Reaffirming the “Crime-of-Violence” Status of Kentucky Assault under Extreme Emotional Disturbance: United States v. Joshua Delmare Habern

Introduction

In United States v. Joshua Delmare Habern, the Sixth Circuit once again addressed the recurring question whether Kentucky’s assault-under-extreme-emotional-disturbance statute (KRS § 508.040) qualifies as a “crime of violence” for purposes of the career-offender provision in the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 4B1.1. Defendant-appellant Joshua Habern, having pleaded guilty to serious drug and firearm offenses, challenged his designation as a career offender and claimed his 300-month sentence was substantively unreasonable in light of mental-health mitigation evidence. The Sixth Circuit rejected both contentions, explicitly reaffirming its 2018 precedent in United States v. Maynard and clarifying the continued vitality of earlier unpublished authority such as United States v. Colbert and United States v. Knox.

Because the panel found no error in treating the Kentucky convictions as crimes of violence, and because it deemed the below-Guidelines sentence adequately reasoned, the judgment offers an important doctrinal “maintenance opinion”: it cements the categorical treatment of KRS § 508.040 and signals limited appellate receptiveness to mental-health-based substantive-reasonableness challenges where a district court has already imposed a downward variance.

Summary of the Judgment

• Career-Offender Status: Applying the categorical approach, the court held that assault-EED under KRS § 508.040 “requires as an element the intentional use of physical force,” squarely satisfying the Guidelines’ elements clause (§ 4B1.2(a)(1)). Both of Habern’s prior assault-EED convictions therefore count as “crimes of violence,” making him a career offender under § 4B1.1(a).
• Substantive Reasonableness: The panel found the 300-month sentence (240 months on drug counts plus the mandatory 60-month consecutive firearm count) substantively reasonable. The district court weighed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, expressly considered Habern’s mental-health history, and granted a downward variance. No abuse of discretion was shown.
• Outcome: Sentence AFFIRMED.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Maynard, 894 F.3d 773 (6th Cir. 2018) – Directly controlling; held KRS § 508.040 qualifies under the elements clause.
• United States v. Colbert, 525 F. App’x 364 (6th Cir. 2013) – Earlier ACCA decision rejecting the argument that EED negates intent.
• United States v. Knox, 593 F. App’x 536 (6th Cir. 2015) – Confirmed that assault-EED is a crime of violence “no matter how you cut it.”
• Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016) – Governs divisibility analysis; statute here deemed indivisible.
• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) – Sets abuse-of-discretion standard for sentencing review.
• United States v. Abdulmutallab, 739 F.3d 891 (6th Cir. 2014) – Discusses substantive-reasonableness framework.
• Comparative authorities distinguished:
  • United States v. Garcia-Jimenez, 807 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2015)
  • United States v. Simmons, 917 F.3d 312 (4th Cir. 2019)
  Both involved state statutes with lower mens rea (recklessness/negligence) and were deemed inapplicable to Kentucky’s intentionally-based statute.

2. Legal Reasoning

(a) Categorical Approach & Elements Clause: The court applied the “categorical approach,” examining the minimum conduct criminalized by KRS § 508.040 rather than the facts of Habern’s prior cases. Because the statute in every application requires intentional infliction of physical injury, it necessarily involves “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force” within the meaning of § 4B1.2(a)(1).

(b) Mens Rea Analysis: Habern argued that the “extreme emotional disturbance” (EED) mitigation diminishes intent and removes the offense from the crime-of-violence ambit. The panel disagreed, relying on Kentucky case law and statutory commentary making clear that EED merely reduces penalty, not the intent element. Thus, the conviction retains the requisite purposeful mens rea.

(c) Substantive-Reasonableness Review: Adopting the deferential standard outlined in Gall and its progeny, the court emphasized:

• The sentence was below the calculated Guidelines range (creating a presumption of reasonableness).
• The district judge explicitly discussed relevant § 3553(a) factors and mitigation evidence.
• Disagreement over weighting of factors does not establish abuse of discretion.

3. Likely Impact

• Sentencing Consistency: The opinion solidifies that all intentional assault-EED convictions under Kentucky law will categorically count as crimes of violence in the Sixth Circuit, both under the Guidelines and, by logical extension, the Armed Career Criminal Act.
• Narrowing Defense Arguments: Defendants with Kentucky assault-EED priors will find it more difficult to relitigate the issue; district courts may summarily rely on Habern alongside Maynard.
• Mental-Health Mitigation: While the opinion does not foreclose mental-health arguments, it underscores that a downward variance may suffice to show the district court’s consideration, limiting appellate relief.
• Comparative-Statutory Analysis: The court’s distinction between statutes requiring purposeful intent and those encompassing recklessness or negligence will inform future categorical-approach litigation involving other states’ assault variants.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Career Offender (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1): A sentencing enhancement for defendants with at least two prior felonies that are either “crimes of violence” or “controlled substance offenses,” resulting in higher offense levels and criminal-history categories.
• Crime of Violence – Elements Clause (§ 4B1.2(a)(1)): Covers any felony that, by its definition, necessarily involves the use (or attempted/threatened use) of physical force against another person.
• Categorical Approach: Courts look only to the statutory elements of the prior offense, not the underlying facts, to see if every conviction under that statute would meet the federal definition.
• Extreme Emotional Disturbance (EED): In Kentucky, EED functions as a mitigating circumstance that can reduce the degree of assault but does not eliminate the intentional-injury element.
• Substantive vs. Procedural Reasonableness:
  • Procedural: Did the judge follow correct steps (compute Guidelines, consider § 3553(a), etc.)?
  • Substantive: Is the length of the sentence fair given the facts and factors?

Conclusion

United States v. Habern is less a doctrinal earthquake than a steady fortification of existing Sixth Circuit law. It confirms that Kentucky’s assault-EED statute remains a categorical crime of violence, removes lingering doubt created by out-of-circuit “recklessness” cases, and demonstrates the appellate court’s reluctance to second-guess district judges who expressly weigh mental-health mitigation yet still impose lengthy—though below-Guidelines—sentences. Practitioners should view the decision as a firm signal that arguments predicated on diminished intent under KRS § 508.040 are foreclosed within the circuit, and that substantive-reasonableness appeals face steep odds when the district court has articulated a thorough, balanced rationale and granted any variance at all.