Reaffirming “Targeting Texas”: Stream-of-Commerce-Plus and Specific Jurisdiction in BRP-Rotax GmbH & Co. KG v. Shaik

I. Introduction

On June 20, 2025, the Supreme Court of Texas in BRP-Rotax GmbH & Co. KG v. Shaik (No. 23‑0756) held that Texas courts lack specific personal jurisdiction over BRP‑Rotax GmbH & Co. KG (“Rotax”), an Austrian manufacturer of aircraft engines, in a products‑liability action arising from a plane crash in Addison, Texas.

Although the Court repeatedly stresses that it is “breaking no new jurisprudential ground,” the opinion is an important and clarifying application of the Texas “stream-of-commerce-plus” doctrine. It sharply reaffirms that:

Mere foreseeability that products will end up in Texas is insufficient for specific jurisdiction.
Even substantial use of a product within Texas, standing alone, does not establish jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer.
The plaintiff must show Texas-specific targeting—conduct by the defendant directed at Texas itself, not just at a broader region such as the United States or the Western Hemisphere.
The actions of independent distributors, service centers, and end-users are not automatically attributable to the manufacturer.

This decision continues and strengthens the line of Texas cases—such as Luciano, LG Chem, Spir Star, and TV Azteca—that adhere to Justice O’Connor’s “stream‑of‑commerce‑plus” approach from Asahi, demanding concrete, forum-specific conduct to support personal jurisdiction.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Accident and Parties

Respondents Sheema Shaik and Touseef Siddiqui (collectively, “the Shaiks”) are Texas residents. Sheema suffered severe, permanent injuries when a Piper Light Sport Aircraft lost engine power and crashed on a runway at an airport in Addison, Texas; Touseef witnessed the crash.

The aircraft was owned and operated in Texas; the crash and injuries occurred in Texas. The engine that allegedly failed was designed and manufactured by Rotax, an Austrian company headquartered in Gunskirchen, Austria. Rotax:

Designs and manufactures its engines exclusively in Austria.
Has no offices, employees, or property in Texas.
Does not contract directly with Texas customers.
Does not directly advertise or market to Texas residents.

B. The Distribution Chain

Rotax sells its engines through independent distributors located outside the United States. The path of the particular engine at issue was:

Rotax sold the engine to Kodiak Research Ltd., a Bahamian company and independent distributor.
Kodiak shipped the engine from Austria to the Bahamas.
Kodiak sold the engine to Lockwood Aviation Supply, Inc., a sub-distributor in Florida.
Lockwood sold the engine to U.S. Sports Aircraft, a Texas company, which installed it in the aircraft that later crashed in Texas.

Rotax had no direct contractual relationship with U.S. Sports Aircraft or the Shaiks and no physical presence or operations in Texas.

C. The Lawsuit and Jurisdictional Challenge

The Shaiks sued multiple defendants in Dallas County, asserting strict liability, negligence, and gross negligence claims. The live pleading (sixth amended petition) retained claims against:

The aircraft designer/manufacturer,
The seller of the aircraft, and
Rotax, as the engine manufacturer.

Rotax filed a special appearance under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120a, arguing that Texas courts lacked personal jurisdiction. Its general manager and vice president of sales submitted a declaration detailing Rotax’s lack of Texas presence and its use of non‑U.S. distributors.

The trial court denied Rotax’s special appearance. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Rotax had purposefully availed itself of the Texas market under the “stream-of-commerce-plus” test and that exercising specific jurisdiction would not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”

The court of appeals relied on:

The distribution agreement between Rotax and Kodiak,
A Texas repair center known as “Texas Rotax,”
Rotax’s website, and
The number of Rotax engines registered in Texas.

Rotax petitioned for review. The Supreme Court of Texas granted the petition and reversed.

III. Summary of the Opinion

Justice Evan Young, writing for the Court, held that Texas courts lack specific personal jurisdiction over Rotax because the Shaiks failed to show that Rotax purposefully availed itself of the Texas market. Key points:

The case is governed by the “stream-of-commerce-plus” doctrine.
Under that doctrine, simply placing a product into the stream of commerce is not enough; there must be “additional conduct” showing an intent or purpose to serve the Texas market.
The record “conclusively establishes the opposite” of purposeful availment—Rotax did not target Texas.
The Court rejects each alleged contact (distribution agreement, Texas Rotax repair center, website, and engine registrations) as insufficient, either individually or cumulatively, to demonstrate Texas-targeted conduct by Rotax.
Because purposeful availment is absent, the Court does not proceed to relatedness or “fair play and substantial justice” balancing.
The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and judgment is rendered dismissing the claims against Rotax for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The Court emphasizes continuity with prior precedent, stating that this result is a straightforward application of established law, not a doctrinal innovation.

IV. Legal Framework

A. Personal Jurisdiction, Due Process, and the Texas Long-Arm Statute

Texas courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants only within the bounds of:

The Texas long-arm statute, and
Federal constitutional due process (Fourteenth Amendment).

Texas interprets its long-arm statute to be as broad as federal due process allows. Thus, the controlling question is: Does exercising jurisdiction comport with due process?

Under International Shoe Co. v. Washington, due process requires:

“Certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”

There are two main types of personal jurisdiction:

General jurisdiction: The defendant is “essentially at home” in the forum (e.g., place of incorporation or principal place of business). Then it can be sued there for any claim.
Specific jurisdiction: The defendant can be sued only on claims that “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s contacts with the forum.

Only specific jurisdiction is at issue in Rotax.

B. Elements of Specific Jurisdiction in Texas

Texas employs a familiar two‑prong test (tracking U.S. Supreme Court precedent, including Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court):

Purposeful availment: The defendant must have undertaken some act by which it purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Texas, thereby invoking Texas law’s benefits and protections.
Relatedness: The plaintiff’s claims must “arise out of or relate to” those Texas-focused contacts.

The minimum contacts analysis looks to the defendant’s own intentional conduct, not accidental, isolated, or purely third-party activity. The defendant must have been able to reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Texas over the type of claim at issue.

C. The Stream-of-Commerce-Plus Doctrine in Texas

In products-liability cases, plaintiffs often argue that a manufacturer is subject to jurisdiction wherever its products travel through the “stream of commerce.” Texas, however, has long followed Justice O’Connor’s plurality approach in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, often labelled “stream-of-commerce-plus.”

Under this doctrine:

Mere placement of a product into the stream of commerce, even with knowledge that it might ultimately reach Texas, is not enough.
The plaintiff must show “additional conduct” demonstrating an intent or purpose to serve the Texas market.

Examples of “additional conduct” previously recognized by Texas courts include:

Advertising in Texas telephone directories.
Operating an office in Texas for sales or service.
Maintaining a warehouse or inventory in Texas.
Retaining a Texas sales representative to find Texas customers.
Creating, controlling, or employing a distribution system that is directed into Texas.

What is not sufficient:

Mere foreseeability that a product could end up in Texas.
Mere knowledge that some products are sold in Texas.
Unilateral actions of third parties (distributors, dealers, end-users) that bring the product into Texas.

As the Court quotes from TV Azteca v. Ruiz and CSR v. Link, awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep a product into Texas “does not convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward [Texas].” There must be “targeting” of Texas.

V. The Court’s Application in BRP-Rotax

A. The Four Alleged Bases for Jurisdiction

The Shaiks relied on four categories of evidence to show that Rotax purposefully availed itself of Texas:

The distribution agreement between Rotax and Kodiak Research Ltd. (Bahamian distributor).
The existence and activities of a Texas repair center known as “Texas Rotax”, located in Bulverde, Texas.
Rotax’s website and associated downloadable engine manual.
The presence of roughly 150 Rotax engines registered in Texas between 2016–2020.

The Court holds that neither singly nor collectively do these prove purposeful availment of Texas.

B. 1. The Rotax–Kodiak Distribution Agreement

The plaintiffs portrayed Rotax as having:

“Created, employed, and controlled” a network of distributors and servicers to sell and service engines in Texas.
Obligated that network to market and advertise in Texas.

The Court closely examines the actual distribution agreement and rejects this characterization.

(a) Kodiak as an Independent Distributor

Key factual/legal points:

Kodiak is an independent Bahamian corporation with no Rotax ownership interest.
Rotax has no distributors in Texas or anywhere in the United States.
Kodiak is the relevant distributor for the “TERRITORY,” defined broadly as the United States, Central America, and much of South America—the bulk of the Western Hemisphere.
Kodiak maintains distribution centers in Florida, Wisconsin, and California; not in Texas.
The engine at issue was sold from Kodiak to Lockwood (a Florida sub‑distributor), which then sold to the Texas entity.

The Court criticizes the Shaiks’ tendency to conflate Rotax and Kodiak—asserting that “Rotax” advertised, serviced, and repaired engines in Texas—when the record shows that Kodiak and its sub-distributors did so. Rotax and Kodiak are “distinct corporate entities,” and the law presumes their separateness.

To treat Kodiak’s actions as Rotax’s for jurisdictional purposes, plaintiffs would need to show:

An agency relationship, or
An alter-ego relationship (such that corporate separateness should be disregarded).

The plaintiffs made no such showing. Citing BMC Software v. Marchand, the Court reiterates that even for parent–subsidiary corporations, jurisdictional “fusion” requires proof of control over internal operations. That standard is far from satisfied between Rotax and an independent distributor.

(b) The “Territory” and Targeting Requirement

The agreement requires Kodiak to advertise, display, and demonstrate Rotax products “in TERRITORY” and to encourage its dealers to do the same “at suitable locations and with adequate facilities.” The Court emphasizes:

This clause imposes no Texas-specific obligations.
It requires performance somewhere within an enormous multi-country territory, not in any particular state.
Nothing in the agreement singles out Texas or directs that any sales or service occur there.

Thus, the Court rejects any suggestion that this is a “formalistic structuring” designed to hide a Texas-focused marketing plan. Unlike in Siskind and Spir Star, there is no evidence that Rotax actually directed marketing into Texas while trying to keep formal contractual performance outside Texas.

The Court’s crucial doctrinal point:

If this were enough to constitute purposeful availment, then the stream-of-commerce-plus test would come to an end. … Targeting Texas remains the touchstone. We will not overlook such targeting when it is wrapped up in various business arrangements, but neither will we find targeting that does not exist merely because a product ultimately comes to Texas.

(c) Trademark Use Control

The agreement requires Kodiak to obtain Rotax’s specific written permission before using the Rotax name or trademarks. The Court treats this as:

A routine feature of trademark licensing—trademark owners must supervise licensees’ use of the mark.
“Jurisdictionally unremarkable”; it does not equate to control over where within the territory Kodiak advertises or sells.

The Court refuses to put manufacturers to a “Hobson’s choice” of either abandoning legitimate trademark control or accepting personal jurisdiction everywhere the distributor operates.

C. 2. The Bulverde Service Center (“Texas Rotax”)

The plaintiffs pointed to “Texas Rotax,” a repair center in Bulverde, as evidence that Rotax:

Authorized a Texas service center,
Serviced, repaired, and warranted Rotax engines in Texas.

The Court again turns to the distribution agreement. It grants Kodiak:

The “right to establish, operate, and maintain an adequate dealer organization,” including authorized repair and service centers, anywhere in its territory.
The responsibility to maintain these centers, ensure adequate spare parts inventories, and require them to honor Rotax’s warranty.

Crucial points:

Nothing in the contract requires any service center to be located in Texas.
Rotax did not direct that a repair center be established in Bulverde or anywhere else in Texas.
Kodiak, not Rotax, trained the Bulverde center, reimbursed it for warranty work, and then sought reimbursement from Rotax.

The Court concludes there is no evidence that Rotax:

Chose Texas as a target location for a service center, or
Exercised control over where within the territory Kodiak’s service network would be placed.

Thus, whatever connections “Texas Rotax” has with Texas are the unilateral, discretionary acts of Kodiak (a third party), not purposeful contacts of Rotax.

D. 3. Rotax’s Website and English-Language Materials

The plaintiffs argued that Rotax’s website:

Directly “interacted” with Texans, and
Provided English-language materials, including an engine manual used for inspection and installation in Texas.

The Court dismisses this argument on multiple grounds:

The website is essentially passive: users cannot purchase engines directly from it. This aligns with the Fifth Circuit’s classification in McFadin v. Gerber of such sites as “passive” and not jurisdictionally significant.
The presence of an “email us” function or downloadable manual does not show that Rotax is targeting Texas, as opposed to any other jurisdiction.
English is widely used in international aviation and commerce; its use does not imply Texas-directed marketing. The Court cites international civil aviation standards requiring English proficiency for pilots and air traffic personnel.

Most importantly, even if the engine manual was downloaded and used in Texas, those acts are unilateral acts of third parties, which cannot establish jurisdiction over Rotax. The Court relies on Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall for the principle that unilateral activities of others are not appropriate considerations in assessing a defendant’s minimum contacts.

E. 4. Registrations of Rotax Engines in Texas

The plaintiffs noted that roughly 150 Rotax engines were registered in Texas between 2016 and 2020 and argued this showed that Rotax “sent hundreds” of engines into Texas and profited from the Texas market.

The Court rejects this for two reasons:

Registration is a voluntary act of engine owners, not Rotax.
There is no evidence these engines were sold into Texas by Rotax, Kodiak, or any sub‑distributor to Texas buyers, much less pursuant to Texas‑focused marketing strategies.

In other words, the presence or registration of products in Texas is not itself a Rotax “contact” with Texas unless tied to Rotax’s own forum-directed conduct.

F. The Court’s Overall Conclusion on Purposeful Availment

Synthesizing the analysis, the Court underscores:

Rotax is not Kodiak; they are separate companies.
Kodiak’s discretion to advertise and establish service centers within a massive territory is not tantamount to Rotax targeting Texas.
The Rotax website is passive and not Texas-specific.
Engine registrations in Texas reflect only the unilateral activities of owners and possibly intermediate distributors.

The Court reiterates its colorful line from Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten:

“Stream-of-commerce jurisdiction requires a stream, not a dribble.”

All the evidence shows that the engine reached Texas through unilateral decisions of third parties, not through a distribution system “engineered, controlled, or manipulated” by Rotax that was specifically directed at Texas.

Because purposeful availment is missing, the Court ends the jurisdictional inquiry there and does not reach the relatedness prong or the fairness analysis.

VI. Role of Precedents and How They Shaped the Decision

A. U.S. Supreme Court Precedents

International Shoe Co. v. Washington: Provides the overarching “minimum contacts” and “fair play and substantial justice” framework.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson: Establishes that a defendant’s contacts must make it reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the forum; mere foreseeability is not enough.
Hanson v. Denckla: Introduces the idea that there must be “some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.”
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California (plurality): The immediate source of “stream-of-commerce-plus”—placing a product into commerce is insufficient absent additional conduct showing an intent to serve the forum market.
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., Walden v. Fiore, and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court: Reinforce that jurisdictional analysis focuses on the defendant’s own forum‑related conduct.
Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court: Distinguished but relied on; Ford conceded that it did substantial, continuous business in the forum states (dealers, advertising, service), so purposeful availment was clear.
Helicopteros Nacionales v. Hall: Emphasizes that unilateral activities of a third party cannot be the basis of the defendant’s minimum contacts.

The Texas Supreme Court uses these decisions primarily to reinforce the centrality of purposeful, defendant-driven, forum-targeted conduct.

B. Texas Supreme Court Precedents

The Court situates Rotax in a line of Texas decisions:

Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg: Clarifies the two-prong specific jurisdiction test in Texas and grounds it in due process.
CSR Ltd. v. Link: Adopts the Asahi “stream-of-commerce-plus” standard and rejects mere foreseeability as a jurisdictional basis.
Spir Star AG v. Kimich: Confirms that purposeful availment can be indirect (through distributors), but only if the foreign manufacturer “specifically targets Texas as a market.”
TV Azteca v. Ruiz: Synthesizes prior cases and reaffirms that additional conduct must demonstrate an intent or purpose to serve the Texas market; mere knowledge that broadcasts may be seen in Texas is not enough.
Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten: Emphasizes that it is the defendant’s Texas-directed conduct, not the plaintiff’s residence or travels, that matter; introduces the “stream, not a dribble” metaphor.
Siskind v. Villa Fundación: Holds that an out-of-state defendant that directly solicits Texas business (mailings, advertising, application materials to Texans) can be subject to jurisdiction even if the contract is formally accepted and performed elsewhere.
State v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft (2023): Upholds jurisdiction over foreign car manufacturers in a Texas Attorney General enforcement action, emphasizing their control over post‑sale recall and repair activities affecting cars already in Texas.
Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC: A pivotal stream-of-commerce-plus case where the manufacturer maintained a Texas warehouse, Texas inventory, and a Texas sales representative; the Court found purposeful availment and held that defendants may also purposefully avoid certain forums.
LG Chem America, Inc. v. Morgan: Reiterates that additional conduct showing an intent to serve Texas is required; close in subject matter (foreign-manufactured product injuring a Texas resident).
BMC Software v. Marchand: Addresses jurisdiction through corporate relationships; clarifies when a parent and subsidiary may be “fused” for jurisdictional purposes—important here by analogy to distributor relationships.

Rotax relies heavily on this body of law to emphasize that:

Texas adheres firmly to the “plus” version of the stream-of-commerce test.
Targeting Texas is critical; knowledge that Texas lies somewhere within a very large territory does not suffice.
Corporate separateness and the unilateral acts of distributors and consumers cannot be casually overridden for jurisdictional convenience.

C. Distinguishing Volkswagen, Luciano, and Ford

The court of appeals had relied particularly on:

State v. Volkswagen AG,
Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com, and
Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District.

The Supreme Court explains why those cases do not support jurisdiction here:

1. Volkswagen AG

Foreign car manufacturers there exercised substantial control over recall and repair activities affecting vehicles already in Texas.
The case involved a sovereign enforcement action by the Texas Attorney General; not a private products-liability suit.
Although the Court said a defendant need not “single Texas out” if it directs activities to every state, that was premised on the manufacturers’ admission of nationwide targeting that clearly included Texas.

By contrast, in Rotax:

There is no evidence Rotax directed activities into every U.S. state or Texas specifically.
Rotax’s role ended at sale to a Bahamian distributor, with no subsequent control over U.S. distribution.

2. Luciano

The manufacturer in Luciano had a Texas warehouse, kept merchandise inventory there, and retained a Texas sales representative to market to Texas customers—on its own initiative and budget (“on its own dime”).
The Court highlighted that this was direct targeting of Texas, even though some activities went through intermediaries.

In Rotax:

Rotax had no Texas warehouse, no Texas inventory, no Texas employees or sales reps, and no direct Texas sales.
All Texas contacts stemmed from independent decisions of Kodiak, its sub‑distributors, and end-users.

3. Ford

Ford conceded that it conducted “substantial business” in the forum states and “actively sought to serve the market for automobiles and related products” there.
Ford had dealerships, repair centers, advertising, and marketing in the forum states.

In Rotax:

There is no comparable showing—no admission and no evidence—of substantial, regular business in Texas by Rotax.
Even if Texas Rotax were attributed to Rotax (which the Court rejects), this lone repair facility would be a far cry from Ford’s pervasive forum presence.

VII. Clarification of the Stream-of-Commerce-Plus Standard

Although the Court says it “break[s] no new ground,” Rotax significantly clarifies how the stream-of-commerce-plus test operates in practice in Texas:

Texas-specific targeting is indispensable. Targeting the United States, North America, or the Western Hemisphere, without more, does not equal targeting Texas.
Independent distributors break the chain for jurisdictional purposes unless the manufacturer:
- directs them to focus on Texas, or
- uses them as an agent/alter ego to execute a Texas-focused strategy.
Service centers established by distributors are not automatically contacts of the manufacturer. Absent proof of manufacturer direction or control as to location and targeting, they reflect distributor activity.
Passive or generally accessible websites—even in English—are usually insufficient. There must be clear forum targeting or transactional interactivity involving the forum.
End-user registrations and product presence do not, by themselves, create jurisdiction. They are unilateral actions of third parties unless tied to manufacturer’s forum-directed behavior.
“Purposeful avoidance” remains legitimate. A manufacturer may structure its distribution so as not to profit from Texas law or be subject to Texas jurisdiction, without having to blacklist Texas (as it might for sanctioned countries).

The Court also resists novel arguments that:

Because Rotax instructed its distributors not to ship to Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, it must therefore have “chosen” all other countries and states—including Texas. The Court calls this theory meritless and refuses to treat the absence of a prohibition as equivalent to purposeful targeting.

VIII. Impact and Practical Implications

A. For Foreign and Out-of-State Manufacturers

Rotax sends a clear message:

Using independent foreign or out-of-state distributors, without directing them to target Texas, is a viable way to avoid being sued in Texas courts.
Maintaining control over trademarks and ensuring general product support at the distributor level does not, without more, amount to Texas targeted conduct.
Manufacturers should, however, recognize that if they:
- establish Texas facilities,
- retain Texas-based staff,
- direct distributors to focus on Texas customers, or
- run Texas-specific marketing campaigns,
they are likely to create sufficient minimum contacts.

The opinion somewhat “protects” foreign manufacturers from being haled into Texas courts absent robust evidence of Texas-focused activities. It permits careful structuring of distribution channels to reduce jurisdictional exposure.

B. For Plaintiffs and Texas Litigants

Injured Texas plaintiffs face a heightened evidentiary burden in suits against foreign manufacturers:

They must investigate and show specific Texas-directed marketing, distribution, or service strategies by the manufacturer itself.
Merely demonstrating that the product was used in Texas, or even commonly used here, will not suffice.
Evidence of contracts with distributors must show that the manufacturer:
- reserved Texas as a focus,
- required Texas outlets, or
- otherwise directed distribution into Texas.

In some cases, plaintiffs may need to:

Pursue the manufacturer in another forum with jurisdiction (e.g., the distributor’s jurisdiction, the manufacturer’s home country), or
Focus claims on entities that do have sufficient Texas contacts (local distributors, service centers, retailers, etc.).

C. For Texas Courts and Practitioners

Rotax reinforces a relatively strict, defendant-friendly reading of due process limits on personal jurisdiction. It aligns Texas with the more restrictive camp in the stream-of-commerce debate (Asahi’s “plus” view) and maintains a high bar for jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers.

Courts are guided to:

Carefully separate the conduct of manufacturers from that of distributors, dealers, and end-users.
Demand concrete evidence of Texas-focused activities.
Resist the temptation to expand jurisdiction based primarily on the plaintiff’s residence, the place of injury, or the mere presence of products in Texas.

D. Interaction with Federal Due Process and Federal Courts

Because the Texas long-arm statute is coextensive with federal due process, the Texas Supreme Court’s interpretation effectively sets the standard for Texas state courts. Federal courts applying federal due process in diversity cases often look to state supreme court decisions for guidance, especially where state law is coextensive.

While federal courts are not strictly bound by the Texas Supreme Court’s interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, practical convergence is likely. Rotax thus has persuasive value beyond state court, especially in the Fifth Circuit, which has historically treated similar issues (e.g., in McFadin) cautiously with respect to personal jurisdiction.

IX. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Personal Jurisdiction

Personal jurisdiction asks: Can this court make binding decisions about this defendant? It’s not about who is right or wrong in the dispute, but whether the defendant is properly before that court at all.

B. General vs. Specific Jurisdiction

General jurisdiction: The defendant can be sued there for any claim, because its ties to the forum are so strong that it is “at home” (for corporations, usually their place of incorporation or principal place of business).
Specific jurisdiction: The defendant can be sued only for claims that are connected to the defendant’s own activities in that state.

C. Purposeful Availment

Purposeful availment means the defendant has deliberately chosen to do things in or toward the forum state—such as:

Advertising directly to its residents,
Opening offices or warehouses there,
Hiring local employees or sales representatives, or
Designing a distribution network specifically to reach customers there.

The idea is fairness: if you choose to benefit from a state’s market and laws, you should also expect to answer lawsuits there related to those activities.

D. Stream of Commerce vs. Stream-of-Commerce-Plus

Stream of commerce: Products move from manufacturer to wholesalers to retailers to consumers, sometimes across many borders.
Stream-of-commerce-plus: It is not enough that a product is placed somewhere in this stream and ultimately ends up in Texas. There must be additional conduct by the manufacturer that shows it intended to serve the Texas market specifically.

Additional conduct can include:

Special advertising aimed at Texas,
Setting up Texas dealerships or service centers at the manufacturer’s direction,
Negotiating agreements that explicitly target Texas as a key sales region.

E. Unilateral Activity

“Unilateral activity” refers to actions taken by someone other than the defendant:

Distributors deciding on their own where to sell.
Consumers taking products into different states.
Repair centers choosing where to locate.

Such third-party actions cannot be attributed to the defendant for jurisdictional purposes unless an agency or alter-ego relationship exists.

F. Agency and Alter Ego (for Jurisdiction)

Agency: One company (the agent) acts on behalf of another (the principal), under the principal’s control, and can bind the principal.
Alter ego: Two corporate entities are so intertwined (common ownership, common officers, disregarded corporate distinctions) that a court may treat them as a single entity.

To treat a distributor’s actions as the manufacturer’s for jurisdiction, plaintiffs must show more than a simple supplier–customer relationship; they must show a degree of control/symbiosis sufficient for agency or alter-ego status.

G. Purposeful Avoidance

“Purposeful avoidance” means structuring your company’s activities so that you:

Do not direct marketing or sales efforts into a particular forum, and
Thus do not reap the specific benefits of doing business there.

Texas precedent (including Luciano, reaffirmed in Rotax) accepts this as legitimate: a company is not required to submit to jurisdiction everywhere it knows its products may end up, so long as it genuinely refrains from targeting the forum.

X. Conclusion

BRP-Rotax GmbH & Co. KG v. Shaik is a significant reaffirmation and clarification of Texas’s approach to personal jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers in product-liability cases.

Key takeaways:

Texas firmly adheres to a strict stream-of-commerce-plus standard.
Targeting Texas—not merely the U.S. generally or a multi-state territory—is required for specific jurisdiction.
Independent distributors, service networks, and end-user behavior cannot be casually imputed to manufacturers; corporate separateness and unilateral third-party actions matter.
Passive websites and English-language materials, by themselves, are not sufficient to show Texas-directed conduct.
Manufacturers may legitimately structure their distribution to avoid Texas jurisdiction, as long as they do not secretly or indirectly target Texas markets.

For Texas courts and practitioners, Rotax serves as a clear roadmap: when faced with foreign manufacturers and multi-step distribution chains, the jurisdictional analysis must focus tightly on the manufacturer’s own, Texas-focused conduct. In the absence of such conduct, even tragic injuries to Texas residents caused by allegedly defective foreign products do not justify the assertion of specific personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.