Introduction

The United States Supreme Court case Thomas D. Arthur v. Jefferson S. Dunn, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, et al. (137 S. Ct. 725, 2017) serves as a pivotal point in the ongoing discourse surrounding the constitutionality of lethal injection protocols under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. This commentary examines the dissenting opinion authored by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, which challenges the majority's decision to deny certiorari, thereby refusing to review the lower court's ruling. The case delves into whether Alabama's lethal injection method, specifically its use of midazolam, adheres to the standards set forth in previous landmark cases such as BAZE v. REES and Glossip v. Gross.

Summary of the Judgment

In this case, Thomas Arthur, a death row inmate in Alabama, contended that the state's lethal injection protocol violates the Eighth Amendment by posing a substantial risk of severe pain and suffering. He further proposed death by firing squad as a "known and available" alternative method of execution. The District Court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals denied Arthur's claims, primarily because Alabama law does not explicitly authorize execution by firing squad, rendering it an unavailable alternative under the standards set by Glossip v. Gross.

The Supreme Court, however, denied the petition for a writ of certiorari, effectively upholding the lower courts' decisions. Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Breyer, dissented from this denial, arguing that the lower courts improperly constrained the States' discretion in selecting execution methods and failed to adequately consider the constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishments.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The majority and dissenting opinions heavily reference two seminal cases: BAZE v. REES (553 U.S. 35, 2008) and Glossip v. Gross (576 U.S. ___, 2015).

• BAZE v. REES: Established that lethal injection protocols do not inherently violate the Eighth Amendment, provided they present a minimal risk of severe pain and that the methods are executed competently.
• Glossip v. Gross: Clarified that inmates challenging lethal injection protocols must demonstrate that the method presents a substantial risk of severe pain and must propose a "known and available" alternative method of execution.

In Arthur v. Dunn, the dissent argues that the Eleventh Circuit misapplied these precedents by requiring state authorization for alternative execution methods, thereby undermining the constitutional protections intended by Glossip.

Legal Reasoning

Justice Sotomayor's dissent centers on the interpretation of the "known and available" standard established in Glossip. She contends that the lower courts erroneously concluded that Alabama's statute does not inherently allow for execution by firing squad, solely based on its current statutory language. According to Sotomayor, this interpretation neglects the flexibility intended by the constitutional requirement for States to provide less cruel alternatives when current methods are shown to be gruesome.

Furthermore, Sotomayor criticizes the Eleventh Circuit for:

• Overlooking substantial expert evidence indicating that midazolam may not effectively prevent pain during execution.
• Misapplying the doctrine of laches to bar Arthur's claims, despite timely attempts to amend his complaints post-Baze.
• Failing to recognize Alabama's statutory provision allowing for any constitutional method of execution if lethal injection is deemed unconstitutional.

The dissent emphasizes that the Constitution supersedes state statutes, and thus, States cannot insulate their execution methods from judicial review by legislation alone.

Impact

The denial of certiorari in this case leaves in place the Eleventh Circuit's restrictive interpretation, potentially allowing States to avoid addressing unconstitutional execution methods by merely not listing alternatives legislatively. Justice Sotomayor warns that this undermines the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishments by permitting States to preemptively exclude less cruel methods through statutory means.

Should the Supreme Court revisit this issue, it could reaffirm or reshape the standards for evaluating lethal injection protocols, ensuring that constitutional protections are not circumvented by state legislation. This has profound implications for the death penalty's administration nationwide, potentially leading to more rigorous judicial oversight of execution methods.

Complex Concepts Simplified

"Known and Available" Alternative

Under the Glossip decision, when challenging a lethal injection protocol, inmates must present an alternative method of execution that is not only recognized but also practicable for the State to implement. This means the alternative must be something the State can realistically adopt without requiring new legislation or facing logistical barriers.

Doctrine of Laches

The doctrine of laches is a legal principle that prevents parties from bringing claims too late, which could unfairly prejudice the opposing party. In this case, the Eleventh Circuit applied laches to bar Arthur's claims, suggesting that he did not act promptly after the Baze decision to seek a firing squad alternative. Justice Sotomayor disputes this application, arguing that Arthur's attempts to amend his complaint occurred within an appropriate timeframe.

Midazolam in Lethal Injection

Midazolam is a benzodiazepine used to sedate individuals before administering paralytic agents and potassium chloride to cause death. Critics argue that midazolam may not reliably render individuals unconscious, potentially allowing them to experience pain upon the administration of subsequent drugs. The effectiveness of midazolam is central to debates over the humanity and constitutionality of lethal injection protocols.

Conclusion

Thomas D. Arthur v. Jefferson S. Dunn underscores the critical tension between state autonomy in administering capital punishment and the imperative to adhere to constitutional safeguards against cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Sotomayor's dissent highlights significant judicial concerns regarding the lower courts' interpretation of the "known and available" standard, arguing for a more robust role of the judiciary in ensuring that execution methods do not inflict undue suffering.

The case serves as a catalyst for ongoing legal debates about the death penalty's execution methods, emphasizing the need for continuous judicial scrutiny and potential legislative reform to align state practices with constitutional mandates. As societal standards evolve, so too must the legal frameworks that govern the most severe forms of punishment, ensuring that they reflect dignity, humanity, and constitutional principles.