Reaffirming Person-Specific Mootness:
In re Appeal of H.D. (DCF, Appellant) and the Limits of the “Capable of Repetition, Yet Evading Review” Exception

I. Introduction

The Vermont Supreme Court’s decision in In re Appeal of H.D. (Department for Children and Families, Appellant), 2025 VT 67, addresses a recurring tension in public-benefits cases: how to reconcile time-limited, rapidly expiring benefits with the constitutional requirement that courts decide only live controversies.

H.D. was a recipient of emergency housing through Vermont’s General Assistance Emergency Housing Program, governed during Fiscal Year 2026 (FY26) by the “Big Bill” Fiscal Year 2026 Appropriations Act, 2025, No. 27, § E.321(b)(2) (“Act 27”). Under Act 27, eligible households can receive up to eighty days of emergency housing within a twelve‑month period, with a winter-season waiver. The core underlying dispute in the administrative proceedings was how to count those eighty days—specifically, whether days received prior to FY26 should count toward the FY26 cap.

The Human Services Board sided with H.D. and held that only days received during FY26 counted toward the eighty-day limit, making her eligible when she applied. The Department for Children and Families (DCF) appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court, seeking review of the Board’s statutory interpretation. By the time the appeal reached the Court, however, H.D. had already exhausted her eighty days under the Board’s favorable interpretation and was no longer in the program or eligible for additional housing under Act 27.

The question before the Supreme Court thus became not how to interpret Act 27’s eighty-day cap, but whether there remained any live controversy to adjudicate. DCF attempted to invoke the narrow “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness, arguing that the issue will arise repeatedly in emergency housing cases and is inherently too short-lived to be fully litigated. The Court rejected that argument and dismissed the appeal as moot.

This opinion does not resolve the substantive statutory question about how to apply the eighty-day cap. Instead, it cements and elaborates a key procedural principle: the mootness exception for issues “capable of repetition, yet evading review” is strictly person-specific in Vermont. It is not enough that many future litigants will face the same issue; there must be a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will again be subject to the same challenged action.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Emergency Housing Program and Act 27

Vermont’s General Assistance Emergency Housing Program provides short-term hotel or motel stays to qualifying households experiencing homelessness or certain crises. For FY26, the Legislature addressed this program in Act 27, the omnibus appropriations legislation (“Big Bill”).

Section E.321(b)(2) of Act 27 created (or confirmed) an eighty-day cap on emergency housing benefits within a twelve-month period. Section E.321(b)(3), however, carves out a significant winter waiver:

DCF "shall provide emergency winter housing to households meeting the eligibility criteria in subsection (a) of this section between December 1, 2025 and March 31, 2026," and "[e]mergency housing in a hotel or motel provided pursuant to this subdivision shall not count toward the maximum days of eligibility per 12‑month period."

The operative dispute in H.D.’s fair hearing turned on how to account for the eighty days: whether the cap included emergency housing days granted prior to July 1, 2025 (the start of FY26), or only those days provided during FY26 itself.

B. DCF’s Determination and the Board’s Decision

DCF initially determined that H.D.’s household was ineligible for further emergency housing as of July 1, 2025 because, counting days she had received before FY26, she had already reached or exceeded the eighty-day maximum.

H.D. requested a fair hearing before the Human Services Board under 3 V.S.A. § 3091(a). The Board interpreted Act 27’s language to mean that, for FY26, only emergency housing days received during FY26 should count toward the eighty-day limit. Under this interpretation, H.D. had not yet exhausted her entitlement when she applied and was therefore eligible.

The Board reversed DCF’s decision and held that H.D. was entitled to emergency housing benefits under Act 27. DCF appealed that ruling to the Vermont Supreme Court, seeking a statewide clarification of how the eighty-day cap should be calculated.

C. Events During the Appeal and the Mootness Question

By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, circumstances had changed:

• Both parties agreed that, using the Board’s favorable interpretation, H.D. had now received her full eighty days of emergency housing for FY26.
• H.D. no longer resided in emergency housing, was not receiving further housing benefits, and was ineligible for more emergency housing under Act 27.

Given these developments, H.D. argued that the case was moot: there was no longer any live dispute about her entitlement to benefits, and no relief the Court could award her.

DCF, however, urged the Court to reach the statutory question, invoking the narrow mootness exception for issues “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” It contended:

• The central dispute—how to apply the eighty-day cap—is of ongoing practical importance.
• Since July 1, 2025, hundreds of individuals have requested fair hearings concerning this cap.
• Many applicants are repeat applicants, making the prospective application of the cap an ongoing source of litigation.
• Because emergency housing decisions are effective for only eighty days (and the cap can be quickly exhausted), cases of this type naturally terminate before full appellate review can occur, even if DCF diligently expedites its appeals.

The Supreme Court nevertheless concluded that the mootness exception did not apply and dismissed the appeal as moot without addressing the merits of Act 27’s interpretation.

III. Summary of the Opinion

Chief Justice Reiber, writing for a unanimous Court, held that:

1. The case was moot because H.D. had already received all the emergency housing benefits to which she was entitled under the Board’s interpretation, and there was no further relief the Board or the Court could grant her.
2. The narrow exception for matters “capable of repetition, yet evading review” did not apply, because DCF failed to demonstrate a “reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again.”
3. The fact that many other applicants might litigate the same statutory issue in other cases is legally insufficient; the exception is person-specific, not issue-specific.
4. The Court therefore lacked constitutional authority to issue what would effectively be an advisory opinion on how to calculate the eighty-day cap for future cases.
5. The appeal was dismissed as moot, leaving the Board’s favorable ruling for H.D. intact but without a binding Supreme Court interpretation of Act 27’s eighty-day rule.

The Court emphasized and extended its recent reasoning in In re S.S., 2024 VT 87, another case involving emergency or temporary housing aid, where it similarly refused to decide a mooted public benefits case despite broader policy concerns.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Mootness Doctrine in Vermont

Mootness is a component of the broader doctrine of justiciability, which limits courts to resolving actual, live controversies between adverse parties. As the Court has often reiterated, including in In re S.S., “mootness doctrine requires an actual controversy to be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.” Here, that quotation (¶ 2) is repeated to anchor the analysis.

The Vermont Supreme Court’s understanding of mootness is tied to the state constitution’s separation of powers and the judiciary’s limited role. In ¶ 11 of this opinion, the Court reaffirms:

Our "authority over a case is limited to the determination of actual, live controversies between adverse litigants," and "[u]nless an actual or justiciable controversy is present, a declaratory judgment is merely an advisory opinion which we lack the constitutional authority to render."

Thus, even when a case raises important issues of public policy, the Court cannot issue what amounts to a legal advisory letter unless there remains a concrete dispute and some effective relief that can be fashioned for the parties before it.

B. The “Capable of Repetition, Yet Evading Review” Exception

The Court applies the familiar two-part test articulated in Paige v. State, 2017 VT 54, ¶ 11, 205 Vt. 287, 171 A.3d 1011:

(1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and
(2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again.

This exception is intentionally narrow. It protects the ability of courts to review certain time-limited actions (for example, election disputes, pregnancies, temporary school suspensions) that otherwise always terminate before appellate review is complete, but only where the same party is likely to face the same action again.

DCF argued that emergency housing disputes over the eighty-day cap are paradigmatic “evading review” cases: benefits are short-term and exhaust quickly, and the Department asserted it acted diligently to move this appeal forward. The Court, however, chose not to address the “evading review” aspect (the first prong), because DCF failed on the second prong—“capable of repetition.”

C. Why the Exception Did Not Apply to H.D.’s Case

1. No Remaining Relief for H.D.

The Court first clarified the straightforward mootness problem: H.D. had received the very relief she sought. Applying the Board’s interpretation of Act 27, she had:

• Received all eighty allowable days of emergency housing for FY26; and
• Exhausted her eligibility for any further emergency housing under Act 27.

Given the statutory structure and the Board’s limited jurisdiction, there was no additional remedy the Board or the Supreme Court could provide. As the Court summarized (¶ 5):

There is no relief that the Board, or this Court, can offer in this case as H.D. has reached the eighty-day housing limit and she is no longer eligible for emergency housing under Act 27.

Without a live claim to benefits or another concrete legal entitlement at stake, the controversy between these particular parties had ended.

2. Person-Specific Nature of “Capable of Repetition”

DCF’s core argument was not that H.D. still needed relief, but that the statutory interpretation question would arise repeatedly for many other applicants, including repeat applicants. In other words, DCF advanced an issue-centric vision of the exception: because the issue is likely to recur, the Court should decide it now.

The Court firmly rejected that view, drawing on a set of authorities to emphasize that the exception is person-specific, not merely issue-specific.

First, the Court reiterated its recent instruction from In re S.S., 2024 VT 87:

We recognized in In re S.S. that "a case remains moot even if others will find themselves in a similar position" and emphasized that the inquiry is "person-specific." (¶ 6)

Second, the Court cited Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure to the same effect:

"[S]imply showing that others will be affected by future repetitions of the challenged conduct ordinarily does not avoid mootness." (¶ 6, quoting 13C C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533.8.3 (3d ed. 2025))

Third, the Court invoked the D.C. Circuit’s formulation in Secretary of Labor, Mine Safety & Health Admin. v. M‑Class Mining, LLC, 1 F.4th 16, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2021), to define precisely what “capable of repetition” requires:

This prong requires that the same parties will engage in litigation over the same issues in the future. The party invoking the exception must show a reasonable degree of likelihood that the issue will be the basis of a continuing controversy between the two parties. (¶ 6, emphasis added by Vermont Supreme Court)

Applying these principles, the Court held that DCF had not demonstrated a “reasonable expectation” that H.D. herself would again be subject to the same eighty-day-cap determination. Any assertion that she would become homeless again, reapply, and again face the same statutory misinterpretation was speculative.

Thus, the exception could not be used to bootstrap a decision on an issue of general importance where the individual claimant’s controversy was definitively resolved.

3. Distinguishing In re PCB File No. 92.27

DCF relied on In re PCB File No. 92.27, 167 Vt. 379, 708 A.2d 568 (1998), where the Court had applied the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception in the context of attorney disciplinary proceedings. There, Bar Counsel challenged an order by a Professional Conduct Board (PCB) hearing panel chairman requiring her to disclose investigatory materials to a respondent. Although she ultimately complied, the Court concluded the matter was not moot because:

• Another PCB panel chair had already issued a similar order to the same Bar Counsel in a separate case; and
• The same parties (Bar Counsel and PCB hearing panels) were likely to face the same discovery dispute repeatedly.

The Court in H.D. emphasized that PCB File No. 92.27 is consistent with, not contrary to, the person-specific requirement:

Significantly, the parties were the same in the first and second action referenced by the Court—Bar Counsel was directed to produce her investigatory materials in both disciplinary cases by a PCB hearing panel chair—and thus, "there [was] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [would] be subjected to the same action again." (¶ 7)

That key feature is missing in H.D.’s case. DCF pointed only to the likelihood that other applicants would face similar interpretations of Act 27, not that H.D. herself would inevitably experience the same dispute again.

4. Analogy to In re S.S.

The Court underscored the continuity of this decision with its earlier ruling in In re S.S., 2024 VT 87, a case that also concerned temporary or emergency housing assistance through DCF.

In S.S., the petitioner had been deemed ineligible for thirty days under a particular agency rule. A hearing officer recommended reversing DCF, but before the Human Services Board issued a final order, DCF itself removed the ineligibility period in line with its internal guidance. By the time the Board addressed the matter, the petitioner had been restored to full eligibility and had no remaining sanction to challenge.

Like H.D., S.S. argued that:

• She might again become unhoused and face similar housing ineligibility decisions.
• DCF’s and the Board’s procedures allegedly violated law and misrepresented their work in annual reports.
• Those practices would continue to harm others.

The Court rejected these arguments and held the case moot, concluding that S.S. had not shown a “reasonable expectation” of facing the same action again. The fact that others would be affected did not preserve a live controversy for S.S.

In H.D., the Court explicitly analogized and applied the same logic (¶¶ 8–10), reaffirming that:

• Relief already obtained by the individual claimant moots the controversy.
• Even serious allegations about systemic or ongoing practices do not justify judicial review in the absence of a specific, live dispute for that claimant.
• Any further analysis of agency practices in such circumstances would be advisory and therefore unconstitutional.

D. The Human Services Board’s Limited Jurisdiction and Its Relevance to Mootness

A central thread of the Court’s reasoning focuses on what the Human Services Board is authorized by statute to do. This directly affects whether any meaningful relief remains possible and thus whether a controversy is live.

Under 3 V.S.A. § 3091(a), individuals may request a fair hearing to challenge certain decisions of state agencies, including DCF, concerning benefits such as emergency housing. However, the Board’s adjudicatory jurisdiction is strictly statutory. Citing In re S.S. again, the Court notes:

The Board has "only such adjudicatory jurisdiction as is conferred on [it] by statute, with nothing presumed in favor of [its] jurisdiction." (¶ 5)

And its remedial authority is limited by 3 V.S.A. § 3091(d):

"The Board's actions in its order at the conclusion of the process are statutorily limited to 'affirming, modifying, or reversing decisions of the [a]gency and 'making orders . . . requiring the [a]gency to provide appropriate relief.' " (¶ 5)

Additionally, although the Board can review “agency policy,” it may do so only insofar as the policy “affects [a claimant’s] situation,” as previously held in Husrefovich v. Dep't of Aging & Indep. Living, 2006 VT 17, ¶ 28, 179 Vt. 456, 898 A.2d 726 (quoted in ¶ 5).

These constraints mean that:

• The Board cannot grant broad declaratory relief about how DCF should apply Act 27 in general.
• It cannot fashion remedies for people other than the petitioner before it.
• Once the petitioner has received all the specific relief the Board could order—here, the full eighty days of housing—the Board’s role is exhausted.

Because the Vermont Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction in such matters is essentially derivative of the Board’s case and the controversy before it, once there is no effective administrative relief available, there is also no effective judicial relief to be had. This underlines why, in ¶ 5, the Court stresses that the Board’s decision “relates only to H.D.’s case.”

E. Precedents and Authorities Shaping the Decision

1. In re S.S., 2024 VT 87

S.S. is the most direct and influential precedent, and the Court references it repeatedly:

• For the general statement of mootness doctrine and the need for an actual controversy “at all stages of review” (¶ 2).
• For the Board’s jurisdictional limits and remedial scope (¶ 5).
• For the insistence that mootness is assessed in a “person-specific” manner and is not defeated by the mere prospect of similar cases arising for others (¶ 6).
• For the explicit recognition that issuing legal views once the petitioner has been fully relieved would amount to an impermissible “advisory opinion” (¶¶ 10–11).

By relying so heavily on S.S., the Court sends a strong signal of doctrinal stability. The approach in housing and benefits cases is not ad hoc but follows a consistent line: once individual relief is complete, the case ends, regardless of systemic or recurring issues.

2. Paige v. State, 2017 VT 54

Paige supplies the canonical Vermont formulation of the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” test. Although the Court in H.D. cites only ¶ 11 and does not analyze Paige in depth, it uses that decision to confirm that both prongs—short duration and likely recurrence to the same party—are required. The failure to satisfy the second prong sufficed to deny DCF’s request to invoke the exception.

3. In re PCB File No. 92.27, 167 Vt. 379 (1998)

This disciplinary case is used to clarify what “capable of repetition” does look like in practice. It illustrates a setting in which:

• The same governmental actor (Bar Counsel) faces the same type of order (disclosure of privileged investigatory materials) from the same type of opposing body (a PCB hearing panel chair) in multiple proceedings.
• There is concrete and documented indication that the challenged practice will recur between these very parties.

This historical example underscores why H.D.’s case falls short: DCF could point to recurrent issues, but not to a realistic likelihood that H.D. and DCF would litigate this very dispute again.

4. Husrefovich v. Dep't of Aging & Indep. Living, 2006 VT 17

Husrefovich is cited for the proposition that, although the Human Services Board has some authority to review “agency policy,” it does so only as the policy affects the individual claimant’s case. It cannot issue generalized declarations or orders about policy independent of a specific benefits dispute. This reinforces the idea that, once a petitioner’s individual entitlement has been fully resolved, there remains no statutory or constitutional basis for the Board—or the Court—to continue adjudicating policy in the abstract.

5. Federal Treatise and D.C. Circuit Authority

The Court’s use of Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure and the D.C. Circuit’s decision in M‑Class Mining suggests an intention to align Vermont’s mootness jurisprudence with well-established federal justiciability principles:

• Wright & Miller confirms that the impact of a practice on “others” is usually insufficient to defeat mootness.
• M‑Class Mining crisply articulates the “same parties” and “continuing controversy” requirement for the “capable of repetition” exception, which the Vermont Supreme Court adopts as persuasive.

These citations lend doctrinal weight to the Court’s insistence on a tight, person-specific interpretation of the exception, limiting the risk that Vermont courts devolve into general overseers of agency policy without concrete, live disputes.

F. Legal Reasoning Step-by-Step

The Court’s reasoning can be broken down into clear steps:

1. Identify mootness. The Court first recognizes that the case is presumptively moot: H.D. has received all possible emergency housing to which she is entitled under the Board’s interpretation of Act 27 and is no longer eligible for further emergency housing under that statute. No further relief is available to her (¶¶ 2, 5).
2. Clarify the Board’s and the Court’s limited remedial authority. Because the Board may only affirm, modify, or reverse agency decisions and order “appropriate relief” for the appellant, and may only review policy as it affects that appellant, there is no vehicle for broader declaratory or prospective relief once H.D.’s individual claim is satisfied (¶ 5).
3. Consider DCF’s reliance on the mootness exception. DCF acknowledges mootness in the technical sense but argues that the case falls under the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception due to the inherently short duration of emergency housing benefits and the large volume of similar disputes (¶ 3).
4. Apply the two-part Paige test. The Court restates the test—short duration and reasonable expectation of recurrence to the same complaining party (¶ 3)—and then chooses to focus on the second prong, leaving unresolved whether these disputes are in fact inherently too short to be litigated.
5. Reject issue-centric arguments; insist on person-specific recurrence. Drawing on S.S., Wright & Miller, and M‑Class Mining, the Court emphasizes that:
   • The exception requires a substantial likelihood that the same parties will again litigate the same issue.
   • Evidence that “hundreds” of other applicants will face similar issues is insufficient.
   • The mootness inquiry centers on H.D., not the broader class of emergency housing recipients (¶ 6).
6. Distinguish past cases where the exception applied. The Court shows that in PCB File No. 92.27, the same Bar Counsel was already facing repeated similar orders, satisfying the same-party repetition requirement. That fact pattern is absent here (¶ 7).
7. Reinforce by analogy to In re S.S.. The Court recalls S.S., where a temporary ineligibility had been removed and the case was found moot despite similar concerns about agency practices affecting others. The Court reiterates that, “whatever the merit” of such systemic concerns, any ruling in a mooted case would be an unconstitutional advisory opinion (¶¶ 8–10).
8. Conclude with constitutional limits. The Court ultimately grounds its decision in the Vermont Constitution’s limitation of judicial power to actual disputes: “This Court lacks constitutional authority to opine on how the eighty-day housing cap should be calculated in future cases” (¶ 11). With no live controversy and no exception applying, the only permissible outcome is dismissal of the appeal as moot.

G. Potential Impact and Implications

1. For Emergency Housing and Public Benefits Litigation

This decision, layered on top of In re S.S., signals that many challenges to time-limited public benefits, especially short-term housing, will be vulnerable to mootness. Once a claimant’s benefit period ends or eligibility is restored, the courts are unlikely to entertain further litigation over systemic issues embedded in the case.

Practically, that means:

• Individual fair-hearing appeals and subsequent judicial reviews are ill-suited vehicles for securing broad, precedential rulings on recurring statutory-interpretation questions like Act 27’s eighty-day cap.
• By the time such a case reaches the Supreme Court, it will often be moot, with no remaining relief possible.

DCF’s own description—that “hundreds” of similar fair hearings have been requested—underscores how frequently important legal questions arise in such short-lived contexts. Yet, the Court is clear that volume alone does not create an exception to mootness.

2. For DCF and Other Agencies

For DCF, the consequence is twofold:

• The Department lost the opportunity to obtain a definitive Supreme Court ruling on how Act 27’s eighty-day cap should be calculated. The Board’s favorable interpretation for H.D. remains intact in her case, but there is no statewide, binding precedent from the high court on that specific statutory question.
• Going forward, if DCF wishes to secure judicial clarification of recurring legal issues in benefits programs, it will need to consider other vehicles (e.g., declaratory judgment actions where allowed, rulemaking challenges, or cases where class-wide relief is statutorily authorized) that are less susceptible to individual mootness.

Similarly situated agencies should understand that:

• Administrative adjudications limited to individual relief are poor platforms for obtaining high-level judicial guidance on policy issues.
• Systemic challenges may require different procedural paths—possibly legislative oversight, regulatory reform, or carefully structured litigation where claimants retain a live stake throughout the appellate process.

3. For Claimants and Advocates

For recipients of public benefits and their advocates, the decision has both protective and limiting aspects:

• Protective: Mootness doctrine prevents courts from issuing decisions that could adversely affect claimants once they have already obtained relief. H.D.’s favorable Board ruling remains undisturbed, and the Supreme Court did not reach a potentially adverse merits decision.
• Limiting: Claimants and advocates cannot count on individual fair-hearing appeals to generate broader judicial pronouncements resolving recurring statutory or regulatory issues. Even highly consequential questions may evade definitive appellate resolution if each individual case becomes moot before reaching final judgment.

Strategically, advocates may need to:

• Monitor timing carefully to see whether some cases can be resolved while still live.
• Explore whether any litigants face ongoing collateral consequences (e.g., sanctions, overpayments, or enduring disqualifications) that keep a controversy alive even after the immediate benefit period ends.
• Consider other procedural mechanisms—such as class actions (where available), declaratory or injunctive relief suits, or legislative advocacy—to address systemic questions that are otherwise likely to be mooted case by case.

4. For the Development of Vermont Administrative Law

The Court’s insistence on a strict, person-specific application of mootness and its exceptions means that:

• Some significant administrative and statutory questions may remain unresolved at the Supreme Court level for extended periods, decided only at the agency or Board level.
• This may lead to some variability or uncertainty in interpretation until a case presents itself in which the claimant retains a live stake through final appellate review.

At the same time, the decision affirms a strong separation-of-powers norm: courts do not exist to police agency policy in the abstract but to resolve concrete disputes between specific parties.

H. Relationship to the Underlying Emergency Housing Question

Notably, the Court did not reach the underlying statutory question: whether Act 27’s eighty-day cap includes days of emergency housing received prior to the start of FY26, or only those during FY26.

As a result:

• The Human Services Board’s interpretation in H.D.’s case—that only days received during FY26 count toward her FY26 eighty-day limit—stands and controls that individual matter.
• However, the Board’s interpretation is not elevated to Supreme Court precedent, and DCF’s statewide policy approach remains judicially unreviewed.
• Future fair-hearing decisions may address the same question, potentially with differing interpretations, until a case arises that is not mooted by the exhaustion or expiration of benefits and satisfies justiciability requirements through appeal.

The decision thus leaves an important issue open for future litigation while making clear that such litigation must involve a live controversy all the way through any appellate process.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Mootness

Mootness means that, by the time a court is asked to decide a case, there is no longer a real, substantive dispute between the parties that the court’s decision can affect. If the court cannot grant any meaningful relief to either side, the case is moot and must be dismissed.

In this case, H.D.’s claim was moot because she had already received all the emergency housing days she could possibly obtain under Act 27. Even if DCF’s legal interpretation were correct or incorrect, the Court’s decision would not change her situation.

B. Justiciable Controversy and Advisory Opinions

A justiciable controversy is a real, active dispute between parties where the court’s decision will have concrete consequences. Courts in Vermont (and generally in the United States) are not allowed to issue advisory opinions, which are abstract legal statements or answers to hypothetical questions not tied to an actual, live dispute.

The Court repeatedly emphasizes that, without a live controversy, any ruling on how to interpret Act 27’s eighty-day cap would be advisory—a kind of legal advice rather than a binding resolution of a real dispute. The Vermont Constitution does not permit the Court to operate in that advisory capacity.

C. “Capable of Repetition, Yet Evading Review”

Some issues naturally end quickly—for example, a short school suspension or a pregnancy. If courts strictly applied mootness, such issues might never be reviewed because they always become moot before an appeal is resolved.

To address this, courts recognize a narrow exception for issues that are:

1. Too short in duration to be fully litigated before they end; and
2. Likely to arise again for the same complaining party.

The key points in Vermont, as underscored in this decision, are:

• The exception is not triggered merely because the issue is important or frequently recurring for others.
• There must be a strong reason to believe that the specific person bringing the case will again face the same situation with the same opposing party.

D. Human Services Board and Fair Hearings

The Human Services Board is an administrative body that hears appeals from decisions of agencies like DCF about public benefits (e.g., cash assistance, housing, medical benefits).

A fair hearing is a formal process where a claimant can challenge an agency’s decision. The Board can:

• Affirm, modify, or reverse the agency’s decision; and
• Order the agency to provide appropriate relief to the claimant (for example, grant or restore benefits).

However, the Board’s powers are limited to the individual claimant’s case. It cannot issue general rules or policies that bind the agency for everyone; it reviews “agency policy” only as it applies to that person’s situation.

E. Appropriations Acts and Program Caps

An appropriations act—like Act 27—is a budget law that authorizes spending for various state programs in a given fiscal year. Sometimes, such acts contain program-specific provisions that govern eligibility, duration, or conditions for particular benefits.

In this case, the relevant provision (§ E.321(b)(2)) set an eighty-day cap on emergency housing within a twelve-month period, while § E.321(b)(3) excluded certain winter-period housing from counting toward that cap. The precise interpretation of these provisions—whether they include prior-year days in the calculation—was the contested substantive issue that the Court ultimately did not reach because of mootness.

VI. Conclusion

In re Appeal of H.D. does not answer the important substantive question of how Act 27’s eighty-day emergency housing cap must be calculated. Instead, it delivers a significant procedural clarification with broad implications for Vermont administrative and public-benefits law.

Key takeaways include:

• The case is dismissed as moot because H.D. had already received all the emergency housing to which she could possibly be entitled and no further relief was available from the Board or the Court.
• The “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception is strictly person-specific: it requires a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will again face the same challenged action.
• The fact that many other individuals will experience similar issues does not preserve a moot case for decision, even in areas of acute public concern like homelessness and emergency housing.
• The Human Services Board’s remedial authority is confined to individual relief, and its capacity to review “policy” is limited to how that policy affects the individual appellant’s case. It cannot anchor generalized advisory rulings once an individual’s dispute is fully resolved.
• The Vermont Supreme Court reiterates that it lacks constitutional authority to render advisory opinions, and that this limitation prevails even where important systemic issues may otherwise escape appellate review due to the short duration of benefits.

Taken together with In re S.S., this decision solidifies a stringent approach to mootness and its exceptions, particularly in the context of temporary public benefits. While this may mean that some urgent policy questions remain unsettled at the appellate level, the Court views that outcome as a necessary consequence of constitutional limits on judicial power. Future efforts to obtain systemic clarification on emergency housing rules and other public benefits questions will need to account for these constraints in both litigation strategy and legislative or regulatory reform.