Reasonable Efforts Are Fact-Dependent and Need Not Be Herculean; ICPC Omission Alone Does Not Defeat Reunification Efforts: Montana Supreme Court Affirms Termination of Parental Rights in Matter of K.B. & B.B.-R. (Noncitable)

Reasonable Efforts Are Fact-Dependent and Need Not Be Herculean; ICPC Omission Alone Does Not Defeat Reunification Efforts: Montana Supreme Court Affirms Termination of Parental Rights in Matter of K.B. & B.B.-R. (Noncitable)

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Montana Supreme Court’s memorandum decision in Matter of K.B. & B.B.-R., Youths in Need of Care (DA 25-0027; 2025 MT 229N), affirming the termination of the parental rights of A.C. (Mother) to her two children, K.B. and B.B.-R. The Opinion, authored by Justice Ingrid Gustafson, is designated as a noncitable memorandum under the Court’s Internal Operating Rules and therefore does not create binding precedent. However, it offers a clear application of established principles governing “reasonable efforts,” parental engagement with treatment plans, and the statutory criteria for termination under § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA.

The case arises from extensive child-protection involvement following reports of unsafe conditions and caregiving deficits, including exposure to domestic violence, physical abuse, drug use, poor hygiene, and inappropriate caregivers in the home Mother shared with her boyfriend in Glendive. After adjudication of the children as youths in need of care (YINC) and the approval of a treatment plan, Mother relocated to North Dakota. Despite an extended timeline—more than three years—during which the Department of Public Health and Human Services (Department) offered numerous supports, the District Court found Mother did not successfully complete her plan and her conduct or condition was unlikely to change within a reasonable time. The central issues on appeal were whether the Department made reasonable efforts to facilitate reunification—especially given the interstate context—and whether the District Court abused its discretion in terminating parental rights.

Parties and posture:

  • Appellant: A.C. (Mother)
  • Appellee: Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services, Child and Family Services Division
  • Youths: K.B. and B.B.-R.
  • Lower Court: Seventh Judicial District Court, Dawson County, Judge Olivia Rieger
  • Opinion Author: Justice Ingrid Gustafson (with unanimous concurrence)
  • Decision Type: Memorandum Opinion (noncitable)

Summary of the Opinion

The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the termination orders entered in September 2024. Applying the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard and reviewing findings for clear error, the Court held that:

  • Each statutory element of § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA, was supported by clear and convincing evidence: the children were adjudicated YINC; an appropriate treatment plan was approved; the plan was not successfully completed; and Mother’s unfitness was unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
  • Although “reasonable efforts” is not a stand-alone termination element, the Department’s efforts—assessed under the totality of the circumstances—were reasonable, even if imperfect. The Department’s failure to initiate an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) home study when the children were on a trial home visit in North Dakota did not, by itself, negate reasonable efforts.
  • Mother’s minimal engagement—sporadic visitation (only five visits in the year after K.B. returned to Montana), inconsistent mental health treatment, and sustained apathy despite substantial Department assistance (including funding offers, travel vouchers, lodging, transportation coordination, and repeated outreach)—demonstrated that the conditions rendering her unfit were unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
  • Given the duration of the case (over three years) and the children’s need for stability and permanence, further extensions of Temporary Legal Custody (TLC) were unwarranted.

Background and Procedural Timeline

  • February 10, 2021: Department removes children due to safety concerns; places them with T.C. (kinship caregiver and ex-husband of Mother; father of the children’s maternal half-siblings).
  • February–June 2021: EPS/TIA granted; children adjudicated YINC; TLC ordered; Mother’s treatment plan approved, requiring visitation, mental health services, parenting classes, proof of legal income and stable housing, and ongoing contact with the Department.
  • Late 2021: Mother moves to Stanley, North Dakota, to live with J.G. (K.B.’s birth father).
  • May 27, 2022: Department initiates a trial home visit in North Dakota for both children. B.B.-R. is returned to Montana September 15, 2022, due to significant behavioral concerns; later placed at Intermountain Group Home in Helena (November 15, 2022); T.C. moves to Lincoln to be closer to him.
  • April 21, 2023: K.B. is also removed from the trial home visit after deterioration in behavior and returned to Montana; placed ultimately with T.C. in a kinship placement.
  • 2022–2024: Multiple TLC extensions to give Mother more time to complete the treatment plan.
  • June 7, 2024: Department petitions to terminate Mother’s parental rights.
  • August 21–22, 2024: Termination hearings with testimony from Dr. Brenda Roche; therapist Joanne Hynes; CPS Laura Moser; A.E. (T.C.’s long-term partner); and Mother.
  • September 27 and 30, 2024: Separate termination orders entered for K.B. and B.B.-R.; Mother appeals.
  • October 7, 2025: Montana Supreme Court affirms by memorandum opinion.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • In re B.J.B., 2025 MT 116, ¶ 5, 422 Mont. 224, 569 P.3d 584
    • Purpose: Confirms the abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing termination decisions.
    • Influence: Anchors appellate deference to the district court’s fact-intensive determinations in this case.
  • In re X.M., 2018 MT 264, ¶ 17, 393 Mont. 210, 429 P.3d 920; In re K.A., 2016 MT 27, ¶ 19, 382 Mont. 165, 365 P.3d 478
    • Purpose: Defines abuse of discretion—acting arbitrarily, without conscientious judgment, or beyond reason causing substantial injustice.
    • Influence: Provides the qualitative measure for assessing the lower court’s exercise of judgment; the Supreme Court finds no arbitrariness here.
  • In re M.V.R., 2016 MT 309, ¶ 23, 385 Mont. 448, 384 P.3d 1058
    • Purpose: Sets the dual standard of review—findings for clear error and conclusions of law for correctness.
    • Influence: Frames the Court’s method, distinguishing fact-finding from legal determinations (e.g., whether § 41-3-609(1)(f) was met).
  • In re R.L., 2019 MT 267, ¶¶ 18, 20, 22, 397 Mont. 507, 452 P.3d 890
    • Purpose:
      • Clarifies that “reasonable efforts” is not a discrete termination element but can be a predicate to finding unfitness unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
      • Emphasizes that reasonable efforts are fact-dependent and need not be “herculean.”
    • Influence: Central to rejecting Mother’s claim that the Department’s efforts were unreasonable, especially given the comprehensive supports provided despite the interstate complications.
  • In re A.M.G., 2022 MT 175, ¶ 28, 410 Mont. 25, 517 P.3d 149
    • Purpose: Reinforces that parents must actively engage with the Department to complete treatment plans.
    • Influence: Underscores the Court’s finding that Mother’s own non-engagement—rather than agency failure—was the primary obstacle to reunification.

Legal Reasoning: Application of § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA

The Court methodically applied the three elements required for termination under § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA, each by clear and convincing evidence:

  • Adjudication as YINC: The children were adjudicated YINC on June 4, 2021, following Mother’s stipulation and the District Court’s findings.
  • Appropriate Treatment Plan and Noncompliance/Failure: Mother’s court-approved plan (June 8, 2021) required visitation, mental health services, parenting classes, proof of legal income and stable housing, and ongoing contact. The District Court found Mother “did not comply” and that attempted parts were “largely unsuccessful,” citing inconsistent mental health engagement and sporadic visitation (only five visits in the year after K.B.’s return to Montana).
  • Unfitness Unlikely to Change Within a Reasonable Time (§ 41-3-609(2), MCA): The District Court detailed Mother’s persistent disengagement, inability to develop or maintain a bond—especially with B.B.-R.—failure to support K.B.’s therapeutic needs, and lack of insight into her role in repeated removals. After over three years, continued extensions would not plausibly achieve permanency.

The Court also emphasized that while “reasonable efforts” is not itself a statutory element of termination, it is a pertinent predicate to the third prong—whether parental conditions are likely to change. The Court found reasonable efforts on the totality of the record.

Reasonable Efforts in an Interstate Context

Mother argued the Department failed in reasonable efforts after she moved to North Dakota, pointing specifically to the lack of an ICPC home study during the trial home visit. The Court’s reasoning—guided by In re R.L.—was nuanced:

  • ICPC Omission: The Department’s failure to request an ICPC home study did not, by itself, render the Department’s efforts unreasonable. Reasonableness is assessed holistically, not via a single procedural lapse.
  • Compensatory Actions: The Department offered to fund services when North Dakota providers could not bill that state’s Medicaid; provided substantial travel gas vouchers and lodging; coordinated transportation (even arranging for family to retrieve Mother and loan a vehicle); and repeatedly urged Mother to visit—CPS staff “literally begged.”
  • Child-Centered Response: The Department ended the trial home visit for each child only after significant deterioration in behavior; it then secured appropriate placements and maintained access for Mother to participate and visit.

In short, the Court concluded the Department made sustained, concrete, and reasonable attempts to facilitate reunification despite interstate hurdles. The primary barrier remained Mother’s non-engagement.

Evaluation of the Evidence Supporting Unlikelihood of Change

The District Court’s findings—affirmed on appeal—highlighted specific, persisting concerns:

  • Inconsistent mental health therapy and failure to follow through on plan tasks over three years.
  • Minimal visitation despite extensive Department assistance; inability to build or maintain a parent-child connection, particularly with B.B.-R.
  • Disengagement when overwhelmed; lack of insight into her role in two separate removals from her care during the trial home visit.
  • Inability to support and coordinate K.B.’s therapeutic needs and appointments; inability to provide necessary emotional support.

The testimony from professionals (Dr. Brenda Roche; therapist Joanne Hynes), CPS Laura Moser’s account of the Department’s efforts, and corroboration from kinship caregivers painted a consistent picture of parental non-engagement despite extensive opportunities and support. The district court’s synthesis of this record was neither arbitrary nor beyond the bounds of reason.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although this is a noncitable memorandum opinion, it signals several pragmatic contours of Montana’s child-protection jurisprudence:

  • Reasonable Efforts Are Holistic and Contextual: Agencies need not achieve perfection. A single shortcoming—such as an omitted ICPC home study—does not invalidate otherwise robust efforts, especially where agencies take significant steps to fund services and facilitate engagement across state lines.
  • Parental Engagement Is Essential: Courts continue to stress that treatment plans are collaborative instruments. A parent’s sustained apathy, sporadic visitation, and failure to follow through can powerfully evidence unlikelihood to change.
  • Permanency After Prolonged Timelines: Extending TLC for years without credible progress undercuts children’s need for stability. Courts are disinclined to prolong cases absent concrete, consistent improvement by the parent.
  • Interstate Complexities Do Not Excuse Non-Engagement: Moving out of state complicates services, but departments can—and often do—bridge those gaps with funding and logistics. Parents must reciprocate with consistent participation and visitation.

Practice considerations:

  • For Agencies: Document all supports offered—funding, travel subsidies, housing, transportation, outreach. Where possible, pursue ICPC processes promptly, but also demonstrate alternative measures taken when administrative barriers arise.
  • For Parents and Counsel: Proactively request interstate coordination (including ICPC) and alternative funding arrangements where needed; maintain consistent visitation and therapy participation; and create a documentary record of compliance.
  • For Courts: The decision underscores measured deference to trial courts that assemble robust factual records and apply § 41-3-609(1)(f) with sustained attention to the child’s need for permanence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Youth in Need of Care (YINC): A judicial status for a child who has been adjudicated as needing state intervention due to abuse, neglect, or other statutory grounds.
  • EPS/TIA/TLC:
    • EPS (Emergency Protective Services): Immediate, short-term protective custody.
    • TIA (Temporary Investigative Authority): Court authority allowing the Department to investigate and take interim measures.
    • TLC (Temporary Legal Custody): Court-ordered custody with the Department while a case plan is implemented.
  • Treatment Plan: A court-approved plan specifying services and tasks for the parent to remedy the conditions that led to state involvement, including therapy, visitation, and stability benchmarks.
  • Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC): A standardized process among states for the placement of children across state lines, often including home studies to assess safety and suitability.
  • Clear and Convincing Evidence: A heightened evidentiary standard requiring that the truth of the allegations be highly probable, used for termination decisions.
  • Abuse of Discretion: An appellate standard that reverses only when a trial court acts arbitrarily or unreasonably; it respects the trial court’s superior vantage on witness credibility and case dynamics.
  • “Reasonable Efforts” (Reunification): The Department’s obligation to take meaningful, not extraordinary, steps to assist a parent in remedying conditions; fact-specific and assessed under the totality of circumstances.
  • Unlikelihood to Change Within a Reasonable Time (§ 41-3-609(2), MCA): The court’s forward-looking determination—considering factors like mental health, substance use, history of violence, or confinement—about whether the parent can realistically provide adequate care soon enough to meet the child’s needs.

Conclusion

In a noncitable memorandum opinion, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the termination of A.C.’s parental rights to K.B. and B.B.-R., applying settled standards to a record showing prolonged noncompliance with a treatment plan and minimal engagement despite extensive Department support. The Court reiterated that “reasonable efforts” are fact-dependent and need not be “herculean”; the Department’s omission of an ICPC home study during an interstate trial home visit did not, standing alone, negate otherwise comprehensive assistance. After more than three years, the District Court reasonably concluded that Mother’s unfitness was unlikely to change within a reasonable time and that further delay would undermine the children’s need for stability and permanence.

Key takeaway: In Montana child-protection cases, sustained parental engagement is indispensable. Agencies must make reasonable, documented efforts, but parents must meet those efforts with consistent action. Where they do not—and where the record shows persistent noncompliance and continued risk—termination under § 41-3-609(1)(f) will be upheld.

Related procedural notes: The Court previously affirmed termination of the rights of J.G. (K.B.’s birth father) in In re K.B., No. DA 24-0640, 2025 MT 164N. B.B.-R.’s putative father was served by publication and did not appeal.

Designation: Memorandum Opinion under Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Mont. Sup. Ct. Internal Operating Rules—noncitable and not precedent.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Montana

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