Reaffirming Strict Timeliness for As‑Applied Lethal Injection and McCoy Claims at the Warrant Stage: Commentary on Randolph v. State of Florida

Reaffirming Strict Timeliness for As‑Applied Lethal Injection and McCoy Claims at the Warrant Stage: Commentary on Randolph v. State of Florida & Randolph v. Secretary, DOC

I. Introduction

The Florida Supreme Court’s per curiam decision in Richard Barry Randolph v. State of Florida and Randolph v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (Nov. 13, 2025) is a warrant‑stage capital case that consolidates and sharpens several strands of Florida death‑penalty jurisprudence.

After more than three decades of litigation following his 1988 murder conviction and death sentence for the killing of Minnie Ruth McCollum, Richard Barry Randolph faced an execution date of November 20, 2025. In response to the Governor’s October 21, 2025 death warrant, Randolph filed a fourth successive motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and a separate original petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Florida Supreme Court.

The opinion is important not because it breaks dramatically new doctrinal ground, but because it:

  • Reaffirms a strict one-year timeliness framework for as‑applied method‑of‑execution challenges that are based on long‑known medical conditions and a longstanding lethal injection protocol;
  • Reasserts tight limits on public records discovery and “warrant‑period” due‑process challenges in capital cases;
  • Confirms that Florida capital defendants have no constitutional right to rebut evidence in clemency or to demand a renewed clemency investigation after a passage of time; and
  • Clarifies once again that McCoy v. Louisiana claims in Florida require an express objection to counsel’s guilt concession and must be raised promptly, not first at the warrant stage.

Collectively, these holdings signal a pronounced emphasis on finality and procedural discipline at the end stages of Florida capital litigation.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Crime and Trial

In 1988, Randolph—formerly an employee of a Palatka, Florida convenience store—broke into the store intending to rob its safe when he believed the manager, Minnie Ruth McCollum, would be outside checking the gas pumps. The facts recounted by the Court are particularly brutal:

  • McCollum discovered Randolph in the store;
  • He forced her into a back room and beat her severely in the head until she “quiet[ed] down”;
  • As he tried to open the safe, she moved again; he strangled her with his sweatshirt drawstring until she again became still;
  • When she revived and screamed, he beat her again, then stabbed her multiple times in the neck with a small knife;
  • He removed her clothing from the waist down and raped her; and
  • He fled in her car, after lying about her whereabouts to a customer and two custodians who had arrived at the store.

Police responding to the scene found McCollum partially unclothed, bleeding from her head and neck, and moaning. She died six days later from her injuries. Randolph subsequently confessed in detail to two detectives. He was charged with first‑degree murder and related offenses, convicted on all counts, and—after a majority jury recommendation—sentenced to death. The trial court found four aggravating circumstances, including that the murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” (HAC).

B. Direct Appeal and Early Postconviction Litigation

On direct appeal, Randolph challenged both his convictions and his death sentence, but the Florida Supreme Court affirmed in all respects. See Randolph v. State, 562 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied, Randolph v. Florida, 498 U.S. 992 (1990). Thereafter:

  • He litigated an initial Rule 3.851 postconviction motion in state court; the trial court denied relief, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed and also denied a habeas petition. Randolph v. State, 853 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 2003).
  • He pursued federal habeas relief, which was denied and affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit. Randolph v. McNeil, 590 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1006 (2010).

C. Prior Successive State Postconviction Motions

Over the next decade, Randolph filed multiple successive Rule 3.851 motions, all denied:

  • First successive motion: relief denied and affirmance in Randolph v. State, 91 So. 3d 782 (Fla. 2012).
  • Second successive motion: relief denied and affirmance in Randolph v. State, 320 So. 3d 629 (Fla. 2021).
  • Third successive motion: relief denied and affirmance in Randolph v. State, 403 So. 3d 206 (Fla. 2024).

The cumulative effect is that, by the time the 2025 death warrant issued, Randolph’s conviction and death sentence had been reviewed and upheld repeatedly in both state and federal courts.

D. The 2025 Death Warrant and Current Proceedings

On October 21, 2025, Governor Ron DeSantis signed a death warrant scheduling Randolph’s execution for November 20, 2025. Within this compressed “warrant period,” Randolph filed:

  1. A fourth successive Rule 3.851 motion raising three substantive claims and seeking extensive public records; and
  2. An original petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Florida Supreme Court, alleging a Sixth Amendment violation under McCoy v. Louisiana.

The circuit court summarily denied the Rule 3.851 motion after a case management conference, without evidentiary hearing, and denied his public‑records demands. Randolph appealed those rulings (No. SC2025‑1722). In parallel, he filed a habeas petition (No. SC2025‑1723) and requested a stay of execution and oral argument.

The Florida Supreme Court had jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(1) (direct review of final orders in death cases) and 3(b)(9) (extraordinary writs) of the Florida Constitution. The Court issued a per curiam opinion:

  • Affirming the trial court’s denial of postconviction relief and public records;
  • Denying the habeas petition; and
  • Declining to stay the execution, hear oral argument, or entertain rehearing, and ordering immediate issuance of the mandate.

III. Summary of the Opinion

A. Public Records

The Court upheld the circuit court’s denial of Randolph’s “numerous” public‑records demands under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852, applying an abuse‑of‑discretion standard. It approved the trial court’s findings that the requests were:

  • Overly broad and tantamount to “fishing expeditions”;
  • Not reasonably related to viable claims; and/or
  • Sought confidential, non‑discoverable materials.

The Court also rejected Randolph’s constitutional challenges to Rule 3.852 (due process, equal protection, access to courts, and access to public records), citing a substantial line of prior decisions that had already upheld the rule on those grounds.

B. Three Substantive Postconviction Claims

  1. Method-of-execution claim (lethal injection & lupus)

    • Randolph argued Florida’s three‑drug lethal injection protocol would cause him a torturous death because of his lupus, including pain from positioning on the gurney and “drowning in his own blood” as the drugs were administered, supported by a report from Dr. Joel Zivot.
    • The Court held the claim:
      • Untimely under Rule 3.851(d)(1)–(2);
      • Procedurally barred because it could have been raised earlier; and
      • Substantively insufficient under the Eighth Amendment standard requiring proof of a substantial risk of severe pain and identification of a known and available alternative method of execution that significantly reduces that risk.
    • Specifically, the Court found that Randolph’s suggested alternatives—different drug combinations or a firing squad—did not qualify as “known and available” methods that could be “readily implemented” and would significantly reduce the risk of severe pain.

  2. Warrant-period and postconviction fairness claim

    • Randolph claimed that the 30‑day warrant period, together with the denial of his public‑records requests, deprived him of a “full and fair” opportunity to litigate postconviction issues, violating various constitutional protections (including due process and the right to counsel).
    • The Court, relying on several recent warrant‑stage decisions, held that a 30‑day warrant period—even when combined with denial of additional public records—does not violate due process or other constitutional protections, so long as the defendant had a fair opportunity to present claims.
    • In a notable footnote, the Court did not treat this claim as untimely or procedurally barred, because a defendant cannot realistically litigate future warrant-period conditions before a warrant issues. But the claim failed on the merits.

  3. Clemency-process challenge

    • Randolph’s clemency investigation had occurred in 2014. He argued that:
      • He was entitled to respond to or rebut certain findings used in denying clemency; and
      • He had a right to a renewed clemency process that incorporated mitigation developed after the original investigation.
    • The Court rejected these assertions, holding that Florida law does not recognize:
      • A right to review and rebut the evidence underlying a clemency denial; or
      • A right to an updated clemency investigation simply because time has passed or new mitigation has been gathered.

C. Habeas Petition: McCoy Claim

In his separate habeas petition, Randolph invoked McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414 (2018), arguing that his trial counsel violated his Sixth Amendment rights by conceding guilt to certain crimes without securing his express consent.

The Court denied the habeas claim on two grounds:

  • Procedural bar and untimeliness. McCoy was decided in 2018, and the trial transcript had been available since 1990; yet Randolph waited until 2025—after the warrant—to raise the issue. The Court held that this delay rendered the claim untimely and procedurally barred in state habeas proceedings.
  • Failure on the merits. Under Florida precedent interpreting McCoy, a defendant must expressly object to counsel’s concession of guilt. Randolph conceded in his petition that he did not expressly object. The Court also reaffirmed that defense counsel is not required to obtain the defendant’s express consent before making a strategic concession of guilt unless the defendant clearly and unambiguously opposes that course of action. On that basis, the McCoy claim was meritless even if timely.

The Court expressly declined to reach whether McCoy applies retroactively to cases like Randolph’s, whose death sentence became final long before 2018, noting that its resolution of timeliness and the merits made that question unnecessary.

IV. Analysis of Key Issues

A. Public Records and Rule 3.852 in Warrant-Stage Litigation

1. Legal framework and precedents

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852 governs public records production in capital postconviction cases. Historically, death‑sentenced inmates have invoked the state’s broad public records laws to seek massive document productions late in the litigation process, prompting the Supreme Court of Florida to cabin discovery via Rule 3.852.

In Randolph, the Court applies an “abuse-of-discretion” standard (citing Hutchinson v. State, 416 So. 3d 273 (Fla.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1980 (2025)) and aligns its reasoning with a series of recent cases:

  • Bates v. State, 416 So. 3d 312 (Fla.), cert. denied, No. 25‑5370, 2025 WL 2396797 (U.S. Aug. 19, 2025);
  • Zakrzewski v. State, 415 So. 3d 203 (Fla.), cert. denied, No. 25‑5194, 2025 WL 2155601 (U.S. July 30, 2025);
  • Jones v. State, 50 Fla. L. Weekly S259 (Fla. Sept. 24), cert. denied, No. 25‑5745, 2025 WL 2775490 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2025);
  • Gudinas v. State, 412 So. 3d 701 (Fla.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2833 (2025);
  • Lambrix v. State, 124 So. 3d 890 (Fla. 2013).

These cases collectively stand for several key propositions:

  • Rule 3.852 is a limiting mechanism, not an open‑ended right to discovery;
  • Requests must be narrowly tailored and reasonably related to a colorable postconviction claim;
  • Courts may reject requests that amount to mere “fishing expeditions”; and
  • Rule 3.852 does not violate due process, equal protection, access to courts, or access to public records.

2. Application in Randolph

The trial court’s reasons for denying Randolph’s requests fall crisply within this body of precedent:

  • Overbreadth / fishing expeditions. The court found some requests so broad that they were disconnected from any specific, viable claim—precisely what Rule 3.852 is intended to prevent.
  • Lack of nexus to a viable claim. Where the requested records were not “reasonably related” to a substantively viable issue (e.g., they could not likely support or refute a recognized claim), denial was appropriate.
  • Confidential or non‑discoverable material. Florida law protects certain categories of records (e.g., privileged, confidential, or statutorily exempt materials), even in capital cases.

The Florida Supreme Court ratifies these reasons and emphasizes that they are “sensible and supported by the facts in the record.” This reinforces a consistent message: at the warrant stage, public‑records demands must be carefully targeted to genuinely new and viable claims; broad or speculative requests will not be indulged.

3. Constitutional attacks on Rule 3.852

Randolph re‑raised a familiar set of constitutional challenges. He argued that Rule 3.852 unconstitutionally restricts:

  • Due process;
  • Equal protection;
  • Access to courts; and
  • Access to public records.

The Court’s response is terse but categorical: it has “rejected all such challenges” in earlier cases. Notably:

  • Hutchinson (due process and equal protection);
  • Gudinas (access to courts);
  • Lambrix (access to public records).

The opinion offers no new doctrinal elaboration here; instead, it powerfully reinforces stare decisis. For practitioners, the message is clear: renewed facial attacks on Rule 3.852 are effectively foreclosed in the Florida Supreme Court.

4. Impact

For capital practitioners, Randolph underscores:

  • The necessity of early and focused investigative work throughout the life of a capital case, rather than relying on late‑stage, broad public‑records demands;
  • The importance of tying any records request to a specific, facially valid postconviction claim (e.g., newly discovered evidence, method‑of‑execution challenge, mental health issue); and
  • The near‑impossibility of using Rule 3.852 at the warrant stage as a general discovery tool to search for new theories.

B. Timeliness and Substance of the Method-of-Execution Claim

1. Rule 3.851 timeliness: the one-year clock and “newly discovered” facts

Rule 3.851(d)(1) generally requires that capital postconviction claims be brought within one year from the date the conviction and sentence become final. An exception exists for claims based on:

  • “the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown” and
  • “could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.”

Even then, Rule 3.851(d)(2)(A) allows such claims only if they are filed within one year of the date those new facts could have been discovered with due diligence.

In Randolph, the relevant “facts” were:

  • Randolph’s lupus diagnosis in 1990 (a chronic condition he had “his entire life”); and
  • Florida’s three‑drug lethal injection protocol, which has remained “essentially unchanged since 2017.”

The Court concludes that the factual basis for a lupus‑based as‑applied challenge to the protocol had been available since “at least 2017.” Accordingly, Randolph had until roughly 2018 to file such a claim. Bringing it in 2025—“eight years later”—renders it untimely.

This analysis tracks recent cases like:

  • Tanzi v. State, 407 So. 3d 385 (Fla.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1914 (2025);
  • Rogers v. State, 409 So. 3d 1257 (Fla.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2695 (2025);
  • Cole v. State, 392 So. 3d 1054 (Fla.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 109 (2024);
  • Bates, 416 So. 3d at 319.

In all of these, the Florida Supreme Court treats the lethal‑injection protocol itself as a “fact” that starts the one‑year clock for relevant method‑of‑execution claims; when combined with a pre‑existing medical condition, any as‑applied challenge must be brought within one year of the protocol’s adoption or of learning the condition—whichever completes the factual puzzle.

2. Procedural bar: claims that “could have been raised earlier”

Beyond timeliness, the Court holds the method-of-execution claim “procedurally barred,” following Bates, 416 So. 3d at 320: a claim is barred if it “could have been raised in earlier postconviction proceedings.” Since Randolph’s lupus was diagnosed in 1990 and the current protocol has existed since 2017, he could have challenged lethal injection in one of his earlier successive motions (e.g., the second or third).

This two‑pronged procedural analysis—(1) one‑year timeliness and (2) preclusion of dormant claims that could have been raised earlier—creates a double hurdle for warrant‑stage Eighth Amendment challenges.

3. Substantive Eighth Amendment standard: Asay, Cole, and the alternative-method requirement

Substantively, the Court applies the two‑part test articulated in Asay v. State, 224 So. 3d 695 (Fla. 2017), and reiterated in Cole, 392 So. 3d at 1065 (tracking the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Glossip v. Gross and Bucklew v. Precythe):

  1. The inmate must show that the method of execution presents a substantial and imminent risk of severe pain—“sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering.”
  2. The inmate must identify a known and available alternative method of execution that:
    • Can be “readily implemented” by the state, and
    • “Entails a significantly less severe risk of pain.”

The Florida Supreme Court sidesteps a full analysis of the first prong (“significant doubts” are noted but not resolved) and resolves the claim on prong two: Mr. Randolph’s suggested alternatives—“a different combination of drugs or a firing squad”—do not qualify as permissible alternatives under the Eighth Amendment standard as interpreted in Florida.

Citing Tanzi and Rogers, the Court emphasizes that firing squads and unspecified “different drug combinations”:

  • Have not been shown to be readily implementable in Florida; and
  • Do not clearly significantly reduce the risk of severe pain in light of the inmate’s physical condition.

This follows a growing line of state and federal decisions that reject Eighth Amendment challenges where the proposed alternatives are vague, not authorized under state law, or would require major institutional changes.

4. Impact on future as‑applied lethal injection challenges

For future Florida capital defendants with chronic medical conditions (e.g., lupus, heart disease, respiratory disorders), Randolph sends several strong signals:

  • Once a new lethal injection protocol is adopted, inmates have roughly one year to assert any as‑applied challenges based on known medical conditions; waiting until a death warrant effectively forfeits such claims.
  • Courts expect concrete, operational alternatives—not abstract references to other drugs or methods used in other jurisdictions.
  • The Court is increasingly comfortable disposing of these claims at the pleading stage without evidentiary hearings, especially when timeliness and alternative‑method prongs are weak.

The broader effect is to align Florida closely with the U.S. Supreme Court’s restrictive posture toward method‑of‑execution litigation, reinforcing finality over late‑stage medical challenges.

C. Due Process, the 30-Day Warrant Period, and “Full and Fair” Litigation

1. Randolph’s argument

Randolph contended that:

  • The thirty‑day warrant period was too short to allow meaningful investigation and litigation; and
  • The denial of his extensive Rule 3.852 records requests compounded this problem, depriving him of due process and the effective assistance of postconviction counsel.

In essence, he argued that the conditions of the warrant period—its brevity and limited discovery—violated fundamental fairness.

2. The Court’s response and precedents

The Court rejected this challenge outright, citing:

  • Bates, 416 So. 3d at 321 (upholding a 30‑day period even when all public‑records demands were denied);
  • Tanzi, 407 So. 3d at 390 (rejecting due process claims despite “truncated warrant period and the denial of his public records requests”);
  • Hutchinson, 416 So. 3d at 279–80 (holding that despite a condensed warrant period, the defendant had a fair opportunity to raise claims and argue them).

The Court emphasizes that due process is satisfied if, in the totality of circumstances, the inmate has a fair opportunity to present claims and argument, even if the timeline is tight and discovery is restricted. There is no freestanding constitutional right to a longer warrant period or broad warrant‑stage discovery.

3. Footnote 2: a clarifying procedural point

A notable nuance appears in footnote 2. The State had argued that Randolph’s challenge to the warrant period was itself untimely or procedurally barred. The Court responds:

It is not clear to us how the defendant could possibly litigate the length and circumstances of his future warrant period in advance of the warrant’s issuance. To the best of our knowledge, we have never held otherwise.

This footnote is modest but significant. It clarifies that:

  • A warrant‑period fairness challenge cannot meaningfully be raised before a warrant issues; and
  • Accordingly, such challenges will typically be treated as timely when raised in the warrant period itself.

However, because the Court finds no substantive constitutional violation in a 30‑day period with limited records production, this procedural openness does not translate into actual relief. It simply preserves, at least in theory, the possibility of challenging unusual warrant‑period conditions in future cases (e.g., extreme interference with counsel access, catastrophic institutional obstacles).

4. Practical impact

For practitioners, the message is mixed:

  • On the one hand, the Court is not foreclosing warrant‑period complaints on pure procedural grounds. A future defendant who can show genuinely extraordinary circumstances during a warrant period might still be heard.
  • On the other hand, as a rule, challenges based solely on the brevity of a 30‑day warrant period and denial of additional public records will almost certainly fail on the merits in light of Bates, Tanzi, Hutchinson, and now Randolph.

D. Constitutional Limits of Clemency Review

1. Randolph’s clemency claims

Randolph mounted a multi‑pronged constitutional challenge to the clemency process in his case, arguing that:

  • He had a right to review and rebut factual findings used to deny clemency; and
  • He was entitled to an updated or renewed clemency investigation reflecting mitigation developed after the 2014 clemency investigation.

He grounded these claims in “at least four” constitutional provisions (though the opinion does not detail each), likely including due process and possibly Eighth Amendment and state constitutional analogues.

2. The Court’s reliance on Bates and Jennings

The Court squarely rejects both premises, citing:

  • Bates, 416 So. 3d at 320–21, which rejected an asserted right to review and rebut the evidence underlying a clemency denial; and
  • Jennings v. State, 50 Fla. L. Weekly S289 (Fla. Nov. 6), cert. denied, No. 25‑6061, 2025 WL 3157365 (U.S. Nov. 12, 2025), which relied on cases from 1986, 2010, and 2012 rejecting claims to updated clemency investigations after lengthy delays.

This line of authority, in turn, is consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998), which recognizes some minimal procedural due process in clemency but holds that clemency remains largely a matter of executive grace, not judicially enforceable rights.

3. Judicial vs. executive functions

The opinion implicitly emphasizes the separation between:

  • Judicial review (direct appeals, postconviction, habeas), which is structured, adversarial, and rights‑based; and
  • Executive clemency, which is discretionary, policy‑infused, and not constitutionally required to mirror judicial procedures (such as adversarial testing of evidence).

By holding that Randolph has no right to:

  • rebut adverse clemency evidence; or
  • demand a new clemency investigation after the passage of time,

the Court aligns with a view of clemency as a largely unfettered executive function. Courts will not second‑guess the Governor’s procedures so long as they do not involve egregiously arbitrary or discriminatory practices.

4. Impact

For capital inmates in Florida, Randolph confirms that:

  • Clemency is not an additional, judicially regulated phase where they can litigate factual disputes or compel consideration of new evidence; and
  • There is no right to multiple or rolling clemency reviews simply because more mitigation is developed over time.

This elevates the importance of presenting a robust mitigation case in earlier phases (penalty phase, initial postconviction) and of making a strong clemency presentation when the opportunity first arises, as later opportunities will be tightly constrained if they exist at all.

E. The McCoy-Based Habeas Claim

1. McCoy v. Louisiana: the autonomy right

In McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414 (2018), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to make certain fundamental decisions about the objectives of the defense, including whether to maintain innocence or concede guilt. Specifically:

  • When a defendant intransigently and unambiguously insists on maintaining innocence, defense counsel may not override that decision by conceding guilt, even if counsel believes such a concession is tactically wise.
  • Violation of this autonomy right is a “structural” error, not subject to harmless‑error analysis.

McCoy thus distinguishes between:

  • Strategic decisions delegated to counsel (e.g., which witnesses to call), and
  • Fundamental objectives reserved to the defendant (e.g., whether to plead guilty or assert innocence).

2. Florida’s interpretation: Atwater and Harvey

The Florida Supreme Court has previously interpreted McCoy in two key cases:

  • Atwater v. State, 300 So. 3d 589 (Fla. 2020);
  • Harvey v. State, 318 So. 3d 1238 (Fla. 2021).

In these decisions, the Court held that:

  • A necessary element of a McCoy claim is that the defendant expressly objected to counsel’s concession of guilt.
  • McCoy does not require counsel to obtain the defendant’s express consent before conceding guilt, absent such an express objection.

In Randolph, the Court underscores that many other jurisdictions have adopted a similar interpretation, citing:

  • Commonwealth v. Alemany, 174 N.E.3d 649 (Mass. 2021);
  • State v. Chambers, 955 N.W.2d 144 (Wis. 2021);
  • Epperson v. Commonwealth, 645 S.W.3d 405 (Ky. 2021);
  • People v. Cuevas, 558 P.3d 1041 (Colo. App. 2024);
  • Griffin v. State, 912 S.E.2d 692 (Ga. 2025);
  • White v. Commissioner of Correction, 236 Conn. App. 66 (2025).

This growing consensus narrows McCoy’s scope: it protects defendants who actively insist on their innocence, not those who silently acquiesce in counsel’s strategy.

3. Procedural default and untimeliness

Randolph’s McCoy claim was raised in 2025, seven years after McCoy (2018) and 35 years after his trial. The factual basis—the trial transcript reflecting counsels’ concessions—was available since 1990. This chronology is critical.

Citing Bates, 416 So. 3d at 322, and Jones, 50 Fla. L. Weekly at S262, the Court holds:

  • The claim is untimely and procedurally barred in state habeas, because it could have been raised earlier after McCoy was decided.
  • Analogously, the Eighth Circuit in Thomas v. Payne, 960 F.3d 465 (8th Cir. 2020), deemed a late‑raised McCoy claim procedurally defaulted.

Although the Court does not define a specific one‑year deadline for habeas McCoy claims, it effectively applies a timeliness principle parallel to Rule 3.851’s—post‑McCoy claims should be raised at the earliest reasonable opportunity, not at the warrant stage.

4. Merits: no express objection, no McCoy violation

On the merits, Randolph’s claim fares no better. The Court notes:

Here, in his petition, Randolph specifically acknowledges that he never expressed any objection to his counsel’s concessions regarding certain crimes.

Because Florida’s McCoy jurisprudence requires an express objection to counsel’s concession, the absence of such an objection is fatal. Additionally, the Court reiterates that counsel is not required to obtain the defendant’s express consent to concede guilt unless the defendant objects, rejecting the argument that McCoy mandates affirmative consent as a prerequisite to any concession.

Having resolved the claim on these grounds, the Court explicitly states it is unnecessary to address whether McCoy applies retroactively to pre‑2018 final convictions.

5. Impact

For Florida capital defendants seeking to raise McCoy claims, Randolph solidifies several constraints:

  • They must show a clear, on-the-record objection to counsel’s concession of guilt; silence or passive disagreement is insufficient.
  • They must raise the claim promptly once McCoy is available and the transcript is known—not years later at the warrant stage.
  • Counsel may still, as a strategic choice, concede guilt or aspects of the offense absent an express client objection, without automatically triggering a structural error under McCoy.

In practice, these constraints significantly limit the potential reach of McCoy in Florida, particularly for older cases where trial records show no express defendant objection.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. Successive Postconviction Motions

A postconviction motion is a request made after a conviction and sentence become final, asking the trial court to vacate or modify them based on constitutional or legal errors not fully addressed on direct appeal (e.g., ineffective assistance of counsel, newly discovered evidence).

A successive motion is any postconviction motion filed after the first one has been resolved. Florida places strict limits on successive motions to promote finality and prevent endless relitigation. To be allowed, a successive motion generally must present:

  • Newly discovered facts that could not have been known earlier with due diligence; or
  • A new, retroactively applicable constitutional rule.

B. Procedural Bar and Timeliness

A claim is procedurally barred when the defendant had a fair opportunity to raise it earlier but failed to do so. Courts will not consider the merits of procedurally barred claims because allowing them would undermine finality and encourage piecemeal litigation.

A claim is untimely when it misses a filing deadline imposed by statute or court rule—here, the one‑year deadline in Rule 3.851(d). A timeliness problem often produces a procedural bar as well.

C. As-Applied vs. Facial Challenges

  • A facial challenge asserts that a law or practice (e.g., Florida’s lethal‑injection statute) is unconstitutional in all applications to all people.
  • An as-applied challenge concedes that the law or practice may be valid generally but is unconstitutional under the particular circumstances of this defendant (e.g., due to a unique medical condition such as lupus).

Randolph’s method‑of‑execution challenge was as-applied: he argued that lethal injection, as administered under Florida’s protocol, would be cruel and unusual for him because of his lupus.

D. Lethal Injection Protocols and Alternative-Method Requirement

A lethal injection protocol describes exactly how the state will carry out death sentences (drugs used, dosages, sequence, procedures). Since Glossip and Bucklew, Eighth Amendment challenges to such protocols must satisfy a demanding standard:

  1. Show that the existing protocol poses a substantial risk of severe pain; and
  2. Propose a specific, known and available alternative method that:
    • Can be implemented without major change (e.g., already authorized, feasible in practice); and
    • Reduces the risk of severe pain to a significant degree.

Simply suggesting that some other method might be “better” or referring generically to a “different combination of drugs” will not satisfy this requirement.

E. Clemency vs. Judicial Relief

Clemency is the executive’s power to reduce or nullify a criminal sentence, independent of the courts. In death cases, clemency might commutate a death sentence to life imprisonment. It is fundamentally a matter of grace or mercy, not a legal entitlement.

By contrast, judicial relief (direct appeal, postconviction, habeas) is a right: defendants can demand it and courts must apply law to facts. Clemency processes need not mirror courtroom procedures; for example, there is no constitutional right to:

  • Confront or cross‑examine witnesses in clemency; or
  • Insist that the Governor provide a full explanation of reasons for denying clemency.

F. Habeas Corpus vs. Rule 3.851

A petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Florida Supreme Court is an extraordinary proceeding challenging the lawfulness of custody, often used for certain constitutional claims (e.g., ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, some retroactive-rule claims).

Rule 3.851, by contrast, is the main vehicle for postconviction relief in capital cases in the trial court. While there is some overlap, certain claims must be brought under Rule 3.851 first; others may be appropriate for habeas in the Florida Supreme Court. Timeliness and procedural‑bar principles apply to both.

VI. Broader Implications and Reflections

A. A Strong Emphasis on Finality in Florida Capital Practice

Randolph continues a noticeable trend: the Florida Supreme Court’s insistence on rigorous procedural compliance and refusal to reopen capital cases absent compelling, timely, and properly framed claims. The opinion:

  • Enforces a strict one‑year window for claims based on established protocols and known diagnoses;
  • Enforces procedural bars for claims that could have been raised in earlier successive motions;
  • Refuses to extend warrant periods, expand public‑records discovery, or treat the warrant stage as a quasi‑new postconviction phase; and
  • Applies a narrow reading of McCoy to minimize late‑stage challenges to long‑final convictions.

B. Method-of-Execution Jurisprudence: Alignment with Glossip/Bucklew

By rejecting Randolph’s as‑applied challenge on timeliness, procedural bar, and the alternative‑method prong, the Florida Supreme Court aligns squarely with the U.S. Supreme Court’s restrictive approach in Glossip and Bucklew. Florida’s message to inmates with chronic medical conditions is:

  • Raise as‑applied lethal‑injection challenges early, not at the warrant stage; and
  • Bring concrete, feasible alternatives, not theoretical or politically controversial methods (such as firing squads), unless Florida has already made them available by law and practice.

C. The Narrowing of McCoy in Practice

Florida’s insistence on an express objection and timely presentation for McCoy claims makes it difficult for many long‑final capital defendants to benefit from McCoy:

  • Old records rarely reflect explicit defendant objections to counsel’s strategy; and
  • Delay in raising McCoy claims will be fatal in state habeas, especially at the warrant stage.

This reinforces a national judicial trend that treats McCoy as a narrow, autonomy‑based protection against overt conflict, rather than a broad mandate requiring express client consent for any strategic concession.

D. Clemency as a Non-Justiciable Sphere

Randolph reinforces that Florida courts will not transform clemency into a quasi‑judicial proceeding with adversarial rights. Defendants cannot:

  • Litigate clemency “errors” as independent grounds for judicial relief; or
  • Compel the executive to re‑open clemency based on new mitigation or passage of time.

This leaves clemency as a largely unreviewable safety valve, emphasizing that the last meaningful judicial review typically occurs in early postconviction and federal habeas stages—not during clemency or the warrant period.

VII. Conclusion

The Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Randolph v. State and Randolph v. Secretary, DOC is best understood as a powerful reaffirmation—not a reinvention—of Florida’s capital postconviction framework. It:

  • Affirms stringent timeliness rules and procedural bars for successive Rule 3.851 motions, particularly for as‑applied method‑of‑execution challenges;
  • Reasserts narrow limits on public‑records discovery at the warrant stage and rejects constitutional attacks on Rule 3.852;
  • Confirms that a 30‑day warrant period, even with limited discovery, ordinarily satisfies due process and the right to counsel;
  • Clarifies that clemency remains a largely executive, non‑justiciable process, without a right to rebut evidence or demand updated investigations; and
  • Construes McCoy narrowly, requiring an express objection and timely assertion, and holding that counsel need not obtain express consent to a concession absent such objection.

For lawyers practicing in Florida’s capital system, Randolph is a reminder that:

  • Critical constitutional claims must be identified, investigated, and litigated early;
  • Method‑of‑execution and McCoy claims raised for the first time at the warrant stage are almost certain to fail; and
  • The warrant period is designed not as a new forum for broad relitigation, but as a narrow window for addressing truly new, properly preserved issues.

In a system where finality and fairness often pull in opposite directions, Randolph places unmistakable weight on finality at the closing chapter of a long‑litigated capital case.

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