Reaffirming that Social Security ALJs Need Not Expressly Recite the “Preponderance of the Evidence” Standard: Commentary on Bigger v. Bisignano (7th Cir. 2025)

Reaffirming that Social Security ALJs Need Not Expressly Recite the “Preponderance of the Evidence” Standard: Commentary on Bigger v. Bisignano (7th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

The Seventh Circuit’s nonprecedential order in Christi Bigger v. Frank Bisignano, No. 23‑2514 (7th Cir. Nov. 17, 2025), addresses a narrow but important procedural question in Social Security disability adjudication:

  • Must an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) explicitly say that they are applying the “preponderance of the evidence” standard in order for their decision to be valid?
  • And does an ALJ’s use of the word “establish” in describing the claimant’s burden imply that the ALJ required a higher standard of proof?

The answer the court gives is “no” on both counts. The Seventh Circuit holds that:

  1. The governing regulations require that an ALJ’s decision be based on a preponderance of the evidence, but the ALJ is not required to expressly recite that standard in the written decision.
  2. The use of common litigation language like “establish” does not in itself signal that a higher standard of proof (such as “clear and convincing evidence” or “beyond a reasonable doubt”) was applied.

The case arises in the familiar context of a Social Security disability claim, but the legal dispute is not about the underlying medical evidence or functional limitations. Instead, the claimant’s attack is almost entirely formalistic: she asserts that the ALJ’s failure to write the magic words “preponderance of the evidence” and his use of the word “establish” show that the wrong standard of proof was used. The Seventh Circuit rejects this argument, emphasizing substance over form and reiterating that ALJs are subject only to “minimal articulation requirements.”

Although formally labeled a “NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION” (and thus not binding in the same way as a published opinion), the order is still citable under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and is informative about how the Seventh Circuit understands ALJs’ articulation duties and the interplay between:

  • The standard of proof at the agency level (“preponderance of the evidence”), and
  • The standard of judicial review in the courts (“substantial evidence”).

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Claimant and Her Alleged Impairments

Plaintiff-appellant Christi Bigger applied for:

  • Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB), and
  • Supplemental Security Income (SSI),

alleging disability based on a combination of mental and physical conditions:

  • Learning disability
  • ADHD
  • Bipolar disorder
  • Anxiety and depression
  • Obsessive compulsive disorder
  • Chronic back pain

Her alleged onset date was initially August 5, 2020, later amended to August 5, 2019.

B. The ALJ’s Decision

After her applications were denied initially and on reconsideration, Bigger had a hearing before an ALJ. She submitted medical records, and both she and a vocational expert testified.

The ALJ applied the familiar five-step sequential evaluation process (explained in more detail below) and made, among others, the following findings:

  1. Step One – Substantial Gainful Activity (SGA)
    The ALJ found that Bigger had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 5, 2019, based on her reported earnings from 2019–2021, which fell below the regulatory SGA thresholds. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a).
  2. Step Two – Severe Impairments
    The ALJ concluded that Bigger had several impairments, including:
    • Polysubstance/stimulant abuse
    • Cocaine abuse
    • Borderline personality disorder
    • Unspecified anxiety disorder
    • Bunions and residuals of bunionectomy
    • Kyphotic deformity and Scheuermann’s kyphosis (curvature of the spine)
    • “Lumbar sway back deformity/hyperlordosis”
    These impairments were deemed “severe” in the sense that they more than minimally affected her ability to perform basic work activities.
  3. Step Three – Listings
    The ALJ analyzed whether any impairment or combination of impairments met or medically equaled a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, including the mental disorder listings:
    • Listing 12.06 – Anxiety and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorders
    • Listing 12.08 – Personality and Impulse-Control Disorders
    After review of several years of medical records, the ALJ found that Bigger’s mental impairments resulted only in “mild” and “moderate” limitations and did not satisfy the criteria for a listed “mental disorder” under the regulations. No physical listing was met or equaled either.
  4. Residual Functional Capacity (RFC)
    Because the listings did not resolve the matter, the ALJ assessed Bigger’s residual functional capacity (RFC)—the most she could still do despite her impairments. Among other things, the ALJ found:
    • She was limited to lifting up to 10 pounds because of her lumbar spine deformity.
    • Otherwise, medical evidence showed a normal gait and normal use of her extremities.
    Overall, the ALJ concluded she could perform a limited range of sedentary work, tying this conclusion to “detailed descriptions” of her medical records for 2019–2021.
  5. Steps Four and Five – Ability to Work
    Relying on the RFC and vocational expert testimony, the ALJ found:
    • Bigger could not perform her past relevant work in fast food.
    • However, she could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, such as:
      • Circuit board assembler
      • Address clerk
      • Final assembler
      • Surveillance systems monitor
    On this basis, the ALJ concluded that Bigger was not disabled.

The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. See Wilder v. Kijakazi, 22 F.4th 644, 650 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.981).

C. District Court Proceedings

Bigger sought judicial review in the Northern District of Indiana. Her principal argument was not that specific findings were factually wrong or unsupported by the evidence. Instead, she argued that:

  • The ALJ’s decision was defective because it did not explicitly use the term “preponderance of the evidence.”
  • Therefore, none of the ALJ’s findings could be deemed to have been made by the preponderance standard required by the regulations.

The district court rejected this purely formalistic argument, holding that the ALJ had in fact applied the appropriate preponderance standard and provided sufficient explanation of his findings. Because Bigger did not attack any specific factual finding or legal conclusion, the court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision.

D. Appeal to the Seventh Circuit

On appeal, Bigger essentially repackaged her district court argument and added a twist:

  1. The ALJ erred by failing to cite the applicable standard of proof.
  2. The ALJ’s use of the word “establish” (as in, “the claimant failed to establish …”) indicated that the ALJ had in fact applied a higher standard than preponderance.

The Seventh Circuit (Judges Kirsch, Pryor, and Kolar) affirmed in a short, tightly focused order.

III. Summary of the Seventh Circuit’s Opinion

The Seventh Circuit resolves the appeal on narrow grounds:

  1. Standard of Review. The court reviews the district court’s decision de novo and will affirm the denial of benefits if the ALJ’s decision is supported by “substantial evidence” and is free of legal error. See Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2021).
  2. No Requirement to Recite the Preponderance Standard. Social Security regulations mandate that an ALJ’s decision be based on the preponderance of the evidence, but there is no requirement that the ALJ expressly state this in the written decision. The court cites Martinez v. Kijakazi, 71 F.4th 1076, 1079 n.2 (7th Cir. 2023) for this proposition and emphasizes that the law focuses on the substance of the decision, not its form.
  3. Minimal Articulation Requirement for ALJs. ALJs face “extraordinary demands” and are subject only to “the most minimal of articulation requirements.” See Warnell v. O’Malley, 97 F.4th 1050, 1053 (7th Cir. 2024). They must explain how the evidence leads to their conclusions in enough detail to allow meaningful judicial review, but need not provide elaborate doctrinal discussions.
  4. Use of “Establish” Does Not Imply a Higher Burden. The court rejects Bigger’s new argument (raised for the first time on appeal and thus waived) that the ALJ’s use of “establish” indicated a higher standard. The term “establish” is neutral and is routinely used in connection with different standards (“preponderance,” “clear and convincing,” “beyond a reasonable doubt”). In context, the ALJ’s language simply means that the weight of the evidence did not support her claims. See Gedatus, 994 F.3d at 900.
  5. No Challenge to Specific Findings. Crucially, Bigger did not challenge any specific findings or point to any concrete evidentiary error. After its own review, the court concluded that the ALJ provided a sufficient “logical bridge” from the evidence to the conclusions. The judgment of the district court is therefore affirmed.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Martinez v. Kijakazi (2023) and the Preponderance Standard

In Martinez v. Kijakazi, 71 F.4th 1076 (7th Cir. 2023), the Seventh Circuit clarified two key points:

  • The five-step disability determination framework is applied under a preponderance of the evidence standard.
  • Social Security regulations explicitly require that an ALJ’s written decision be supported by the preponderance of the evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.953(a).

Critically, Martinez adds a footnote (71 F.4th at 1079 n.2) stating that while the decision must be based on preponderance, the law does not require “the ALJ expressly state” that he or she is applying that standard. Bigger directly leans on this footnote to dispose of the claimant’s argument about the missing “magic words.”

2. Fetting v. Kijakazi (2023) and the Five-Step Framework

The court cites Fetting v. Kijakazi, 62 F.4th 332 (7th Cir. 2023), which lays out the five-step sequential evaluation process used in disability cases. This sets the backdrop to remind readers that:

  1. At steps one through four, the claimant generally has the burden to show disability.
  2. At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that there are jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform.

The reference to Fetting underscores that the “preponderance of the evidence” standard governs these burden allocations, but again, that does not require explicit recitation in each decision.

3. Warnell v. O’Malley (2024) and Minimal Articulation Requirements

The court relies on Warnell v. O’Malley, 97 F.4th 1050 (7th Cir. 2024), for the proposition that ALJs:

  • Face “extraordinary demands,” and
  • Are held to “only the most minimal of articulation requirements.”

Under Warnell, an ALJ’s duty is not to write like an appellate judge or law professor, but to explain “how the evidence leads to their conclusions” sufficiently to permit meaningful judicial review and provide the claimant with a clear understanding of the basis for the decision. The emphasis is firmly on function, not form.

Bigger uses Warnell to reject the idea that an ALJ must insert formal doctrinal labels—like naming the “preponderance of the evidence” standard—to satisfy their obligations.

4. Gedatus v. Saul (2021) and the “Logical Bridge” Requirement

In Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 2021), the Seventh Circuit articulated the familiar “logical bridge” standard:

  • An ALJ must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to the conclusion.
  • The reviewing court looks to whether a reasonable mind could accept the evidence as adequate to support the conclusion (“substantial evidence”).

Bigger cites Gedatus both for the substantial evidence standard and for interpreting how judicial language like “failed to establish” should be understood. The Bigger panel quotes Gedatus to explain that, “given the context,” saying that a claimant failed to establish a claim “was a polite way to say the weight of the evidence did not support” it. This directly undercuts Bigger’s attempt to read a heightened standard into the ALJ’s phrasing.

5. Clifford v. Apfel (2000) and the “Accurate and Logical Bridge”

The opinion also references Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863 (7th Cir. 2000), which popularized the phrase that an ALJ must:

“build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.”

Clifford provides the doctrinal backbone for the articulation requirement. Bigger confirms that the ALJ satisfied this requirement by engaging in a “systematic[] analy[sis]” of the medical evidence and testimony regarding Bigger’s conditions and limitations.

6. Regulatory Authorities: 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.953(a), 404.901, 416.1401

The court relies heavily on key regulations:

  • 20 C.F.R. § 404.953(a)
    Provides that an ALJ’s decision “must be based on the preponderance of the evidence offered at the hearing or otherwise included in the record.” Notably, the regulation speaks to the basis of the decision, not to any required “magic words” in the ALJ’s written explanation.
  • 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.901, 416.1401
    Define “preponderance of the evidence” as existing where:
    “such relevant evidence … as a whole shows that the existence of the fact to be proven is more likely than not.”

These definitions provide the substantive standard the ALJ is required to apply and that the reviewing court presumes was applied absent evidence to the contrary.

7. “Establish” Across Different Standards of Proof

To respond directly to Bigger’s “establish implies a higher standard” argument, the court cites:

  • Erdman v. City of Madison, 91 F.4th 465, 476 (7th Cir. 2024) – “establish by a preponderance of the evidence”
  • NLRB v. Haven Salon + Spa, Inc., 60 F.4th 1058, 1060 (7th Cir. 2023) – “establishes by clear and convincing evidence”
  • United States v. Jones, 79 F.4th 844, 852 (7th Cir. 2023) – “establish beyond a reasonable doubt”

These citations show that “establish” is not tethered to any specific burden of proof. It is a flexible verb used in conjunction with multiple standards, undermining Bigger’s attempt to infer a heightened burden from the ALJ’s diction.

8. Waiver/Forfeiture: Bradley v. Village of University Park (2023)

The panel notes that Bigger’s argument about the word “establish” was not raised in the district court and was therefore waived. For this proposition it cites Bradley v. Village of University Park, 59 F.4th 887, 897 (7th Cir. 2023).

The court could have stopped there, treating the argument as procedurally barred. Nonetheless, it proceeds to explain why even on the merits, the argument fails. This dual treatment (waiver plus merits rejection) makes clear that future litigants should not expect success by focusing on isolated word choices divorced from context.

9. Richardson v. Perales (1971) and the Definition of “Substantial Evidence”

To reiterate the judicial review standard, the panel quotes the classic Supreme Court definition of “substantial evidence” from Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971):

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

This definition is juxtaposed with the preponderance standard at the hearing level to clarify that:

  • The ALJ’s fact-finding must satisfy the preponderance standard; and
  • The court’s review asks only whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion, which is a more deferential inquiry.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Substance Over Form: No Magic Words Required

The heart of the opinion is the court’s insistence on substance over form. The regulations and prior case law demand that:

  • The ALJ apply the preponderance of the evidence standard, and
  • The ALJ articulate a clear enough rationale to allow judicial review.

What they do not require is that the ALJ:

  • Include specific doctrinal phrases in the written opinion, or
  • Engage in a detailed discussion of standards of proof or burdens of production.

By citing Martinez and Warnell, the panel makes explicit that an ALJ’s decision can be entirely valid even if it never mentions “preponderance of the evidence,” so long as:

  1. The decision is actually grounded in a weighing of the evidence consistent with that standard; and
  2. The written explanation “systematically analyz[es]” the claimant’s impairments, medical records, and testimony, and connects them to the ALJ’s findings.

2. Minimal Articulation + Logical Bridge

The Seventh Circuit walks a familiar line:

  • On one hand, ALJs must construct a “logical bridge” from evidence to conclusion (Clifford, Gedatus), and decisions unsupported by substantial evidence or missing reasoning can be reversed.
  • On the other hand, ALJs are not held to the same level of analytic rigor as federal judges writing precedential opinions; minimal articulation is acceptable so long as meaningful review is possible.

In Bigger, the court holds that the ALJ’s decision satisfied these twin requirements. The ALJ:

  • Reviewed earnings records for SGA.
  • Identified and categorized physical and mental impairments.
  • Analyzed whether the impairments met/equaled the Listings.
  • Assessed RFC in detail, tying physical limitations (e.g., lifting up to 10 pounds) to the medical record, including gait and extremity use.
  • Relied on vocational expert testimony to identify specific jobs available given the RFC.

The court therefore finds that there is both:

  • Substantial evidence supporting the decision, and
  • A sufficient written logical bridge for appellate review.

3. The Word “Establish” and the Burden of Proof

Bigger’s semantic argument about the word “establish” is given little weight. The court makes three key points:

  1. Waiver. Because Bigger did not make this argument in the district court, it is waived on appeal (Bradley).
  2. Contextual Meaning. The word “establish” is routinely used in legal discourse to describe satisfying any of several burdens of proof. The court illustrates this by citing cases where parties must “establish” something by preponderance, clear and convincing evidence, or beyond a reasonable doubt. The verb itself is neutral; the modifier (“by a preponderance,” etc.) determines the burden.
  3. Functional Interpretation. In the context of an ALJ decision where the governing regulation explicitly sets the standard at “preponderance,” the ALJ’s statement that the claimant failed to “establish” her claims is properly understood (quoting Gedatus) as a “polite way to say the weight of the evidence did not support” them. There is no indication that the ALJ required proof to a higher degree of certainty.

Thus, the argument that “establish” somehow proves the ALJ applied the wrong burden is both procedurally barred and substantively weak.

4. Separation of Concepts: Hearing Standard vs. Judicial Review Standard

Although not extensively discussed, the opinion implicitly maintains a critical conceptual distinction:

  • At the administrative hearing level, the ALJ is supposed to decide disputed factual questions under the preponderance of the evidence standard. This is mandated by regulation.
  • At the judicial review stage, both the district court and the court of appeals review the ALJ’s factual determinations for support in the record under the substantial evidence standard, which is more deferential.

Part of the confusion in some Social Security appeals arises when claimants conflate these distinct standards. Bigger reinforces that:

  • Courts assume that ALJs applied the correct standard (preponderance) unless there is affirmative evidence they did not.
  • The absence of the words “preponderance of the evidence” in the decision is not itself such evidence.

C. Impact and Implications

1. For Claimants and Their Counsel

The decision sends a clear message to Social Security practitioners:

  • Attacks on ALJ decisions should focus on substantive shortcomings—for example:
    • Mischaracterization of the medical record,
    • Failure to consider relevant evidence,
    • Erroneous RFC formation, or
    • Misapplication of the sequential evaluation steps.
  • Purely formalistic challenges—like complaining that the ALJ did not recite the standard of proof verbatim—are highly unlikely to succeed, especially in the Seventh Circuit.

Moreover, Bigger underscores the importance of preserving arguments at the district court level. The claimant’s more nuanced (if ultimately unpersuasive) argument about the word “establish” was deemed waived for failure to raise it earlier.

2. For ALJs and the Social Security Administration

The opinion affords ALJs some reassurance:

  • They are not required to include stock phrases such as “I have applied the preponderance of the evidence standard” in every decision.
  • They should instead focus on:
    • Accurately stating and weighing the evidence,
    • Explaining their reasoning about RFC and the Listings, and
    • Clearly describing how they reached their decision at each step.

That said, as a practical matter, some ALJs or offices might still choose to insert explicit references to the preponderance standard to ward off arguments like Bigger’s. Nothing in Bigger forbids doing so; it simply holds that such phrasing is not legally required.

3. For the Development of Social Security Law in the Seventh Circuit

Because the disposition is designated “NONPRECEDENTIAL,” it does not have formal binding effect on future panels. However, under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, litigants may still cite it, and it is likely to be treated as persuasive given its express reliance on recent published opinions (Martinez, Warnell, Gedatus).

Substantively, Bigger:

  • Reaffirms the holdings of Martinez and Warnell on the preponderance standard and articulation requirements.
  • Clarifies that attempts to read higher standards of proof into isolated words like “establish” will not be favored, absent stronger evidence.
  • Signals continued judicial patience with ALJ decisions that are concise but logically organized, as long as the record supports them.

4. Broader Administrative Law Considerations

Beyond Social Security, the case is consistent with a broader theme in administrative law:

  • Reviewing courts generally do not demand doctrinal perfection or exhaustive legal analysis in agency decisions.
  • The focus remains on:
    • Whether the agency understood and applied the correct legal standard (unless evidence shows otherwise), and
    • Whether a reasonable mind could accept the evidence as adequate to support the decision.

Bigger thus fits within the deferential approach that respects the heavy caseloads and practical constraints on frontline adjudicators.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Preponderance of the Evidence”

This is the standard of proof used in most civil cases (including Social Security hearings). It means:

  • When all the evidence is weighed together, it is more likely than not (slightly more than 50% likelihood) that the fact in question is true.
  • Think of a scale: if the evidence in favor of the fact slightly outweighs the evidence against it, the preponderance standard is met.

2. “Substantial Evidence” (Judicial Review Standard)

This is the standard courts use when reviewing an ALJ’s factual findings. It is not about which side has more evidence; instead, the question is:

  • Is there enough relevant evidence that a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the ALJ’s conclusion?

A court can affirm an ALJ’s decision even if the court might have reached a different conclusion had it been the original decision-maker, so long as substantial evidence supports what the ALJ did.

3. The Five-Step Sequential Evaluation

Social Security ALJs decide disability claims using a five-step process:

  1. Step 1: Working?
    Is the claimant engaged in “substantial gainful activity” (i.e., significant paid work)? If yes, claim is denied.
  2. Step 2: Severe Impairment?
    Does the claimant have a medically determinable impairment that significantly limits basic work activities? If not, claim is denied.
  3. Step 3: Listed Impairment?
    Does the impairment meet or equal one of the listed impairments that are automatically considered disabling? If yes, claim is allowed.
  4. Step 4: Past Relevant Work?
    Given the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC), can they still perform any of their past relevant work? If yes, claim is denied.
  5. Step 5: Other Work?
    Can the claimant perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy, considering RFC, age, education, and work experience? If yes, claim is denied; if no, claim is granted.

In Bigger, the controversy is not about how these steps were applied substantively; it is about whether the correct standard of proof was used at those steps.

4. “Residual Functional Capacity” (RFC)

RFC is the most a claimant can still do in a work setting despite their impairments. It reflects both:

  • Physical limitations (e.g., lifting, standing, walking, sitting, use of hands), and
  • Mental limitations (e.g., ability to concentrate, interact with others, maintain pace).

The ALJ’s RFC determination is often the linchpin of the decision, as it translates medical and other evidence into concrete work-related capacities.

5. “Logical Bridge”

When the court says an ALJ must build a “logical bridge” from the evidence to the conclusion, it means:

  • The ALJ must explain enough of their reasoning so that a reviewing court can follow how they moved from the facts to the outcome.
  • The court should not have to guess why certain evidence was credited or discounted.

A decision that simply states a result without connecting it to the evidence typically fails this test. In Bigger, the court found the ALJ’s decision adequately built such a bridge.

6. “Waiver” of Arguments on Appeal

In appellate practice, “waiver” (or “forfeiture”) means:

  • If a party does not raise a particular argument in the trial court (here, the district court), they usually cannot raise it for the first time on appeal.

In Bigger, the claimant’s argument that the word “establish” signified a higher burden was deemed waived because it was not presented to the district court, and the appellate court generally will not consider new theories raised for the first time on appeal.

VI. Conclusion: Significance of Bigger v. Bisignano

Bigger v. Bisignano is not a sweeping pronouncement on disability standards or medical evidence. Instead, its importance lies in what it reaffirms about the structure and expectations of Social Security adjudication in the Seventh Circuit:

  • No Magic Words Requirement. ALJs are obliged to decide cases based on a preponderance of the evidence but are not required to explicitly utter that phrase in their decisions. The correctness of the standard used is judged by substance, not by the presence or absence of formulaic language.
  • Context Matters. Common legal terms like “establish” are not inherently linked to any particular standard of proof. Their meaning depends on the context and the governing legal framework. When regulations specify a preponderance standard, courts will not infer a higher standard from normal phrases in the decision absent stronger indications.
  • Minimal but Meaningful Articulation. While ALJs must build a logical bridge from evidence to conclusion, their articulation burden is intentionally modest in light of high caseloads and practical constraints. What matters is that the explanation be coherent enough for meaningful judicial review, not that it be stylistically or doctrinally elaborate.
  • Focus Appeals on Substantive Error. Claimants and counsel are encouraged (by implication) to direct appellate challenges to substantive issues—misweighing of evidence, legal missteps in applying the five-step framework, erroneous RFCs—rather than on hyper-technical attacks on phraseology.
  • Reaffirmation of Existing Law. The decision harmonizes with and reinforces recent published precedents like Martinez, Warnell, and Gedatus, contributing to a consistent body of law on ALJ articulation duties and applicable standards of proof.

In the end, the Seventh Circuit’s affirmation in Bigger stands as a concise statement of judicial pragmatism: what matters is that the ALJ applied the correct legal standard and supported the outcome with substantial evidence, not whether the decision contains particular legal incantations. For practitioners, this is both a warning against over-formalistic arguments and a reminder to concentrate appellate advocacy on concrete errors that affect the real-world outcome of disability claims.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Judge(s)

PerCuriam

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