Reaffirming Hoecher: Nonresidential Community Corrections Is Not “Confinement” for Presentence Credit Under § 18-1.3-405

Introduction

In Bonde v. People, 2025 CO 24, 569 P.3d 109 (Colo. 2025), the Colorado Supreme Court addressed whether time served on the nonresidential phase of a community corrections sentence qualifies as “confinement” for purposes of presentence confinement credit (PSCC) under section 18-1.3-405, C.R.S. (2024). The petitioner, Ryan Wallace Bonde, urged the Court to revisit and overrule its 1991 decision in People v. Hoecher, 822 P.2d 8 (Colo. 1991), arguing that legislative changes to the parole and credit schemes undermined Hoecher’s reasoning and warranted recognizing PSCC for nonresidential community corrections time.

The Court—sitting en banc and led by Chief Justice Márquez—declined to do so. It reaffirmed that nonresidential community corrections is not “confinement” under § 18-1.3-405 and held that any parity-based expansion of PSCC lies with the legislature, not the courts. The decision clarifies the boundaries among PSCC, good time, and earned time credits, applies Colorado’s robust stare decisis doctrine, and relies on the textual meaning of “confined” and legislative acquiescence.

The case also presents a justiciability wrinkle. Although the State suggested that Bonde had completed his CDOC sentence, the Court exercised review under the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to mootness—an important procedural holding for short-duration community corrections cases.

Summary of the Opinion

The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals and held:

Nonresidential community corrections is not “confinement” for PSCC under § 18-1.3-405. Hoecher remains good law.
The statutory and practical realities of nonresidential status—living independently in the community with limited supervision and wide-ranging freedoms—remain inconsistent with “confinement.”
Although the legislature has expanded PSCC for parole in several respects since Hoecher, it has repeatedly declined to extend PSCC to nonresidential community corrections. Under rules of statutory construction and legislative acquiescence, that silence supports reaffirming Hoecher.
Offenders may still receive good time and earned time credits for nonresidential community corrections (per § 17-27-104(9) and related statutes), but these are distinct from PSCC.
The case is justiciable despite potential mootness because it raises an important issue capable of repetition yet evading review (Walton v. People; People v. Brockelman; DePriest v. People).

Case Background

Bonde resolved two cases by plea and received two concurrent four-year community corrections sentences. He completed the residential portion and was transitioned to nonresidential status. Following his arrest and new charges, his nonresidential status was terminated. On resentencing to the Department of Corrections (CDOC), Bonde sought PSCC for 355 days served during his nonresidential community corrections period. The district court denied PSCC under Hoecher but awarded good time/earned time credits; the mittimus credited jail and residential community corrections time as PSCC and noted 153 earned-time days.

On appeal, Bonde argued that legislative changes since Hoecher, especially the extension of PSCC to certain parole contexts, undermined Hoecher’s premise that nonresidential community corrections and parole are comparable in credit consequences. A court of appeals division rejected the argument and adhered to Hoecher. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

People v. Hoecher, 822 P.2d 8 (Colo. 1991): The cornerstone precedent. Hoecher held that nonresidential community corrections time is not “confinement” and thus does not generate PSCC under § 18-1.3-405. The rationale emphasized the freedoms enjoyed by nonresidential participants and the programmatic aim of reintegration with “limited” confinement. Bonde sought to overrule or cabin this holding.
Wilson v. People, 747 P.2d 638 (Colo. 1987), abrogated on other grounds by Benz v. People, 5 P.3d 311 (Colo. 2000): Cited in Hoecher for the objective of community corrections—to limit confinement while supporting reintegration—underscoring the non-carceral character of the nonresidential phase.
People v. McCreadie, 938 P.2d 528 (Colo. 1997): Clarifies that earned time and good time are distinct from PSCC and serve different functions in sentence administration.
Fransua v. People, 2019 CO 96, 451 P.3d 1208; People v. Houston, 2014 COA 56, 411 P.3d 808: Establish de novo review for whether a defendant is entitled to PSCC.
People v. Steen, 2014 CO 9, 318 P.3d 487; People v. Manzo, 144 P.3d 551 (Colo. 2006): Provide core principles of statutory interpretation—plain meaning, fidelity to legislative intent, and interpretation within the larger statutory scheme.
People v. Swain, 959 P.2d 426 (Colo. 1998): Articulates legislative acquiescence; when the legislature amends a statute without altering a judicially construed portion, the prior construction is presumed accepted and ratified.
Rios-Vargas v. People, 2023 CO 35, 532 P.3d 1206; Love v. Klosky, 2018 CO 20, 413 P.3d 1267: State the stare decisis standard—departure from precedent only when the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changed conditions, and when more good than harm will flow from overruling.
DePriest v. People, 2021 CO 40, 487 P.3d 658; Walton v. People, 2019 CO 95, 451 P.3d 1212; People v. Brockelman, 933 P.2d 1315 (Colo. 1997): Mootness and the exception for important issues capable of repetition yet evading review.
LaFond v. Sweeney, 2015 CO 3, 343 P.3d 939: Courts presume the legislature acts with awareness of its own enactments and existing case law.

Statutes and standards integral to the analysis include § 18-1.3-405 (PSCC), § 18-1.3-301(1)(j) and § 17-27-104(9) (community corrections credit documentation and time-credit framework), and §§ 17-22.5-301, -302, -405 (good time/earned time provisions). The Court also referenced the 2022 Colorado Community Corrections Standards to illustrate the practical conditions and supervision levels associated with nonresidential status.

Legal Reasoning

1) Textual anchor: What “confined” means under § 18-1.3-405

Section 18-1.3-405 grants PSCC when a person is “confined for an offense prior to the imposition of sentence.” The Court returned to the statute’s plain meaning: “confined” contemplates physical restraint and custodial control akin to jail, prison, or residential placement. The Court underscored that nonresidential community corrections participants:

Do not reside in a CDOC facility or a residential community corrections facility.
Live independently in the community “under program supervision.”
Enjoy broad freedoms, including employment, education, vocational training, family contact, and comparatively less stringent testing and programming requirements (with some programming even by phone).

These conditions are “inconsistent with the notion of confinement” as used in § 18-1.3-405. The Court thus reaffirmed the core holding of Hoecher: nonresidential community corrections time is not PSCC-eligible time.

2) Stare decisis: No basis to overturn Hoecher

Under Colorado’s stare decisis framework, the Court will depart from precedent only if clearly convinced that the prior rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound due to changed conditions, and if more good than harm would result from departure (Rios-Vargas; Love). Bonde’s argument targeted a piece of Hoecher’s reasoning—its comparison to parole—suggesting that subsequent legislative changes had eroded that analogy.

The Court acknowledged that legislative changes have indeed extended PSCC to certain parole contexts, weakening Hoecher’s parole analogy. But crucially, the bottom-line rule in Hoecher rests on the text of § 18-1.3-405 and on the nonresidential program’s freedoms—not on parity with parole. The nature of nonresidential status has not materially changed since 1991 in ways relevant to “confinement,” and the statute’s language remains the same. Thus, neither prong of the stare decisis test was met.

3) Statutory scheme and legislative acquiescence

The Court canvassed post-Hoecher legislative developments:

1995: Amendment to § 17-22.5-403(6) allowed PSCC for nonviolent offenders resentenced after revocation of parole.
2009: Amendment to § 18-1.3-405 granted PSCC for offenders “confined” while awaiting a parole revocation hearing.
2011: Amendment to § 17-27-104(9) authorized earned time and good time credits for nonresidential community corrections participation (but did not provide PSCC).
Multiple amendments to community corrections statutes (e.g., to earned time caps; elimination of credits for escape/absconding) further refined the time-credit landscape without extending PSCC to nonresidential time.

The Court drew two conclusions. First, the General Assembly has consciously conferred PSCC in discrete parole-related settings—demonstrating that when it intends to grant PSCC, it knows how to do so explicitly. Second, the legislature’s silence regarding PSCC for nonresidential community corrections—despite numerous opportunities—suggests acceptance of Hoecher’s interpretation. Under Swain and LaFond, such targeted amendments and silence amount to legislative acquiescence and weigh against judicial expansion of PSCC.

4) Mootness exception

Even if Bonde had completed his CDOC sentence, the Court applied the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception. Community corrections sentences often involve shorter terms and transitions, while appeals can span years. Without review under this exception, the recurring credit issue would routinely evade appellate resolution (Walton; Brockelman; DePriest).

Impact and Implications

1) Clear rule for PSCC in community corrections

Bonde cements a bright-line demarcation:

Residential community corrections time can qualify for PSCC upon resentencing to CDOC (as “confinement”).
Nonresidential community corrections time does not qualify for PSCC.
Nonresidential time remains eligible for earned time and good time credits under § 17-27-104(9) and §§ 17-22.5-301, -302, -405, but those credits are distinct from PSCC.

2) Sentencing practice and advising

Trial courts should not award PSCC for nonresidential community corrections when preparing mittimi upon resentencing to CDOC. They should, however, document nonresidential time for the purpose of good time and earned time calculations as required by statute.
Defense counsel must advise clients that time spent on nonresidential status will not reduce their sentence via PSCC if later revoked and resentenced to DOC. This affects plea negotiations, risk assessments when transitioning from residential to nonresidential phases, and expectations regarding sentence credits.
Prosecutors and community corrections programs can continue to rely on earned time/good time as incentives in nonresidential phases without the additional, automatic credit consequence of PSCC.

3) Legislative roadmap

The Court signals that any shift toward parity—treating nonresidential status like certain parole contexts for PSCC—should come from the General Assembly. If the legislature wishes to align credit rules across supervision statuses, it can amend § 18-1.3-405 or the community corrections statutes. Until then, the Hoecher rule controls.

4) Future litigation

Bonde minimizes litigation over the meaning of “confinement” in the nonresidential community corrections context and discourages attempts to leverage parity with parole to expand PSCC. Challenges going forward will need to identify materially different custodial conditions or rely on statutory change rather than re-argument of the policy merits.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Presentence Confinement Credit (PSCC): A day-for-day credit applied to an imposed sentence for time a defendant was “confined” before sentencing for that offense (§ 18-1.3-405). PSCC directly reduces the length of the sentence by the credited days.
Good Time and Earned Time: Administrative credits that can affect parole eligibility and discharge calculations, awarded for compliance with rules and completion of programming, work, or education (§§ 17-22.5-301, -302, -405). These are not the same as PSCC and do not require that the offender was “confined.”
Residential vs. Nonresidential Community Corrections:
- Residential: The offender lives at a community corrections facility with custodial controls; often considered “confinement” for PSCC calculations.
- Nonresidential: The offender lives independently in the community under supervision; enjoys substantial freedoms inconsistent with “confinement,” so no PSCC under current law.
Legislative Acquiescence/Ratification: When the legislature amends a statute but leaves untouched a portion previously construed by the courts, it is presumed to accept that judicial interpretation (Swain).
Stare Decisis: The principle that courts adhere to precedent unless the prior rule is clearly wrong or outdated due to changed conditions and overruling would do more good than harm (Rios-Vargas; Love).
Mootness Exception—Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review: Courts may decide an otherwise moot case if the issue is likely to recur but typically ends before appellate review can be completed (Walton; Brockelman; DePriest).

Conclusion

Bonde v. People squarely reaffirms the rule of People v. Hoecher: time served on nonresidential community corrections does not qualify as “confinement” for PSCC under § 18-1.3-405. The opinion rests on a textual interpretation of “confined,” confirms that nonresidential status retains freedoms incompatible with confinement, and emphasizes that apparent policy arguments for parity with parole must be addressed by the General Assembly.

The decision provides clear guidance for sentencing courts, counsel, and community corrections administrators: document nonresidential time for earned and good time purposes, but do not apply PSCC. Doctrinally, Bonde reinforces stare decisis and legislative acquiescence as constraints on judicial alteration of statutory meaning, and it confirms that short-duration credit disputes in the community corrections setting qualify for review under the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception. In the broader legal landscape, Bonde stabilizes Colorado’s PSCC jurisprudence while inviting any future change through legislation, not judicial redefinition.