Reaffirming the High Bar for “Fraud on the Court” and Applying Collateral Estoppel to Attorney-Malpractice Claims: Commentary on Browne v. Ciobanu (7th Cir. Dec. 5, 2025)

I. Introduction

This nonprecedential order from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Kathy Browne v. Andrea L. Ciobanu, consolidates two related appeals arising from a deteriorated attorney–client relationship and the fallout from a federal civil-rights lawsuit. Although formally designated as a “NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION” under Seventh Circuit rules and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, the decision is practically important in several respects:

It powerfully reaffirms how narrow and demanding the doctrine of “fraud on the court” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3) really is.
It applies Indiana’s collateral estoppel (issue-preclusion) rules to bar an attorney-malpractice suit in federal diversity jurisdiction, where the malpractice allegations simply repackage issues previously litigated in the underlying civil-rights case and in an attorney’s fee lien dispute.
It illustrates the limits of a litigant’s ability to repeatedly re-open settled disputes through serial motions, new lawsuits, and appeals.
It imposes substantial appellate sanctions and a filing bar under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 and Seventh Circuit precedent on a pro se litigant whose appeal the court deems frivolous and vexatious.

The case pits Kathy Browne, a pro se plaintiff-appellant, against her former lawyer, Andrea Ciobanu, the defendant-appellee. The underlying 2020 case was a federal civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, arising out of Browne’s alleged false arrest by a Valparaiso police officer and others. After a partial settlement and the lawyer’s withdrawal, Browne turned on her former counsel, disputing the settlement, attacking the fee lien, and eventually filing a separate malpractice suit.

At a high level, the Seventh Circuit:

Affirmed the denial of Browne’s Rule 60(d)(3) motion alleging “fraud on the court” in the 2020 case.
Affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of Browne’s 2023 malpractice suit as barred by collateral estoppel (and, alternatively, for failure to state a claim).
Upheld the district court’s discretionary case-management decisions regarding amendments, stays, and scheduling orders.
Imposed monetary sanctions and a broad filing bar on Browne for pursuing a frivolous appeal that rehashed already rejected arguments.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The 2020 Civil-Rights Case and Settlement

In 2020, Browne—then represented by attorney Andrea Ciobanu—filed a federal suit in the Northern District of Indiana against:

Jennifer Waldo, and
City of Valparaiso, among other defendants,

alleging false arrest and related civil-rights violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. During that litigation:

Browne and one defendant reached a settlement.
After the settlement was reached, Ciobanu withdrew from representing Browne.
A dispute arose over whether the settlement agreement was valid and enforceable, with Browne arguing partly that she had been coerced into settling.
Judge Van Bokkelen enforced the settlement agreement.
Browne appealed that enforcement, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed in Browne v. Waldo, No. 24‑1497, 2024 WL 4719082 (7th Cir. Nov. 8, 2024).

Meanwhile, Ciobanu asserted a claim for unpaid attorney fees and costs in that same 2020 case. She:

Filed an attorney’s lien against a portion of Browne’s settlement proceeds.
Held the settlement funds in her trust account.
Ultimately sent the settlement check to the district court clerk to be held until the lien was adjudicated.

Browne opposed the lien, alleging overcharging, unjust enrichment, and failure to quash a subpoena. Judge Van Bokkelen:

Validated Ciobanu’s lien, and
Directed the clerk to distribute part of the settlement funds to Ciobanu and the remainder to Browne.

Browne attempted to appeal that lien order (in Browne v. Ciobanu, No. 23‑1520), but voluntarily dismissed that appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b).

B. The Rule 60(d)(3) Motion: Alleged “Fraud on the Court”

In May 2025, still in the original 2020 case (now reassigned to Judge Jon E. DeGuilio), Browne filed a post-judgment motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3) to vacate Judge Van Bokkelen’s order. Rule 60(d)(3) permits a court to “set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.”

Browne accused her former attorney, Ciobanu, of committing “fraud on the court” by:

Including a fictitious person labeled “Mr. Back” in the amended complaint,
Taking a supposed bribe from the City of Valparaiso in exchange for dismissing the City from the lawsuit,
Failing to disclose to the court a sexually explicit video of Browne that allegedly supported her claims against Waldo, and
Withholding Browne’s case file after the attorney–client relationship ended.

Ciobanu opposed the motion and, in turn, moved for sanctions against Browne.

Judge DeGuilio:

Denied Browne’s Rule 60(d)(3) motion, finding no fraud on the court.
Denied sanctions against Browne, stressing her pro se status and lack of apparent bad faith.

This denial is the subject of one of Browne’s consolidated appeals.

C. The 2023 Malpractice Case

While the 2020 civil-rights case was still ongoing, Browne filed a separate suit in May 2023:

Case No. 2:23‑cv‑00164‑GSL‑AZ,
Assigned to Judge Gretchen S. Lund,
Asserting state-law claims such as negligence, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract against Ciobanu,
Alleging that Ciobanu failed to protect Browne’s interests in the 2020 case and fraudulently induced her to settle.

The jurisdictional posture is diversity-based: the malpractice suit is a state-law action, adjudicated in federal court, so state preclusion rules govern (as the court explains in a footnote).

During this 2023 malpractice litigation:

Browne, acting pro se, filed numerous motions, including multiple attempts to amend her complaint.
Ciobanu moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and sought sanctions, including attorney’s fees.
While the motion to dismiss was pending, Judge Lund stayed the case to address Browne’s proliferation of motions.
The stay was later lifted, and the court ruled on the pending requests.

Ultimately, Judge Lund:

Granted Ciobanu’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the case with prejudice.
Held that Browne’s malpractice-related claims were barred by collateral estoppel because the underlying issues had already been litigated and decided in the 2020 case (settlement enforcement and attorney’s lien proceedings).
Alternatively, found that the complaint failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
Denied as moot Browne’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint and all other pending motions, including Ciobanu’s sanctions motion.

Browne then moved for reconsideration under Rule 60(b). After she filed a notice of appeal, Judge Lund denied the reconsideration motion as moot. Browne’s challenge to the dismissal and to these associated rulings is the second appeal.

D. Consolidated Appeals and Appellate Sanctions Motion

The Seventh Circuit consolidated:

No. 25‑2237 – the appeal of Judge DeGuilio’s denial of Rule 60(d)(3) relief in the 2020 case; and
No. 25‑1441 – the appeal of Judge Lund’s dismissal of the 2023 malpractice action and associated procedural rulings.

The panel—Judges Hamilton, Jackson-Akiwumi, and Lee—decided the case without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2)(C), finding that the briefs and record were adequate and that oral argument would not materially assist.

Separately, Ciobanu moved in the court of appeals for sanctions against Browne under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, arguing that Browne’s consolidated appeal was frivolous. The court granted that motion and imposed significant consequences, as discussed below.

III. Summary of the Seventh Circuit’s Opinion

The court’s core holdings can be distilled as follows:

No Rule 60(d)(3) “fraud on the court.” The panel held that Browne failed to make the necessary “meaningful evidentiary showing” of egregious misconduct—such as forgery, perjury, bribery of a judge, or comparable conduct—that would justify setting aside the judgment as fraud on the court. The alleged scrivener’s error, supposed bribery, and asserted mishandling of evidence and files did not come close to meeting the high bar.
Collateral estoppel bars the malpractice suit. Applying Indiana’s issue-preclusion doctrine (as required in a diversity case), the court held that Browne’s malpractice and related claims were barred because: (i) there were prior final judgments on the merits (the settlement-enforcement order and the attorney’s-lien order), (ii) the issues underlying the malpractice allegations were already litigated and resolved there, and (iii) Browne and Ciobanu were parties to the earlier proceedings.
Denial of leave to amend was within the district court’s discretion. Judge Lund properly denied further amendment, given Browne’s previous amendment as of right, her repeated attempts to amend without curing defects, and the futility of the proposed new complaint.
Stays and scheduling decisions were proper exercises of docket-management discretion. The court rejected Browne’s contention that the district court erred by staying the case and failing to promptly enter a Rule 16 scheduling order, emphasizing the court’s broad authority to manage its docket, especially in the face of repetitive, meritless motions.
Denial of postjudgment reconsideration is not before the court. The panel declined to review the denial of Browne’s Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration in the malpractice case because she did not file a new or amended notice of appeal after the postjudgment ruling, as required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(B)(ii).
Sanctions and filing bar imposed on Browne. Finding the appeal frivolous and noting prior warnings to Browne from both the district court and the Seventh Circuit, the panel:
- Fined Browne $750.
- Ordered her to pay Ciobanu’s reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in responding to the appeal.
- Imposed a circuit-wide filing bar in civil matters, instructing the clerks of all federal courts in the circuit to return unfiled any papers submitted by or on behalf of Browne until she pays the sanction in full, with exceptions for criminal and habeas cases and a limited mechanism for future modification if she cannot pay.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Rule 60(d)(3) and the Narrow Doctrine of “Fraud on the Court”

1. The governing standard and precedents

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3) preserves the court’s power to “set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.” This is a distinct and much more demanding concept than the ordinary “fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party” addressed in Rule 60(b)(3).

The Seventh Circuit, citing In re Golf 255, Inc., 652 F.3d 806 (7th Cir. 2011), and Citizens for Appropriate Rural Roads v. Foxx, 815 F.3d 1068 (7th Cir. 2016), emphasized:

Nature of the misconduct. Fraud on the court requires misconduct that directly corrupts the judicial process itself—examples include bribery of a judge, forgery, or inserting bogus documents into the record.
Extraordinary and egregious threshold. The doctrine applies “only in the most extraordinary and egregious circumstances,” far beyond ordinary litigation misconduct or attorney negligence.
Evidentiary burden. A party alleging fraud on the court must make a “meaningful evidentiary showing,” not mere speculation or conclusory accusations.

In Citizens for Appropriate Rural Roads, the court elaborated that fraud on the court is reserved for conduct that “might be thought to corrupt the judicial process itself,” e.g., bribing a judge or planting fabricated evidence. Routine disputes over how evidence is handled, however serious they may feel to a party, generally do not qualify.

2. Application to Browne’s allegations

Browne’s Rule 60(d)(3) motion asserted four categories of alleged misconduct by her former attorney:

“Mr. Back” in the amended complaint.
The amended complaint apparently named (or referred to) a “Mr. Back,” who did not correspond to any real party. The district court regarded this as, at most, a scrivener’s error—a clerical mistake in drafting—and found that it did not mislead the court or prejudice Browne. The Seventh Circuit agreed. At worst, this was a drafting mistake, which:
- Did not change substantive rights,
- Did not result in any unfair advantage, and
- Certainly did not approach the level of “egregious” misconduct that would “corrupt the judicial process.”
Alleged bribery by the City of Valparaiso.
Browne alleged that Ciobanu accepted a bribe from the City in exchange for agreeing to dismiss the City from the lawsuit. The Seventh Circuit, deferring to Judge DeGuilio’s findings, noted that Browne offered no evidence of bribery—no documents, no credible witness testimony, no concrete facts. Absent a “meaningful evidentiary showing,” the court could not treat this as fraud on the court. Bare accusations of bribery are insufficient.
Concealment of a sexually explicit video.
Browne claimed there existed a sexually explicit video of her that would have supported her civil-rights claims against Waldo, and that Ciobanu failed to show this evidence to the court. Even if true, such an omission—without more— is, at most, an issue of litigation strategy or possible malpractice, not fraud on the court. The panel stressed that allegations of “mishandled or concealed evidence” cannot, on their own, meet the heightened standard for Rule 60(d)(3).
Withholding Browne’s case file.
Browne alleged that Ciobanu withheld the client file after termination of the representation. Judge DeGuilio found that Browne had not shown that Ciobanu actually withheld the file, and the appellate court saw no abuse of discretion in that determination. Even if there had been a dispute over file turnover, that is a matter for professional-responsibility rules and possible malpractice liability, not fraud on the court.

In sum, none of these allegations, individually or collectively, rose to the level of “extraordinary and egregious” corruption of the judicial process required for Rule 60(d)(3) relief. At best, they suggested potential attorney mistake or disputed tactical choices; at worst, they were unsupported accusations. The district court’s refusal to set aside its prior judgment was squarely within its discretion, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

B. Collateral Estoppel and the Malpractice Action

1. Choice of preclusion law: Semtek and Cannon

In a footnote, the panel noted that the malpractice case is a diversity case and that the parties agreed that Indiana’s rules of preclusion apply. Under Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001), and Seventh Circuit cases like Cannon v. Armstrong Containers, Inc., 92 F.4th 688 (7th Cir. 2024), federal courts sitting in diversity apply federal common-law preclusion rules that ordinarily adopt the forum state’s preclusion law, absent conflict with federal interests.

Here, the federal court looked to Indiana’s doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, specifically the Indiana Supreme Court’s articulation in Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639 (Ind. 2023).

2. Indiana’s collateral estoppel test: Miller v. Patel

Under Miller v. Patel, collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) in Indiana requires:

A final judgment on the merits in a court of competent jurisdiction;
Identity of the issues—the precise issue must have been actually litigated and necessarily decided in the prior case; and
Mutuality of the parties—the parties (or their privies) in the subsequent case must be the same as those in the prior case.

All three elements were satisfied here.

3. Final judgments on the merits

The panel held that the following orders in the 2020 case constituted final judgments on the merits for purposes of Indiana’s collateral estoppel:

The order enforcing the settlement agreement between Browne and one of the defendants, and
The order recognizing and enforcing Ciobanu’s attorney’s lien on part of the settlement proceeds.

These orders resolved substantive rights:

The settlement order decided that the settlement was valid and enforceable, including the circumstances of Browne’s agreement to settle.
The lien order decided the propriety and amount of attorney’s fees owed to Ciobanu from the settlement, necessarily addressing allegations of overcharging, unjust enrichment, or misconduct in fee handling.

Browne had both the opportunity and, in some respects, actually availed herself of the chance to challenge those issues in the 2020 proceeding and on appeal.

4. Identity of issues between the lien/settlement decisions and the malpractice suit

Browne argued that the 2023 malpractice suit involved different claims—negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, and breach of contract—distinct from her earlier civil-rights claims against Waldo and the City of Valparaiso.

The Seventh Circuit responded by focusing not on the labels of the claims but on the underlying factual issues:

Whether Ciobanu induced or coerced Browne into the settlement;
Whether Ciobanu overcharged fees or was unjustly enriched;
Whether Ciobanu withheld or mishandled evidence relevant to the 2020 suit;
Whether her conduct in connection with the settlement and subsequent fee lien comported with legal and professional obligations.

Those factual questions were already addressed in the 2020 case:

When Judge Van Bokkelen enforced the settlement, he necessarily rejected Browne’s attacks on the validity and voluntariness of that agreement.
When he validated Ciobanu’s attorney lien and determined the proper distribution of settlement funds, he necessarily rejected Browne’s accusations that Ciobanu’s fee claims were improper or that she had been unjustly enriched.

The panel underscored that Browne could have raised—and, in several instances, did raise—the very complaints about attorney performance that she later tried to package as malpractice claims. Having had a full opportunity to litigate those issues in the first suit, she could not re-litigate them in a second suit; the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred her from doing so.

5. Mutuality of parties

The mutuality element was straightforward:

Browne was the plaintiff in both the 2020 and 2023 cases; and
Ciobanu was a party in the 2020 case by virtue of her asserted attorney’s lien, and the sole defendant in the 2023 malpractice case.

Thus, the necessary identity of parties was satisfied.

6. Alternative 12(b)(6) analysis and practical significance

Although the Seventh Circuit’s order focuses more on collateral estoppel, the panel also notes that Judge Lund alternatively found that each of Browne’s claims failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The appellate court did not need to revisit that alternative ground in detail; the issue-preclusion holding sufficed.

Practically, however, the decision signals that where:

The central factual contentions about an attorney’s conduct have already been adjudicated in fee or settlement disputes in the underlying litigation; and
A client attempts to launch a new lawsuit re-asserting those same contentions as malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, etc.,

federal courts applying state preclusion rules are likely to find the second suit barred by collateral estoppel. A malpractice claim cannot ordinarily be used as a vehicle to collaterally attack final judgments upholding a settlement and fee awards.

C. Amending Pleadings, Staying the Case, and Appellate Jurisdiction

1. Denial of leave to amend: Rule 15 and Circle Block

Browne challenged Judge Lund’s denial of her motion for leave to file a second amended complaint in the malpractice case. She argued that the proposed amendment would have corrected deficiencies and added plausible allegations of malpractice.

The panel applied the familiar standard for leave to amend under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), citing Circle Block Partners, LLC v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 44 F.4th 1014 (7th Cir. 2022). While Rule 15(a)(2) provides that leave to amend should be “freely give[n] when justice so requires,” courts have discretion to deny leave, particularly where:

The party has already amended once as a matter of course (Rule 15(a)(1));
There has been undue delay, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, or prejudice to the opposing party; or
Amendment would be futile, i.e., the new complaint would still fail to state a claim or would remain barred by preclusion.

Judge Lund noted that:

Browne had already amended once as of right.
She repeatedly tried to amend—often without complying with procedural requirements—even before being ordered to file a proper motion to amend.
Her proposed second amended complaint did not supply new, specific, non-precluded factual allegations that could cure the defects identified by the court.

On this record, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the denial of leave to amend was well within the district court’s discretion.

2. Case management: stays and scheduling orders under Rule 16 and Alicea

Browne also argued that Judge Lund abused her discretion by:

Staying the malpractice case while evaluating Browne’s pending motions; and
Failing to promptly enter a scheduling order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b).

The court invoked Alicea v. County of Cook, 88 F.4th 1209 (7th Cir. 2023), which emphasizes the district court’s broad authority to manage its docket, including using stays to control the timing and sequence of litigation when overwhelmed by motion practice, especially repetitive or frivolous filings.

Rule 16(b)(2) requires district courts to issue a scheduling order “as soon as practicable.” However, the panel pointed out:

Much of the delay in the malpractice case was attributable to Browne herself, who filed multiple, overlapping motions and attempted to amend her complaint several times.
The stay allowed the court to address and resolve the threshold motions before committing further judicial resources or forcing the parties into discovery.

Given these circumstances, the panel found no abuse of discretion. Courts are not required to plow ahead with full scheduling and discovery while dealing with serial, often meritless, motions that go to the viability of the case itself.

3. Limits on appellate jurisdiction: Rule 4(a)(4)(B)(ii) and Johnson v. Purdue

Browne also challenged the denial of her post-judgment motion for reconsideration (her Rule 60(b) motion) in the malpractice case. The panel held it lacked jurisdiction to consider that issue.

Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(B)(ii):

If a party files a notice of appeal and then files a timely Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) motion (among others),
The party must file a new or amended notice of appeal after the district court disposes of that postjudgment motion,
If they wish to obtain appellate review of the order disposing of that postjudgment motion.

Here, Browne:

Filed her notice of appeal from the judgment dismissing the malpractice case.
Then moved for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b).
Did not file an amended or new notice of appeal after the motion was denied.

Citing Johnson v. Purdue, 126 F.4th 562 (7th Cir. 2025), the panel held that because Browne failed to comply with Rule 4(a)(4)(B)(ii), the denial of the postjudgment motion was not properly before the court. The court therefore reviewed only the original judgment and the rulings that preceded it.

D. Appellate Sanctions, Filing Bar, and Vexatious Litigation

1. Rule 38 sanctions and Upchurch

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 authorizes a court of appeals to award “just damages and single or double costs to the appellee” if it determines that an appeal is frivolous.

The panel found Browne’s appeal frivolous because:

Her challenge to the dismissal of the malpractice case simply rehashed arguments already rejected in prior proceedings—chiefly, that the settlement was invalid and that Ciobanu’s attorney’s lien was improper.
She had received multiple warnings from both the district court and the Seventh Circuit against filing frivolous litigation.

Relying on Upchurch v. O’Brien, 111 F.4th 805 (7th Cir. 2024), which affirmed sanctions against a party for pursuing meritless and repetitive appeals, the panel concluded that sanctions were appropriate notwithstanding Browne’s pro se status. Pro se litigants are entitled to some solicitude, but not a license to burden courts and opposing parties with duplicative, baseless proceedings.

2. The monetary sanctions imposed

The panel imposed two forms of monetary sanction:

A fixed fine of $750.
Browne was ordered to pay a $750 sanction to the clerk of the Seventh Circuit “for her continued vexatious litigation.” She must tender a check payable to the clerk of the court within 14 days of the order.
Fee-shifting to compensate Ciobanu.
The court further ordered Browne to pay Ciobanu’s reasonable attorney’s fees for responding to the appeal. To implement this:
- Ciobanu must file a statement of her fees and costs within 14 days.
- Browne may file a response within 14 days of the statement’s filing.

3. Filing bar and Seventh Circuit practice: In re City of Chicago and Mack

Beyond monetary sanctions, the court imposed a significant filing bar:

The clerks of all federal courts in the Seventh Circuit are directed to return unfiled any papers submitted by or on behalf of Browne in civil cases unless and until she pays the full sanction imposed.
This bar explicitly excludes:
- Criminal cases, and
- Applications for writs of habeas corpus.

This mechanism is drawn from two leading Seventh Circuit decisions:

In re City of Chicago, 500 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2007), and
Support Systems International, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185 (7th Cir. 1995).

Those cases authorize the court of appeals to direct district and circuit clerks to refuse filings from litigants who have repeatedly abused the judicial process, conditioned on the litigant’s payment of outstanding sanctions. The bar is designed to:

Protect judicial resources,
Prevent repeated vexatious filings, and
Ensure that sanctions are not ignored.

4. Safety valve: possibility of future modification

Recognizing that some litigants might face genuine financial constraints, the panel followed In re City of Chicago and Mack by including a limited safety valve:

If Browne, “despite her best efforts,” remains unable to pay the sanctions in full,
She may file a motion to modify or rescind the filing bar no earlier than two years from the date of the order.

In other words, the filing bar is not necessarily permanent. It can be revisited after a substantial interval and in light of Browne’s demonstrated efforts and changed circumstances. But unless and until the sanctions are paid or modified, Browne’s ability to file civil actions in federal courts within the circuit is dramatically curtailed.

V. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion weaves together several important precedents. Briefly:

In re Golf 255, Inc., 652 F.3d 806 (7th Cir. 2011)
Reaffirms that “fraud on the court” requires grave misconduct like perjury, forgery, or judicial bribery, not simply litigation errors or ordinary fraud between the parties. Used here to define the Rule 60(d)(3) standard.
Citizens for Appropriate Rural Roads v. Foxx, 815 F.3d 1068 (7th Cir. 2016)
Emphasizes that fraud on the court is reserved for the “most extraordinary and egregious circumstances” corrupting the process itself and requires a “meaningful evidentiary showing.” Quoted to dismiss Browne’s speculative accusations of bribery and evidence concealment.
Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639 (Ind. 2023)
Indiana Supreme Court case setting out that collateral estoppel requires a final judgment on the merits, identity of issues, and mutuality of parties. Applied to bar Browne’s malpractice suit.
Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001)
Holds that the preclusive effect of a federal diversity judgment is controlled by federal common law, which generally looks to the forum state’s preclusion rules. Invoked to justify using Indiana’s collateral-estoppel doctrine.
Cannon v. Armstrong Containers, Inc., 92 F.4th 688 (7th Cir. 2024)
Seventh Circuit authority on applying state preclusion law under Semtek. Cited to confirm that Indiana’s rules of preclusion govern here.
Circle Block Partners, LLC v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 44 F.4th 1014 (7th Cir. 2022)
Discusses the discretion to deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile or comes after repeated, unsuccessful attempts to cure defects. Used to uphold denial of Browne’s motion for further amendment.
Alicea v. County of Cook, 88 F.4th 1209 (7th Cir. 2023)
Affirms the broad discretion district courts maintain to manage their dockets, including through stays and case-management orders. Supports the propriety of Judge Lund’s stay and delayed scheduling order.
Johnson v. Purdue, 126 F.4th 562 (7th Cir. 2025)
Clarifies that appellate jurisdiction over an order denying a postjudgment motion (e.g., under Rule 60(b)) exists only if the appellant files a fresh or amended notice of appeal after that order, as required by Rule 4(a)(4)(B)(ii). Applied to decline review of Browne’s motion for reconsideration.
Upchurch v. O’Brien, 111 F.4th 805 (7th Cir. 2024)
Approves appellate sanctions against a litigant who persists in frivolous or duplicative appeals. Provides direct support for sanctioning Browne under Rule 38 and awarding fees.
In re City of Chicago, 500 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2007), and Support Systems Int’l, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185 (7th Cir. 1995)
These cases authorize courts to impose filing restrictions on vexatious litigants and to condition future filing on payment of outstanding sanctions, while preserving access for criminal and habeas matters. They supply the template for the filing bar imposed on Browne.

VI. Key Legal Concepts Simplified

1. “Fraud on the court” (Rule 60(d)(3))

“Fraud on the court” is:

Not just lies by a witness, discovery misconduct, or flawed lawyering.
Instead, it is conduct that undermines the integrity of the judicial process itself—like bribing a judge, forging court orders, or inserting completely fabricated documents into the record.
It requires very strong evidence; unsupported accusations are not enough.

Rule 60(d)(3) is a safety valve for extreme cases where the normal limits of Rule 60(b) might otherwise prevent correction of a judgment obtained by truly corrupt means. It is not a vehicle to re-open every loss or to relitigate ordinary attorney mistakes.

2. Collateral estoppel (issue preclusion)

Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents a party from re-litigating an issue that:

Was actually litigated and decided in a prior case,
Resulted in a final judgment on the merits, and
Involved the same parties (or their privies).

For example: if a court already decided that a settlement was valid and that the attorney’s fee lien was proper, the client generally cannot later file a new lawsuit claiming that the settlement was coerced and the fee was unjust—those issues are already resolved.

3. Attorney’s lien

An attorney’s lien is a legal claim a lawyer has against funds owed to a client (e.g., settlement proceeds) to secure payment of the lawyer’s fees. Here:

Ciobanu filed a lien in the underlying civil-rights case based on alleged unpaid fees and costs.
The court adjudicated that lien, determining how much of the settlement fund should go to Ciobanu and how much to Browne.

Once a court adjudicates the validity and amount of such a lien, its decision can have preclusive effect on later disputes over whether the lawyer was overpaid or unjustly enriched.

4. Pro se litigant

A “pro se” litigant is someone who represents herself in court without a lawyer. Courts often give pro se parties some leeway in how filings are interpreted and how rules are applied. But:

Pro se status does not exempt a party from procedural rules.
It does not shield a party from sanctions for frivolous or abusive litigation.

5. Nonprecedential disposition

This opinion is labeled “NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION” and specifies that it may be cited only as allowed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1. That means:

It is not binding precedent in the Seventh Circuit.
It generally does not control future cases, though parties may cite it for persuasive value in limited circumstances.

Nevertheless, it provides valuable insight into how the court is currently applying doctrines such as fraud on the court, collateral estoppel, and appellate sanctions, especially in the context of pro se, vexatious litigation.

6. FRAP 38 sanctions and filing bar

Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38:

An appeal is “frivolous” if its result is obvious or the appellant’s argument is wholly without merit.
The court can award damages (often in the form of attorney’s fees) and costs to the appellee.

The Seventh Circuit takes this a step further in egregious cases by using its inherent authority, as recognized in Mack and In re City of Chicago, to bar further civil filings from a litigant until sanctions are paid.

VII. Broader Impact and Practical Implications

Even though this is a nonprecedential order, it has several practical implications:

1. For clients contemplating malpractice suits

If a former client wishes to sue a lawyer over conduct in a prior case, it is critical to recognize that:
- Any issues previously litigated and decided—such as the validity of a settlement or the reasonableness of a fee award—cannot be relitigated under the guise of malpractice.
- Failure to raise objections during the underlying case, when the opportunity exists, may forfeit the ability to press those issues later.

2. For attorneys in fee and lien disputes

Judicial validation of a fee lien not only secures payment but may also function as a form of factual adjudication that later insulates the lawyer from certain malpractice or unjust-enrichment claims founded on the same alleged misconduct.
Maintaining clear records and ensuring that fee disputes are squarely addressed in the underlying proceeding can provide significant preclusion defenses later.

3. For courts managing vexatious litigation

The decision illustrates a familiar pattern: initial judicial patience with a pro se litigant, followed by increasingly firm responses—denial of baseless motions, warnings, and ultimately sanctions and filing bars when the litigant persists.
It confirms that the Seventh Circuit is willing to impose financial sanctions and filing restrictions when a litigant repeatedly re-asserts previously resolved claims and refuses to heed warnings.

4. For appellate practitioners

The case reinforces several procedural points:
- Challenges to denial of postjudgment relief require a new or amended notice of appeal under Rule 4(a)(4)(B)(ii).
- Raising arguments that are foreclosed by final judgments and prior appeals can expose counsel and clients (or pro se appellants) to Rule 38 sanctions.
- Nonprecedential doesn’t mean inconsequential: courts may rely on such orders to justify sanctions and to signal future enforcement patterns.

5. For understanding the limits of Rule 60(d)(3)

This case underscores that Rule 60(d)(3) is a narrow escape hatch, not a broad vehicle for revisiting outcomes one is unhappy with.
Allegations like “my lawyer mishandled evidence” or “my lawyer misadvised me on settlement,” even if true, generally implicate malpractice or ethics rules, not fraud on the court.

VIII. Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s nonprecedential order in Browne v. Ciobanu is a clear, structured application of several well-established doctrines:

Fraud on the court under Rule 60(d)(3) is reserved for egregious misconduct that corrupts the judicial process itself, supported by concrete evidence—not by suspicion or dissatisfaction with counsel’s performance.
Collateral estoppel prevents re-litigation of issues already decided in prior proceedings, including settlement enforcement and attorney’s-lien adjudications, and can bar a later malpractice suit that hinges on the same factual disputes.
District court discretion over amendments, stays, and scheduling is broad, especially in the face of proliferating and duplicative motions.
Appellate jurisdiction over postjudgment rulings depends on compliance with Rule 4(a)(4)(B)(ii)’s requirement of a new or amended notice of appeal.
Frivolous appeals, particularly those that repeat already rejected arguments, can and will trigger monetary sanctions, fee-shifting, and even filing bars, even for pro se litigants.

While the opinion is not precedential, it offers a concise yet powerful reaffirmation of these principles and serves as a cautionary tale about the limits of postjudgment attacks and the consequences of vexatious litigation. It also highlights how the preclusive effect of settlements and fee rulings can effectively foreclose later attorney-malpractice suits premised on the same contested conduct.