Reasonable Efforts May Be Satisfied by Prior and Ongoing Services; Trial Court Credibility Findings Govern Post‑Termination Visitation (In re D.G. and L.G.)

Reasonable Efforts May Be Satisfied by Prior and Ongoing Services; Trial Court Credibility Findings Govern Post‑Termination Visitation

Commentary on In re D.G. and L.G., No. 24-595 (W. Va. Sept. 30, 2025)

Introduction

In this memorandum decision, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the termination of an adoptive father’s parental rights and the denial of post‑termination visitation for two children, D.G. and L.G. The case arises from a recurrence of dangerous household conditions and a failure to secure timely medical care for D.G., set against a backdrop of substantial supports that had been provided to the family in a prior abuse and neglect case and continued services thereafter.

Two issues were presented on appeal: (1) whether the Department of Human Services (DHS) made “reasonable efforts” to preserve and reunify the family before termination, as required by statute, and (2) whether the circuit court erred in denying post‑termination visitation. The Supreme Court held that DHS satisfied the reasonable‑efforts obligation by arranging psychological evaluations in the present case and by relying on the family’s extensive recent service history from the prior case—services that were still ongoing when the home again fell into deplorable condition. On post‑termination contact, the Court reaffirmed that the determination is a best‑interests inquiry grounded in trial‑level credibility assessments about emotional bonds and potential detriment to the children, and it declined to reweigh conflicting testimony on appeal.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the Nicholas County Circuit Court’s September 18, 2024 order terminating Petitioner Father P.G.’s parental rights to D.G. and L.G. and denying post‑termination visitation. Key holdings include:

  • DHS made “reasonable efforts” to preserve and reunify the family where it (a) arranged and paid for psychological evaluations in the current case and (b) had provided extensive parenting and life‑skills services in a prior case, with the father still engaged with a clinical social worker when the home again regressed into deplorable condition. Further duplicative services were not required where the court found “no reasonable likelihood” of correction “even with the assistance of the DHS.”
  • Denial of post‑termination visitation was within the circuit court’s discretion under In re Christina L., given its supported findings that the children lacked an emotional bond with the father, were ambivalent about returning home, and would not be harmed by the absence of contact. Appellate courts will not reweigh conflicting testimony or reassess witness credibility.
  • Standard of review: factual findings are reviewed for clear error; legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. See Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T.

Background and Procedural History

The parents adopted D.G. and L.G. in 2019. In 2020, DHS filed an abuse and neglect petition alleging deplorable home conditions; the children were removed; Father was adjudicated and given an improvement period that he successfully completed after receiving eight months of parenting and adult life‑skills services. The children were returned in July 2021.

In December 2023, DHS filed the present petition alleging:

  • The home had again become dangerously deplorable: foul odor, clutter, seven animals inside, and a urine‑soaked bed that had not been cleaned.
  • Medical neglect: D.G. cut his leg with a hunting knife, asked to go to the hospital, but parents declined to seek medical care, instead bandaging and duct‑taping the wound before sending him to school; teachers observed the wound required stitches.

At a preliminary hearing, the circuit court ordered DHS to arrange and pay for psychological evaluations for both parents. Father completed the evaluation; the clinician offered a guarded prognosis, noting that Father minimized concerns and lacked attachment to the children.

After a January 2024 adjudicatory hearing, the court found abuse and neglect based on the home’s condition and failure to obtain medical care, emphasizing that this was the second such case and finding that Father likely avoided medical treatment to evade CPS involvement.

Dispositional hearings occurred in March and September 2024. Testimony included:

  • A licensed clinical social worker reported long‑term engagement with the family since 2021 and Father’s compliance with services.
  • The children’s psychiatrist described extensive diagnoses (ASD, ADD, OCD, Tourette’s, speech impediment for D.G.; ADD, trauma‑related disorders, affective behavior disorder for L.G.) and opined the children had an emotional bond with the parents and severance would be detrimental.
  • A CPS worker testified the children were doing well in placement, had not asked to see the parents, and that D.G. became upset and stated he did not want to see them.
  • The guardian ad litem proffered that the children had no emotional attachment to Father. Both the guardian and DHS recommended termination based on lack of attachment and regression of home conditions.

The circuit court found that Father had a “fundamental inability to understand the conditions of abuse and neglect,” allowed dangerous conditions to recur, failed to follow through with a reasonable case plan or rehabilitative efforts, and that the children would not be harmed by not returning home. It found no bond and child ambivalence, and concluded there was “no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future even with the assistance of the [DHS].” It terminated parental rights and denied post‑termination visitation. Father appealed on the two issues noted above. The Supreme Court affirmed without oral argument pursuant to Rule 21.

Precedents and Authorities Cited

  • Standard of Review: Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011) (factual findings—clear error; legal conclusions—de novo).
  • Reasonable Efforts—Statutory Basis:
    • W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑601(d): DHS must provide supportive services to remedy circumstances detrimental to a child.
    • W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑604(c)(6)(C)(iii), (iv): before terminating parental rights, the court must consider whether DHS made reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family.
    • “No reasonable likelihood” language (mirrored in § 49‑4‑604) supports termination when the conditions cannot be substantially corrected in the near future “even with the assistance of the [DHS].”
  • Post‑Termination Visitation: Syl. Pt. 5, In re Christina L., 194 W. Va. 446, 460 S.E.2d 692 (1995) (post‑termination contact may be considered if in the child’s best interests; court should consider the existence of a close emotional bond and the child’s wishes; contact must not be detrimental).
  • Appellate Deference to Credibility:
    • State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 669 n.9, 461 S.E.2d 163, 175 n.9 (1995) (appellate courts do not decide credibility or weigh evidence).
    • In re D.S., 251 W. Va. 466, 914 S.E.2d 701, 707 (2025) (the Supreme Court will not reweigh evidence or make credibility determinations in abuse and neglect appeals).
  • Evolving Standards on Post‑Termination Visitation: In re Z.D.-1, 251 W. Va. 743, 916 S.E.2d 375, 382 n.21 (2025) (noting provisional amendments to Rule 15 to adopt generalized standards for post‑termination visitation). The Court applied pre‑amendment standards here because the underlying order predated the change.

Legal Analysis

1) Reasonable Efforts: Prior and Ongoing Services Can Satisfy the Requirement When Further Services Would Be Futile

West Virginia’s statutory scheme requires DHS to provide supportive services aimed at family preservation and reunification and requires courts to consider DHS’s reasonable efforts before termination. The father argued DHS “never provided any services” in this case. The record refuted that claim in two critical ways:

  • DHS arranged and paid for psychological evaluations of both parents during this proceeding. Father completed his evaluation, which produced a guarded prognosis.
  • More importantly, DHS had already provided extensive services for eight months in the 2020 case—parenting and adult life‑skills—that resulted in reunification in 2021. The licensed clinical social worker continued working with Father and the children into 2024, yet the home again fell into deplorable condition while Father was still engaged with services.

From these facts, the circuit court reasonably concluded that additional, duplicative services would not correct the problems “even with the assistance of the [DHS].” The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the reasonable‑efforts requirement was satisfied and that the statute does not obligate DHS to offer endless rounds of services when the evidence demonstrates futility. The decision thus clarifies that courts may look to the broader service continuum—including prior, recent services and ongoing engagement at the time of relapse—to determine whether DHS has met its reasonable‑efforts obligation in the present case.

2) “No Reasonable Likelihood of Correction” and Futility

Termination was upheld under the statutory standard that there is no reasonable likelihood the conditions of abuse and neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future, even with DHS assistance. The facts supporting futility included:

  • Recurrence of dangerous household conditions—despite past successful completion of services and continued engagement with a social worker.
  • Medical neglect involving significant injury to D.G. and an apparent decision to avoid medical care to forestall CPS involvement.
  • A psychological evaluation indicating minimization and poor attachment.

These findings align with the statute’s focus on the near‑term prognosis for safe parental functioning. Successful completion of an earlier improvement period is not dispositive; when conditions relapse under active services, the inference of futility strengthens.

3) Post‑Termination Visitation: Best Interests, Bond Assessment, and Deference to Trial‑Level Credibility Findings

Applying Christina L., the circuit court considered whether post‑termination contact would be in the children’s best interests, including whether there was a close emotional bond and the children’s wishes. Evidence conflicted:

  • The children’s psychiatrist opined there was an emotional bond and severance would be detrimental.
  • The CPS worker and guardian ad litem reported the children did not ask to see the parents, D.G. became upset and expressly stated he did not want contact, and, in their view, there was no bond.

The circuit court credited the latter evidence, finding no bond or interest in returning and expressly concluding that not returning the children “would not be harmful to them in any way.” On appeal, the Supreme Court refused to reweigh that testimonial conflict or to disturb the trial court’s credibility determinations, consistent with Guthrie and D.S.. The result underscores that post‑termination visitation is a discretionary best‑interests remedy, and trial courts’ on‑the‑ground assessments of bond and detriment will be given substantial deference.

The Court also noted, without applying, the provisional amendment to Rule 15, announced in Z.D.-1, adopting general standards for post‑termination visitation. Even under evolving statewide guidance, the determinative principles remain: the child’s best interests, the presence or absence of a meaningful bond, the child’s wishes, and whether contact would be non‑detrimental.

4) Standards of Review: Why the Appeal Failed

The Supreme Court applied established review standards:

  • Factual determinations (e.g., existence of a bond, child’s wishes, home conditions, futility) are reviewed for clear error and are anchored in the circuit court’s superior vantage point on credibility.
  • Legal conclusions (e.g., whether the law requires additional services under the “reasonable efforts” rubric) are reviewed de novo, but here the legal framework was correctly applied to well‑supported facts.

Because the circuit court made supported findings on reasonable efforts and detriment and because the appellate court does not reweigh evidence, affirmance followed.

Impact and Future Significance

A. Reasonable Efforts: No Obligation for Perpetual, Duplicative Services

This decision provides practical guidance in recurring‑condition cases:

  • DHS can satisfy “reasonable efforts” in a new petition by demonstrating its prior, recent service provisions—especially where the same conditions reappear while services are still in place or newly provided supports (like psychological evaluations) have been arranged.
  • Courts may find additional services unwarranted where evidence demonstrates that the parent cannot correct conditions “even with the assistance of DHS.” This echoes a futility principle woven into West Virginia’s disposition statute.

Expect more trial courts to take a holistic, longitudinal view of DHS efforts rather than confining the inquiry to the narrow timeframe of the latest petition—particularly where the new petition is close in time to earlier, robust interventions for the same issues.

B. Post‑Termination Visitation: Importance of Child‑Centered Evidence and Credibility

The case clarifies that:

  • Post‑termination visitation turns on a child’s best interests with specific attention to bond, the child’s wishes, and non‑detriment.
  • Trial courts may weigh day‑to‑day observational testimony from CPS workers and GALs against clinical opinions; appellate courts will not second‑guess that weighing absent clear error.
  • Children’s direct statements and emotional responses carry significant weight, especially when consistent with the guardian’s position and the children’s functioning in placement.

As Rule 15’s new standards mature in the wake of Z.D.-1, this case still illustrates the core adjudicative posture: granular, child‑specific fact‑finding and heavy deference on appeal.

C. Practical Effects for Stakeholders

  • For DHS: Document both current and prior services and the parent’s engagement and response over time. When conditions recur under active services, develop a clear record explaining why further services would be duplicative or futile.
  • For Parents’ Counsel: To contest reasonable‑efforts findings, distinguish prior services (content, timing, goals) and demonstrate new, concrete steps that could meaningfully remediate conditions. For post‑termination contact, marshal credible, consistent evidence of child‑parent bonding and non‑detriment that can withstand trial‑level credibility assessments.
  • For Guardians/Courts: Elicit and document the child’s wishes in a developmentally appropriate manner, and build a detailed record about bond, daily functioning, and potential detriment or benefit of continued contact.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Reasonable Efforts: The statutory duty of DHS to provide supports (e.g., parenting classes, life‑skills coaching, mental health evaluations) intended to fix the problems endangering a child. The question is whether, in context, DHS did enough—not whether it did everything conceivable.
  • Improvement Period: A court‑supervised window during which a parent works a case plan to address abuse/neglect issues. Success does not guarantee lasting change; if conditions reappear, the court reassesses safety and capacity.
  • “No Reasonable Likelihood of Correction”: A dispositional standard authorizing termination when the parent cannot substantially fix the harmful conditions in the near future, even with DHS help.
  • Post‑Termination Visitation: Contact between the child and a parent whose rights have been terminated. It is not automatic; it is authorized only if it serves the child’s best interests, there is a meaningful bond, the child’s wishes support it (or at least do not oppose it), and the contact would not be harmful.
  • Guardian ad Litem (GAL): An attorney appointed to represent the child’s best interests. The GAL’s recommendations are influential but not binding.
  • Standard of Review: On appeal, factual findings (what happened, who is believable) are disturbed only if clearly wrong; legal conclusions (what law applies) are reviewed anew. Appellate courts do not re‑try the case or reassess witness credibility.

Notable Facts Undergirding the Decision

  • The parents allegedly avoided medical treatment for a significant laceration that ultimately required stitches, with evidence suggesting the avoidance aimed to evade CPS scrutiny.
  • The home’s reversion to deplorable conditions occurred despite Father’s ongoing participation in services with a clinical social worker—an important factor in the futility analysis.
  • Both children were reported to be doing well in placement; neither asked to return home; D.G. expressly did not want contact and became upset when asked about his parents.
  • The circuit court explicitly found that “not returning the children to the petitioner would not be harmful to them in any way,” a finding that powerfully informed the denial of post‑termination visitation.

Conclusion

In re D.G. and L.G. reinforces two practical points of West Virginia child welfare law. First, the “reasonable efforts” requirement is a contextual, cumulative inquiry: DHS may satisfy it through services provided in a prior, closely related case—especially where the same risks reappear while the parent is still engaged in services and after DHS has arranged additional supports, such as psychological evaluations. The law does not require agencies to provide repetitive services where the evidence shows the parent cannot or will not correct the conditions even with assistance.

Second, decisions about post‑termination visitation remain squarely within the circuit court’s best‑interests discretion under Christina L., hinging on specific findings about emotional bond, the children’s wishes, and the absence of detriment. Appellate courts will not reweigh conflicting expert and lay testimony or second‑guess credibility determinations that are supported by the record.

Although rendered as a memorandum decision, the Court’s analysis offers clear guidance for future cases involving relapse into dangerous conditions after substantial services: the reasonable‑efforts inquiry is holistic and may rely on prior and ongoing interventions, and trial‑level findings on bond and harm will control the post‑termination visitation calculus. For practitioners and agencies alike, the message is to build a thorough, child‑centered record on services, responsiveness, and the concrete effects of continued contact on the child’s well‑being.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia

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