Reaffirming Tailored Vexatious‑Litigant Injunctions, Payment‑Conditioned Circuit‑Wide Filing Bars, and Post‑Judgment Amendment Protocols: Seventh Circuit’s Order in Smith v. United States Congress (7th Cir. Oct. 10, 2025)

Introduction

In a consolidated nonprecedential disposition, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Judges Hamilton, Pryor, and Kolar) addressed three persistent themes in federal civil practice: (1) when and how a court may maintain and clarify a vexatious‑litigant prefiling injunction; (2) the strict procedural prerequisites for amending a complaint after the entry of final judgment; and (3) the availability of escalating appellate sanctions—including a payment‑conditioned, circuit‑wide return‑of‑papers bar—when a litigant continues to pursue frivolous appeals.

Barry J. Smith, Sr. appealed two district court orders from the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Chief Judge Pamela Pepper denied Smith’s request to rescind a 2019 filing bar that had been imposed after repeated frivolous litigation; she also clarified and tailored the scope of that injunction. In a separate case, Judge J.P. Stadtmueller denied Smith’s attempt to “reopen” and amend a case dismissed years earlier pursuant to that filing bar. On appeal, Smith also renewed a recusal argument against Judge Stadtmueller. The appellees Community Care Inc. and Guardiantrac LLC d/b/a GT Independence sought sanctions for a frivolous appeal.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed both district court rulings, rejected the recusal claim, and imposed significant appellate sanctions: a $7,500 fine, an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees to the healthcare-provider appellees, and a Mack-style instruction requiring clerks of all federal courts in the circuit to return unfiled any papers from Smith until the sanction is paid, with criminal and habeas filings excepted.

Summary of the Opinion

Jurisdiction and standard of review: The court exercised interlocutory jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) to review the denial of the motion to lift a filing injunction and reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Prefiling injunction maintained and clarified: Chief Judge Pepper did not abuse her discretion in refusing to rescind the 2019 filing bar. Smith failed to show an intent to desist from abusive filings. The district court tailored the injunction to claims previously rejected (e.g., Bills of Attainder; Second, Thirteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments; Dred Scott theories) and set a future date—January 10, 2028—when Smith may again seek modification or rescission.
Post-judgment amendment denied: Judge Stadtmueller properly denied Smith’s attempt to amend a complaint after final judgment without first vacating that judgment under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). The request was years late and procedurally improper.
Recusal rejected: Adverse rulings and knowledge gained in presiding over proceedings do not establish bias; prior rejection of the same recusal theory underscores its lack of merit.
Sanctions imposed: Finding Smith’s appeal frivolous as to the healthcare-provider appellees, the court imposed a $7,500 fine and awarded those appellees their reasonable attorneys’ fees under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38. It also directed clerks of all federal courts within the Seventh Circuit to return unfiled any papers submitted by or on behalf of Smith until the sanction is paid, except for criminal cases and habeas applications. If unable to pay despite best efforts, Smith may move to modify this sanction order after two years. This appellate sanction does not alter the district court’s preexisting filing bar.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Support Systems International, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185 (7th Cir. 1995): The court emphasized the judiciary’s “ample” authority to curb abusive filings and relied on Mack to authorize a circuit‑wide, payment‑conditioned return‑of‑papers directive. Mack also stands for carving out criminal and habeas filings and disfavors perpetual filing bars, guiding the tailoring and exceptions the court adopted here.
In re Sassower, 510 U.S. 4 (1993): Cited for the principle that sanctions must be tailored to the abuse. The district court’s clarifications—targeting previously rejected claims and avoiding identity‑based prohibitions—reflect that tailoring; the appellate sanction scales in response to continued frivolous filings.
Reed v. PF of Milwaukee Midtown, LLC, 16 F.4th 1229 (7th Cir. 2021): Establishes that a litigant typically must demonstrate intent to desist from abusive practices before a filing restriction should be lifted. The absence of such a showing was decisive against Smith.
Martin v. Redden, 34 F.4th 564 (7th Cir. 2022): Provides the abuse‑of‑discretion lens for reviewing decisions on prefiling injunctions. This deferential standard supported affirmance given the record of repeated frivolous litigation.
In re Chapman, 328 F.3d 903 (7th Cir. 2003): Emphasizes that filing restrictions must preserve meaningful access to the courts. The district court explicitly allowed Smith to bring suits under valid statutes or actionable constitutional provisions not previously rejected, satisfying Chapman’s balance.
Foster v. DeLuca, 545 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2008) & Dubicz v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 377 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2004): These decisions make clear that once a final judgment is entered, a plaintiff may not amend the complaint without first obtaining relief from judgment under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). Smith’s post‑judgment “amendment” was thus a legal nonstarter.
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994): Provides the foundational rule that judicial rulings and knowledge gained on the bench do not equate to personal bias, defeating Smith’s recusal theory.
Mac Naughton v. Asher Ventures, LLC, 76 F.4th 539 (7th Cir. 2023): Articulates the standard for imposing FRAP 38 sanctions for frivolous appeals; the court applied it to award a fine and shift fees to deter continued abuse.
Upchurch v. O’Brien, 111 F.4th 805 (7th Cir. 2024): Cited to support awarding attorneys’ fees as part of FRAP 38 sanctions.
In re City of Chicago, 500 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2007): Authorizes the administrative mechanism directing clerks to return filings unfiled until sanctions are paid, and provides a safety valve permitting later modification if payment is impossible despite best efforts.
Statutes and Rules: 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (interlocutory review of injunction orders); 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (recusal standard); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, 59(e), 60(b), 60(c)(1) (post‑judgment amendment prerequisites and deadlines); Fed. R. App. P. 38 (appellate sanctions); Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C) (decision without oral argument); Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 (citation of nonprecedential dispositions).

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds on three tracks: the propriety of maintaining a tailored filing injunction; the procedural misstep of attempting to amend after final judgment without setting aside the judgment; and the imposition of deterrent sanctions at the appellate level.

1) Maintaining and Clarifying a Tailored Prefiling Injunction

Orders denying motions to dissolve or modify injunctions fall within § 1292(a)(1) and are reviewed for abuse of discretion. The Seventh Circuit underscored that while “perpetual” filing bars are disfavored, courts possess “ample” authority to curtail abusive practices and must tailor restrictions to the abuse. The district court accomplished this by:

Finding that Smith’s continuing litigation across multiple suits failed to demonstrate an intent to desist from previously rejected theories (as Reed requires for lifting restrictions).
Clarifying that the injunction targets the substance of claims previously rejected—including those invoking Bills of Attainder, the Second, Thirteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, and reliance on Dred Scott v. Sandford—rather than barring filings based on personal identity or status per se.
Allowing meaningful access to the courts by expressly preserving Smith’s ability to bring suits under valid federal statutes and actionable constitutional provisions that raise new, non‑repetitive claims.
Setting a concrete date (January 10, 2028) after which Smith may again move to rescind or modify the bar, avoiding any suggestion of an indefinite, unreviewable prohibition.

Against that backdrop, the panel found no abuse of discretion in refusing to lift the injunction. The record of recurrent, discredited filings and the prospective opportunity for modification placed the order squarely within the range of reasonable judicial responses to vexatious litigation.

2) Post‑Judgment Amendment: The Foster/Dubicz Rule

The court reaffirmed a bedrock procedural rule: once a final judgment is entered, a plaintiff cannot amend the complaint under Rule 15 unless and until the judgment is vacated or altered under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). Smith offered only a proposed amended complaint years after judgment—without any Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) motion. Under Foster and Dubicz, the district court “could not have abused its discretion” by denying an amendment that procedural law forbids.

The panel’s footnote further confirms that even if Smith’s papers had been liberally construed as seeking relief from judgment, they were far too late for Rule 59(e) (28‑day deadline) and beyond the one‑year limit for Rule 60(b)(1)–(3). Nor did Smith invoke the narrow circumstances covered by Rule 60(b)(4)–(5) or otherwise justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6).

3) Recusal Under § 455(a) and Liteky

Smith’s recusal argument recycled an already‑rejected claim that Judge Stadtmueller’s prior adverse rulings and presiding over his earlier criminal case demonstrate bias. Citing Liteky, the panel reiterated that judicial rulings and information acquired in the course of judicial proceedings are not evidence of personal bias. The court’s prior rejection of the same recusal theory in Smith v. Community Care Inc. reinforced the conclusion that no reasonable question of impartiality arose.

4) Appellate Sanctions: FRAP 38, Fees, and the Mack/City of Chicago Return‑of‑Papers Bar

Determining that the appeal as to the healthcare providers was frivolous—rehashing a foreclosed bias claim and attempting to amend an adjudicated case without first vacating the judgment—the court imposed a $7,500 sanction and awarded the appellees reasonable attorneys’ fees. Under FRAP 38 and the Seventh Circuit’s cases (e.g., Mac Naughton and Upchurch), sanctions are proper to deter and compensate for frivolous appellate practice.

Importantly, the court invoked Mack and In re City of Chicago to order an administrative gatekeeping remedy: clerks of all federal courts in the Seventh Circuit must return unfiled any papers from Smith until he pays the sanction in full. Consistent with Mack, the order:

Exempts criminal matters and habeas applications, safeguarding access to core liberty‑related proceedings.
Includes a safety valve: if Smith is unable to pay despite best efforts, he may move to modify or rescind the order after two years.
Clarifies that this new appellate sanction does not alter the district court’s preexisting filing bar.

Impact

Although designated nonprecedential and citable only within Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, this disposition offers clear, practical guidance for litigants and courts within the Seventh Circuit.

For district courts: It reinforces the best practices for prefiling injunctions: tailor them to specific abusive patterns (e.g., claims already rejected), preserve meaningful access for non‑frivolous claims, and provide a path to revisit the restriction after a defined interval. The decision also validates clarifications that reduce overbreadth—here, shifting emphasis from status/identity to subject matter and claim history.
For pro se and frequent filers: The court signals that filing‑injunction rescission requires a credible, demonstrated intent to stop recycling discredited theories. Attempts to bypass final judgments by “amending” without first vacating those judgments will fail and may attract sanctions. Recusal demands must meet the objective standard of § 455(a) and cannot be built from adverse outcomes alone.
For appellate practice: The decision showcases the Seventh Circuit’s readiness to escalate FRAP 38 sanctions—including a Mack‑style return‑of‑papers bar—when prior fines have not curbed frivolous appeals. The inclusion of criminal/habeas exceptions and a two‑year modification window illustrates how deterrence and access-to-courts concerns are balanced.
Substantive‑law clarity: By listing the categories of previously rejected claims (Bills of Attainder; Second, Thirteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments; and Dred Scott‑based theories), the order provides concrete boundaries, making it easier for the litigant—and the clerk’s office—to identify barred from permissible filings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Prefiling injunction (filing bar): A court order that limits a litigant’s ability to file new lawsuits without meeting defined conditions. It is used to stop repetitive, frivolous filings and must be tailored to the pattern of abuse while preserving access to legitimate claims.
Abuse of discretion (standard of review): A deferential appellate standard. The question is not whether the appellate court would have made the same decision, but whether the lower court’s decision falls within a reasonable range given the facts and law.
Tailoring a sanction: Sanctions should address the specific misconduct without being overbroad. For filing injunctions, tailoring might mean restricting only claims already rejected rather than banning all filings.
Rule 15 vs. Rules 59(e)/60(b): Rule 15 governs amendments to pleadings, but once a final judgment is entered, a plaintiff must first get that judgment altered or vacated under Rule 59(e) (within 28 days) or Rule 60(b) (limited grounds, with certain time limits) before any amendment can be considered.
Recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a): A judge must recuse if their impartiality might reasonably be questioned. However, adverse rulings and information acquired while presiding in court are not, by themselves, signs of bias (Liteky).
FRAP 38 sanctions: When an appeal is frivolous, the court may impose a monetary penalty and award appellees their costs and attorneys’ fees to deter misuse of appellate resources.
Mack/City of Chicago return‑of‑papers bar: If a litigant does not pay imposed sanctions, the court can direct clerks to refuse and return any new filings from that person until payment is made, with carveouts (e.g., criminal and habeas) and an opportunity to seek modification if payment is impossible despite best efforts.
Nonprecedential disposition (FRAP 32.1): Such decisions are not binding precedent but may be cited under the governing rule. They can be persuasive and are especially useful for procedural guidance.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s order in the consolidated Smith appeals is a comprehensive reaffirmation of three interlocking principles: courts may maintain and clarify tailored prefiling injunctions to curb vexatious litigation; finality strictly limits post‑judgment amendments absent timely relief under Rules 59(e) or 60(b); and persistent frivolous appeals will trigger serious, calibrated sanctions, including fines, fee‑shifting, and a payment‑conditioned, circuit‑wide return‑of‑papers bar with narrow exceptions.

Although nonprecedential, the decision offers a practical template for calibrating restrictions to the specific abuse at issue, preserving meaningful access for legitimate claims, and escalating sanctions in a measured way when prior penalties fail to deter. For litigants, the message is equally clear: demonstrate actual intent to desist from abusive practices before seeking to lift prefiling restrictions, respect the procedural architecture of finality when attempting to amend, and avoid recycling arguments already rejected—particularly recusal theories premised on adverse rulings. The Seventh Circuit’s approach harmonizes deterrence with due process, anchoring access to courts in procedures that promote orderly, nonfrivolous adjudication.