Reaffirming § 922(g)(5) Post-Bruen & Refining Reasonable-Suspicion Stops: Commentary on United States v. Herbert Murillo-Lopez, 90 F.4th 4302 (4th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

The Fourth Circuit’s published decision in United States v. Murillo-Lopez confronts two pressing questions that have roiled federal criminal practice since the Supreme Court’s watershed Second-Amendment decision in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (2022):

• Does Bruen undermine pre-existing circuit precedent upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), which prohibits firearm possession by undocumented non-citizens?
• What quantum of “reasonable suspicion” is necessary for officers to stop a vehicle when they believe (but have not confirmed) that a wanted felon may be among the occupants?

In affirming Herbert Murillo-Lopez’s conviction for possessing a firearm while unlawfully present in the United States, the majority (Judge Heytens, joined by Chief Judge Diaz) answers both questions in the Government’s favor, while Judge Benjamin partially dissents on the Fourth-Amendment point. The case thus:

1. Reaffirms, post-Bruen and Rahimi, that undocumented non-citizens are outside the “political community” protected by the Second Amendment, leaving § 922(g)(5)(A) intact within the Fourth Circuit.
2. Clarifies the circumstances under which officers may execute a Terry-style investigatory stop of a vehicle to effectuate an outstanding arrest warrant for a third party.

II. Summary of the Judgment

The panel:

• Sufficiency of the Evidence – Found substantial evidence that the defendant knew of his undocumented status, citing on-scene admissions, corroborating ICE database searches, and the absence of lawful-status documentation (unanimous).
• Fourth Amendment – Held that (i) the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion that the suspect named in the warrant might be in the vehicle; and (ii) the search of the defendant’s satchel was consensual (2–1; Judge Benjamin dissented on the stop).
• Second Amendment – Rejected a facial challenge to § 922(g)(5)(A), concluding that United States v. Carpio-Leon (4th Cir. 2012) survives Bruen and Rahimi (unanimous).
• Affirmed the eight-month sentence and three years of supervised release.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited & Their Influence

1. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974 (4th Cir. 2012) – Held that undocumented aliens are not within the Second-Amendment “people.” The panel treats it as controlling and harmonious with Bruen.
2. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) & Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. 1889 (2024) – Superseded “means-end” scrutiny for firearm restrictions with a historical-analogue test. The court reasons that Carpio-Leon already relied on history and text, so its validity remains.
3. Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019) – Supplies the knowledge element for § 922(g) offenses; shapes the sufficiency analysis.
4. Wong Sun, Opper – Provide the corroboration rule for admissions; the panel finds sufficient independent evidence.
5. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985); Fourth-Circuit decisions such as Holmes & Brugal – Guide the reasonable-suspicion framework for warrant-related vehicle stops.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Knowledge of Undocumented Status – The jury could credit an officer’s testimony that defendant admitted being “illegal,” bolstered by:
   • Post-arrest interview where defendant named El Salvador as sole citizenship and offered no lawful-status proof.
   • Fingerprint search showing no lawful entry record.
   Together these satisfy Rehaif despite the corroboration doctrine of Wong Sun.
2. Fourth Amendment – Vehicle Stop – Reasonable suspicion existed because:
   • Task-force intel placed the wanted armed-robbery suspect at one of a “few specific” houses.
   • Occupants of one such house immediately left in the Explorer; one man matched the suspect’s general description.
   • Surveillance, though lengthy, did not dispel suspicion; officers are not required to confirm identity before stop (Hensley).
   Judge Benjamin counters that the description (“Hispanic male with short black hair”) was too generic, surveillance produced no additional suspicious behavior, and the Fourth Amendment therefore forbade the stop.
3. Fourth Amendment – Satchel Search – Consent was voluntary. District court’s factual finding not clearly erroneous: defendant conversed in English, responded appropriately, and showed no coercion.
4. Second Amendment – Panel applies intra-circuit stare decisis. Because Carpio-Leon used the same textual-historical mode endorsed by Bruen, it remains good law absent en banc or Supreme Court reversal. The historical record supports disarming non-citizen transients lacking allegiance to the polity.

C. Impact on Future Litigation

• Second-Amendment Landscape – The decision positions the Fourth Circuit with the Eighth Circuit (Sitladeen) in upholding § 922(g)(5). Defendants in Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, and the Carolinas now face an uphill battle challenging the statute absent Supreme Court intervention.
• Vehicle Stops Based on Outstanding Warrants – The court’s articulation that officers may stop a vehicle when a plausible match to a warrant exists—even if description is broad—tips the scales toward law-enforcement discretion. Practitioners will cite Murillo-Lopez to defend stops where physical descriptors are somewhat generic but tied to narrow geographic intel.
• Evidentiary Practice Post-Rehaif – The embrace of on-scene admissions plus minimal corroboration provides prosecutors a blueprint for proving “knowledge-of-status,” especially where immigration files show no lawful entry.
• Dissent’s Foothold – Judge Benjamin’s dissent may seed petitions for en banc review on the reasonableness of stops predicated on broad ethnic descriptors, feeding into national debates about racial profiling.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• § 922(g)(5)(A) – A federal law making it a felony for someone “illegally or unlawfully in the United States” to possess a firearm.
• Bruen Historical-Analogue Test – After Bruen, courts ask whether modern gun regulations are “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation,” rather than applying balancing tests.
• Reasonable Suspicion vs. Probable Cause – “Reasonable suspicion” is a specific, articulable basis for suspecting wrongdoing—less than “probable cause,” but more than a hunch. It justifies brief stops (Terry stops).
• Intra-Circuit Stare Decisis – A three-judge panel cannot overrule prior published circuit precedent unless an intervening Supreme Court decision is “plainly irreconcilable” with it.
• Corroboration Doctrine (Wong Sun) – A defendant’s own uncorroborated confession cannot alone sustain a conviction; independent evidence must support its trustworthiness.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Murillo-Lopez reinforces two pivotal principles:

1. Section 922(g)(5)(A) remains constitutional in the Fourth Circuit even after Bruen and Rahimi, because undocumented non-citizens fall outside the Second-Amendment’s protected “people.”
2. Officers may conduct an investigatory vehicle stop aimed at executing an arrest warrant when specific (if somewhat broad) descriptors and localized surveillance collectively create reasonable suspicion that the wanted person is present.

For prosecutors, the decision supplies a robust precedential shield against renewed Second-Amendment attacks on § 922(g)(5). For defense counsel, Judge Benjamin’s dissent offers a pathway to contest stops grounded in generic descriptors and localized tips. And for scholars, the case exemplifies how lower courts are assimilating the Supreme Court’s originalist turn in firearm jurisprudence while maintaining pre-existing circuit doctrines. As such, Murillo-Lopez is poised to shape both Second-Amendment and Fourth-Amendment litigation in the years ahead.