Reaffirming Montana’s Postconviction Limits: Claims Raised or Raisable on Direct Appeal Are Barred; Probable Cause Defects Do Not Affect Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

Introduction

In C. Hardy v. State, 2025 MT 206N, the Montana Supreme Court issued a noncitable memorandum opinion affirming the summary denial of a postconviction relief (PCR) petition filed by Caressa Jill Hardy, a/k/a Glenn Lee Dibley, following Hardy’s convictions for two counts of deliberate homicide and two counts of solicitation for homicide. The case does not announce new law; rather, it applies settled principles governing PCR in Montana, particularly the bar on relitigating or belatedly raising claims that were or could have been addressed on direct appeal, and it clarifies that alleged defects in probable cause do not deprive district courts of subject-matter jurisdiction.

The key issues presented on PCR were:

Whether sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims are cognizable on PCR.
Whether an asserted lack of probable cause for solicitation charges deprived the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Whether claims about “improper use” of incarcerated informants and related right-to-counsel concerns can be revisited on PCR after being litigated on direct appeal.
Whether jury-instruction challenges can be raised on PCR after being raised (or capable of being raised) on direct appeal.

Parties and posture:

Appellant: Hardy, self-represented, appealing the denial of an amended PCR petition by the Fourth Judicial District Court (Missoula County), Hon. Shane A. Vannatta presiding.
Appellee: State of Montana, represented by the Attorney General’s Office and the Missoula County Attorney.
Submission/Disposition: Submitted on briefs July 23, 2025; decided September 9, 2025.

Notably, the Court emphasizes at the outset that this memorandum opinion “shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent” under Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of the Montana Supreme Court’s Internal Operating Rules.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order denying Hardy’s amended PCR petition without requesting a State response or holding a hearing. The Court held:

Under § 46-21-105(2), MCA, claims that were or could reasonably have been raised on direct appeal are not cognizable in PCR. This procedural bar disposed of Hardy’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges, his complaints about incarcerated informants and right to counsel, and his jury-instruction challenges—all of which were raised or were raisable on direct appeal and, in fact, some were litigated in State v. Hardy, 2023 MT 110 (Hardy I), where the convictions were affirmed.
The district court did not lack subject-matter jurisdiction over the solicitation charges. Subject-matter jurisdiction is conferred by the Montana Constitution and statutes; it does not turn on whether probable cause existed. Any probable-cause challenge should have been litigated in the charging court and on direct appeal, not on PCR.
Because Hardy did not satisfy PCR pleading requirements, including attaching supporting affidavits or records to establish factual claims, dismissal without a hearing was appropriate under settled law.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

State v. Hardy, 2023 MT 110 (Hardy I), 412 Mont. 383, 530 P.3d 814. The Court’s prior opinion on Hardy’s direct appeal addressed several of the very issues Hardy attempted to reassert on PCR—namely, alleged right-to-counsel violations associated with incarcerated informants, the requested cautionary instruction on informant testimony, limitations on commenting about a missing witness (Braunreiter), and prosecutorial misconduct. Hardy I affirmed the convictions, thereby foreclosing relitigation of those issues and underscoring the § 46-21-105(2) bar in PCR.
Fletcher v. State, 2023 MT 266, ¶ 9, 372 Mont. 22, 309 P.3d 998. Cited for the proposition that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered. The Court refused to entertain any new arguments Hardy attempted to introduce on PCR appeal that had not been presented to the district court in the amended PCR petition.
Wilkes v. State, 2015 MT 243, ¶ 9, 380 Mont. 388, 355 P.3d 755. Articulates the standard of review for PCR denials: findings of fact are reviewed for clear error; conclusions of law for correctness.
Herman v. State, 2006 MT 7, ¶¶ 13, 15, 32, 330 Mont. 267, 127 P.3d 422. Establishes that a district court may dismiss a PCR petition as a matter of law and may dismiss for failure to state a claim when the petitioner does not attach required affidavits, records, or other evidence under § 46-21-104(1)(c), MCA.
DeShields v. State, 2006 MT 58, ¶ 15, 331 Mont. 329, 132 P.3d 540; § 46-21-105(2), MCA. Reinforces the central PCR bar: PCR is not a substitute for direct appeal, and issues that were or could have been raised on direct appeal may not be raised in a PCR proceeding.
In re E.G., 2014 MT 148, ¶ 11, 375 Mont. 252, 326 P.3d 1092; In re A.D.B., 2013 MT 167, ¶ 54, 370 Mont. 422, 305 P.3d 739. Defines jurisdiction as the court’s fundamental power to hear and determine cases—an authority conferred by the Montana Constitution and applicable statutes, not by the adequacy of probable cause in a particular charging document.
Montana Constitution art. VII, § 4; § 3-5-302(1)(a), MCA. Confers original jurisdiction on district courts over felony criminal cases. This constitutional/statutory grant defeats Hardy’s argument that alleged probable-cause defects could deprive the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Plouffe v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Human Servs., 2002 MT 64, ¶¶ 18–19, 309 Mont. 184, 45 P.3d 10. Provides the operative definition of probable cause, making clear it is a standard tied to suspicion based on reasonably strong circumstances. Crucially, the Court leverages this to explain that even if probable cause is challenged, it does not govern constitutional subject-matter jurisdiction.
City of Bozeman v. Lehrer, 2020 MT 55, ¶ 7, 399 Mont. 166, 459 P.3d 850. Confirms that challenges to probable cause are to be brought and adjudicated in the court where the charging document was filed—i.e., the correct forum for litigating such issues is the trial court in the criminal case, and then (if necessary) on direct appeal, not in PCR.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three principal steps.

Procedural bar under § 46-21-105(2), MCA, for record-based claims. The opinion emphasizes that PCR cannot be used to reargue or serially litigate claims:
- Sufficiency of the evidence: Hardy could have challenged (and did challenge) sufficiency at trial and did so on direct appeal. As such, the PCR route is foreclosed.
- Incarcerated informants/right to counsel: These issues were squarely raised and resolved in Hardy I; they cannot be relitigated on PCR.
- Jury instructions: The concerns about the court’s emphasis on “purpose” and the alleged verbal misstatement (“provided” versus “proved”) were issues Hardy could have objected to at trial and could have raised (and did raise) on direct appeal. They are thus procedurally barred on PCR.
This step is reinforced by Herman and § 46-21-104(1)(c), MCA—the petition failed to attach the required supporting evidence for any new factual predicates, providing an independent basis for dismissal without a hearing.
Subject-matter jurisdiction is not dependent on probable cause. The Court rebuffs Hardy’s attempt to recast a merits or procedural challenge (probable cause) as a jurisdictional one. In Montana, district court jurisdiction over felony crimes is constitutionally and statutorily conferred (Mont. Const. art. VII, § 4; § 3-5-302(1)(a), MCA). The presence or absence of probable cause relates to charging and pretrial processes—not to the court’s fundamental power to adjudicate the case. Hence, even if Hardy believed the solicitation counts rested on unreliable jailhouse informant testimony, that contention does not strip the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction. The proper avenues for such a claim were pretrial motions and direct appeal, not PCR.
Summary disposition without response or hearing is permissible. The Court affirms the district court’s authority to summarily deny PCR petitions when the face of the petition shows legal bars or fails to meet statutory pleading requirements. The opinion specifically rejects Hardy’s misunderstanding that the petition became “deemed denied” by the passage of time; instead, the district court entered a written order on December 4, 2024, explaining its reasoning.

Impact

While noncitable and nonprecedential, this memorandum opinion conveys several practical messages with recurring significance in Montana’s criminal postconviction practice:

Strict enforcement of the direct-appeal bar: The Court continues to apply § 46-21-105(2), MCA, to prevent PCR from becoming an avenue for relitigating trial-record issues or raising record-based claims that were available earlier. Defense counsel must preserve and pursue such claims on direct appeal.
Jurisdictional reframing is ineffective: Recasting probable-cause or evidentiary arguments as “jurisdictional” will not bypass PCR’s procedural bars. Subject-matter jurisdiction is anchored in the Constitution and statutes, not in the sufficiency of a particular charging instrument or the reliability of specific witnesses.
Use of informants is addressed at trial and on appeal: Credibility issues with jailhouse informants are tried in the crucible of adversarial testing—cross-examination, impeachment, and appropriate jury instructions—not later through PCR absent new evidence or legally cognizable grounds outside the trial record.
Summary dismissal tools remain robust: District courts may deny PCR petitions without a hearing when petitioners fail to attach the affidavits or records required by § 46-21-104(1)(c), MCA, or where the legal landscape forecloses relief as a matter of law.
Pro se litigants must adhere to procedure: Although not stated as a broad doctrinal pronouncement, the Court’s response to Hardy’s procedural misunderstandings underscores that self-represented status does not relax statutory PCR requirements or appellate preservation rules.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Memorandum opinion (noncitable): A short decision used when the Court views the case as controlled by settled law or clear standards. It does not create precedent and may not be cited. Its case title, number, and disposition appear in the Court’s quarterly list.
Postconviction relief (PCR): A limited, statutory mechanism for challenging a conviction or sentence after direct appeal. It typically addresses claims not apparent from the trial record (for example, certain ineffective-assistance claims or newly discovered evidence). PCR is not a second direct appeal.
§ 46-21-105(2), MCA (the “direct-appeal bar”): If a claim was or could reasonably have been raised on direct appeal, it cannot be raised in a PCR proceeding.
§ 46-21-104(1)(c), MCA (pleading with attachments): PCR petitions must identify facts supporting the grounds for relief and attach affidavits, records, or other evidence establishing those facts. Failure to do so can justify dismissal without a hearing.
Subject-matter jurisdiction: The court’s basic authority to hear a class of cases. In Montana, district courts have constitutional and statutory jurisdiction over felonies. This authority does not depend on whether a particular charging document was supported by probable cause.
Probable cause: A pretrial threshold—reasonable grounds to believe a person committed an offense. It affects charging and pretrial determinations but does not control a district court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate a felony case.
Sufficiency of the evidence: A merits question assessed at trial and reviewable on direct appeal. Because it is based on the trial record, it is ordinarily not cognizable in PCR.
Incarcerated informants and right to counsel: Claims that the State used informants to elicit incriminating statements after counsel was appointed are record-based and, here, were litigated on direct appeal (Hardy I). Those issues cannot be revived on PCR absent new, extra-record facts satisfying statutory requirements.
Jury instructions: Challenges to instructions must be preserved at trial and pursued on direct appeal. Attempting to reframe such claims on PCR is generally barred if they were or could have been raised earlier.

Conclusion

The Montana Supreme Court’s memorandum opinion in C. Hardy v. State applies settled law to affirm the summary denial of Hardy’s PCR petition. The Court reiterates two bedrock principles of Montana postconviction practice: first, PCR is not a substitute for direct appeal, and record-based claims that were or could have been raised on direct appeal are barred; second, subject-matter jurisdiction over felony prosecutions stems from the Constitution and statutes and is not contingent on the existence of probable cause for particular charges. The decision also underscores that PCR petitions must comply with statutory pleading requirements, including attaching evidentiary support for factual allegations, and that district courts may summarily deny petitions when legal or procedural defects are apparent.

Although nonprecedential, the opinion offers clear guidance for litigants and courts alike: preserve claims at trial, present record-based issues on direct appeal, and reserve PCR for claims that legitimately require extra-record development or that are otherwise cognizable under the postconviction statutes.