Reaffirming Page: Repeated Distribution‑Quantity Drug Sales Alone Support Conspiracy; Constructive Possession and Drug–Firearm Joinder Upheld

Case: United States v. Rick P. Coley & David K. Duggar

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Panel: Chief Judge Sykes, and Circuit Judges Ripple and Lee; opinion by Chief Judge Sykes

Date: May 15, 2025

Dockets: Nos. 23-2494 & 23-2519

Introduction

In this decision, the Seventh Circuit affirms the drug and firearm convictions of Rick Coley and David Duggar, two resellers in an Indianapolis methamphetamine and fentanyl distribution ring led by Jason Betts. The defendants’ primary challenge was that their dealings with Betts were mere buyer–seller relationships, not conspiracies. Coley additionally challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his felon‑in‑possession conviction, and both defendants argued that the district court erred by refusing to sever the drug counts from the firearms counts.

Anchored by the court’s recent en banc realignment in United States v. Page (2024), this opinion makes three central points:

• Under Page, evidence of repeated, distribution‑quantity drug transactions alone is enough to sustain a drug‑conspiracy conviction.
• Constructive possession of a firearm is satisfied where a gun is found in a defendant’s bedroom alongside his effects and drug‑dealing paraphernalia.
• Drug‑trafficking and firearms counts are properly joined when discovered contemporaneously as part of the same ongoing scheme, and severance is not warranted absent actual prejudice.

Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed all convictions and sentences. It held that:

• Sufficiency—Conspiracy: The record showed that Betts repeatedly supplied Coley and Duggar with distribution quantities of illegal drugs for resale. Per United States v. Page, this evidence alone permitted the jury to infer an implicit agreement to distribute drugs, defeating the buyer‑seller defense.
• Sufficiency—Coley’s § 922(g) Count: The shotgun found behind Coley’s bedroom door, together with his clothing in the room and drug‑distribution implements nearby, supported constructive possession.
• Joinder/Severance: The drug and firearm counts were properly joined under Rule 8(a) as parts of a common scheme without temporal disconnect; denial of severance under Rule 14 was not an abuse of discretion because the defendants failed to show actual prejudice, especially where limiting instructions were given and the evidence would have been cross‑admissible.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• United States v. Page, 123 F.4th 851 (7th Cir. 2024) (en banc): The fulcrum of the conspiracy analysis. Page overruled Seventh Circuit decisions that had required “more” than repeated, distribution‑quantity transactions to infer conspiracy. It realigned circuit law with the Supreme Court’s Direct Sales, holding that repeated sales of illegal drugs in distribution quantities, with knowledge of further distribution, suffice to establish an implicit agreement.
• Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943): Foundational buyer‑seller doctrine case. The Supreme Court affirmed a conspiracy conviction based on repeated sales of illicit drugs (morphine) in “illegally vast quantities” to a doctor who redistrib­uted them. Page emphasizes that illegality and distribution‑level quantities create inherent mutual trust and a shared stake, distinguishing sales of innocuous goods.
• United States v. Wright, 85 F.4th 851 (7th Cir. 2023) and United States v. Hidalgo‑Sanchez, 29 F.4th 915 (7th Cir. 2022): Restate conspiracy elements: an agreement to commit an unlawful act and knowing, intentional joinder—often established implicitly.
• United States v. Brown, 973 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2020); United States v. Garcia, 919 F.3d 489 (7th Cir. 2019); United States v. Dessart, 823 F.3d 395 (7th Cir. 2016): Define the demanding sufficiency standard of review (“heavy, nearly insurmountable” burden), deferring to jury inferences.
• United States v. Cruse, 805 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Conley, 875 F.3d 391 (7th Cir. 2017): Witness credibility belongs to the jury; appellate courts deem testimony incredible only in extreme, physically impossible scenarios.
• United States v. Price, 28 F.4th 739 (7th Cir. 2022); United States v. Perryman, 20 F.4th 1127 (7th Cir. 2021); United States v. Thomas, 321 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Alanis, 265 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Katz, 582 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Irby, 558 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Hampton, 585 F.3d 1033 (7th Cir. 2009): Establish constructive possession principles: proximity plus control and linkage to the place (e.g., a bedroom) suffices; possession may be joint; forensic evidence is not required.
• United States v. Pigee, 197 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Blanchard, 542 F.3d 1133 (7th Cir. 2008): Support the longstanding presumption that drug‑trafficking and firearms charges are closely related and properly joined because guns are tools of the drug trade, evidencing motive and protection.
• United States v. Hubbard, 61 F.3d 1261 (7th Cir. 1995): An example where misjoinder occurred due to a significant temporal disconnect (17 months) between drug and firearms offenses.
• United States v. Berg, 714 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Peterson, 823 F.3d 1113 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Jackson, 787 F.3d 1153 (7th Cir. 2015): Clarify two‑step joinder/severance analysis and standards of review (de novo for joinder; abuse of discretion for severance).
• United States v. Ervin, 540 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Rollins, 301 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Dixon, 184 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Maggard, 865 F.3d 960 (7th Cir. 2017); Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534 (1993): Defendants carry a heavy burden to show actual prejudice from joinder; speculative “spillover” is insufficient; limiting instructions generally cure risk; cross‑admissibility defeats prejudice.
• United States v. Parker, 508 F.3d 434 (7th Cir. 2007): Only one § 922(g) conviction may result from a single incident of possession despite multiple disqualification theories; applied here to merge Coley’s § 922(n) count into § 922(g)(1).

Legal Reasoning

1) Conspiracy: Page controls and the buyer–seller defense collapses on these facts

Applying Page, the court held that the government’s proof that Betts repeatedly sold distribution quantities of illicit drugs to Coley and Duggar for resale was sufficient to allow the jury to infer an implicit agreement to distribute. The evidence included:

• Coley: Initially bought incrementally through Pennington/Smith; then, after their arrest, Betts fronted sizable quantities (about 1.5 pounds of meth and three ounces of fentanyl over three transactions) and, later, supplied a few hundred grams of fentanyl every two weeks from late 2020 to July 2021. Betts advised him on distribution practices and even helped him secure housing to mitigate risk—facts that go beyond “mere” purchases.
• Duggar: Purchased meth every day or two from Betts between October 2020 and May 2021, typically 4–8 ounces (sometimes up to a pound) per transaction, paying cash. The relationship was non‑exclusive and Betts did not dictate Duggar’s distribution methods, but they coordinated timing, addressed missed meetings, and discussed law‑enforcement risks.

Under Page and Direct Sales, repeated sales of illicit drugs in distribution‑level quantities—with the seller’s knowledge that the buyer will resell—create an inherent mutual trust and “shared stake” sufficient to support a finding of an implicit conspiratorial agreement. The court rejected the defendants’ arguments challenging Betts’s credibility; determining weight and credibility of cooperator testimony is a jury function, and appellate courts disturb such determinations only in extreme circumstances not present here.

2) Coley’s firearm conviction: Constructive possession supported by proximity and control

To sustain a § 922(g)(1) conviction, the government needed to prove knowing possession of a firearm by a felon with the required knowledge elements and interstate nexus. Coley contested only possession. The court applied settled constructive‑possession principles:

• A firearm found in areas the defendant controls (e.g., his bedroom) supports constructive possession when coupled with evidence linking the defendant to that space.
• Here, the loaded shotgun was behind Coley’s bedroom door; he directed officers to retrieve his clothing and sandals from his bedroom closet, and drug‑distribution items (a scale and blender with residue) were in his nightstand.
• Possession may be joint; roommates’ access does not negate possession. Forensic proof (fingerprints/DNA) is not required; circumstantial evidence suffices.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the court held a rational jury could find constructive possession.

3) Joinder and severance: Drug–gun counts belong together on these facts

The court conducted the two‑step joinder/severance inquiry:

• Joinder (Rule 8(a)): Offenses may be joined if of the same or similar character, based on the same act/transaction, or connected with a common scheme or plan. Seventh Circuit precedent presumes that drug‑trafficking and firearms counts are properly joined because guns and drugs are closely connected in the trade. There was no temporal disconnect; the guns were discovered contemporaneously with drugs and paraphernalia during the ongoing conspiracy. Joinder was therefore proper.
• Severance (Rule 14): Even when joined properly, severance requires a showing of actual prejudice—more than a better chance of acquittal. The defendants’ “spillover” argument failed: the evidence would have been cross‑admissible (drug activity supplies motive for gun possession; proximity plus motive helps show constructive possession), and the district court gave limiting instructions to consider each count separately. With compelling evidence on all counts, the court found no abuse of discretion.

Impact and Practical Implications

• Page cemented—buyer–seller defense narrowed: This case powerfully confirms that in the Seventh Circuit, repeated distribution‑quantity transactions of illegal drugs, standing alone, allow juries to infer an implicit conspiratorial agreement. Defense strategies must now focus on undermining the “distribution‑quantity” and “repeated” aspects, or the seller’s knowledge that the buyer will redistribute, rather than relying on non‑exclusivity or lack of explicit coordination.
• What qualifies as “distribution‑quantity” and “repeated”: The court accepted patterns such as hundreds of grams of fentanyl every two weeks (Coley) and multiple 4–8 ounce meth purchases every day or two (Duggar). These benchmarks will guide future sufficiency challenges.
• Constructive possession in shared spaces: Guns found in bedrooms with personal effects and drug‑dealing implements will typically satisfy constructive possession, even without forensic testing and despite shared access. Defendants should, where possible, develop affirmative evidence severing the nexus to the room or gun.
• Joinder remains the default in drug–gun cases: Absent a substantial temporal gap or unique prejudice, drug and firearm counts will be tried together. Limiting instructions and cross‑admissibility will often defeat severance arguments.
• Trial practice: Expect continued weight on cooperators and wiretap evidence. Credibility attacks are jury questions and rarely succeed as sufficiency challenges on appeal.
• Charging and plea dynamics: Prosecutors may rely on Page to charge conspiracy where repeated distribution‑quantity sales exist; defendants may face higher trial risk, increasing plea leverage for the government.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Buyer–seller doctrine: A mere agreement to buy and sell drugs does not itself make a conspiracy. But in the Seventh Circuit after Page, repeated sales of illegal drugs in distribution‑level quantities, with knowledge of redistribution, allow a jury to infer an implicit agreement to distribute—transforming the relationship into a conspiracy.
• Implicit agreement: Conspiracies are often proved by circumstances. A consistent pattern of distribution‑level sales, mutual coordination, and shared stake in resale profits can imply an agreement without any explicit pact.
• Distribution quantity: Amounts inconsistent with personal use and consistent with resale (e.g., ounces to pounds), especially when repeated over time.
• Fronting: Supplying drugs on credit; it evidences mutual trust and a shared stake in successful redistribution, supporting an inference of conspiracy.
• Constructive possession: Legal possession without physical custody. If a defendant controls the area where a gun is found (like his bedroom), and evidence links him to that space, a jury may find possession even without fingerprints or exclusive access.
• Joinder vs. severance: Joinder (Rule 8(a)) asks whether charges are properly tried together based on similarity or a common plan. Severance (Rule 14) asks whether, despite proper joinder, a joint trial would cause actual prejudice that prevents a reliable verdict. Limiting instructions and cross‑admissibility often cure potential prejudice.
• Temporal disconnect: A significant time gap between alleged drug and gun offenses can defeat joinder; contemporaneous discovery typically supports joinder.
• Appellate sufficiency review: The court views evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Defendants must show no rational jury could convict—a “nearly insurmountable” burden.

Conclusion

United States v. Coley & Duggar solidifies the Seventh Circuit’s en banc course correction in Page. The court holds that repeated, distribution‑quantity drug sales alone support a conspiracy conviction, rejects a sufficiency challenge to constructive firearm possession where the gun is found in a defendant’s bedroom alongside personal and drug‑distribution items, and endorses joinder of drug and gun counts discovered contemporaneously as part of a common scheme. The opinion underscores the heavy deference due to jury verdicts and the limited circumstances in which credibility attacks or “spillover” concerns will warrant reversal or severance.

Going forward, defendants seeking to avoid conspiracy liability must target the frequency, scale, and resale knowledge surrounding transactions rather than relying on formalistic markers like non‑exclusivity or lack of instruction. In drug‑firearm cases, constructive‑possession proof anchored in control of living spaces will remain potent, and joinder will remain the norm in the absence of a clear temporal or evidentiary disconnect. The opinion therefore provides clear guidance for prosecutors, defense counsel, and trial courts on sufficiency, conspiracy, and joinder in the post‑Page landscape.