Reaffirming the Narrow Scope of the Reeves Exception: Pretext Alone Sends ADA & Rehabilitation Act Claims to a Jury

Introduction

In Jenny v. L3Harris Technologies, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit delivered a significant decision on 21 July 2025 that reshapes the practical operation of summary-judgment motions in disability-discrimination litigation. The case revolves around David Jenny, a senior director with decades of service, who alleged that his discharge followed close on the heels of his ADA accommodation for recurring cellulitis. The District Court had granted summary judgment for L3Harris despite recognising Jenny’s evidence of pretext. Invoking the Supreme Court’s narrow “Reeves exception,” the lower court required something more— a direct “tie” between Jenny’s termination and discriminatory intent.

The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that once a plaintiff satisfies the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and creates a genuine dispute as to pretext, the matter ordinarily proceeds to trial unless the record conclusively demonstrates a non-discriminatory explanation or contains abundant, uncontroverted evidence negating discrimination. Any attempt to demand “pretext-plus” proof, the panel stressed, contravenes Supreme Court authority and improperly weighs evidence at the summary-judgment stage.

Summary of the Judgment

• Holding: The district court erred in granting summary judgment to L3Harris. Jenny’s evidence of pretext sufficed to present his ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims to a jury; the narrow circumstances articulated in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. were not met.
• Disposition: Summary judgment reversed and case remanded.
• Key Points:
  • The Reeves exception applies only when (i) the record conclusively reveals an alternative, non-discriminatory reason or (ii) the plaintiff’s showing of pretext is weak and independent, uncontested evidence negates discrimination. Neither existed here.
  • The district court mistakenly engaged in “judicial guesswork” by speculating about benign motives not supported by conclusive record evidence.
  • Undisputed facts—temporal proximity, travel denials, opaque reorganisation, shifting explanations— were more than adequate for a reasonable jury to infer unlawful motive.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)
  Sets the familiar three-step burden-shifting framework for indirect-evidence discrimination claims. The panel agreed Jenny satisfied all three steps.
• Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000)
  Clarifies that proof of pretext usually suffices to defeat summary judgment, rejecting “pretext-plus.” Reeves acknowledges rare exceptions—exceptions the Tenth Circuit found inapplicable.
• Jones v. Oklahoma City Public Schools, 617 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 2010) & Swackhammer v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 493 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir. 2007)
  Tenth Circuit precedents refining the Reeves exception. The court contrasts Swackhammer’s “conclusive” nondiscriminatory evidence with the disputed, inferential record in Jenny.
• Other Circuit & Supreme Court authorities: Johnson v. Weld County, Litzsinger v. Adams County Coroner’s Office, Staub v. Proctor Hospital, Fassbender v. Correct Care Solutions, and scholarly works by now-Justice Gorsuch, Judge Newsom, and Judge Tymkovich—all noted either in the opinion or the concurrence to question McDonnell Douglas’ continued utility.

Legal Reasoning

1. Step-by-Step Application of McDonnell Douglas
   The district court conceded (i) Jenny’s prima facie case (disability, accommodation, adverse action, temporal proximity), (ii) L3Harris’s articulated non-discriminatory reason (“requested to be packaged out”), and (iii) Jenny’s evidence undermining that reason (inconsistent statements, timing, pattern of hostility).
2. Error in Invoking Reeves
   Reeves allows summary judgment only if the record conclusively shows an alternative, benign motive or if the plaintiff’s pretext evidence is meagre and counter-evidence overwhelming. The panel found the district court’s speculation (“Gentile could have believed Jenny was unpleasant…”) fell short of conclusive proof and improperly weighed disputed facts against the non-movant.
3. Evidence Supporting Pretext
   Denial of travel immediately after accommodation, removal from leadership, failure to honour promise to “fix” the situation, and shifting justifications combined to create a strong inference that disability animus motivated both the reorganisation and the ultimate discharge.
4. Concurring Critique of the Framework
   Judge Eid, echoing voices from the Supreme Court and other circuits, highlighted McDonnell Douglas’s “hyper-fixation on pretext” and potential incompatibility with Rule 56 standards. While concurring in the judgment, she signalled openness to re-examining or abandoning the framework in an appropriate future case.

Impact of the Decision

• Practical Litigation Effect: Employers within the Tenth Circuit now face a steeper climb at summary judgment once a plaintiff undermines the proffered rationale. “Pretext-plus” arguments are effectively foreclosed.
• ADA & Rehabilitation Act Harmony: The ruling affirms identical analytical paths for ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, ensuring consistency across statutes.
• Guidance for District Courts: Courts must resist substituting conjecture for record evidence, and must view facts in the plaintiff’s favour. Reeves cannot be an escape hatch simply because a judge doubts the ultimate merits.
• Potential Supreme Court Interest: The concurrence’s invitation to reassess McDonnell Douglas joins a chorus of similar opinions nationwide, increasing the likelihood of future high-court review.
• Human-Resources & Employer Policy: Employers should document non-discriminatory reasons contemporaneously and apply accommodation policies consistently; informal or shifting rationales will be viewed sceptically.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Prima Facie Case: The initial, low-threshold showing a plaintiff must make (membership in protected class, qualification, adverse action, causal link). Think of it as “raising your hand” with enough evidence to be heard.
• Pretext: Evidence indicating the employer’s stated reason is false or not worthy of belief. Once you show the “mask” is fake, a jury may infer discriminatory intent underneath.
• Burden-Shifting Framework: A procedural dance: (1) plaintiff’s prima facie, (2) employer’s reason, (3) plaintiff shows pretext. Importantly, the burden of proof (persuasion) always remains with the plaintiff.
• Reeves Exception: Two narrow escape routes an employer can use after pretext is shown: (i) conclusive alternative explanation, or (ii) plaintiff’s evidence is weak plus overwhelming contrary proof. Absent these, the jury decides.
• Summary Judgment: A procedural device to dispose of cases lacking a genuine factual dispute. Judges must not weigh evidence or assess credibility—roles reserved for juries.

Conclusion

Jenny v. L3Harris fortifies the principle that, in discrimination cases decided by indirect evidence, once a plaintiff exposes an employer’s explanation as potentially pretextual, the courthouse doors must remain open for a jury. The Tenth Circuit soundly rejects any resurrection of “pretext-plus” and restricts the Reeves exception to genuinely exceptional circumstances. Beyond resolving Jenny’s personal dispute, the opinion clarifies summary-judgment doctrine across ADA and Rehabilitation Act litigation, warns employers against speculative litigation defences, and adds momentum to the growing judicial debate over the continued viability of the McDonnell Douglas framework itself. For practitioners, the lesson is plain: focus on building (or dismantling) a robust record of pretext; it is usually the decisive threshold between dismissal and trial.