Reaffirming the Presumptive Lawfulness of Felon-in-Possession Statutes after Bruen and Rahimi
A Comprehensive Commentary on United States v. Walter Rider, 23-13043 (11th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

In United States v. Walter Rider, the Eleventh Circuit confronted a familiar yet newly-framed constitutional question: does 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)—the federal felon-in-possession statute—remain valid after the Supreme Court’s recent Second Amendment landmarks in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen (2022) and United States v. Rahimi (2024)?

Background. Walter Rider, previously convicted on three non-violent drug felonies (alprazolam, methamphetamine, synthetic marijuana), was indicted for possessing a pistol and ammunition. He moved to dismiss, asserting that Bruen’s “text-and-history” test and Rahimi render § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional, at least as applied to non-violent felons. The district court denied the motion; Rider entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his challenge on appeal.

Key Issues on Appeal.

• Whether § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment under Bruen’s historical-tradition framework.
• Whether a lifetime firearm ban predicated on non-violent drug felonies is permissible.

The Eleventh Circuit, in a per-curiam opinion, affirmed Rider’s conviction, holding that both Bruen and Rahimi reinforce— rather than undermine—the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1), resurrecting and relying on its own precedent, United States v. Rozier (2010), as recently reaffirmed in United States v. Dubois (2025).

II. Summary of the Judgment

1. Standard of Review: Constitutionality of a statute is reviewed de novo.
2. Main Holding: Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional both facially and as applied to Rider.
3. Key Rationale: Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi each categorically describe felon-in-possession bans as “presumptively lawful.” The Eleventh Circuit’s prior decision in Rozier—holding that felons fall outside “law-abiding, responsible citizens” protected by the Second Amendment—remains binding. Neither Bruen nor Rahimi abrogated Rozier.

4. Permanence of the Ban: A lifetime disqualification, even for non-violent drug felonies, does not offend the Second Amendment under existing precedent.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Each case incrementally shaped the doctrinal path:

• Heller supplied the original felon carve-out.
• Rozier applied it circuit-wide.
• Bruen reset methodology but preserved the carve-out.
• Rahimi expressly reconfirmed the carve-out in the course of a fresh historical analysis, signaling to lower courts that felon-in-possession bans remain intact.
• Dubois functioned as a circuit “bell-wether,” showing that Bruen did not unsettle Rozier—a conclusion Rider could not overcome.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Step 1 – Textual Inquiry. The Second Amendment covers “the people.” But following Heller, “the people” does not necessarily include felons. Consequently, Rider’s conduct falls outside the protected class at the first step.
2. Step 2 – Historical Tradition. Even if felons were within the Amendment’s text, § 922(g)(1) would survive because centuries-old laws disarmed individuals viewed as threats to social order (e.g., Catholics in pre-Revolutionary England, “dangerous” persons in the early Republic). Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi treat these traditions as sufficient analogues.
3. Stare Decisis within the Circuit. Under the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel rule, Rozier binds later panels unless clearly overruled by the Supreme Court or the en banc court. The panel found no such overruling; if anything, Rahimi “reinforced” Rozier.

C. Potential Impact

• Circuit Stability. The decision cements the Eleventh Circuit’s post-Bruen equilibrium: § 922(g)(1) remains fully enforceable against all felons, violent or not.
• Litigation Forecast. Defendants invoking Bruen for non-violent felonies in Alabama, Florida, and Georgia now face near-certain defeat unless they can distinguish their status from “felon” or urge the Supreme Court to revisit the carve-out.
• National Dialogue. Other circuits have split—most have upheld § 922(g)(1), one (the 5th in United States v. Daniels) struck it down in limited circumstances before the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Rider’s case adds weight to the majority upholding stance.
• Legislative Signals. By blessing lifetime bans even for non-violent drug felons, the judgment discourages congressional revision absent intervention by the Supreme Court.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Facial vs. As-Applied Challenge. A facial challenge claims the law is invalid in all circumstances; an as-applied challenge claims invalidity only in a particular defendant’s situation. Rider pressed both.
• “Presumptively Lawful.” A judicial shorthand indicating that certain firearm restrictions (e.g., on felons, the mentally ill) enjoy a strong but rebuttable validity presumption.
• “Text-and-History” Test (Bruen). Courts first ask whether the Second Amendment’s text covers the conduct. If yes, the government must show a “historical analogue” that justifies the restriction. Modern interest-balancing (i.e., strict/intermediate scrutiny) is disallowed.
• Prior-Panel Rule (11th Cir.). A published panel decision binds all subsequent panels unless overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Walter Rider stands as a decisive reaffirmation of the felon-in-possession statute’s validity, despite post-Bruen turbulence. By anchoring its analysis in Heller’s carve-out, endorsing Rozier, and reading Rahimi as supportive rather than disruptive, the Eleventh Circuit effectively closed the doctrinal loop for now: felons—even non-violent, drug-related ones—remain outside the “law-abiding, responsible” citizenry whose arms-bearing rights the Second Amendment robustly protects.

Future challenges may hinge on Supreme Court clarification or novel factual distinctions, but until such time, Rider provides a stable, comprehensive framework for lower courts within the Eleventh Circuit—and persuasive authority elsewhere—to evaluate Second Amendment attacks on § 922(g)(1). The decision’s broader significance lies in its explicit message: the historical tradition of disarming felons retains full constitutional force after Bruen and Rahimi.