Reaffirming the Enforceability of Non‑Negotiable Appellate Waivers and the Deference Owed to Below‑Guidelines Sentences: Commentary on United States v. Briana White

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Seventh Circuit’s nonprecedential disposition in United States v. Briana White, No. 24‑1844 (7th Cir. Nov. 21, 2025), a case that reaffirms two important themes in federal criminal practice:

The robust enforceability of appellate waivers contained in standard, largely non‑negotiable plea agreements; and
The extremely deferential review applied to below‑Guidelines sentences, particularly when a defendant seeks leniency based on family hardship or co‑defendant disparity.

Briana White pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting an armed bank robbery and to a firearm offense resulting in a death. She received a total sentence of 300 months’ imprisonment, which was significantly below the advisory Guidelines recommendation derived from a cross‑reference to first‑degree murder. On appeal, she argued (1) that her appellate waiver was unenforceable on several grounds, and (2) that her sentence was substantively unreasonable in light of her role, her lack of intent to kill, and the interests of her young children.

The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal based on the appellate waiver, and in the alternative explained that even without the waiver, the below‑Guidelines sentence would be entitled to a “nearly irrebuttable presumption” of reasonableness. Although this decision is formally labeled a “NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION,” its reasoning reflects and consolidates settled Seventh Circuit doctrine on plea‑based waivers and sentencing review.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The bank robbery and homicide

White lived with her fiancée, Hailey Gist‑Holden. Along with co‑defendants James King and Kenyon Hawkins, they planned to rob a First Midwest Bank in Gary, Indiana. Several key facts informed the district court’s and the Seventh Circuit’s view of her culpability:

White was pregnant and thus did not physically enter the bank; instead, she took a planning and coordination role.
She helped persuade King—initially reluctant—to participate, telling him she would do the robbery herself if she were not pregnant.
The robbers used two firearms that belonged to White.
During the robbery, she coordinated communications by setting up a three‑way call between the two robbers inside the bank (Gist‑Holden and King) and the getaway driver (Hawkins).
She downloaded and monitored a police scanner app to detect law enforcement response.

During the robbery, Gist‑Holden shot and killed Robert Castellano, a retired police officer working as a security guard at the bank. Under federal law, White’s active participation in planning and facilitating the crime made her responsible as an aider and abettor for the bank robbery and for the firearm offense tied to the homicide, regardless of whether she anticipated the killing.

B. Charges, plea agreement, and appellate waiver

White pleaded guilty to:

Armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d); and
Discharge of a firearm during a crime of violence resulting in murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).

The written plea agreement contained a broad appellate waiver. White:

Expressly waived her right to appeal or otherwise contest her conviction and “all components” of her sentence;
Reserved only the right to raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

In exchange, the government agreed:

To recommend reductions for acceptance of responsibility; and
To recommend a sentence at the minimum of the applicable Guidelines range.

At the Rule 11 change‑of‑plea hearing, the district court:

Explained in detail that White was waiving the right to appeal any decisions concerning her conviction and sentence, as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N);
Emphasized that, effectively, he would be “the last judge” to decide her case;
Heard the government state that defense counsel had requested a modification to allow an appeal if the court exceeded the parties’ recommendation, but the government refused.

The court found a sufficient factual basis and accepted the plea as knowing and voluntary.

C. Sentencing

The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) calculated the United States Sentencing Guidelines as follows for the armed bank robbery count:

Base offense level: 43, via a cross‑reference under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(c)(1) to the homicide guideline, § 2A1.1(a) (first‑degree murder).
Acceptance of responsibility: −3 levels under § 3E1.1(a)–(b).
Total offense level: 40.
Criminal history category: I.
Statutory maximum: 300 months for the robbery count, which truncated the otherwise higher Guidelines range to 292–300 months.

For the § 924(c) firearm count, the law required:

A statutory mandatory minimum term of 10 years (120 months); and
A maximum of life imprisonment, to run consecutively to the sentence on the robbery count.

The PSR recommended a Guideline‑consistent sentence of:

292 months for the robbery; plus
120 consecutive months for the firearm count;
for a total of 412 months.

The government supported the PSR’s calculation and recommended a Guidelines sentence in line with that analysis. White, by contrast, sought a sentence of no more than 157 months, relying primarily on:

The detrimental impact of long‑term parental incarceration on children; and
Her asserted lack of knowledge that Gist‑Holden would kill Mr. Castellano.

At sentencing, the district court:

Overruled White’s objections to the Guidelines calculation and adopted the PSR;
Considered White’s testimony, letters of support, and victim impact statements;
Reviewed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in detail.

The court stressed:

The violent nature of the offense and White’s active participation;
Her high level of education (two master’s degrees, including one in criminal justice, and work toward a Ph.D.)—emphasizing that she understood the risks and consequences of such conduct;
The serious burden that her incarceration would impose on her four children, while noting that this hardship flowed from her own choices;
The need to avoid unwarranted disparities with co‑defendants, recognizing that King and Hawkins received lower sentences (192 and 210 months) because they cooperated and testified against Gist‑Holden, while White did not.

Ultimately, the district court varied significantly below the robbery Guidelines range and imposed:

180 months for the armed bank robbery (far below the 292–300 month advisory range), plus
120 months consecutive for the § 924(c) count;
for a total of 300 months (25 years).

The court then advised White about appeal procedures but reminded her that she had waived her right to appeal in the plea agreement.

D. The appeal

On appeal, White raised two principal challenges:

Appellate waiver enforceability. She argued the waiver was:
- Ambiguous because it did not explicitly say she was waiving challenges to the length of her sentence;
- Not voluntary, because it was a standard, “non‑negotiable” term used in all or most plea agreements in the Northern District of Indiana;
- Unsupported by consideration.
Substantive reasonableness. Even if the waiver were valid, she argued that enforcing it would cause a miscarriage of justice because:
- The district court did not sufficiently weigh the impact on her children; and
- There was an unwarranted disparity between her sentence and those of the (arguably more culpable) co‑defendants King and Hawkins.

III. Summary of the Seventh Circuit’s Disposition

The Seventh Circuit, applying de novo review to the enforceability of the appellate waiver, held:

The waiver was valid: it was express, unambiguous, knowing, and voluntary.
The waiver was supported by consideration, given the government’s concessions (acceptance‑of‑responsibility recommendation and recommendation for the low end of the Guidelines).
No “miscarriage of justice” or unlawful‑sentence exception applied: the sentence was within statutory limits and consistent with the plea agreement.

The court therefore dismissed the appeal based on the waiver. It nonetheless proceeded to explain that, even without the waiver:

White’s below‑Guidelines sentence would enjoy a “nearly irrebuttable presumption” of substantive reasonableness under United States v. Miller;
The district court had in fact considered the impact on her children and her personal circumstances, but reasonably assigned less weight to those factors;
Any disparity with co‑defendants’ sentences was warranted because King and Hawkins materially cooperated with the government, while White did not, consistent with United States v. Harris.

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed in its entirety.

IV. Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

A. Enforceability of the appellate waiver

1. Standard of review and baseline rule

The Seventh Circuit reviews the enforceability of appellate waivers de novo. Citing United States v. Quintero, 618 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2010), the panel reiterated that:

Defendants may waive their right to appeal in a written plea agreement; and
Such waivers are enforceable when they are:
- Knowing and voluntary; and
- Express and unambiguous as to the rights relinquished.

This reflects the longstanding view that plea agreements are contracts: if a defendant knowingly trades appellate rights for concessions, the bargain will be honored.

2. Alleged ambiguity: does “all components” include sentence length?

White argued that the waiver was ambiguous because it did not explicitly mention the length of any prison term. She contended that without such specificity, she could not knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to challenge the sentence’s duration.

The court rejected this argument as contrary to common sense and prior circuit law. Relying on United States v. Mobley, 833 F.3d 797 (7th Cir. 2016), the panel held that:

The length of imprisonment is plainly a “component” of the sentence.

Since the waiver covered “all components” of her sentence, the court found no ambiguity: challenges to the length of the sentence fell squarely within the waiver’s scope. The court thus treated White’s argument as an attempt to re‑label a standard, clear waiver as ambiguous in order to avoid its consequences.

3. Voluntariness and non‑negotiable plea terms

White next argued that the appellate waiver was not voluntary because it was a standard, non‑negotiable term included in “all or most” plea agreements in the Northern District of Indiana. In essence, she claimed that the lack of individualized negotiation and the government’s refusal to modify the clause rendered it coercive.

The Seventh Circuit held that this theory misunderstands what “voluntary” means in the context of plea bargaining:

White was not required to plead guilty; she could have gone to trial.
She was fully informed of the waiver’s content during the Rule 11 colloquy and acknowledged that she understood it.
The government’s refusal to negotiate over a term it routinely includes in plea agreements does not constitute coercion.

Citing United States v. McGuire, 796 F.3d 712, 716–17 (7th Cir. 2015), the court confirmed that:

The government’s insistence on standardized waiver provisions in plea agreements does not invalidate those waivers as involuntary or coerced.

In other words, “take‑it‑or‑leave‑it” plea offers with appellate waivers remain constitutionally acceptable, so long as the defendant knowingly chooses to accept them and the court ensures understanding during the Rule 11 colloquy.

4. Consideration for the waiver

White further asserted that her waiver was invalid for lack of consideration—that she received nothing of value in exchange for relinquishing her appellate rights.

The panel rejected this contention by pointing to the clear benefits White obtained:

A three‑level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, which materially lowered her advisory Guidelines range; and
The government’s agreement to recommend the minimum of the Guidelines range, which helped her avoid the statutory maximum and likely contributed to the court’s choice to vary further downward.

The court cited United States v. Carson, 855 F.3d 828, 831 (7th Cir. 2017), for the principle that such prosecutorial concessions suffice as consideration in this context. The logic is simple: the government is not obliged to offer plea discounts or reduced recommendations; when it does so in exchange for a waiver of appellate rights, the defendant has received something concrete in return.

Thus, the court concluded that the appellate waiver was:

Express and unambiguous (covering all components of the sentence, including its length);
Knowing and voluntary (despite its standard, non‑negotiable character); and
Supported by valid consideration.

B. The “miscarriage of justice” or unlawful‑sentence exception

1. Out‑of‑circuit formulations

White argued in the alternative that even if her waiver was valid, enforcing it in this particular case would produce a “miscarriage of justice.” The Seventh Circuit noted that several circuits have recognized a narrow equitable exception to enforcing appellate waivers:

United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001);
United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 2001).

These cases, as summarized by the White panel, typically limit the exception to extreme situations—such as:

Sentences exceeding a statutory maximum;
Sentences imposed in violation of the terms of the plea agreement itself; or
Sentences based on constitutionally impermissible factors (e.g., race).

2. Seventh Circuit’s formulation: unauthorized sentences

The Seventh Circuit has historically eschewed the “miscarriage of justice” label in favor of a slightly different formulation, but the substance is similar. Citing United States v. Worthen, 842 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 2016), the White panel reiterated:

The court “could not enforce a sentence that the law does not authorize,” even in the presence of a valid waiver.

In Worthen, the court, in turn, relied on United States v. Gibson, 356 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 2004). There, it vacated a 262‑month sentence despite an appellate waiver because the statutory maximum was only 60 months. That is, a defendant cannot waive objection to a sentence that is illegal in the sense of exceeding statutory limits or being otherwise unauthorized by law.

Thus, the Seventh Circuit’s “exception” is effectively coextensive with the unlawful‑sentence scenarios identified in the First, Third, and Eighth Circuits’ miscarriage‑of‑justice approach, even if described differently.

3. Application to White’s case

The panel held that White’s case did not fall within any such narrow exception:

Her total sentence of 300 months did not exceed any statutory maximum for either count.
It did not conflict with the plea agreement; indeed, it was more lenient than the Guidelines range suggested.
There was no indication that the sentence was driven by constitutionally impermissible considerations such as race.

White’s claim of a “miscarriage of justice” rested instead on:

Her personal belief that the sentence was too harsh given her lesser role and lack of homicidal intent;
The hardship imposed on her children; and
Alleged unwarranted disparities relative to co‑defendants who physically committed the robbery.

The Seventh Circuit made clear that such equities, while relevant to sentencing, do not create an exception to a valid appellate waiver. A defendant’s disagreement with the court’s weighing of § 3553(a) factors is not a miscarriage of justice in this doctrinal sense. Consequently, the panel enforced the waiver and dismissed the appeal.

C. Substantive reasonableness (in the alternative)

Although the case was resolved on the waiver, the court addressed White’s substantive reasonableness arguments as an alternative holding, or at least a reinforcing explanation. This portion of the opinion underscores the difficulty of overturning a below‑Guidelines sentence on substantive grounds.

1. The “nearly irrebuttable” presumption for below‑Guidelines sentences

Citing United States v. Miller, 829 F.3d 519, 527 (7th Cir. 2016), the court reiterated that a below‑Guidelines sentence carries a:

“Nearly irrebuttable presumption” of substantive reasonableness.

In practice, this means:

Appellate courts presume that a sentence at or below the properly calculated advisory Guidelines range is reasonable; and
It is extraordinarily difficult for a defendant to overcome this presumption absent extreme or irrational sentencing decisions.

Here, the district court:

Correctly calculated a very high Guidelines range for the robbery (292–300 months) based on the cross‑reference to first‑degree murder;
Then varied downward by over nine years on that count (180 months versus at least 292 months);
Imposed only the mandatory minimum on the § 924(c) count.

Thus, both the robbery sentence and the total sentence were not just within, but substantially below, what the Guidelines contemplated for a conspiracy that resulted in a homicide.

2. Consideration of the impact on White’s children

White argued that the district court failed to give adequate consideration to the harm that her lengthy imprisonment would cause her four young children. The panel disagreed, noting that the sentencing judge explicitly:

Acknowledged that the decision was “weighty”;
Recognized and expressed sympathy for the burden her incarceration would impose on the children and the relatives who would raise them;
Nevertheless concluded that this hardship was a foreseeable consequence of White’s voluntary criminal choices.

The Seventh Circuit emphasized a key point about substantive reasonableness review:

A defendant’s disagreement with the weight assigned by the district court to a properly considered factor does not render the sentence substantively unreasonable.

This reflects a core principle of abuse‑of‑discretion review: sentencing judges have wide latitude in how they balance competing § 3553(a) factors, and appellate courts will not re‑weigh those factors simply because the defendant would have placed more emphasis on family circumstances.

3. Co‑defendant disparities and cooperation

White also claimed that her sentence was unreasonably harsh compared to those of King (192 months) and Hawkins (210 months), whom she portrayed as more culpable because they physically entered the bank and more directly facilitated the shooting.

The district court explicitly addressed this argument, and the Seventh Circuit endorsed its reasoning:

King and Hawkins cooperated with the government and testified against Gist‑Holden at trial.
White did not cooperate.

Relying on United States v. Harris, 791 F.3d 772, 782 (7th Cir. 2015), the court reiterated that:

Sentencing disparities caused by cooperation are not “unwarranted” within the meaning of § 3553(a)(6); they reflect a legitimate, systemic policy of rewarding defendants who assist the government.

Moreover, the court noted that White was responsible for helping bring a reluctant co‑conspirator (King) into the scheme, provided firearms, and coordinated crucial aspects of the crime. Even if she did not pull the trigger, her central planning role and her educational background underscored her culpability.

Because White was not similarly situated to her co‑defendants—given their cooperation and her lack thereof—she could not make out an “unwarranted disparity” claim.

V. Precedents and Authorities Discussed

A. Key Seventh Circuit authorities

United States v. Quintero, 618 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2010)
Establishes that appellate waivers are enforceable if they are knowing, voluntary, and express, and confirms de novo review of waiver enforceability.
United States v. Mobley, 833 F.3d 797 (7th Cir. 2016)
Clarifies that the length of a sentence is a component of the sentence and thus falls within the scope of a waiver that covers “all components.”
United States v. McGuire, 796 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2015)
Holds that the government’s refusal to negotiate over an appellate waiver provision does not render the waiver involuntary or coerced; standardized plea terms remain enforceable.
United States v. Carson, 855 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2017)
Explains that a defendant receives adequate consideration for a waiver when the government offers sentencing concessions (such as acceptance‑of‑responsibility benefits or favorable recommendations) in return.
United States v. Worthen, 842 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 2016)
Affirms that the court will not enforce appellate waivers to uphold a sentence that the law does not authorize (e.g., above a statutory maximum), aligning with earlier cases like Gibson.
United States v. Gibson, 356 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 2004)
Vacated a 262‑month sentence where the statutory maximum was 60 months, despite an appellate waiver—illustrating that waivers cannot validate illegal sentences.
United States v. Miller, 829 F.3d 519 (7th Cir. 2016)
Describes the presumption of reasonableness for below‑Guidelines sentences as “nearly irrebuttable,” underscoring the deference given to district courts that sentence below the advisory range.
United States v. Harris, 791 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 2015)
Holds that disparities resulting from defendants’ cooperation are not “unwarranted” under § 3553(a)(6), legitimizing lower sentences for cooperating co‑conspirators compared with non‑cooperating ones.

B. Out‑of‑circuit “miscarriage of justice” authorities

United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001)
Recognizes an equitable “miscarriage of justice” exception to enforcing appellate waivers in rare cases (e.g., illegal sentences, departures from plea terms, or unconstitutional considerations).
United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2003)
Similar to Teeter, limits the exception to narrow situations such as unauthorized sentences or constitutional violations.
United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 2001)
Adopts a comparable approach in the Third Circuit, stressing that departures from waivers are appropriate only to prevent manifest injustice.

VI. Clarifying Complex Legal Concepts

Several legal concepts are central to understanding United States v. White:

Appellate waiver
A provision in a plea agreement in which a defendant agrees not to appeal the conviction or sentence (or both), subject to limited exceptions (often ineffective assistance of counsel or illegal sentences).
Knowing and voluntary
A waiver is “knowing” if the defendant understands what rights she is giving up; it is “voluntary” if it is the product of free choice, not coercion. The Rule 11 hearing is designed to ensure both.
Consideration (in plea agreements)
Contract law concept: each party must receive something of value. In criminal pleas, the defendant typically gains concessions (reduced charges, recommendations, or Guidelines reductions) in exchange for pleading guilty and waiving rights.
Sentencing Guidelines
Advisory federal guidelines that suggest a sentencing range based on offense severity (offense level) and criminal history. Courts must calculate and consider the range but are not bound to follow it.
Below‑Guidelines sentence
A sentence lower than the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range. Such sentences are generally presumed reasonable on appeal, especially in the Seventh Circuit.
Substantive reasonableness
An appellate standard focusing on whether the length and nature of a sentence are justified by the § 3553(a) factors. The question is not whether the appellate court would have imposed the same sentence, but whether the chosen sentence falls within the wide range of reasonable outcomes.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors
Statutory considerations that guide sentencing, including the nature of the offense, the defendant’s history and characteristics, deterrence, protection of the public, the need to avoid unwarranted disparities, and the kinds of sentences available.
Unwarranted sentencing disparities
Differences in sentences among similarly situated defendants that lack a legitimate basis. Disparities based on cooperation agreements are generally considered warranted.
Mandatory minimum and consecutive sentence
Some statutes require a minimum prison term and require that term to be served in addition to (and consecutive to) other sentences, limiting judicial discretion.
Nonprecedential disposition and Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
A “nonprecedential” decision does not bind future panels but may be cited for its persuasive value under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1. It still reflects the court’s application of existing law.

VII. Impact and Practical Implications

A. Plea bargaining and appellate waivers in the Seventh Circuit

White reinforces existing Seventh Circuit doctrine that:

Broad appellate waivers are routinely enforceable;
Standard, non‑negotiated waiver provisions do not, standing alone, raise voluntariness concerns;
Consideration for waivers can take the form of Guidelines concessions and government recommendations.

For defense counsel, this underscores the importance of:

Explaining to clients that accepting a plea with a waiver typically forecloses later challenges to the length of the sentence, even if the judge imposes a harsh term within statutory limits;
Recognizing that arguments about family hardship and relative culpability will usually need to be fully developed at sentencing rather than preserved for appeal.

B. Sentencing advocacy: children and family hardship

The case also illustrates the limited traction that “children of incarcerated parents” arguments often have on appeal in serious violent cases. While such considerations may contribute to a downward variance at sentencing, they rarely support a finding that a below‑Guidelines sentence is substantively unreasonable.

Practically, defendants hoping to use such arguments must:

Develop a robust factual record (e.g., specific evidence of exceptional hardship); and
Understand that even compelling family circumstances are weighed against the seriousness of the offense and other § 3553(a) factors.

C. Co‑defendant disparities and cooperation

White reaffirms a well‑entrenched principle: prosecutors may offer, and courts may impose, substantial sentencing discounts for cooperation, even where a cooperator’s conduct was more direct or violent than that of a non‑cooperating defendant. Such disparities are not “unwarranted” but are instead a deliberate feature of the system.

For defendants and counsel, this highlights:

The powerful sentencing leverage that cooperation can offer; and
The difficulty of challenging co‑defendant disparities on appeal when they arise from differential cooperation with the government.

D. District courts: Rule 11 colloquies and record‑building

The decision also shows the importance of:

Careful Rule 11 colloquies that explicitly explain the scope of appellate waivers; and
Thorough on‑the‑record consideration of § 3553(a) factors, including family impact and co‑defendant comparisons.

The sentencing judge in White’s case:

Made a clear record of explaining the appellate waiver and its consequences; and
Addressed each of White’s main mitigation arguments explicitly, which made it straightforward for the Seventh Circuit to conclude the sentence was reasonable.

VIII. Conclusion

Although designated nonprecedential, United States v. Briana White is an instructive illustration of how the Seventh Circuit approaches two recurring practical issues:

The enforceability of broad, standardized appellate waivers in plea agreements; and
The high level of deference afforded to below‑Guidelines sentences on substantive reasonableness review.

The panel reaffirmed that:

An appellate waiver that is express, unambiguous, knowing, and voluntary—supported by even modest prosecutorial concessions—will almost always be enforced;
Arguments based on personal hardship, the impact on children, or co‑defendant disparity generally do not qualify as “miscarriages of justice” capable of defeating an otherwise valid waiver;
A sentence significantly below a correctly calculated Guidelines range, especially in a serious violent case involving a death, is almost impossible to overturn as substantively unreasonable.

For practitioners, White serves as a cautionary reminder: once a defendant enters into a plea agreement with a robust appellate waiver, substantive sentencing challenges—however sympathetic the personal circumstances—are unlikely to find a receptive audience on appeal, particularly in the Seventh Circuit’s current doctrinal framework.