Reaffirming the “Could Have Believed” Good‑Faith Standard for Police Official Immunity:
Commentary on The City of Mesquite, Texas v. Anthony Wagner

I. Introduction

In The City of Mesquite, Texas v. Wagner, the Supreme Court of Texas issued a per curiam opinion that clarifies and strengthens the already deferential “good faith” standard applicable to official-immunity defenses raised by law-enforcement officers and their governmental employers under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA).

The case arises from an unintentional dog bite inflicted by a police K‑9 during a nighttime pursuit of burglary suspects. The key legal issue was not whether the officer was negligent, but whether the City, relying on the officer’s official immunity, had conclusively shown that he acted in “good faith” and thus preserved the City’s governmental immunity from suit.

The Court holds that the City met its burden to prove official immunity through an affidavit from the K‑9 officer and that the plaintiff failed to rebut this showing under the very demanding “no reasonable officer” standard. In doing so, the Court:

Corrects the court of appeals’ misapplication of the good‑faith standard;
Reaffirms that the test is whether a reasonable officer could have believed the conduct was justified—not whether a reasonable officer would have acted differently;
Clarifies what type of affidavit evidence is sufficient for a governmental unit to prevail on a plea to the jurisdiction based on official immunity; and
Confirms that mere negligence is not enough to defeat official immunity once good faith is established.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court reverses the court of appeals and renders judgment dismissing the suit for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the City’s governmental immunity was not waived because its officer was protected by official immunity.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Incident

In the early morning hours of March 29, 2020, Garland Police Department officers responded to a burglary-in-progress at a commercial building. Around 3:30 a.m., Garland officers requested the assistance of Officer Jason Crawford, a K‑9 handler employed by the City of Mesquite Police Department, who was on duty with his service dog, Kozmo.

Kozmo was a trained police K‑9 with multiple agency certifications, including obedience and control in response to commands. When Crawford arrived, other officers advised him that burglary suspects were fleeing on foot.

Key details:

Officer Crawford deployed Kozmo on an approximately 30‑foot, extended-length lead (leash) to assist in the foot pursuit—described as standard practice and consistent with his training.
The area was “completely dark” except for another officer’s flashlight.
Three burglary suspects attempted to flee.
One suspect, later identified as Anthony Wagner (the plaintiff), was commanded to stop and get on the ground and began slowly complying while yelling back.
Another officer began to handcuff Wagner on the ground.
Crawford shortened Kozmo’s lead and moved to the left of Wagner and the other officer to continue pursuing the remaining suspects because the route to the right involved “rocky, sloping, difficult terrain.”
Crawford positioned his own body between Kozmo and the struggle with Wagner to shield Wagner from the dog.
Kozmo suddenly cut across Crawford’s path, causing Crawford to trip and fall; Kozmo then bit Wagner once on the shoulder.

Wagner received treatment at the scene and later at a nearby hospital for a single dog bite.

B. The Lawsuit

Wagner sued the City of Mesquite, claiming that:

His injuries were caused by Officer Crawford’s negligent handling and control of Kozmo; and
The City’s governmental immunity was waived under the TTCA, specifically under Section 101.021(2), which addresses personal injury caused by the condition or use of tangible personal property.

The City responded with a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting that the trial court lacked subject‑matter jurisdiction because the City’s governmental immunity was not properly waived. The City put forward four grounds:

Official immunity — Officer Crawford’s official immunity as an individual officer gave the City derivative governmental immunity;
No “use” of tangible personal property — The injury was not caused by the use of tangible personal property within the meaning of TTCA § 101.021(2);
Intentional-tort exception — The claim arose from intentional acts, excluded by § 101.057(2); and
Emergency-response exception — The incident occurred during an emergency response, invoking § 101.055(2).

In support of the plea, the City attached Officer Crawford’s sworn affidavit. Wagner opposed the plea and attached an internal “Unintentional Bite” Memorandum authored by Crawford after the incident. Wagner argued:

The TTCA’s waiver for use of tangible property applied; and
Crawford was not entitled to official immunity because he lacked “good faith” in handling Kozmo.

The trial court denied the plea, and the City sought an interlocutory appeal.

C. The Court of Appeals’ Decision

The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial. It concluded that the City failed to meet its burden on the “good faith” element of official immunity, holding that:

The City did not show that “a reasonably prudent officer, under the same or similar circumstances, could have believed no further safeguards other than those employed by Officer Crawford were necessary” in handling the K‑9; and
The City purportedly provided “no evidence” that a reasonable officer would have taken the same actions Crawford took or that accounted for the particular visual and spatial impediments present at the scene.

One justice dissented on the emergency exception, but that issue is not addressed in the Supreme Court’s opinion.

D. The Supreme Court’s Review

The Supreme Court of Texas granted the petition for review, focusing exclusively on the official-immunity issue, which the Court deemed dispositive. Without oral argument, the Court:

Reversed the court of appeals;
Held that the City established official immunity through the Crawford affidavit; and
Rendered judgment dismissing Wagner’s suit for lack of jurisdiction.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

A. Holding

The Supreme Court holds that:

Officer Crawford was protected by official immunity at the time of the incident because:
- He was performing a discretionary duty (assisting in a foot pursuit and apprehension of suspects);
- He acted in good faith under the correct legal standard; and
- He was acting within the scope of his authority as a K‑9 officer.
Because the officer was entitled to official immunity, the City of Mesquite’s governmental immunity was not waived under the TTCA.
The trial court therefore lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, and Wagner’s suit must be dismissed.

B. Disposition

Applying a de novo standard to the plea to the jurisdiction, the Court:

Concludes that the City met its initial burden to produce evidence establishing official immunity, particularly “good faith,” via Officer Crawford’s affidavit; and
Holds that Wagner failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact to controvert that showing under the stringent “no reasonable officer” standard.

The Court reverses the court of appeals and renders judgment dismissing Wagner’s claims against the City for lack of jurisdiction.

C. Key Doctrinal Points

The opinion reaffirms and clarifies several doctrines:

Good Faith Standard: Good faith for official immunity is an “objective legal reasonableness” standard. The inquiry is whether a reasonably prudent officer, under the same or similar circumstances, could have believed the conduct was justified, not whether a reasonable person would have done something different.
Burden-shifting: Once the governmental unit meets its burden to show good faith, the plaintiff must meet an elevated burden by showing no reasonable officer in that position could have believed the officer’s actions were justified.
Mere negligence insufficient: Evidence that an officer may have been negligent or did not consider every possible alternative does not defeat official immunity.
Derivative governmental immunity: If the officer is protected by official immunity, the governmental employer’s immunity remains intact and the TTCA’s waiver does not apply.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Legal Framework: TTCA and Official Immunity

1. Governmental Immunity and the TTCA

A Texas municipality, as a political subdivision of the State, enjoys governmental immunity from suit unless that immunity is waived by statute. The Texas Tort Claims Act provides a limited waiver of this immunity for:

“personal injury and death so caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property if the governmental unit would, were it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law.”
— TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021(2)

However, this waiver is tightly constrained and subject to numerous exceptions, including:

Intentional-tort exception (§ 101.057(2));
Emergency-response exception (§ 101.055(2)); and
Other specific conditions limiting the scope of liability.

The Court notes that because the case is resolved on official-immunity grounds, it does not need to reach any of these statutory exceptions.

2. Official Immunity as an Affirmative Defense

Official immunity is an individual defense belonging to the government employee. It protects a governmental officer from personal tort liability when:

He or she was performing a discretionary duty;
Was acting in good faith; and
Was acting within the scope of authority.

Crucially, under cases like City of Houston v. Rodriguez and DeWitt v. Harris County, this individual immunity has a derivative effect: if the employee is protected by official immunity, the governmental employer’s immunity from suit is not waived under the TTCA.

Because official immunity is an affirmative defense, the burden rests initially on the governmental unit (the City) to plead and prove it. The Court reiterates:

“Because it is an affirmative defense, the governmental unit bears the burden to plead and prove that its employee was protected by official immunity to avoid a waiver.” — citing Rodriguez, 704 S.W.3d at 469

3. Plea to the Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The City asserted official immunity through a plea to the jurisdiction, a procedural mechanism used to challenge subject‑matter jurisdiction early in a case. When jurisdictional facts are disputed and both parties present evidence, courts:

Apply a standard similar to that governing summary judgment;
Take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant (here, Wagner);
Indulge every reasonable inference in the nonmovant’s favor; but
Do not ignore “necessary contextual evidence” or evidence unfavorable to the nonmovant if reasonable jurors could not disregard it.

If the evidence fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact about a jurisdictional element (here, the existence of good faith), the court must grant the plea and dismiss the suit.

B. The Good-Faith Standard for Official Immunity

1. The “Could Have Believed” Standard

The central doctrinal focus of the opinion is the meaning of “good faith” in the official-immunity context. The Court relies heavily on Telthorster v. Tennell and City of Lancaster v. Chambers to reaffirm that:

Good faith is measured by an objective legal reasonableness standard;
It asks what a reasonable officer could have believed under the circumstances;
It explicitly does not ask what a reasonable officer would have done.

Quoting its own precedents, the Court explains:

“An officer acts in good faith if a ‘reasonably prudent officer, under the same or similar circumstances, could have believed that his conduct was justified based on the information he possessed when the conduct occurred.’” — quoting Telthorster, 92 S.W.3d at 465

This highly deferential standard is rooted in public policy: police officers often face situations that require “split-second judgments” in tense, uncertain, rapidly evolving scenarios, as recognized in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), and adopted into Texas law.

2. Distinguishing Negligence from Lack of Good Faith

A key clarification is that:

Negligence by itself does not defeat official immunity once good faith is shown; and
The governmental unit “must prove only that a reasonably prudent officer, under similar circumstances, might have reached the same decision.”

Once the governmental defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must meet a significantly higher showing:

The plaintiff must present “evidence that no reasonable officer in [the defendant officer]’s position could have believed that the facts were such that they justified his conduct.” — Telthorster, 92 S.W.3d at 465 (emphasis added)

Thus, the plaintiff must exclude the entire range of reasonable police judgment; showing that the officer may have been careless, or failed to consider every safer option, is legally insufficient to overcome official immunity.

3. Misapplication by the Court of Appeals

The Supreme Court criticizes the Dallas Court of Appeals for substituting a stricter, incorrect standard. The court of appeals effectively asked:

Whether a reasonably prudent officer would have believed that “no further safeguards” were needed beyond those Crawford used; and
Whether a reasonable officer would have taken “the same actions” Crawford took, including specifically addressing visual and spatial impediments.

This formulation:

Shifts the inquiry from an officer could have believed his conduct was justified to whether officers would have chosen exactly the same course; and
Demands that the government prove that no safer alternatives existed or were necessary, which is not the law.

The Supreme Court reiterates that the correct test is far more deferential and does not second‑guess tactical decisions so long as those decisions fall within the universe of reasonable police responses under the circumstances.

C. Applying the Good-Faith Standard to Officer Crawford’s Conduct

1. The City’s Evidence: Crawford’s Affidavit

To establish official immunity, the City relied primarily on Officer Crawford’s sworn affidavit. Key points from the affidavit, as recounted in the opinion, include:

Crawford was “assisting in the search for and pursuit of suspects on foot.”
He “intentionally deployed Kozmo with an extended length lead as he and [Kozmo] were trained to do in situations such as this.”
He stated that “[a] reasonable K-9 officer in [his] place would have used a similar leash as this is standard practice in those circumstances.”
He described the scene as “completely dark” except for an officer’s flashlight.
There were “multiple suspects fleeing officers on foot” under rapidly developing conditions.
When Wagner was being detained by another officer, Crawford shortened the lead and:
- Chose to move to the left of Wagner and the detaining officer, because the right-hand side was “rocky, sloping, difficult terrain”; and
- Positioned himself between Wagner and Kozmo.

The court of appeals had discounted this affidavit as being “limited to the length of the leash” and as failing to identify “those circumstances” in which such a leash would be used. The Supreme Court rejects that reading as unduly narrow:

The affidavit explicitly identified “those circumstances” as a nighttime, on-foot pursuit of multiple fleeing suspects; and
It described environmental conditions (darkness, terrain) and tactical constraints (multiple suspects, need for speed, choice of route) that informed Crawford’s decisions.

Given this context, the Supreme Court finds that the City adequately showed that a reasonably prudent K‑9 officer in similar circumstances might have:

Used a 30‑foot lead consistent with training;
Chosen the smoother path to the left over dangerous terrain on the right; and
Attempted to shield the suspect with his own body while continuing the pursuit.

2. Correct Application of the “Could Have Believed” Test

Analyzing the affidavit under the proper legal standard, the Court holds that:

“We conclude the City presented adequate evidence that a reasonably prudent officer ‘could have believed [Crawford’s] conduct was justified based on the information he possessed when the conduct occurred.’” — quoting Telthorster, 92 S.W.3d at 465

The Supreme Court emphasizes that the City was not required to show that:

Crawford chose the best possible alternative;
No additional safeguards were available or desirable; or
Every reasonable officer would have made exactly the same choices.

The City’s burden was only to show that Crawford’s decision-making fell within the range of objectively reasonable police judgment under the circumstances. The affidavit supplied enough contextual detail for that.

D. Wagner’s Evidence and Failure to Rebut Good Faith

Once the City met its initial burden, the burden shifted to Wagner to offer evidence that no reasonable officer in Crawford’s position could have believed his conduct was justified. Wagner attempted to meet this burden by:

Relying on the internal “Unintentional Bite” report and other materials; and
Arguing that no “reasonably prudent officer, under the same or similar circumstances” would have:
1. “failed to properly control the lead on their K9”;
2. “believed they had enough room to safely get by Mr. Wagner in this situation”; or
3. “failed to anticipate and account for the conditions and distance in this situation.”

The Supreme Court characterizes these assertions as, at most, allegations of negligence—implying Crawford should have exercised better control, perception, or anticipation. But even if these criticisms are valid, they do not satisfy the stringent “no reasonable officer” standard:

They suggest that a careful officer might have done more or done something different;
They do not demonstrate that every reasonable officer would have rejected Crawford’s chosen tactics as unjustified; and
They fail to exclude the possibility that some reasonable officers, faced with multiple fleeing suspects, darkness, and terrain concerns, might have made the same decisions.

Accordingly, the Court holds that Wagner’s evidence:

“at best … presented evidence of negligence by Officer Crawford, but evidence that he ‘may have acted negligently, or did not consider and assess all possible subsidiary alternatives,’ is not sufficient to overcome proof of good faith.” — citing Sauls, 690 S.W.3d at 79; Telthorster, 92 S.W.3d at 465

Because Wagner did not meet his elevated burden, there was no fact issue on good faith, and the City’s plea to the jurisdiction should have been granted.

E. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. City of Lancaster v. Chambers (1994)

Chambers is a foundational case on official immunity in Texas. It established that:

Official immunity applies to officers performing discretionary acts within the scope of their authority;
The pursuit of a suspect is a paradigmatic discretionary function; and
Governmental immunity is not waived under the TTCA when the employee is protected by official immunity.

In Wagner, the Court cites Chambers to:

Confirm that Crawford was performing a discretionary duty (pursuit of suspects); and
Support the derivative-immunity principle—if Crawford is immune, so is the City.

2. Telthorster v. Tennell (2002)

Telthorster articulates the modern good‑faith standard for official immunity in Texas:

Good faith is an “objective legal reasonableness” test;
The government must show that a reasonably prudent officer “could have believed” the conduct was justified; and
The plaintiff must show that no reasonable officer could have so believed.

Wagner relies heavily on Telthorster, both in direct quotation and in methodological approach, especially regarding:

The burden‑shifting framework for good faith;
The tolerance for negligence or imperfect tactical decisions within the good‑faith standard; and
The emphasis on “split‑second judgments” and rapidly evolving law‑enforcement situations.

3. City of Houston v. Sauls (2024)

Sauls is cited for two main propositions:

Reaffirming that good faith focuses on what an officer could have believed, not on a hypothetical perfect response; and
Clarifying that evidence an officer “may have acted negligently, or did not consider and assess all possible subsidiary alternatives” does not defeat good faith.

Wagner uses Sauls to respond to Wagner’s argument that Crawford failed to take account of various conditions and alternatives; even if true, this only points toward negligence, which remains insufficient to defeat official immunity.

4. City of Houston v. Rodriguez (2024)

Rodriguez reinforces that:

Official immunity is an affirmative defense;
It precludes the TTCA’s waiver of governmental immunity; and
The governmental unit bears the burden to plead and prove official immunity to avoid waiver.

Wagner cites Rodriguez to frame the burden of proof and to support derivative governmental immunity once Crawford’s official immunity is established.

5. City of Austin v. Powell (2024) and City of San Antonio v. Maspero (2022)

These cases are cited to define the standard of review for pleas to the jurisdiction involving jurisdictional facts:

Review is de novo;
When evidence is presented on jurisdictional issues, courts apply a standard similar to summary judgment;
Courts accept evidence favorable to the nonmovant and draw reasonable inferences in that party’s favor;
But courts do not ignore undisputed contextual facts or implausible inferences.

Wagner applies these principles in determining that Wagner’s evidence did not raise a material issue on the good‑faith element.

6. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark (2018)

Alamo Heights is cited via Rodriguez for the proposition that courts cannot simply disregard unfavorable context when evaluating jurisdictional evidence; they must consider the whole record and draw only reasonable inferences.

7. Wadewitz v. Montgomery (1997)

Wadewitz introduced a more granular need/risk analysis in the context of emergency driving (e.g., police pursuit in vehicles). It requires government defendants to articulate specific facts about:

The need for the officer’s actions (speed, urgency, law-enforcement objective); and
The risks of harm to the public from those actions (speed, traffic, weather, etc.).

In Wagner, the Court notes in a footnote that:

Neither party asked for application of the Wadewitz need/risk framework; and
The court of appeals did not address Wadewitz, so the Supreme Court does not address it either.

This indicates that Wadewitz remains largely confined to emergency-vehicle and high-speed pursuit cases, and does not automatically apply to every official-immunity dispute, particularly those involving on‑foot pursuits and K‑9 operations.

8. Graham v. Connor (U.S. Supreme Court, 1989)

Although a federal Fourth Amendment case, Graham is cited (via Telthorster) for its rationale that officers must make “split‑second judgments” in tense and rapidly evolving situations. Texas courts have long adopted this reasoning to justify a deferential standard in both excessive-force and official-immunity analyses. Wagner follows this tradition in emphasizing the need for deference to officers’ tactical choices in fluid, high‑risk scenarios.

F. Scope and Limits of the Decision

The Court’s holding is both broad and narrow:

Broad in reaffirming and emphasizing the highly deferential “could have believed” good‑faith standard and clarifying the insufficiency of mere negligence to defeat official immunity.
Narrow in that the Court:
- Resolves the case solely on official-immunity grounds;
- Does not decide whether the TTCA’s “use of tangible personal property” provision is satisfied by a K‑9 deployment or a leash;
- Does not analyze whether the incident falls within the emergency-response or intentional-tort exceptions; and
- Explicitly declines to apply the Wadewitz need/risk analysis to this scenario.

Thus, the precedential significance lies mainly in refining official-immunity doctrine and evidentiary standards, rather than in expanding or contracting TTCA statutory waivers.

V. Impact and Future Implications

A. For K‑9 Operations and Police Training

This opinion sends a clear signal regarding incidents involving trained police dogs:

Unintentional bites that occur during good‑faith deployments in the course of discretionary law‑enforcement activities will often be shielded by official immunity.
Even if an officer could have used more caution or greater control, the key question will be whether a reasonable officer could have believed the chosen deployment tactics were justified given the information and conditions at the time.
The existence of K‑9 training, standard operating procedures, and certifications may support an officer’s affidavit as evidence that the methods used were within professional norms.

Police departments will likely:

Ensure that K‑9 handlers’ training and certifications are well-documented;
Train officers not only in dog control but also in how to articulate tactical decisions in post‑incident reports and affidavits; and
Recognize that clear articulation of environmental conditions (darkness, terrain, number of suspects) can be crucial to establishing good faith if litigation arises.

B. For TTCA Litigation Strategy

1. Government Defendants

The case underscores the importance of detailed, officer-level affidavits in jurisdictional challenges:

Affidavits should:
- Describe the officer’s specific mission (e.g., search, pursuit);
- Explain environmental conditions and constraints;
- Connect tactical decisions to training and standard practices; and
- Articulate why the officer believed the chosen course was appropriate.
When well-drafted, such affidavits can be sufficient to win a plea to the jurisdiction without trial on the merits.

Additionally, Wagner confirms that governments can—and should—raise official immunity early, potentially avoiding costly discovery and trial if the official-immunity defense succeeds.

2. Plaintiffs

For plaintiffs, Wagner highlights the difficulty of overcoming official immunity once the governmental unit presents a credible good‑faith showing:

General assertions of negligence or second‑guessing the officer’s tactics are insufficient.
To create a fact issue, plaintiffs may need:
- Expert testimony on police practices showing that no reasonable officer would have engaged in similar conduct; and
- Specific evidence undermining the factual premises of the officer’s affidavit (e.g., contradicting the direction of flight, lighting conditions, or terrain).
Plaintiffs should frame their arguments in terms of the “no reasonable officer could have believed” standard, not simply a “reasonable officer wouldn’t have done this” critique.

C. For Appellate Courts and Trial Judges

The Supreme Court’s criticism of the court of appeals’ framing is instructive:

Courts must carefully track the language of Telthorster and Chambers, focusing on what an officer could have believed.
Recasting the test as whether a reasonable officer would have taken the same steps, or whether additional safeguards were necessary, improperly tightens the standard and undermines the deference afforded to police decision-making in dynamic field conditions.
Trial courts ruling on pleas to the jurisdiction should resolve official-immunity issues at the jurisdictional stage when the evidence is undisputed and no fact issue is raised under the correct legal standard.

D. Relationship to Federal Qualified Immunity

Although Texas official immunity arises under state law, it resembles federal qualified immunity in key respects:

Both use an “objective reasonableness” lens;
Both are policy-driven, designed to prevent excessive judicial second‑guessing of officers in rapidly evolving situations; and
Both place a heavy burden on plaintiffs to show that the officer’s conduct fell outside the range of reasonable professional judgment.

Wagner reinforces this alignment by emphasizing:

The deferential attitude toward split‑second tactical decisions; and
The requirement that plaintiffs show that no reasonable officer could have believed the conduct was justified.

VI. Complex Legal Concepts Simplified

A. Governmental Immunity

Under Texas law, governmental entities (like cities) are generally immune from lawsuits for money damages.
This immunity can only be waived if a statute (like the TTCA) clearly says so.

B. Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA)

A statute that allows some lawsuits against governmental entities for certain types of negligence.
Relevant here: § 101.021(2) permits suits for injuries caused by using tangible personal property (e.g., vehicles, equipment—arguably a leash or K‑9).
But the TTCA also has many exceptions that preserve immunity in specific situations.

C. Official Immunity

A defense that protects individual government employees (like police officers) from personal liability when:
1. They perform discretionary (judgment-based) duties;
2. In good faith (under the objective standard);
3. And within the scope of their authority (doing their job).
If the officer is protected by official immunity, the government employer often remains immune from suit.

D. Plea to the Jurisdiction

A procedural device used by governmental defendants to argue that the court has no power (no “jurisdiction”) to hear the case.
If successful, the case is dismissed before trial.
When evidence is presented, courts decide whether the facts show that immunity has been waived or not.

E. Interlocutory Appeal

Most appeals occur after a final judgment.
An “interlocutory” appeal is an appeal taken before the case is over, allowed in specific circumstances—such as when a trial court denies a plea to the jurisdiction based on immunity.
Here, the City used an interlocutory appeal to challenge the denial of its plea.

F. “Good Faith” and “Objective Legal Reasonableness”

“Good faith” does not mean the officer acted perfectly or without error.
It is an objective test:
- Would a reasonable officer in the same situation have been able to believe that the actions were appropriate?
- Not: Would a reasonable person have chosen a different alternative?
Even if the officer could have made a better choice, official immunity still applies if the chosen course was within the range of reasonable options.

G. Derivative Governmental Immunity

Because the TTCA’s waiver is limited, if the employee is immune via official immunity, the government’s immunity usually remains intact.
This is called “derivative” immunity: the government’s immunity depends on the status of the employee’s immunity in many TTCA contexts.

VII. Conclusion

The City of Mesquite, Texas v. Wagner is a significant reaffirmation of the deferential good‑faith standard governing official immunity for Texas law‑enforcement officers. By correcting the court of appeals’ misstatement of the standard and focusing on what a reasonable officer could have believed, the Supreme Court reinforces that:

Official immunity protects officers even when their decisions can be criticized as negligent, so long as those decisions fall within a range of objectively reasonable responses to the situation as they perceived it;
Once the government produces competent evidence of good faith, plaintiffs face a high bar: they must show that no reasonable officer in the same circumstances could have believed the conduct was justified; and
Well-drafted affidavits that describe tactical context, training, and environmental conditions can be dispositive at the jurisdictional stage.

For K‑9 deployments and other tactical law‑enforcement situations, Wagner confirms that Texas courts will not impose hindsight-driven, perfectionist standards on officers making split‑second choices in dangerous and uncertain conditions. Instead, the inquiry remains anchored in objective legal reasonableness and the “could have believed” test long recognized in Chambers, Telthorster, and their progeny.

As a result, the case fortifies governmental immunity defenses in TTCA litigation, particularly in law‑enforcement contexts, and provides clear guidance to courts, practitioners, and governmental entities on how to litigate and evaluate official-immunity claims going forward.

Reaffirming the “Could Have Believed” Good‑Faith Standard for Police Official Immunity: Commentary on The City of Mesquite, Texas v. Anthony Wagner