Reaffirming “Little Tolerance” for Shotgun Pleadings: Commentary on Spence v. Georgia Diagnostic & Classification Prison

Reaffirming “Little Tolerance” for Shotgun Pleadings: Commentary on Spence v. Georgia Diagnostic & Classification Prison

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished per curiam decision in Cornelia Spence v. Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison, No. 25‑11448 (11th Cir. Dec. 12, 2025), affirming dismissal of a prisoner death case on “shotgun pleading” grounds.

The case arises from the death of Jeremiah Ebenzee Spence, an inmate at Georgia Diagnostic & Classification Prison (“GDCP”), who was found dead in his cell on January 17, 2023, following a 72‑hour “holiday lockdown.” His estate administrator, Cornelia Spence, and a relative, Cleo Spence, sued a wide range of defendants: GDCP, the Georgia Department of Corrections, private medical contractor Wellpath LLC, associated insurers, and others.

After removal to federal court, the plaintiffs (eventually represented by counsel) twice attempted to amend their complaint. The district court concluded that both the original and amended complaints were impermissible “shotgun pleadings,” and— after allowing one opportunity to replead—dismissed the second amended complaint with prejudice. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that their pleadings were sufficiently clear for defendants to discern what claims were being asserted and on what facts.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The majority held that the second amended complaint fell squarely into the third and fourth categories of shotgun pleading as defined in Weiland v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2015), and that dismissal with prejudice after a prior warning and opportunity to cure was within the district court’s discretion. Judge Jordan dissented in part, contending that the Eighth Amendment claim against a specific nurse (Rovina Billingslea) was neither shotgun nor unintelligible and should not have been dismissed with prejudice.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural Posture

The plaintiffs initially filed in Georgia state court. Defendants removed to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. There:

  • The plaintiffs (later represented by counsel) moved to amend their complaint.
  • Defendants opposed on futility grounds, arguing the proposed pleading failed to state a claim.
  • The district court instead denied amendment on the distinct ground that both the original and proposed complaint were “shotgun pleadings.”
  • The court gave the plaintiffs “one final chance” to file a rule‑compliant complaint, with explicit instructions about defects.
  • The plaintiffs filed a second proposed amended complaint; the court again found it to be a shotgun pleading and this time dismissed with prejudice.
  • The plaintiffs appealed that dismissal.

B. Holding

The Eleventh Circuit:

  • Applied abuse‑of‑discretion review to the shotgun‑pleading dismissal.
  • Held that the second amended complaint violated Rules 8(a)(2) and 10(b) and fell into:
    • the third Weiland category (failure to separate distinct causes of action into separate counts); and
    • the fourth Weiland category (asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying who did what).
  • Confirmed that district courts must give represented litigants one sua sponte chance to replead, but may dismiss with prejudice if they repeat the same shotgun defects (Vibe Micro).
  • Noted that the district court incorrectly faulted plaintiffs for not explicitly invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but deemed that error harmless because the complaint was still shotgun.
  • Concluded that the district court did not make a “clear error of judgment” and therefore did not abuse its discretion.

C. The Dissent

Judge Jordan dissented. He focused on a narrow but significant point: he believed that the Eighth Amendment “deliberate indifference” claim in Count I against Nurse Rovina Billingslea was sufficiently clear and should not have been dismissed as a shotgun pleading, much less with prejudice. In his view:

  • Count I did not fit any of the four recognized Weiland shotgun categories as applied to Nurse Billingslea.
  • The complaint alleged a viable Eighth Amendment claim based on her failure to provide insulin and to respond to signs of pneumonia during the 72‑hour lockdown.
  • At worst, claims against the entity defendants in that count might have required pruning or clarification; wholesale dismissal with prejudice of the Eighth Amendment claim against the nurse was unjustified.

III. Analysis of the Opinion

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Shotgun Pleading Framework: Weiland and Its Progeny

The backbone of the majority’s analysis is Weiland v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2015), which cataloged four common types of shotgun pleadings:

  1. Incorporation‑by‑reference counts: each count adopts all preceding paragraphs and counts.
  2. Convoluted factual allegations: complaints “replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action.”
  3. Failure to separate claims: complaints that do not separate into different counts each cause of action or claim for relief.
  4. Multiple defendants, unclear responsibility: asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which defendant is responsible for which acts or which defendant each claim targets.

Weiland also underscores why shotgun pleadings are problematic: they frustrate Rule 8’s requirement of a “short and plain statement” and Rule 10(b)’s expectations for organized, numbered paragraphs and separable counts when clarity would be promoted.

The majority reprises—and amplifies—the Eleventh Circuit’s longstanding hostility to shotgun pleadings, drawing on:

  • Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2021) – confirms that shotgun pleadings violate Rule 8 and/or Rule 10 and reiterates that courts are “flatly forbidden” from scouring such complaints to construct viable claims for plaintiffs.
  • Estate of Bass v. Regions Bank, Inc., 947 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2020) – criticizes the burden shotgun pleadings impose on courts.
  • Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2018) – sets the procedural requirement that a court must give a represented litigant one sua sponte opportunity to cure a shotgun pleading before dismissing with prejudice.
  • Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consolidated, 516 F.3d 955 (11th Cir. 2008) – details the systemic harms of shotgun pleadings: broadened discovery, delay, strain on judicial resources, and damage to public confidence.
  • T.D.S. Inc. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 760 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir. 1985) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) – one of the earlier recognitions of the “shotgun pleading” problem.
  • Jackson v. Bank of America, N.A., 898 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2018) – likens tolerating shotgun complaints to tolerating “obstruction of justice.”
  • Vargas v. Lincare, Inc., 134 F.4th 1150 (11th Cir. 2025) (Tjoflat, J., concurring) – quoted for warning that courts should not “play detective rather than umpire.”

Collectively, these authorities reinforce the circuit’s “little tolerance” stance toward shotgun pleadings and articulate both doctrinal and institutional reasons for strict enforcement.

2. Pleading Standards: Rule 8, Rule 10, and Twombly

The majority tracks the now‑familiar pleading standard:

  • Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
  • Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007): the complaint must give the defendant “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
  • Rule 10(b): demands that claims be stated “in numbered paragraphs” and, when doing so would “promote clarity,” that each claim based on a separate transaction or occurrence be stated in a separate count.

The court uses these rules not to engage in a plausibility analysis of the underlying substantive claims, but instead to assess whether the structure and organization of the complaint allows the court and defendants to understand what is being asserted against whom.

3. Abuse of Discretion Standard: Klay and McMahan

The appellate lens is drawn from:

  • Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092 (11th Cir. 2004) – abuse of discretion occurs if a district court:
    • applies an incorrect legal standard,
    • follows improper procedures,
    • makes clearly erroneous fact findings, or
    • applies the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner.
  • McMahan v. Toto, 256 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir. 2001), amended on reh’g, 311 F.3d 1077 – emphasizes that the abuse‑of‑discretion standard acknowledges a “range of choice” for district courts; an appellate court will not reverse merely because it would have decided differently.

This standard is crucial: it frames the appellate question not as whether the complaint could have been saved, but whether it was clearly erroneous for the district court to dismiss with prejudice after one failed opportunity to cure the defects.

4. § 1983 Pleading: Johnson v. City of Shelby

In footnote 3, the panel corrects a specific legal error in the district court’s reasoning:

“The District Court also faults Counts 1 and 2 of the complaint for citing constitutional amendments broadly instead of citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 directly. The Court was wrong to do that, for ‘no heightened pleading rule requires plaintiffs seeking damages for violations of constitutional rights to invoke § 1983 expressly in order to state a claim.’ Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014).”

This is important. The Eleventh Circuit reaffirms that plaintiffs need not expressly label their constitutional damages claims as “§ 1983 claims” to survive. What matters is the substance of the allegations, not the citation to the enforcement mechanism. The panel nonetheless affirms on alternative grounds: the complaint remained a prohibited shotgun pleading.

5. Dissent’s Authorities

Judge Jordan’s dissent adds:

  • Pinson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 942 F.3d 1200 (11th Cir. 2019) – invoked to argue that the defendant (Nurse Billingslea) could not plausibly claim confusion about the Eighth Amendment claim.
  • Barmapov again – cited for what a truly “rambling, dizzying array” of incomprehensible allegations looks like, by contrast.
  • Flowers v. Bennett, 123 F. Supp. 2d 595 (N.D. Ala. 2000) – a district court decision illustrating that failure to provide needed insulin can support a deliberate indifference claim.
  • Weiland and Rule 10(b) – used to argue that Rule 10’s “separate counts” requirement is conditional (“if doing so would promote clarity”), which in his view was satisfied here without further splitting claims.

These authorities underscore the dissent’s theme: the complaint, at least as to Nurse Billingslea, met the notice function of Rule 8 and should not have been deemed a shotgun pleading.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Identifying the Complaint as a Shotgun Pleading

The majority’s core conclusion is that the second amended complaint suffers from two classic shotgun defects:

  1. Third category (Weiland): multiple distinct claims combined in single counts.
  2. Fourth category: multiple claims asserted against multiple defendants without specifying who is liable for which acts.
a. Multiple Claims in Single Counts

The court scrutinizes the structure of the three main counts:

Count 1 – “Cruel and Unusual Punishment”
The majority reads Count 1 as simultaneously alleging:

  • violations of the Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual punishment/deliberate indifference),
  • violations of the Fourteenth Amendment,
  • wrongful death,
  • gross negligence, and
  • some form of negligent hiring/retention (“failed to ensure that they employed and contracted reliable resources and employees”).

The panel emphasizes that combining these theories in a single count fails to distinguish:

  • constitutional vs. state‑law tort vs. contract‑based theories; and
  • distinct causes of action such as wrongful death, gross negligence, negligent hiring/supervision, and constitutional deliberate indifference.

Count 2 – “Contracting with Contractor who Lacked the Competence for the Job”
The court finds similar conflation. Count 2:

  • begins as a contracting/hiring claim (“duty to contract with competent employees”),
  • ends by referencing “failure to provide adequate care” and breach of the “duty of care,” and
  • sprinkles in terms like gross negligence, wrongful death, “a standard duty of reasonable care,” and both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

From the panel’s perspective, it is unclear whether Count 2 is meant to present:

  • a contract claim,
  • a negligence or gross‑negligence tort claim, or
  • a constitutional § 1983 claim.

Count 3 – “State Law Claim for Wrongful Death”
The majority notes that Count 3:

  • blends the decedent’s wrongful death claim with the estate’s claims for pain and suffering, loss of consortium, support, and companionship;
  • adds compensatory and punitive damages theories;
  • mixes in “failure to train” and “failure to supervise” type claims; and
  • again references the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

The result, according to the majority, is fundamental ambiguity: “We are, thus, left wondering if Counts 1 and 2 are meant as contract claims, tort claims, or constitutional claims and if Count 3 is meant as a tort claim or a constitutional claim. And if any are meant as tort claims, we wonder which tort claims are intended.”

This ambiguity drives the third‑category shotgun finding: distinct legal theories, based on overlapping but not identical facts, are compressed into multi‑theory, multi‑defendant counts.

b. Multiple Defendants, Unclear Responsibility

As to the fourth category, the majority highlights the complaint’s practice of referring broadly to:

  • “Georgia Department of Corrections, GDC Prison, GDC Prison staff and their contractors,” and
  • “ALL Defendants named herein.”

Compounding the problem, the opinion notes that:

  • Six defendants are named in the caption, but
  • Eleven defendants are identified in the defined term “Defendants” within the body of the complaint.

This mismatch exacerbates the fourth‑category concern: the complaint not only fails to specify which defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions; it is unclear whether all the persons described as “Defendants” are even properly before the court.

In the majority’s view, such broad, undifferentiated pleading:

“asserts multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.”

2. Institutional Concerns and Judicial Role

The opinion devotes significant space to reiterating why the Eleventh Circuit treats shotgun pleadings as more than a mere technical flaw:

  • They “inexorably broaden[] the scope of discovery.”
  • They “delay[] a just disposition of the case at the undue expense of one or both of the parties.”
  • They “lessen the time and resources the court has available” for other cases.
  • They “wreak havoc on appellate court dockets.”
  • They “undermine[] the public’s respect for the courts” and courts’ ability to function “efficiently, economically, and fairly.”

Citing Davis and Barmapov, the majority presses the normative point:

“At bottom, tolerating a shotgun complaint is akin to ‘tolerat[ing an] obstruction of justice,’ and the courts cannot do that.”

A related theme is the proper role of courts. The opinion stresses that it is “not the proper function of courts in this Circuit to parse out incomprehensible allegations,” nor may district courts “scour[] shotgun complaints to craft a potentially viable claim for a plaintiff.” Doing so would mean “playing detective rather than umpire,” which in turn risks the appearance of partiality: lawyering for one side instead of neutrally applying the rules.

That judicial‑role framing justifies a strict approach: if a plaintiff, after explicit warning, continues to submit shotgun pleadings, the court should not try to salvage claims buried within them.

3. Opportunity to Replead and Dismissal with Prejudice

Under Vibe Micro, a district court confronting a shotgun pleading filed by a represented party who has not requested leave to amend must sua sponte grant “one chance to replead” before dismissing with prejudice.

Here:

  • The plaintiffs were represented by counsel in federal court.
  • The district court identified the shotgun defects in the first proposed amended complaint and:
    • denied amendment,
    • explicitly explained the pleading deficiencies, and
    • granted “one final chance” to file a compliant complaint.
  • The second amended complaint, according to the court, “did not address the deficiencies” and remained shotgun.

The panel therefore applies Vibe Micro’s implicit corollary: when a plaintiff “squander[s] that opportunity by filing another shotgun pleading,” dismissal with prejudice is not an abuse of discretion. Even if the appellate court “would have given leave to amend” again, McMahan teaches that disagreement with the district judge’s choice is not enough to amount to reversible error.

4. Correcting—but Ultimately Sidestepping—the § 1983 Error

The panel candidly acknowledges the district court’s mistake in criticizing plaintiffs for not expressly invoking § 1983. Citing Johnson v. City of Shelby, it clarifies that no such heightened pleading rule exists.

However, the court treats this error as non‑dispositive. Because independent, sufficient reasons supported the shotgun‑pleading dismissal, the misstatement about § 1983 does not trigger reversal under the abuse‑of‑discretion standard.

C. The Dissent’s Counter‑Reasoning

1. Focus on the Eighth Amendment Claim Against Nurse Billingslea

Judge Jordan narrows his focus to a specific slice of the complaint: the Eighth Amendment claim in Count I against Nurse Rovina Billingslea. He agrees that the complaint is “not a model of draftsmanship” but insists it is not a shotgun pleading as to this claim.

He highlights the following allegations:

  • Mr. Spence suffered from pneumonia, Type I diabetes requiring insulin, schizo‑affective disorder, and undernutrition.
  • GDCP nursing staff, including Nurse Billingslea, knew of these chronic conditions.
  • During the 72‑hour holiday lockdown (Jan. 15–17, 2023), nurses (including Billingslea and Ellis) interpreted the lockdown as barring contact with inmates, and thus failed to administer essential medications.
  • Mr. Spence died on January 17, 2023, from “acute pneumonia” and “untreated diabetes,” with cardiac arrest as the immediate mechanism.
  • Count I alleges that:
    • Nurse Billingslea knew that failing to provide medical care and medications posed a substantial risk of serious harm;
    • She failed to give his (inferred) insulin injection on January 15;
    • She ignored signs of acute pneumonia and let him “languish without treatment” for 72 hours; and
    • These acts and omissions deprived Mr. Spence of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by amounting to cruel and unusual punishment.

In the dissent’s view, these allegations, taken together, plainly state a deliberate indifference claim under the Eighth Amendment. The claim is specific to Nurse Billingslea and does not require judicial guesswork to identify the alleged wrong or the defendant.

2. Disputing the Shotgun Characterization Under Weiland

Judge Jordan systematically addresses each Weiland shotgun category:

  • First category (incorporation of all prior counts): Count I does not incorporate allegations from prior counts; it stands on its own.
  • Second category (conclusory, disconnected facts): Count I’s factual allegations are not “rambling” or “nearly incomprehensible” but focused on the 72‑hour lockdown, the nurse’s knowledge, and her failure to provide care.
  • Third category (failure to separate claims into different counts): While Count I references both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and uses negligence‑flavored terminology, Rule 10(b) only requires separate counts “if doing so would promote clarity,” and “multiplicity does not always equate with clarity.” In his view, splitting the claim further would not meaningfully increase clarity.
  • Fourth category (multiple defendants without allocation of responsibility): Count I sets out Nurse Billingslea’s acts separately from those alleged against the entity defendants; her individual liability is distinct and clear.

On this reading, Count I against Nurse Billingslea simply does not match the paradigmatic shotgun models. At most, the count may be imperfectly drafted or partially duplicative as to entities, but it is not so opaque as to justify dismissal on shotgun grounds.

3. Viability and Harshness of Dismissal with Prejudice

The dissent underscores that:

  • The alleged failure to provide insulin and respond to signs of pneumonia is a well‑recognized basis for deliberate indifference in prisoner‑medical‑care cases.
  • The Eighth Amendment claim against Nurse Billingslea is therefore substantively viable, not frivolous or speculative.
  • Given that viability, dismissal with prejudice—without an opportunity to address any remaining drafting concerns as to this specific claim—is too harsh.

Judge Jordan proposes a more tailored approach:

  • If the district court believed claims against the entity defendants in Count I were insufficiently pled or shotgun, it could dismiss those claims.
  • But it should not use the shotgun label to extinguish a clear, fact‑specific Eighth Amendment claim against a single, identified nurse.
  • At minimum, plaintiffs should have had leave to amend Count I to cure any residual defects as to this defendant.

He concludes that, at least on this discrete point, the district court abused its discretion. Hence, his respectful dissent.

D. Likely Impact on Future Litigation

1. Reinforcement of Strict Shotgun‑Pleading Enforcement

This decision reinforces several important procedural principles in the Eleventh Circuit:

  • Shotgun doctrine remains robust: The court continues to treat shotgun pleading as a serious defect warranting dismissal, not a minor technicality to be overlooked.
  • One opportunity is often enough: After a represented plaintiff receives one explicit warning and opportunity to replead, a second shotgun complaint will likely be met with dismissal with prejudice, and such dismissal will typically be affirmed on appeal.
  • Appellate deference is substantial: Even where reasonable judges could disagree (as the majority and dissent do here), the abuse‑of‑discretion standard makes it difficult to overturn a district court’s choice to dismiss with prejudice.

2. Practical Lessons for Drafting Complaints

For practitioners, especially in complex civil rights and wrongful death cases involving multiple defendants, the case sends clear signals:

  • Separate distinct causes of action: Do not mix constitutional, tort, and contract theories in a single count. Each cause of action (e.g., Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference, state‑law wrongful death, negligent hiring, breach of contract) should be its own count when doing so enhances clarity.
  • Identify which defendant did what: Avoid generic references such as “all defendants” or “defendants and their contractors.” For each claim, specify the particular defendant(s) alleged to have engaged in particular conduct.
  • Align caption and definitions: Ensure that the defendants named in the caption match those described in the body (e.g., in a defined term “Defendants”), or clearly explain any differences (such as dropping or adding parties with leave).
  • Don’t assume the court will “rescue” viable claims: Once a complaint is branded “shotgun,” courts in the Eleventh Circuit view themselves as prohibited from sifting through to save isolated viable claims; the onus remains on counsel to plead clearly.

3. Significance for Prisoner and Medical‑Contractor Litigation

Substantively, this case arises in a high‑stakes context: a custodial death allegedly caused by denied medical care during a lockdown, involving both state prison personnel and a private medical contractor.

The majority’s approach, juxtaposed with the dissent’s concern, highlights a tension:

  • Majority’s message: Procedural regularity and clarity in pleading are essential, even in grave civil rights cases. Failure to adhere to pleading rules after a clear warning can result in full dismissal, regardless of the underlying seriousness of the allegations.
  • Dissent’s warning: Overly rigid use of the “shotgun” label risks extinguishing colorable constitutional claims—in this case, an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against a specific nurse—on structural rather than substantive grounds.

Practitioners representing inmates or their estates should treat this opinion as a cautionary example: emotionally compelling facts and potentially strong substantive claims will not compensate for noncompliant, undifferentiated pleading.

4. Clarification on § 1983 Citation

Although not outcome‑determinative here, the panel’s invocation of Johnson v. City of Shelby has ongoing importance:

  • Plaintiffs are not required to label constitutional damages claims as “§ 1983” claims in their pleadings.
  • What matters is that the factual allegations plausibly show a violation of federal rights by a state actor (or an entity acting under color of state law).
  • Defense motions to dismiss based solely on the absence of “§ 1983” language should fail if the substance of the pleading adequately alleges a constitutional violation.

Future litigants can cite this opinion to counter any suggestion that explicit reference to § 1983 is a pleading prerequisite in the Eleventh Circuit.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. What Is a “Shotgun Pleading”?

A “shotgun pleading” is a complaint drafted in such a confusing, overlapping, or undifferentiated manner that:

  • Defendants cannot tell what specific claims are being made against them, or
  • The court cannot readily determine which facts support which legal theories.

The four common types are:

  1. Every count incorporates all previous paragraphs and counts, making it impossible to see which facts apply to which claim.
  2. Long, rambling factual narratives filled with conclusory or irrelevant material not clearly tied to any claim.
  3. Multiple, different legal theories (e.g., negligence, constitutional violations, contract claims) lumped together in one count.
  4. Multiple defendants sued collectively without specifying what each one did or which claim applies to which defendant.

The Eleventh Circuit views such pleadings as a serious impediment to fair and efficient litigation.

B. Rules 8 and 10 in Plain Terms

Rule 8(a)(2) is about clarity and brevity. It does not require detailed evidence, but it does demand:

  • a short, straightforward statement,
  • that shows the plaintiff is entitled to relief, and
  • gives the defendant fair notice of what is being claimed and why.

Rule 10(b) deals with organization:

  • Use numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.
  • When it would make things clearer, put each separate claim (based on a distinct event or legal theory) into its own count.

C. Dismissal “With Prejudice” vs. “Without Prejudice”

A case dismissed without prejudice can usually be refiled or re‑pleaded; the plaintiff gets another chance, often by filing an amended complaint that fixes the identified problems.

A case dismissed with prejudice is over. The claims are terminated and generally cannot be refiled in the same court. It is a final disposition on procedural grounds (here, defective pleading) even though the court does not reach the merits (e.g., whether the Eighth Amendment was in fact violated).

D. Abuse of Discretion

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit does not re‑decide in the first instance whether it would have dismissed the case. Instead, it asks:

  • Did the district court have a reasonable range of options?
  • Did it misapply the law, use wrong procedures, or rely on clearly wrong facts?
  • Was its decision a “clear error of judgment”?

If the answer is no, the appellate court will affirm even if some judges (as here, the dissent) would have made a different choice.

E. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference

Although the panel did not reach the merits, the dissent briefly describes the Eighth Amendment theory. In prisoner medical care cases:

  • The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, which includes deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.
  • A serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician or is so obvious that even a lay person would recognize the need for medical attention.
  • Deliberate indifference requires more than negligence; it means:
    • the defendant knew of a substantial risk of serious harm, and
    • disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.

The dissent’s point is not that the claim is proven, but that the allegations, if true, describe a classic deliberate indifference scenario (failure to provide insulin, ignoring pneumonia), and that such a claim should not have been lost solely due to pleading structure.

F. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 is the federal statute that allows individuals to sue state actors for violations of federal rights (including constitutional rights). The Supreme Court in Johnson v. City of Shelby made clear:

  • Plaintiffs do not need to cite § 1983 by name in their complaint.
  • It is enough to allege facts showing a violation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.

The Spence opinion reiterates that point: the district court erred in insisting on an explicit § 1983 citation, although that error did not affect the outcome.

V. Conclusion

Spence v. Georgia Diagnostic & Classification Prison is a forceful reminder that, in the Eleventh Circuit, procedural rigor in pleading is not optional. The majority opinion:

  • Labels the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint a classic shotgun pleading under the third and fourth Weiland categories, due to its mixing of multiple substantive theories in single counts and its failure to particularize allegations against specific defendants.
  • Reaffirms that district courts must give represented litigants one opportunity to cure shotgun defects, but may dismiss with prejudice if the plaintiff fails to correct those defects.
  • Emphasizes the institutional harms of shotgun pleadings and the impropriety of courts “playing detective” to salvage claims.
  • Corrects the district court’s misconception that § 1983 must be expressly cited, relying on Johnson v. City of Shelby, but finds that error harmless in light of the overall pleading deficiencies.

Judge Jordan’s dissent tempers this strict approach by highlighting a concrete consequence: the effective dismissal, with prejudice, of what he views as a clearly pled and substantively viable Eighth Amendment claim against a specific nurse. His opinion illustrates an ongoing tension in Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence between:

  • the need to deter and sanction shotgun pleading that burdens courts and parties, and
  • the imperative to preserve access to adjudication on the merits for serious constitutional claims, especially in cases involving custodial deaths.

For practitioners, the takeaway is clear: in complex, multi‑defendant civil rights and wrongful death litigation, careful structuring of complaints is essential. Distinct legal theories should be separately pleaded; responsibility must be tied to specific defendants; and redundancy or ambiguity should be scrupulously avoided. Failure to do so—especially after a judicial warning—may result in the complete and final loss of claims, no matter how compelling the underlying facts.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

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