of U.S. involvement in how the foreign agency obtained the IP address.

Under Gates’ “fair probability” standard and the deferential review owed to magistrate judges (we do not “second-guess” but ask whether the warrant issued on a “substantial basis”), these facts mirror Sanders and Bosyk and amply warrant the search.

3. Restitution Awards. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2259, victims of child exploitation are entitled to the full amount of their losses if the defendant’s offense “proximately caused” those losses. The statutory floor is $3,000 per victim. Citing Paroline, the court considered:

• The number of images and volume of exploitation;
• Whether Dugan reproduced or distributed images;
• The relative causal role compared with other offenders;
• Evidence of emotional, psychological, and therapy expenses.

Finding evidence that certain victims had suffered more severe and ongoing harms, the district court exercised its broad discretion to exceed $3,000—awarding $7,000, $5,000, and $4,000 to three victims—while remaining within both statutory and precedential bounds.

Impact

This decision has several important implications:

• Foreign Tips and Fourth Amendment. It confirms that a U.S. search can rest on a non‐U.S. law enforcement tip—even if obtained without involvement of U.S. officers—so long as the source is reliable and the domestic affidavit establishes probable cause.
• Dark Web Investigations. It reaffirms that multiple, deliberate steps to access TOR‐hidden child pornography sites strongly support a fair probability of criminal evidence at the target location.
• Limits on Discovery. It reinforces that Brady and Rule 16 do not permit fishing expeditions into foreign agencies’ methods when no concrete factual hook ties those methods to constitutional violations.
• Restitution Discretion. It underscores the deference afforded to district courts in tailoring restitution above minimum statutory floors based on individualized victim harm and causation analysis.

Complex Concepts Simplified

TOR Network: An anonymizing overlay of the Internet, routing traffic through volunteer servers (“nodes”) to conceal user identities and to host “hidden services” (dark-web sites) not indexed by standard search engines.

Hidden Service Access: To reach a TOR‐only site like the TARGET WEBSITE, a user must install TOR software, discover a 16–56‐character “.onion” address, register an account, and often upload illicit files, making accidental exposure virtually impossible.

Probable Cause “Fair Probability”: The threshold for issuing a search warrant—lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt” or even “preponderance of the evidence”—requiring simply enough facts to show it’s more likely than not that evidence of crime will be found.

Paroline Restitution Framework: A multi‐factor inquiry to determine a defendant’s individual contribution to a victim’s broader losses from child pornography, with a statutory minimum award of $3,000 per victim.

Conclusion

United States v. Raymond Dugan clarifies how U.S. courts may rely on trustworthy foreign‐law enforcement tips, combined with a robust affidavit, to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement in dark-web child pornography cases. It simultaneously affirms the narrow scope of Brady and Rule 16 in pretrial discovery challenges and underscores the broad discretion of sentencing courts to craft restitution awards that reflect each victim’s individualized harms. Practitioners and courts should view Dugan as a blueprint for future prosecutions involving transnational information sharing, complex digital investigations, and the tailored compensation of exploited victims.