Reaffirming TVPA Restitution as “Gross Income” with No Forfeiture Offset and Upholding Recording-Device Supervised-Release Conditions: United States v. Austin Koeckeritz (7th Cir. 2025)

Note: This is a nonprecedential disposition from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and may be cited only in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1. Despite its nonprecedential status, the decision provides useful guidance on recurring issues in sex-trafficking prosecutions under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), supervised release conditions, and restitution calculations.

Introduction

In United States v. Austin Koeckeritz, No. 24-3039 (7th Cir. Nov. 10, 2025), the Seventh Circuit granted appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw under Anders v. California and dismissed the defendant’s appeal as frivolous. The appeal arose after Koeckeritz pleaded guilty to two sex-trafficking charges stemming from a scheme in which he directed an adult victim (Jane Doe 1) to broadcast sexual activity for money over approximately 19 months and enticed a minor (Jane Doe 2) to create promotional content and appear in explicit photos.

The district court imposed a 240-month prison sentence (within the advisory Guidelines) and a life term of supervised release, later ordering $410,042.26 in mandatory restitution. On appeal, the defendant challenged (directly or through pro se submissions considered under Circuit Rule 51(b)) the voluntariness of his plea, aspects of his sentence and supervised release conditions, and multiple components of the restitution award. He also raised ineffective-assistance and Eighth Amendment confinement claims.

Although the court’s disposition is nonprecedential, it reaffirms important principles: enforcement of appeal waivers tied to imprisonment; the permissibility of narrowly administered technology-related supervised release conditions; the TVPA’s “gross income” measure for restitution; the prohibition on netting out taxes or insurance; and the separation of restitution from criminal forfeiture with no offset between the two.

Summary of the Opinion

Anders framework and scope of review: Finding counsel’s submission thorough, the court limited review to the issues counsel identified and those the defendant raised in response (United States v. Bey; Cir. R. 51(b)).
Plea voluntariness: Any challenge would be frivolous. The plea colloquy substantially complied with Rule 11; the defendant acknowledged understanding the charges, penalties, and rights waived. Claims that mental-health issues undermined his plea were refuted by his sworn colloquy statements (plain-error review).
Appeal waiver and sentencing: The appeal waiver covering imprisonment was enforceable because the plea was knowing and voluntary, and the sentence neither exceeded the statutory maximum nor rested on impermissible factors (United States v. Larry; United States v. Nulf). The court therefore rejected any challenge to the prison term.
Supervised release conditions: The waiver did not bar review of supervised release. The life term and a special condition requiring probation-officer approval to own a recording device were upheld as reasonable in light of the offense conduct and risk of recidivism (United States v. Kappes; United States v. Shannon; United States v. Warren).
Restitution: Restitution is mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 1593. The court rejected five defense arguments:
- No deduction for taxes from “gross income” (plain text of § 1593(b)(3)).
- Waiver of objection to medical expenses for Jane Doe 1 (United States v. Macias).
- Value of Jane Doe 2’s labor was properly included even though the district court mistakenly referenced a “relevant conduct” frame; using the correct “proximate cause” test (United States v. Griffin) yields the same result.
- Future therapy for Jane Doe 2 was supported by evidence and permissible despite uncertainty (United States v. Dickey), and insurance cannot reduce restitution (18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(B); United States v. Malone).
- No offset of restitution by forfeiture; they serve different purposes and are satisfied separately (United States v. Venturella; United States v. Emerson; 18 U.S.C. § 1594(f)).
Collateral claims: Ineffective-assistance claims belong on collateral review (United States v. Cates; Massaro v. United States). Eighth Amendment prison-conditions challenges must be brought via a civil action (Bivens).

Disposition: Motion to withdraw granted; appeal dismissed; pending motions denied as unnecessary.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967): Establishes counsel’s process for withdrawing from a frivolous appeal and the court’s duty to examine the record. Here, counsel’s brief was thorough, permitting the court to confine its review.
United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774 (7th Cir. 2014): Allows the court to limit its review to issues identified in counsel’s Anders submission, supplemented by any pro se issues raised under Circuit Rule 51(b).
United States v. Larry, 104 F.4th 1020 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Nulf, 978 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 2020)): An appeal waiver stands or falls with the voluntariness of the plea; enforceable unless the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum or rests on impermissible factors. This controlled the sentencing-waiver analysis.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b): Sets the plea colloquy requirements. Substantial compliance confirmed Koeckeritz’s plea was knowing and voluntary.
United States v. Dyer, 892 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2018): Pleas by defendants with mental illness are valid where the court ensures comprehension and participation. The colloquy satisfied this test.
United States v. Barr, 960 F.3d 906 (7th Cir. 2020): Courts presume defendants’ sworn colloquy statements are truthful; this undermined post hoc challenges to voluntariness.
United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2015): District courts have wide discretion over supervised release conditions but must justify terms with § 3553(a) factors. The life term and device-permission condition were justified by recidivism risk and public safety.
United States v. Shannon, 851 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2017) and United States v. Warren, 843 F.3d 275 (7th Cir. 2016): Conditions cannot inflict a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary; courts presume probation officers administer permission-based conditions reasonably. This sustained the recording-device approval condition despite modern reliance on smartphones.
United States v. Shah, 665 F.3d 827 (7th Cir. 2011): Restitution often falls outside appeal waivers unless expressly included; enabled review here.
United States v. Alverez, 21 F.4th 499 (7th Cir. 2021): De novo review for authority to order restitution; abuse-of-discretion for calculation; evidence viewed in the government’s favor. Guided the court’s restitution review posture.
United States v. Robl, 8 F.4th 515 (7th Cir. 2021): Government bears preponderance burden to support restitution amounts.
18 U.S.C. § 1593 (TVPA restitution): Mandates restitution for trafficking offenses, including “the full amount of the victim’s losses” plus “the greater of the gross income or value to the defendant of the victim’s services or labor.” The court relied on the statute’s text to reject “net” arguments and tax deductions.
United States v. Griffin, 76 F.4th 724 (7th Cir. 2023): Restitution scope uses a proximate-cause standard tied to the offense of conviction, not Guidelines-style “relevant conduct.” Although the district court used the wrong frame, the error was harmless because Jane Doe 2’s promotional labor was directly caused by the charged trafficking.
United States v. Dickey, 52 F.4th 680 (7th Cir. 2022): Permits restitution for prospective losses (e.g., future therapy) even if uncertain, when supported by evidence. This validated the therapy award (1.5 sessions/week for one year) within the therapist’s 1–2 sessions estimate.
18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(B); United States v. Malone, 747 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 2014): Restitution is not reduced by insurance or similar compensation; courts focus on victim loss, not collateral sources.
United States v. Macias, 927 F.3d 985 (7th Cir. 2019): Confirmed the waiver doctrine; the defendant abandoned his objection to certain medical expenses for Jane Doe 1.
United States v. Venturella, 585 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2009): Forfeiture and restitution serve different purposes and go to different recipients; no offset.
United States v. Emerson, 128 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1997): Reinforces that restitution cannot be offset by other monetary penalties absent statutory authorization; applied here alongside the TVPA’s express forfeiture-transfer rules (18 U.S.C. § 1594(f)).
United States v. Cates, 950 F.3d 453 (7th Cir. 2020) and Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003): Ineffective-assistance claims are best pursued on collateral review.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971): Prison-conditions and Eighth Amendment claims proceed through civil rights litigation, not a direct criminal appeal.

Legal Reasoning

1) Plea and Appeal Waiver: Applying Rule 11(b), the panel found the plea knowing and voluntary. The defendant’s own sworn statements at the colloquy defeated later claims of impairment. Given the plea’s validity, the appeal waiver covering the prison term was enforceable under Larry/Nulf. No allegation of impermissible sentencing factors or statutory over-maximum was plausible here.

2) Supervised Release: Because the waiver addressed only imprisonment, challenges to supervised release remained open. The district court adequately tied the life term and the device-approval condition to § 3553(a) factors—particularly public protection and the defendant’s recidivism risk. Under Shannon/Warren, permission-based technology conditions are presumed reasonably administered by probation, and the on-the-record rationale supported that the constraint did not impose a greater deprivation than necessary, even in an era when cellphones are ubiquitous.

3) Restitution (TVPA § 1593 and § 3664):

Gross income, not net: The statute’s explicit “gross income” language foreclosed deduction of taxes the defendant chose to pay. The court relied on ordinary meaning drawn from Black’s Law Dictionary and the statutory text.
Medical expenses for Jane Doe 1: The defendant withdrew his objection to post-broadcast medical costs. Under Macias, this lapse operated as waiver.
Jane Doe 2’s labor and causation standard: Although the district court invoked a “relevant conduct” frame, Griffin requires a “proximate cause” inquiry tethered to the offenses of conviction. The error did not matter because the record showed that, as part of trafficking Jane Doe 2, Koeckeritz enticed her to create promotional content, making the value of her labor directly caused by the offense and compensable under § 1593.
Future therapy for Jane Doe 2 and collateral sources: The therapist’s testimony supported an award of 1–2 sessions per week for one year; the court selected 1.5 sessions per week, an exercise of discretion well within Dickey. Section 3664(f)(1)(B) barred reduction for insurance or similar benefits (Malone).
No offset for forfeiture: Restitution compensates victims; forfeiture deprives defendants of ill-gotten gains and is payable to the government, with § 1594(f) providing a government-administered transfer to satisfy restitution, not an automatic defense offset. The statute also obligates defendants to reimburse the government for any transfer. Venturella and Emerson support treating restitution and forfeiture as separate obligations.

4) Collateral and Non-Record Claims: Ineffective-assistance claims require factual development best suited to collateral review (Cates/Massaro). Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claims must be brought as civil rights actions (Bivens), not on direct appeal.

Impact

Sex-trafficking restitution practice: The decision reinforces, even if nonprecedentially, that TVPA restitution is measured by “gross income” or the “value to the defendant,” barring deductions for costs or taxes. Defense attempts to “net out” expenses are unlikely to succeed.
Restitution vs. forfeiture: The court’s reading of § 1594(f) and cases like Venturella and Emerson provides a clear compliance roadmap: practitioners should treat restitution and forfeiture as independent financial obligations. Victim recovery may be facilitated by government transfers, but defendants cannot claim a dollar-for-dollar credit against restitution based on forfeiture.
Causation standard for restitution: Even though the district court used a broader “relevant conduct” frame, the panel highlighted Griffin’s narrower “proximate cause” test tied to the offense of conviction. This signals to district courts and counsel to frame restitution proofs and objections around proximate causation. Where the record shows direct inducement or exploitation as part of the charged offense, inclusion of labor value is secure.
Future therapy awards: The court’s endorsement of a measured, evidence-based award for prospective therapy continues a pragmatic approach: uncertainty does not bar prospective restitution if grounded in professional testimony and reasonable estimates.
Technology-related supervised release conditions: The approval requirement for recording devices underscores that carefully tailored conditions—especially when administered through probation-officer permission—will be sustained where tied to offense conduct and risk mitigation. This is instructive for cases involving sexual exploitation, online misconduct, or digital facilitation.
Anders and appeal waivers: The disposition exemplifies efficient appellate screening: robust Anders briefs, combined with enforceable appeal waivers, significantly narrow viable issues—leaving primarily restitution and supervised-release questions, which often lie outside standard incarceration waivers.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Anders dismissal: When appointed counsel believes there are no nonfrivolous issues on appeal, counsel may move to withdraw with a brief explaining why. The court independently checks the record; if it agrees, it permits withdrawal and dismisses.
Appeal waiver: As part of a plea, a defendant may agree not to appeal certain sentence components. If the plea is valid, the waiver is enforceable unless the sentence is unlawful (e.g., exceeds the statutory maximum) or rests on forbidden factors.
Plain error review: When a defendant failed to object below (e.g., to the plea), the appellate court asks whether there was a clear error affecting substantial rights and the proceeding’s fairness. This is a high bar.
Supervised release condition with “permission”: Rather than a blanket ban, a condition may require probation-officer approval before possession or use. Courts presume officers will administer such conditions reasonably and flexibly.
“Gross income” in TVPA restitution: Gross means total, without deducting expenses or taxes. Under § 1593, defendants often must pay the greater of the gross income earned from the victim’s services or the value of those services to the defendant.
Proximate cause vs. relevant conduct for restitution: Restitution covers losses directly caused by the specific offense(s) of conviction (proximate cause), not everything related to a defendant’s broader misconduct or Guidelines “relevant conduct.”
Prospective losses: Restitution may include future therapy or treatment where supported by credible evidence, even if the exact amount involves reasonable estimates.
Forfeiture vs. restitution: Forfeiture is paid to the government to strip ill-gotten gains; restitution compensates victims. They are separate obligations and typically do not offset each other.
Ineffective assistance and prison-conditions claims: Attorney-performance claims are usually raised in a post-conviction motion to build a factual record. Claims about prison conditions or treatment are brought in civil litigation, not on direct criminal appeal.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s nonprecedential order in United States v. Austin Koeckeritz illustrates settled, practical doctrines that frequently shape appellate outcomes in sex-trafficking cases. The panel enforced an appeal waiver for the imprisonment term following a clean Rule 11 colloquy; upheld a life term of supervised release and a technology-related condition grounded in recidivism and public-safety concerns; and affirmed a comprehensive TVPA restitution award, emphasizing “gross income” without tax or insurance offsets, recognizing prospective therapy costs, and maintaining a firm separation between restitution and forfeiture obligations.

Although not binding precedent, the decision offers a concise roadmap for litigants. Prosecutors should present restitution proofs tied to proximate cause and prepared for scrutiny under § 3664; defense counsel should anticipate that netting arguments (taxes, insurance, or forfeiture) will fail and that tailored, permission-based technology conditions are likely to be affirmed when well justified. For appellate practice, strong Anders submissions and plea-based appeal waivers continue to focus meaningful review on discrete areas—principally restitution and supervised release—where clear statutory and case-law frameworks provide the governing answers.