Reaffirming the Line Between Lay and Expert Interpretation of Coded Drug Communications—and the “Low Bar” for the Drug-Premises Enhancement

Introduction

This Sixth Circuit appeal arises from the conviction of Arnon Justin Lake for drug-trafficking crimes tied to a wiretap investigation centered on dealer John Humphrey. Law enforcement intercepted calls and texts in which Lake and Humphrey used coded language (“ice,” “fire,” “stick,” references to quantities like “27.3”) and coordinated pickups from a stash house. A search of Lake’s home uncovered heroin, packaging materials, cutting agents, scales and a blender, cash, and ten firearms; the nearby stash house yielded 6.2 kilograms of methamphetamine (“ice”) and fentanyl.

On appeal, Lake challenged the admission of testimony by three law-enforcement witnesses who interpreted his coded communications: two as lay witnesses (Officers Greg Parrott and Patrick Muller) and one as an expert (DEA Special Agent Alexis Giudice). He also raised sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges to his drug conspiracy, heroin possession-with-intent, and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) gun convictions; contested a two-level U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) “drug-premises” enhancement; and asserted ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC).

Judge Thapar, joined by Judges Kethledge and Larsen, affirmed across the board. Although the opinion is not recommended for publication, it provides a clear, structured application of the rules governing lay and expert interpretation of coded drug communications, underscores the difficulty of proving plain error where the defense failed to object at trial, and reinforces the relatively low threshold for the drug-premises enhancement when “tools of the trade” and storage are present.

Summary of the Opinion

Lay opinion testimony (Rule 701): The court held that two officers properly offered lay interpretations of cryptic terms in Lake’s communications because they had personal knowledge from their direct roles in the investigation and their testimony assisted the jury in understanding coded language.
Expert testimony (Rule 702): The DEA agent permissibly interpreted drug slang (e.g., “ice,” “fire,” “fet,” “shaky”) as an expert, without needing personal knowledge of the specific investigation.
Plain error: Even assuming any testimony strayed beyond Rules 701 or 702, Lake could not show prejudice. The same interpretive content was properly admitted via the expert, independent evidence was strong, and some disputed testimony was elicited on cross-examination.
Sufficiency of the evidence: The court found more than sufficient evidence for conspiracy, possession of heroin with intent to distribute, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking.
Drug-premises enhancement (§ 2D1.1(b)(12)): The enhancement was proper because drug manufacturing, distribution, and storage were a primary use of the premises, as shown by abundant “tools of the trade,” cash, firearms, and evidence of mixing/cutting.
Ineffective assistance: The court declined to address IAC on direct appeal given an undeveloped record, leaving the claim for possible collateral review.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

Federal Rules of Evidence 701 and 702:
- Rule 701 (lay opinion) requires the opinion to be rationally based on the witness’s perception, helpful to the jury, and not based on specialized knowledge.
- Rule 702 (expert) allows opinions based on specialized knowledge; law enforcement officers are often qualified to interpret drug jargon and coded language.
United States v. Akridge, 62 F.4th 258 (6th Cir. 2023): Sets the plain-error framework when there is no contemporaneous objection at trial.
United States v. Kilpatrick, 798 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2015): A key Rule 701 case. It permits officers to use personal knowledge of the investigation to interpret cryptic language, but warns against testimony that morphs into argument by telling the jury which inferences to draw or parroting the government’s theory.
United States v. Freeman, 730 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2013): Limits lay interpretation based on “generic” knowledge and forbids instructing the jury about inferences from ordinary language.
United States v. Hall, 20 F.4th 1085 (6th Cir. 2022): Clarifies that lay opinion is helpful when decoding “street language,” not when interpreting plain English.
United States v. Young, 847 F.3d 328 (6th Cir. 2017): Recognizes that serving as case agent can supply the personal knowledge necessary for lay opinions.
United States v. Williamson, 656 F. App’x 175 (6th Cir. 2016): Upholds lay interpretation of coded numerical references (e.g., quantities/prices) when grounded in personal participation and investigation.
United States v. Robinson, 872 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 2017): Approves background testimony explaining investigative steps and suspect identification.
United States v. Blackwell, 459 F.3d 739 (6th Cir. 2006): Confirms experts may rely on specialized knowledge rather than personal participation.
United States v. Maya, 966 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2020): Reaffirms frequent qualification of law enforcement as experts to interpret drug jargon.
OHLER v. UNITED STATES, 529 U.S. 753 (2000), and United States v. Van Der Ent, 52 F. App’x 793 (6th Cir. 2002): Weigh against plain error where the complained-of evidence was elicited on cross-examination.
JACKSON v. VIRGINIA, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), and United States v. Wright, 774 F.3d 1085 (6th Cir. 2014): Supply the deferential sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard (view evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict).
United States v. Rosales, 990 F.3d 989 (6th Cir. 2021): Recites the elements of a drug-distribution conspiracy.
United States v. Garth, 965 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2020): Addresses proof for possession with intent to distribute; intent may be inferred from packaging, tools, and other circumstantial indicators.
United States v. Bell, 766 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2014), and United States v. Leggett, 800 F. App’x 378 (6th Cir. 2020): Explain the “relatively low bar” for the § 2D1.1(b)(12) drug-premises enhancement and how “tools of the trade” and storage support it.
United States v. Verners, 53 F.3d 291 (10th Cir. 1995): Provides a canonical list of “tools of the trade” (scales, packaging, cash, guns, ammunition) that reinforce the enhancement.
United States v. Gonzalez, 501 F.3d 630 (6th Cir. 2007): Generally counsels against adjudicating IAC on direct appeal without a developed record.

Legal Reasoning

1) Lay versus expert interpretation of coded communications

The court restates a now-familiar three-part boundary for lay opinion under Rule 701 in drug cases:

Personal knowledge: The officer’s testimony must spring from direct perception rooted in participation in the investigation (e.g., surveillance, wiretap review, cell-phone extraction), not from generic departmental expertise.
Helpfulness: Interpretation should assist the jury in decoding “street language” or cryptic references; officers should not gloss plain English.
No specialized knowledge: Lay testimony may not covertly rely on specialized expertise that belongs in Rule 702 territory.

Applying those limits, the court found:

Officer Parrott (case agent) possessed personal knowledge by supervising operations, monitoring calls, and directing the investigative steps. When asked how a call “impacted [his] investigation,” he explained that it identified Lake as trafficking with Humphrey. The panel treated this as permissible background about investigative steps and suspect identification, not impermissible argument instructing the jury what to conclude.
On cross-examination, Parrott interpreted ambiguous references as drug-related in light of the entire case record and other calls—exactly the kind of cryptic-language interpretation Kilpatrick permits from a personally involved witness.
Officer Muller (cell-phone analyst) similarly had personal knowledge from extracting and analyzing the device. His interpretation that “27.3” in a text was significant because 28 grams equals an ounce fits Williamson’s acceptance of decoding numerical shorthand connected to drug quantities.

The court distinguished Freeman—where the officer drew inferences from ordinary language based on generic experience—because both Parrott and Muller were personally embedded in, and testifying from, the specifics of this investigation.

2) Expert interpretation of drug jargon

DEA Agent Giudice, as an expert, defined drug slang such as “ice” (crystal meth), “fire” (high potency), “fet” (fentanyl), and “shaky” (quality descriptor), which falls squarely within Rule 702. Under Blackwell and Maya, an expert need not have personal involvement in the particular case so long as the testimony rests on specialized knowledge. The panel approved the testimony on that basis.

3) No plain error even if any line was crossed

Because Lake did not object at trial, the court reviewed for plain error and emphasized lack of prejudice:

The wiretaps, surveillance, and physical evidence at Lake’s home provided independent, admissible support for the verdict.
The government introduced expert testimony decoding the relevant slang before the lay officers testified; thus the same interpretive content was admissible through a proper Rule 702 route.
Some contested statements were elicited on cross-examination, a factor weighing against plain-error relief (Ohler; Van Der Ent).

4) Sufficiency of the evidence

Viewing the evidence most favorably to the government (Jackson; Wright), a rational jury could find:

Conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, heroin, and fentanyl (Rosales): The stash-house pickup of “ice,” encoded calls about mixing heroin and fentanyl (“throw like five grams of the white fet on it”), instructions on blending and quality control (“get a read on the street”), and corroborating surveillance, together with drug paraphernalia, cash, and weapons at Lake’s residence, easily supported agreement, knowledge, and participation. The absence of meth or fentanyl at Lake’s house was immaterial because possession is not an element of conspiracy, and drugs tied to the conspiracy were found at the stash house Lake visited.
Possession of heroin with intent to distribute (Garth): Although only 2.05 grams of heroin were seized, the surrounding items—digital scale, blender, baggies, cutting agents (Sleepinol, mannitol), bundled lottery tickets, cash, and weapons—indicated distribution rather than personal use. Lake’s communications provided further support. As the panel memorably put it, “Coded language isn’t a get-out-of-jail-free card.”
Possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking (§ 924(c)): Lake had ten firearms at his home and discussed bringing his “stick” to retrieve a drug package. The nexus between firearms and trafficking was sufficient.

5) The § 2D1.1(b)(12) drug-premises enhancement

Under the guideline commentary, the enhancement applies when manufacturing, distributing, or storing controlled substances is a primary or principal use of the premises. Sixth Circuit cases describe this as a “relatively low bar” (Leggett) that can be satisfied by storage or by circumstantial proof such as the presence of “tools of the trade” (Bell; Verners).

The record at Lake’s residence contained precisely the kind of evidence those cases endorse: scales, a blender, baggies (some containing heroin), cutting agents, cash (> $6,000), bundled lottery tickets, firearms, body armor, and ammunition—all situated consistent with drug preparation (e.g., by a workbench in the basement; heroin in the kitchen mixed with six other substances). The government also presented evidence that methamphetamine was stored in a cooler in the garage, and storage alone qualifies. The district court therefore did not commit clear error in applying the enhancement.

6) Ineffective assistance of counsel

Following Gonzalez, the panel declined to adjudicate Lake’s IAC claim on direct appeal because the record did not explain counsel’s tactical reasons for not objecting to the officers’ testimony. Such claims generally belong in collateral proceedings (e.g., a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion) where an evidentiary record can be developed.

Impact

Rule 701/702 line-drawing in drug cases: The opinion reinforces that officers may offer lay opinions interpreting coded language if they ground their views in personal involvement with the investigation and avoid re-framing plain English or advancing argument. Prosecutors who pair that lay testimony with expert decoding of jargon minimize appellate risk.
Trial strategy and preservation: The decision is a cautionary tale for the defense—failure to object contemporaneously invites plain-error review, under which overlapping expert testimony and strong independent evidence will often defeat prejudice.
Decoding numbers and shorthand: The court’s acceptance of lay testimony that “27.3” relates to an ounce (28 grams) continues a line of cases permitting officers to explain numerical code in drug communications when tied to the investigation.
Conspiracy proof without possession at home: The panel reiterates that conspiracy does not hinge on drugs being found in the defendant’s residence; intercepted communications, surveillance, and stash-house seizures can suffice.
Drug-premises enhancement breadth: The Sixth Circuit again signals that the enhancement is readily met when a residence houses tools of distribution or when drugs are stored onsite. Controlled buys or actual sales at the residence are not required.
Sequencing witnesses: Presenting the expert before lay officers can be tactically valuable, as it inoculates later lay testimony against prejudice and clarifies for the jury the distinct bases of each witness’s opinions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Lay opinion (Rule 701): Non-expert witness opinions allowed only if based on personal observation, helpful to understanding evidence, and not reliant on specialized expertise.
Expert opinion (Rule 702): Specialized knowledge (e.g., drug jargon, trafficking practices) can be offered by qualified experts even if they did not participate in the specific investigation.
Plain error: A demanding standard applied when no timely objection was made. The appellant must show a clear error that affected substantial rights and impaired the fairness or integrity of the proceedings.
“Street language” versus plain English: Courts let lay officers interpret coded slang but discourage them from glossing ordinary words or telling the jury what conclusion to draw.
Conspiracy to distribute: Requires proof of agreement, knowing intent to join, and participation; possession of drugs is not required.
Possession with intent to distribute: Intent can be inferred from packaging, scales, cutting agents, cash, weaponry, and communication patterns, not just drug quantity.
§ 924(c) “in furtherance”: The firearm must advance or help the drug trafficking; proximity, readiness, and communications about carrying the gun can establish the nexus.
Drug-premises enhancement (§ 2D1.1(b)(12)): Applies when a primary use of the premises is drug production, distribution, or storage; “tools of the trade” and storage are strong indicators; the threshold is relatively low.
Ineffective assistance on direct appeal: Generally deferred to collateral review to allow fact development about counsel’s strategy.

Conclusion

United States v. Lake is an instructive reaffirmation of Sixth Circuit doctrine on the admissibility of law-enforcement interpretations of coded drug communications. The court carefully applies Rule 701 to permit lay testimony rooted in personal involvement and aimed at decoding cryptic language, while preserving the distinct role of expert testimony under Rule 702 for specialized slang. On plain-error review, overlapping expert testimony, strong independent evidence, and cross-examination dynamics defeated any claim of prejudice.

On the merits, the court underscores that conspiracies can be proved without drugs found at the defendant’s residence, that packaging and “tools of the trade” readily establish intent to distribute, and that a defendant’s own references to firearms in the context of drug pickups can satisfy § 924(c). For sentencing, the decision reiterates the “relatively low bar” for the § 2D1.1(b)(12) drug-premises enhancement where storage and distribution paraphernalia make drug activity a principal use of the home.

For practitioners, the case offers both a blueprint and a warning: prosecutors can solidify the admissibility of interpretive testimony by laying proper foundations and sequencing expert and lay witnesses wisely; defense counsel must object contemporaneously, press the line between coded and ordinary language, and seek limiting instructions and Daubert scrutiny where appropriate. Even as a nonprecedential opinion, Lake crisply synthesizes controlling law and is likely to be influential in shaping trial practice and evidentiary rulings in drug conspiracy prosecutions.