Reaffirming the “One Central Reason” Nexus and CAT Acquiescence Requirements in Private-Actor Extortion Cases: Commentary on Baldiviezo Castro v. Bondi (2d Cir. Summary Order)

Note on precedential status: This is a Second Circuit summary order issued on November 5, 2025, which “does not have precedential effect.” Even so, it offers instructive guidance on the proof burdens for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) relief when the feared harm stems from private criminal actors engaged in extortionary violence.

Introduction

This case, Baldiviezo Castro v. Bondi, arises from a petition for review filed by a Bolivian family—lead applicant Solange Katerine Baldiviezo Castro, her husband Ajoy Poddar, and their minor daughter—seeking relief from removal based on alleged persecution and torture at the hands of a cartel-linked lender and associates. The petitioners challenged a February 9, 2024 Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision that affirmed the Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s) August 23, 2023 denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. The Second Circuit (Judges Jacobs, Leval, and Lohier) denied the petition.

At the core of the case are three legal issues:

Whether the alleged harm, primarily extortion and violence by private actors, bore the requisite “nexus” to a protected ground (race, religion, nationality, particular social group, political opinion) for asylum and withholding.
Whether the record established that it is more likely than not that the petitioners would be subjected to torture with the consent or acquiescence of Bolivian officials for CAT purposes.
Whether any due process violations occurred and, if so, whether such claims were properly exhausted before the BIA.

The case also presents procedural nuances: (1) the court reviewed the IJ decision as modified by the BIA, excluding grounds the BIA did not reach; (2) the petitioners did not challenge the agency’s alternative order of removal to Bangladesh (relevant to Mr. Poddar) or the withholding determination as to Bangladesh; and (3) certain arguments—including an asserted religion-based theory and a due process claim—were deemed abandoned or unexhausted.

Summary of the Opinion

Asylum and withholding of removal were properly denied for lack of nexus. The Second Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the agency’s finding that the cartel-linked lender’s motive was financial, not based on any protected ground. The court also found the petitioners abandoned certain theories (notably, religion) by failing to brief them.
Particular social group (PSG) theories tied to borrowing from gangs or resisting gang abuse failed at the nexus stage even assuming cognizability. The record did not show animus toward the group(s), as distinct from ordinary criminal motives.
CAT protection was properly denied. The court agreed that the record did not compel a conclusion that Bolivian officials would acquiesce in torture; the police response to an incident and mixed country conditions evidence undermined the claim of likely governmental acquiescence or willful blindness.
Due process arguments were unexhausted and, in any event, not substantiated by a showing that the petitioners were denied a full and fair hearing.
The petition for review was denied, and all pending motions and applications were denied with stays vacated.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Department of Justice, 426 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2005): The court reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA, omitting grounds the BIA did not reach. This frames the scope of appellate review.
Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2013); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B): Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo; factual findings under the deferential substantial evidence standard, which makes administrative fact findings conclusive unless no reasonable adjudicator could agree.
8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A); Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103 (2d Cir. 2022): The “one central reason” causation standard applies to both asylum and withholding. This is crucial where criminal motives (e.g., extortion) predominate.
Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 1999): General crime and violence are not grounds for asylum or withholding.
Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540 (2d Cir. 2005): Applicants must show, with direct or circumstantial evidence, that the persecutor’s motive arises from a protected ground.
Edimo-Doualla v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2006): Nexus determinations are subject to substantial evidence review.
Pinel-Gomez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 523 (2d Cir. 2022): Even if testimony is credible, it may still be insufficient if it lacks specific facts to meet the burden of proof. This rebuts any assertion that credibility alone compels relief.
Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676 (2d Cir. 2023); Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1998): Issues not raised or insufficiently briefed are abandoned/waived on appeal.
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985): Persecution entails harm to punish a protected characteristic; PSG doctrine roots (immutability) and the need to distinguish ordinary criminality from persecutory animus.
Garcia-Aranda v. Garland, 53 F.4th 752 (2d Cir. 2022); Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007): “Perceived ability to pay” and generalized victimization by ordinary criminals do not satisfy protected ground or PSG nexus requirements.
CAT Framework: 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1), (a)(7); Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland, 3 F.4th 569 (2d Cir. 2021); Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2004); Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2012). These clarify the burden (“more likely than not”), define acquiescence (prior awareness and breach of duty; willful blindness suffices), and confirm that likelihood-of-future-harm findings are factual.
Vera Punin v. Garland, 108 F.4th 114 (2d Cir. 2024); Ud Din v. Garland, 72 F.4th 411 (2d Cir. 2023): Issue exhaustion is mandatory where raised by the government; arguments must closely match those presented to the BIA.
Burger v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2007): Due process is implicated only when the petitioner is denied a full and fair opportunity to present claims or fundamental fairness is otherwise lacking.

Legal Reasoning

1) Asylum and Withholding: Nexus to a Protected Ground

The court affirmed the agency’s determination that the extortionate and violent acts by a cartel-affiliated lender and associates were motivated by financial gain, not by animus tied to any protected characteristic. The petitioners’ principal narrative involved borrowing capital for a business, followed by assaults and threats when repayment demands weren’t met. This scenario, without more, falls squarely within the Second Circuit’s repeated holdings that ordinary criminal motives—extortion, debt collection, “perceived ability to pay,” asserting control—do not establish persecution “on account of” a protected ground (Melgar de Torres; Ucelo-Gomez; Garcia-Aranda).

Two additional facets solidified the court’s nexus analysis:

Religion theory abandoned: Although the record included a stray remark by a collector questioning why the lead applicant married someone of a different faith (she is Christian; her husband is Hindu), the petitioners did not brief the religion-based claim on appeal. The court deemed it abandoned (Debique; Norton). Even if considered, the passing comment, set against the context of a collection attempt, did not compel a finding that religion was “one central reason” for the harm (Quituizaca; Acosta).
PSG theories assumed arguendo but fail on nexus: The IJ and BIA did not rest on PSG cognizability questions. Instead, even assuming the proposed groups—such as “people who borrowed money from gangs/cartels” or “those who resist gang recruitment/abuse”—were cognizable, the record did not show that the persecutors were motivated by antipathy toward the groups per se, as opposed to ordinary criminal objectives (Quituizaca; Acosta). This analytic move underscores that even a viable PSG does not suffice absent proof that group membership is at least one central reason for the harm.

Finally, the panel addressed a common misconception: a positive credibility finding does not automatically meet the ultimate burden. Citing Pinel-Gomez, the court reiterated that credible testimony may nonetheless be insufficient if it lacks specific facts establishing refugee status under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).

2) CAT: Government Acquiescence and Willful Blindness

For CAT relief, the petitioners bore the burden to show that they would more likely than not be tortured by or with the acquiescence of Bolivian officials (8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1)). Acquiescence requires prior awareness and a breach of legal duty to intervene; willful blindness suffices (8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7); Khouzam).

Key record points undermine the claim of likely acquiescence:

Police response: After an incident in which gunfire occurred, neighbors called the police, who responded and the assailants fled. Although no further action followed that specific response, the lead applicant declined to file a formal complaint at that time, weakening the causal inference of purposeful non-intervention or tolerance.
Country conditions: The evidence reflected widespread corruption and limited capacity to combat organized crime, but also government efforts to reduce such violence. Mixed evidence of state effectiveness does not compel a finding of likely acquiescence to torture.
Factual deference: Whether future torture and governmental acquiescence are “more likely than not” is a factual determination reviewed for substantial evidence (Hui Lin Huang; Quintanilla-Mejia). The record did not compel a contrary finding.

3) Due Process: Exhaustion and Substantive Showing

The due process claim was not exhausted before the BIA. Under Vera Punin and Ud Din, a court will not consider an argument that cannot be closely matched to one presented to the BIA when the government raises exhaustion. Substantively, even if reached, the petitioners did not articulate how they were denied a full and fair hearing (Burger). The court thus rejected this challenge both procedurally and on the merits.

Impact and Implications

Reaffirmation of “nexus” rigor in private-actor violence cases: Petitioners facing gang/cartel extortion must marshal concrete evidence that a protected characteristic is a central motive for the harm—more than mere evidence of opportunistic crime or wealth extraction. Passing remarks unrelated to the core motive are unlikely to satisfy “one central reason.”
PSG claims in extortion contexts: Even if a proposed PSG might be cognizable, failure on the nexus element can be outcome-determinative. Practitioners should focus as much on motive evidence as on PSG formulation.
CAT acquiescence proof: Evidence that police sometimes respond, even imperfectly, and that the state takes steps to combat crime, generally undercuts assertions of willful blindness. To prevail, applicants should develop record evidence of (a) prior awareness or pervasive local collusion, (b) specific failures to intervene despite notice, and (c) concrete reasons the state will not act in their particular case.
Issue preservation: The decision underscores the importance of briefing all theories advanced below. Abandonment and exhaustion doctrines are strictly enforced; unbriefed claims are treated as waived and unexhausted due process claims will not be entertained.
Standards of review matter: The substantial evidence standard is highly deferential. Petitioners must build a record that compels—not merely supports—findings in their favor on nexus and likely acquiescence.
Derivative beneficiaries and alternative removal orders: Where derivative applicants rely solely on the principal’s claim, their fate rises and falls with the principal. Additionally, unchallenged alternative country designations (e.g., Bangladesh for Mr. Poddar) are treated as conceded.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Nexus: The causal link between the harm feared and a protected ground. It is not enough that harm occurs; it must occur “because of” (and, in this circuit, with “one central reason” being) a protected characteristic.
Particular Social Group (PSG): A protected ground defined by a group with a common, immutable characteristic, social distinction, and particularity. Even a cognizable PSG does not suffice without nexus.
Ordinary criminality vs. persecution: Extortion, debt collection, and opportunistic violence for financial gain are generally “ordinary crime,” not persecution “on account of” a protected ground, absent evidence of protected-ground animus.
CAT acquiescence and willful blindness: The government need not intend the harm; it suffices if officials know of (or are willfully blind to) impending torture and breach a duty to prevent it. Ineffectiveness is not the same as acquiescence; the focus is on prior awareness and a failure to intervene.
Substantial evidence review: A deferential standard. The court asks whether the record compels a conclusion contrary to the agency’s—not whether it might support a different view.
Issue exhaustion and abandonment: Arguments must be raised to the BIA to be reviewable in court. On appeal, theories not developed in the brief are deemed abandoned.
Review “as modified by the BIA”: The court reviews the IJ’s reasoning after subtracting any grounds the BIA declined to reach, ensuring alignment with the agency’s actual basis for decision.

Conclusion

Although non-precedential, Baldiviezo Castro v. Bondi robustly reinforces two pillars of immigration jurisprudence in private-actor violence cases: (1) the stringent “one central reason” nexus requirement for asylum and withholding where extortion and debt collection are at issue, and (2) the demanding evidentiary showing for CAT relief requiring likely government acquiescence or willful blindness. The decision also underscores strict enforcement of abandonment and issue exhaustion rules and clarifies that credibility alone will not carry a claim absent specific, persuasive facts that meet statutory burdens.

For practitioners, the message is clear: develop record evidence tightly linking harm to protected-ground animus, document concrete instances of state knowledge and non-intervention for CAT, and preserve every theory at both the BIA and court stages. For adjudicators and courts, the order echoes existing Second Circuit doctrine that distinguishes ordinary criminal violence from protected-ground persecution and treats mixed state capacity and response evidence as insufficient, without more, to compel findings of acquiescence.