Reasonable Need, Not the Formula, Controls Term Alimony Under RSA 458:19-a: Commentary on In the Matter of Laurie Bondaz & Jean‑Pierre Bondaz

Reasonable Need, Not the Statutory Formula, Controls Term Alimony Under RSA 458:19-a: Commentary on In the Matter of Laurie Bondaz & Jean‑Pierre Bondaz

Commentary on the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s order dated November 21, 2025, in Case No. 2024‑0327. This analysis is for educational purposes and does not constitute legal advice.

I. Introduction

A. Background and Parties

Laurie and Jean‑Pierre Bondaz married in 1993 and had three children. The husband is a commercial airline pilot. The wife, who holds a master’s degree and a pilot’s license, worked in publishing before the parties’ first child was born in 2003. By agreement, she then stayed home to raise the children for approximately sixteen years. She later reentered the workforce in lower‑paid positions (paraprofessional, administrative assistant, French teacher).

The parties filed a joint petition for divorce in 2020. They continued to cohabit until selling their marital home in October 2022, splitting net proceeds of roughly $400,000 each. By early 2024, the husband’s monthly income was attributed at $22,313, the wife’s at $2,220. They also held substantial retirement and other financial assets, which the trial court found to be of “significant value.”

One of the children was still a minor at the time relevant to this appeal and will turn 18 in 2027. These timelines drove the structure of both child support and term alimony.

B. Procedural Posture

The Circuit Court (Garner, J.) held:

  • A May 2023 hearing, after which it issued temporary child support and alimony orders.
  • A two‑day final hearing in November 2023, leading to a final divorce decree addressing alimony, child support, and property division.

The final orders included:

  • Alimony to the wife:
    • $2,769 per month until June 2024 (while two children were still in high school/under support).
    • $3,268 per month from June 2024 until June 2031 (when the husband turns 65).
    • $1,500 per month from June 2031 until 2036.
  • Child support to the wife:
    • $4,026 per month until June 2024 (full guidelines support).
    • $2,942 per month thereafter until the youngest child ceases to be a minor (anticipated in 2027).
  • Property division: essentially equal division of marital property, including the $400,000 each received from the home sale and roughly equal division of significant retirement assets and other property.

Both parties moved for reconsideration or clarification. The trial court made minor adjustments to the property distribution (to account for overlooked assets) but left its alimony and child support orders unchanged. The wife appealed.

C. Issues on Appeal

The wife raised three principal issues:

  1. Alimony calculation under RSA 458:19‑a:
    • She argued that alimony from June 2027 to June 2031 was too low because the court did not increase alimony when child support for the youngest child terminated in 2027, allegedly contrary to the statutory “23% formula.”
    • She also contested the reduced $1,500/month alimony award from 2031 to 2036.
  2. Retroactive support: She claimed the court erred by failing to award retroactive alimony and child support for the period from October 2022 (sale of the marital home) to July 2023 (when temporary orders took effect), seeking the difference between what the husband voluntarily paid and what later became the ordered amounts.
  3. Property division:
    • The trial court allegedly failed to account properly for joint checking and brokerage accounts.
    • She asserted the husband used joint funds to pay his own expenses and that the court failed to compensate her for that use.
    • She claimed error in the calculation of the parties’ individual checking account balances, including treatment of proceeds from the sale of a mutual asset (a Kubota tractor).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decree in full.

  • Alimony (June 2027–June 2031): The Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to increase alimony after child support for the youngest child ends in 2027. Under RSA 458:19‑a, term alimony is capped by the recipient’s “reasonable need,” even if the statutory formula (23% of the income differential) would allow a higher number. The trial court could reasonably conclude that by 2027 the wife’s reasonable need would be less than the formula amount due to her increased earning capacity and her substantial share of marital property. The statute does not require an explicit, numeric finding that “need < formula.”
  • Alimony (2031–2036): The wife’s challenge to the reduced alimony amount beginning when the husband turns 65 was deemed unpreserved; she had not raised this specific issue in the trial court. The Supreme Court therefore declined to consider it.
  • Retroactive alimony and child support: The Court upheld the trial court’s decision not to make alimony and child support retroactive to October 2022. Given the significant assets each party held after the home sale, and the husband’s voluntary child support payments during the interim, the decision not to “backfill” the wife’s expenses was within the trial court’s broad discretion.
  • Property division – treatment of joint accounts and expenditures: The husband’s use of joint funds for living expenses, a new condominium down payment, and voluntary support did not constitute improper “dissipation” of marital assets. The Court read the trial court’s decree as excluding those already‑spent funds from the divisible estate because they were used for reasonable and necessary living expenses. That approach was consistent with RSA 458:16‑b and prior case law (Brownell).
  • Property division – checking account balances and tractor proceeds: The trial court’s treatment of the parties’ checking accounts, including the wife’s share of proceeds from the Kubota tractor sale, was supported by the evidence. Given discrepancies in the wife’s financial affidavit and the trial court’s role in judging credibility, there was no “unsustainable exercise of discretion.”

The unifying theme is the Court’s reaffirmation of the trial court’s broad discretion in divorce matters, subject to deferential appellate review. At the doctrinal level, the most important clarification is that under RSA 458:19‑a, the recipient’s reasonable need operates as a ceiling on term alimony, and the trial court is not compelled to reapply the 23% formula at later milestones (such as the end of child support) if the record supports a finding—express or implicit—that reasonable need is already fully addressed.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Standard of Review and the Central Role of Discretion

The Court begins by anchoring its analysis in familiar principles:

  • Broad discretion in divorce: In In the Matter of Spenard & Spenard, 167 N.H. 1 (2014), the Court recognized that trial courts have “broad discretion” in fashioning divorce decrees, particularly with respect to child support, alimony, and property distribution. The same theme recurs throughout this order.
  • Unsustainable exercise of discretion standard: Citing In the Matter of Braunstein & Braunstein, 173 N.H. 38 (2020), the Court reiterates that it will disturb a discretionary ruling only if the record lacks “an objective basis” sufficient to sustain the trial court’s decision. If the decision “could reasonably have been made,” it stands.
  • Deference to factual findings: Under In the Matter of Routhier & Routhier, 175 N.H. 6 (2022), factual findings are upheld unless unsupported by the evidence. Credibility determinations and the weighing of evidence belong to the trial court, not the appellate court (Letendre & Letendre, 149 N.H. 31 (2002); Routhier).

This deferential standard frames every issue on appeal and is critical to understanding why the Court affirms despite the wife’s plausible arguments for higher support.

B. Term Alimony Under RSA 458:19‑a – The Dominance of “Reasonable Need”

1. The Statutory Framework

RSA 458:19‑a (Supp. 2024) governs term alimony. Paragraph II(a) provides:

“The amount of a term alimony order shall be the lesser of the payee’s reasonable need, or a formula based on 23 percent of the difference between the parties’ gross incomes at the time the order is created, unless the court finds that justice requires an adjustment.”

Key consequences:

  • The 23% formula is not an entitlement; it is a cap, alongside reasonable need.
  • The court must determine the payee’s reasonable need. If that is less than the formula amount, the statute points to reasonable need as the governing figure.
  • The “justice requires an adjustment” clause gives the court flexibility to deviate from the default (the lesser of need and formula), but the Court in this case does not treat that clause as a prerequisite to awarding less than the formula so long as need is lower.

The Court also stresses, via Routhier, that alimony determinations are based primarily on income and need.

2. The Wife’s Argument: Failure to Increase Alimony When Child Support Ends

The wife contended that from June 2027 to June 2031, the trial court should have increased alimony when child support for the youngest child was expected to terminate in 2027. Her theory was:

  • The trial court correctly applied the statutory formula, adjusted for child support, when it increased alimony at an earlier milestone (the June 2024 graduation of the parties’ second child).
  • It should likewise have recalculated alimony using the statutory 23% formula to “replace” child support after the youngest child’s emancipation in 2027.
  • By failing to rerun the formula and increase alimony—with no explicit explanation—the court, she argued, abused its discretion under RSA 458:19‑a.

3. The Court’s Answer: Implied Finding of Lower “Reasonable Need”

The Supreme Court rejected this argument. Its reasoning proceeds in several steps.

a. The trial court’s factual findings on the wife’s future earning capacity

The trial court made detailed findings about the wife’s qualifications and employment history:

  • She holds a master’s degree.
  • She previously worked for a publishing company in a more skilled, presumably higher‑paid role.
  • She has a pilot’s license, although she has not flown commercially.
  • She has work experience as a paraprofessional, administrative assistant, and French teacher.
  • The court described her as “undoubtedly a well organized and competent person whose experience and level of education might well enable her to achieve a greater level of income” than her current role as a school administrative assistant.

The trial court recognized that she had justifiably limited her job search because she prioritized caring for the children, but it observed that this need was “diminishing as the children get older.” It concluded that she could be expected to regain full‑time employment “at an income consistent with her education and experience” in a matter of years. The Supreme Court found these conclusions supported by the record.

b. The role of property distribution in assessing need

The trial court further found that:

  • Each party received approximately $400,000 from the sale of the marital home.
  • The remaining marital assets, of “significant value,” were also divided equally.
  • Both parties would possess “significant retirement assets” and would be able to maintain “a comfortable standard of living” post‑divorce with those assets.

These property findings are crucial because alimony and property division are interrelated: a party with a large asset base may have a lower ongoing “need” for cash support, all else equal.

c. Combining alimony with child support until 2027

In shaping the alimony award, the trial court expressly considered the fact that the wife would receive guidelines child support until 2027. Thus, from the court’s perspective:

  • The wife would have:
    • Her own earned income.
    • Substantial assets from the property division.
    • Child support until 2027.
    • Alimony structured to provide additional support that gradually adjusted as child support changed and as the husband aged (and approached retirement).
d. The inferential step: “Reasonable need” is less than the formula amount by 2027

The Supreme Court then articulates the core doctrinal move:

“The trial court, in declining to adjust the alimony award following the third child’s graduation, appears to have concluded that, by 2027, the wife’s ‘reasonable need’ would be less than the amount under the statutory formula.”

In other words:

  • The statute requires the court to award the lesser of:
    • The payee’s reasonable need, or
    • The 23% formula amount.
  • If reasonable need is lower than the formula amount, the court is not compelled to award the formula amount, even when child support ends.
  • Here, the trial court’s findings regarding:
    • The wife’s likely increased future earnings; and
    • Her substantial asset base from the property division
    together support an implicit finding that her reasonable need by 2027 would be fully met at the existing alimony levels (post‑2024 increase), making any further increase unnecessary.

The Court states explicitly that even though the trial court did not say in so many words that “the wife’s reasonable need is less than the formula alimony amount starting in 2027,” the statute does not require an express finding to that effect. It is enough that the record supports such a conclusion.

e. Support from prior (non‑precedential) authority: Bois

The Court reinforces its reading of RSA 458:19‑a with a citation to:

In the Matter of Valerie Bois and Alan Bois, No. 2024‑0252 (non‑precedential order at 2‑3), 2025 WL 2237314 (N.H. Aug. 6, 2025).

There, the Court affirmed an alimony award that was less than the statutory formula amount, where “it appears that the court determined that Wife’s reasonable need was less than the formula alimony amount.”

Although Bois is explicitly non‑precedential, the Court cites it to illustrate a consistent approach: where the record indicates that reasonable need is lower than the formula, the award may be set at the need figure—without the necessity of formalistic, explicit findings.

f. Application of the “unsustainable exercise of discretion” test

With this framework, the Court concludes that “sufficient evidence” supports the trial court’s decision not to increase alimony in 2027 and specifically references In the Matter of Peirano & Larsen, 155 N.H. 738, 745‑47 (2007). While the details of Peirano are not recounted, its citation signals:

  • The Court is comfortable with trial courts using a holistic, future‑oriented approach to alimony (considering property, future earnings, and other circumstances).
  • When a trial court builds a step‑structure into alimony awards (in anticipation of milestones such as emancipation of children or the payor’s retirement age), the appellate court will defer as long as the record supports the trial court’s predictions and balancing.

Because the record provided an “objective basis” for the trial court’s judgment—given the wife’s education, work history, future prospects, and asset base—the Supreme Court finds no unsustainable exercise of discretion.

C. Alimony from 2031 to 2036: The Importance of Issue Preservation

The wife also argued that the $1,500 per month alimony award from 2031 (when the husband will turn 65) through 2036 was improperly calculated or insufficient. The Supreme Court does not reach the merits of this argument.

Relying on Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H. 248, 250 (2004), the Court notes that:

  • An issue is unpreserved on appeal if the appellant did not present that specific claim to the trial court in a timely and clear manner.
  • The wife “failed to demonstrate that she raised this issue before the trial court,” so it cannot be reviewed.

This portion of the order underscores a practical but critical point: even substantive errors may go uncorrected if not properly preserved in the trial court through objections, motions, or specific requests for findings.

D. Retroactive Alimony and Child Support

1. The Wife’s Claim

The wife sought retroactive support for the period after the marital home was sold (October 2022) until the temporary support orders became effective in July 2023. Her argument was essentially compensatory:

  • During that period, the husband voluntarily paid child support each month, but those payments were less than the amounts later ordered by the court for child support plus alimony.
  • She contended the trial court should have ordered the husband to pay the difference retroactively.
  • She argued that the lack of retroactive support was unfair because it “forced her to liquidate assets” and to “front” expenses from her own funds that should have been reimbursed through retroactive awards.

2. Governing Legal Principles

Two prior decisions frame the Court’s response:

  • Walker v. Walker, 133 N.H. 413, 418 (1990):
    • The Court held that “the date from which alimony is payable is peculiarly within the discretion of the trial court” (quotation omitted).
    • In other words, there is no automatic entitlement to retroactive alimony back to a particular milestone like separation or home sale; it is entirely discretionary.
  • West v. Turchioe, 144 N.H. 509, 512‑13 (1999):
    • The Court upheld a trial court’s exercise of discretion in granting less than full guidelines retroactive child support.
    • This reinforces that trial courts may fashion retroactive support based on the equities, rather than by mechanical adherence to guideline amounts.

3. Application to the Facts

The Supreme Court reviews the facts emphasized by the trial court:

  • Upon selling the marital home, each party received about $400,000.
  • The husband began providing voluntary monthly child support shortly thereafter.
  • The wife received an equal share of the parties’ “significant” property value.
  • Her salary had the potential to increase in the future (a point also relevant to the alimony analysis).

Against this backdrop, the Court concludes that the trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion by declining to award retroactive alimony and child support:

  • The wife was not left destitute; she had substantial liquid assets and ongoing voluntary support.
  • The need to “liquidate assets” is not, standing alone, a sufficient reason to compel retroactive support, especially when both parties received large, equal distributions from the home sale.
  • Given Walker and West, the question is not whether another judge might have granted retroactive support, but whether this judge had a reasonable, equitable basis for declining to do so.

The Court’s answer is yes: the record supports such an equitable basis; therefore, no error.

E. Property Division and Treatment of Joint Accounts

1. Equitable Distribution Framework

The Court reiterates core New Hampshire principles on marital property division:

  • In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 799 (2015):
    • Marital property is not divided by “some mechanical formula,” but in a manner deemed “just” based on the evidence and equities of the case.
  • In the Matter of Heinrich & Heinrich, 164 N.H. 357, 365 (2012):
    • Appellate courts will not reweigh the equities or substitute their judgment for the trial court’s in dividing assets.
  • In the Matter of Letendre & Letendre, 149 N.H. 31, 36 (2002):
    • If the trial court’s findings on property distribution “can reasonably be made on the evidence presented, they will stand.”

Together, these cases frame the trial court’s property division decisions as highly discretionary and entitled to significant deference on appeal.

2. The Wife’s Complaints About Joint Accounts

The wife claimed that:

  • The trial court unjustifiably failed to account for the parties’ joint checking and brokerage accounts when dividing property.
  • It failed to account for the husband’s use of those joint funds to pay his:
    • Personal expenses, including a $5,000 down payment on his new condominium, and
    • Spousal support and other living expenses.
  • Because these expenditures came from joint marital funds, she argued that the husband effectively received a greater share of the marital estate than the trial court recognized.

3. Reasonable Living Expenses vs. Dissipation

The Supreme Court’s resolution of this issue turns on the distinction between:

  • Using marital funds for reasonable and necessary expenses of living; and
  • Intentionally dissipating or wasting marital funds to avoid their inclusion in the marital estate.

Two legal sources are central here:

  • RSA 458:16‑b, I(b) (2018):
    • This statute describes an exception to anti‑hypothecation orders (orders that generally bar parties from disposing of marital assets pending divorce) for the use of marital property “[f]or reasonable and necessary expenses of living.”
  • In the Matter of Brownell & Brownell, 163 N.H. 593, 600‑01 (2012):
    • Dissipated marital property—property “intentionally dissipated to avoid its inclusion in the property to be equitably distributed”—is characterized as a “fraud on marital rights.”
    • Courts will treat such dissipated property as though it still exists, by “constructively” considering it part of the marital estate.

In light of these principles, the Supreme Court notes:

  • The husband used joint funds to pay:
    • Spousal support.
    • His own living expenses, including a $5,000 condo down payment.
    • Other reasonable expenses during the pendency of the divorce.
  • The wife did not argue that the husband wasted marital funds intentionally so as to avoid sharing them.
  • Instead, her claim was effectively that such use reduced the “pot” of equity to be divided and that she should be compensated for that reduction.

The Supreme Court reads the trial court’s decree as having decided to distribute only the parties’ remaining divisible assets at the time of the final hearing. Because the joint accounts had been drawn down to pay reasonable, necessary expenses and spousal support, the trial court effectively excluded those already‑spent funds from the marital estate.

That approach is consistent with RSA 458:16‑b’s recognition that living expenses may justifiably be paid from marital assets during the divorce process, and with Brownell, which reserves the concept of “constructive inclusion” for truly dissipated assets (i.e., funds deliberately wasted to evade equitable distribution).

Because the record “shows that these transfers were made to pay reasonable and necessary living expenses,” the Court holds there was no error in declining to include the joint accounts (in their prior, pre‑expenditure amounts) in the property distribution.

4. Checking Accounts and the Kubota Tractor Proceeds

The wife also contended that the trial court erroneously:

  • Included her share of the sale proceeds from a mutual asset (a Kubota tractor) in calculating her checking account balance; but
  • Failed to include the husband’s share of those same proceeds in his checking account balance.

The Supreme Court finds no error, emphasizing:

  • The trial court adjusted both parties’ checking account balances to deduct the net proceeds each separately received from the sale of the marital home.
  • The wife’s financial affidavit contained “some discrepancies and omissions,” a fact she admitted at trial.
  • Given these discrepancies, the trial court could reasonably have declined to fully credit her assertions about the amount and source of the remaining funds in her account.

Again invoking Letendre and Routhier, the Supreme Court underscores that determinations regarding financial affidavits and account balances involve fact‑finding and credibility assessments that fall squarely within the trial court’s discretion. Because the findings “can reasonably be made on the evidence presented,” they stand.

IV. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

A. Divorce Discretion and Standard of Review

  • Spenard & Spenard, 167 N.H. 1 (2014):
    • Affirms that trial courts have “broad discretion” in divorce decrees.
    • Bondaz builds on this to defer heavily to the structure and amounts of alimony, child support, and property division absent clear abuse.
  • Braunstein & Braunstein, 173 N.H. 38 (2020):
    • Clarifies that appellate review focuses on whether there is an “objective basis” in the record for the trial court’s judgment.
    • Bondaz applies this in upholding the alimony schedule and the denial of retroactive support.
  • Routhier & Routhier, 175 N.H. 6 (2022):
    • Reiterates that alimony is based on income and need.
    • Emphasizes deference to trial court’s factual findings and credibility judgments, which Bondaz relies on in evaluating the wife’s earning capacity and the accuracy of financial affidavits.

B. Alimony and Future‑Oriented Awards

  • Peirano & Larsen, 155 N.H. 738 (2007):
    • Although not discussed in detail, its citation in Bondaz suggests the Court’s continued acceptance of multi‑stage alimony awards that anticipate future changes (e.g., retirement, children’s emancipation), so long as supported by evidence.
  • Bois, No. 2024‑0252 (non‑precedential):
    • Supports the notion that the statutory formula in RSA 458:19‑a is constrained by reasonable need, and that express numeric comparisons are not always required when it is clear the trial court found need lower than the formula amount.

C. Retroactive Support

  • Walker v. Walker, 133 N.H. 413 (1990):
    • “The date from which alimony is payable is peculiarly within the discretion of the trial court.”
    • Bondaz directly applies this principle to uphold the denial of retroactive alimony.
  • West v. Turchioe, 144 N.H. 509 (1999):
    • Affirms the trial court’s discretion to set retroactive child support at less than “full guidelines” levels.
    • In Bondaz, the Court analogously defers to the trial court’s equitable decision to make no retroactive adjustment at all, given the parties’ resources and voluntary support payments.

D. Property Division and Dissipation

  • Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785 (2015):
    • Rejects mechanical formulas for dividing marital property and stresses equitable, fact‑driven decisions.
    • Bondaz uses Kempton to justify the trial court’s flexible approach to joint accounts and checking balances.
  • Heinrich & Heinrich, 164 N.H. 357 (2012):
    • Warns appellate courts against reweighing equities in property division.
    • Bondaz applies this principle in declining to adjust for the husband’s use of joint accounts for living expenses.
  • Brownell & Brownell, 163 N.H. 593 (2012):
    • Defines intentional dissipation as a “fraud on marital rights,” and permits courts to treat dissipated property as still part of the marital estate.
    • Bondaz distinguishes reasonable use of joint funds for living expenses (permissible, not added back) from dissipation (which would be added back).
  • Letendre & Letendre, 149 N.H. 31 (2002):
    • Confirms that property distribution findings will stand if “reasonably made” on the evidence presented.
    • Bondaz uses Letendre in upholding the trial court’s handling of the parties’ checking accounts and the Kubota tractor proceeds.

E. Issue Preservation

  • Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H. 248 (2004):
    • Stands for the principle that issues not raised below are not preserved for appellate review.
    • In Bondaz, the Court uses Bean to decline review of the wife’s challenge to alimony for 2031‑2036.

V. Complex Concepts Explained in Plain Terms

A. “Unsustainable Exercise of Discretion”

This is a very deferential appellate standard. In practice, it means:

  • The Supreme Court asks whether a reasonable judge, looking at the same evidence, could have made the same decision—even if another judge might have decided differently.
  • If there is any reasonable, evidence‑based path to the trial court’s outcome, it is not “unsustainable,” and the appellate court will not disturb it.

This standard explains why the Court in Bondaz repeatedly upholds discretionary choices so long as the record contains some support (education, assets, voluntary payments, etc.).

B. Term Alimony and the 23% Formula (RSA 458:19‑a)

Term alimony is alimony ordered for a set period of time (as opposed to indefinite alimony). RSA 458:19‑a provides:

  • The court calculates 23% of the difference between the parties’ gross incomes.
  • That formula amount is compared to the recipient’s reasonable need.
  • The court must start from the premise that the award will be the lesser of:
    • (a) reasonable need; or
    • (b) the 23% formula amount.

Bondaz clarifies that:

  • The 23% formula is a ceiling, not a guaranteed entitlement.
  • If the recipient’s needs are lower, the court can (and should) award less.
  • The court need not always write out a detailed comparison of need vs. formula, as long as the record clearly supports the conclusion that need is less than the formula amount.

C. “Reasonable Need”

“Reasonable need” refers to the amount of support necessary to allow the recipient spouse to maintain an appropriate and fair standard of living, in light of:

  • Each spouse’s income and earning capacity.
  • The property each spouse receives in the divorce.
  • Other sources of funds (such as child support).
  • Health, age, and other relevant circumstances.

It is not an entitlement to replicate the exact marital standard of living forever, nor is it whatever amount the recipient subjectively wants. It is a reasoned, fact‑based estimate of what is necessary and fair.

D. Retroactive Support

Retroactive alimony or child support means ordering payments that reach back to an earlier date (e.g., the date the parties separated or filed for divorce) to compensate for under‑payments during that period.

In New Hampshire:

  • Whether to award retroactive support, and from what date, is a discretionary, equitable decision for the trial court (Walker, West).
  • There is no automatic right to have final support amounts applied retroactively, even if voluntary payments were lower.

E. Dissipation of Marital Assets

“Dissipation” occurs when one spouse intentionally wastes or transfers marital assets in order to prevent the other spouse from sharing in them upon divorce (e.g., extravagant spending, secret transfers to friends or new partners, unnecessary gambling losses).

If the court finds dissipation:

  • It may treat the dissipated assets as though they still existed (“constructive inclusion”).
  • The offending spouse might be assigned those lost assets on his or her side of the ledger, thereby reducing their share of what remains (Brownell).

By contrast, using marital funds for reasonable and necessary living expenses—including housing, food, utilities, and even reasonable legal fees—does not generally count as dissipation and need not be added back into the marital estate.

F. Anti‑hypothecation Orders

An anti‑hypothecation order is a court order that prevents parties from disposing of or encumbering marital property during the divorce proceedings, intended to preserve the marital estate. RSA 458:16‑b provides exceptions, including:

  • Use of marital property “[f]or reasonable and necessary expenses of living.”

Bondaz situates the husband’s withdrawals from joint accounts firmly within this exception, reinforcing the idea that such expenditures do not automatically trigger an obligation to restore the funds through the property division.

VI. Impact and Future Implications

A. Alimony Practice Under RSA 458:19‑a

Bondaz carries several important implications for future alimony cases in New Hampshire:

  • Formula as cap, not entitlement: Parties should recognize that the 23% formula is bounded by reasonable need. A recipient cannot simply point to the formula to claim a right to that amount.
  • No automatic increase when child support ends: Many spouses assume that the end of child support will automatically trigger a compensating increase in alimony. Bondaz rejects that assumption:
    • Whether alimony should increase at such a milestone depends on a fresh assessment of need and available resources (including property and income).
    • If reasonable need at that time is lower than the formula amount—even after child support ends—the court may leave alimony unchanged or even reduce it.
  • Prospective structuring of alimony is permissible: Trial courts may create multi‑stage alimony schedules that anticipate:
    • Children aging out of support;
    • The payor’s prospective retirement age;
    • The payee’s expected increase in earning capacity.
    As long as these forecasts are grounded in evidence, appellate courts are likely to uphold them.
  • Importance of evidence on earnability: In Bondaz, the wife’s education, licenses, and prior skilled employment were pivotal. Future litigants seeking higher alimony will need to address:
    • Why their qualifications do not translate into substantial earning capacity (e.g., health, age, job market limitations); or
    • Why a longer or more generous alimony period is needed to allow genuine retraining or re‑entry into the workforce.

B. Retroactive Support Claims

Bondaz reinforces that retroactive support is exceptional, not routine. To justify it, a spouse should be prepared to show:

  • Genuine hardship or inequity that cannot be addressed through the ordinary property division or forward‑looking support orders.
  • That voluntary interim payments were clearly inadequate in light of the parties’ financial abilities and needs.
  • That retroactivity is necessary to do equity, rather than simply to equalize cash flows after the fact.

Where, as in Bondaz, both parties have substantial assets and interim support was voluntarily paid, the prospects for retroactive awards appear limited.

C. Property Division and Use of Marital Funds During the Case

Three practical lessons emerge:

  • Not all pre‑decree spending is “waste”: Using joint funds for living expenses, housing deposits, or even voluntary support is often permissible and may not be recharacterized as an “extra” share of the marital estate for the spending spouse.
  • Dissipation arguments must be specific: A party seeking to have withdrawn funds added back into the marital estate should explicitly allege and prove dissipation—that the spending was excessive, unnecessary, or designed to deprive the other spouse of their share.
  • Accurate financial affidavits are critical: Discrepancies or omissions, as in the wife’s affidavit here, give the trial court reason to discount a party’s claimed account balances or explanations. This can directly affect the equitable distribution of assets.

D. Appellate Strategy and Issue Preservation

Bondaz also illustrates the importance of:

  • Raising specific objections in the trial court: Challenges to future phases of alimony (such as the 2031–2036 period here) must be clearly articulated to the trial court, typically via motions to reconsider or requests for more detailed findings.
  • Building a robust record: Because appellate review is deferential and focused on whether there is “any” reasonable basis in the record for the trial court’s decision, parties must present strong, concrete evidence of their financial reality and needs at trial.

VII. Conclusion

In the Matter of Laurie Bondaz & Jean‑Pierre Bondaz is a significant clarification of New Hampshire’s alimony and property division jurisprudence under RSA 458:19‑a and RSA 458:16‑b. Its central holding is that:

  • The statutory 23% formula for term alimony is subordinate to the recipient’s reasonable need; and
  • Trial courts are not required to increase alimony at each child‑related milestone if the evidence supports the conclusion—express or implicit—that reasonable need is already satisfied at a lower amount.

The Court also reaffirms:

  • The broad discretion of trial courts in deciding whether to award retroactive alimony or child support and from what date.
  • The line between permissible use of marital funds for living expenses and impermissible dissipation, with only the latter being constructively added back to the marital estate.
  • The necessity of issue preservation and robust evidence, especially when challenging future‑oriented support schedules on appeal.

In the broader legal context, Bondaz fortifies a pragmatic, equity‑driven approach to divorce decrees. It instructs litigants and practitioners to focus not on mechanical formulas or assumptions (such as automatic alimony increases when child support ends), but on carefully demonstrating—or contesting—reasonable need, earning capacity, and fairness in light of the entire economic picture of the marriage and its dissolution.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of New Hampshire

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