Re-Urged Summary Judgment as Rule 50 Preservation & the Fact-Specific Nature of “Clearly Established” Rights: A Commentary on Trabucco v. Rivera

Introduction

The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Trabucco v. Rivera, No. 24-60383 (June 26 2025), tackles two recurring flash-points in civil-rights litigation against law-enforcement officers:

When, and how, a losing party preserves sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50; and
Where the often-invoked defence of qualified immunity draws the line between “clearly established” and “yet-unclear” constitutional limits on police force.

Plaintiff Nickolas Trabucco alleged that Officer Andres Rivera used excessive force—first tackling, then tasing him—during a parking-lot encounter. A jury agreed that the force was excessive, yet simultaneously found that Rivera was protected by qualified immunity. The district court denied Trabucco’s post-trial motions, and the Fifth Circuit has now affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

Rule 50 Preservation. The court held that Trabucco did not waive his right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence even though he never uttered the magic words “Rule 50(a)” at trial. By “re-urging” his summary-judgment motion at the close of evidence, he satisfied the purposes of Rule 50: alerting both court and opponent to the precise evidentiary issues. The opinion collects earlier “technical-non-compliance” precedents (Flowers, Greenwood, Polanco) and extends them.
Merits of the Qualified-Immunity Finding. On de novo review, the panel concluded that a reasonable jury could deem Rivera’s mistake reasonable in light of fact-specific distinctions from the plaintiff’s cited precedent (Trammell v. Fruge and Hanks v. Rogers). Therefore, the denial of judgment as a matter of law was proper.
Jury-Instruction Challenges. Alleged errors—such as quoting language from Salazar v. Molina without fuller factual context and omitting plaintiff’s preferred passages—did not create “substantial and ineradicable doubt” that the jury was misled. Some objections were unpreserved and reviewed only for plain error.
New-Trial Motion. Given evidence that Rivera perceived (even if incorrectly) resistance and potential flight, the split verdict was not irrational. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Preservation Cases

Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Servs., 247 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2001) – laid groundwork that Rule 50’s technical requirements may give way when the trial judge and opposing party had adequate notice.
Greenwood v. Societe Francaise De, 111 F.3d 1239 (5th Cir. 1997) – “purposes over formalities” approach.
Polanco v. City of Austin, 78 F.3d 968 (5th Cir. 1996) – mis-labelled motions may still preserve sufficiency issues if the arguments are unmistakable.

The panel synthesized these to announce that re-urging a summary-judgment motion—when it flags identical sufficiency points—is enough to permit Rule 50(b) and appellate review. That holding is the decision’s clearest procedural precedent.

2. Qualified-Immunity / Excessive-Force Line of Cases

Trammell v. Fruge, 868 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 2017)
Hanks v. Rogers, 853 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2017)
Salazar v. Molina, 37 F.4th 278 (5th Cir. 2022)
Escobar v. Montee, 895 F.3d 387 (5th Cir. 2018)
Foundational Supreme Court authorities: Pearson v. Callahan, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, Anderson v. Creighton.

The court carefully parsed factual variations—length of encounter, plaintiff’s agitation, signs of flight, officer commands—to demonstrate why earlier holdings did not place “beyond debate” the unreasonableness of Rivera’s force. This reinforces the Supreme Court’s admonition that qualified-immunity analysis is not about general principles (“don’t use excessive force”) but about “particularized” facts.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Rule 50 Technicality. The panel applied a functional approach: if the trial judge had the power to grant JMOL and fully understood the sufficiency challenge, the plaintiff preserved the point. By characterising Trabucco’s re-urged summary-judgment motion as a “de minimis departure,” the court eases strict practice-trap hurdles for civil-rights litigants.
Qualified Immunity Step One – Constitutional Violation. The jury already answered “yes.” The panel accepted that finding for purposes of appellate review.
Qualified Immunity Step Two – Clearly Established Law.
• The court compared video/record evidence with Trammell and Hanks, identifying three recurring factors: (a) time for verbal negotiation, (b) demeanor & resistance level, (c) attempt or possibility of flight.
• Because each factor diverged materially, prior precedent could not render Rivera’s conduct “beyond debate” unconstitutional.
• Nor was this “the rare obvious case” where unlawfulness is apparent absent precedent.
Standard of Review Overlay. Even if judges might disagree with the jury, appellate review is “especially deferential.” The court highlighted that unless evidence so overwhelms the verdict that “no reasonable juror” could agree, JMOL is improper. Differences between what actually happened and what Rivera reasonably believed remained jury questions.

C. Impact of the Judgment

Procedural Clarity on Rule 50 Waiver. Litigants who, in the heat of trial, forget to couch their motion in Rule 50 terminology may still preserve appellate review by expressly “re-urging” a summary-judgment motion that focuses on the same insufficiency arguments.
Qualified-Immunity Bar Raised for Plaintiffs. The opinion underscores how fine factual distinctions can defeat the “clearly established” prong. Even a jury finding of unconstitutional force does not eliminate qualified immunity if no prior case closely mirrors the precise circumstances.
Jury-Instruction Crafting. Trial courts now have Fifth-Circuit approval to give abstract, proposition-style instructions about qualified immunity without laying out detailed case facts. Requests to add fact-heavy comparisons may be refused without reversible error.
Officer Guidance. While the case leaves intact liability for objectively excessive force, it affirms that officers can make mis-judgements when confronting ambiguous resistance without losing immunity—so long as fact-matched precedent is lacking.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Judgment as a Matter of Law (JMOL) – Rule 50. After both sides finish presenting evidence, a party can ask the judge to rule immediately because no reasonable jury could decide otherwise. But you must request it before the case goes to the jury to preserve the right to renew (Rule 50(b)) and appeal. Trabucco teaches that courts may treat an “I renew my summary-judgment motion” as good enough.
Qualified Immunity. A shield for government officials sued personally. Even if an officer violates the Constitution, they avoid damages unless (a) a right was violated and (b) that right was “clearly established”— meaning existing case law (or obviousness) would alert every reasonable officer that the conduct is unlawful.
Clearly Established Law. Not about broad statements (“you can’t use excessive force”) but about fact-specific guidance. The closer a precedent’s facts are to the current case, the more likely immunity will be denied.
Split Verdict. A jury can find both (i) excessive force and (ii) qualified immunity. This is not contradictory because the second finding focuses on the officer’s notice in advance, not the force’s objective excessiveness.
Plain Error vs. Preserved Error. If you object properly at trial, appellate courts examine for “abuse of discretion.” If you forget, review is tougher—plain error—requiring clear error affecting fundamental fairness.

Conclusion

Trabucco v. Rivera is important less for altering substantive excessive-force doctrine than for clarifying its procedural and evidentiary frameworks.

First, the Fifth Circuit cements a pragmatic, notice-based approach to Rule 50 preservation: relabelling is forgiven when the trial judge had the same sufficiency question squarely before it.
Second, the opinion illustrates how minute factual nuances continue to cabin the reach of earlier excessive-force precedents, making qualified immunity an enduring obstacle for plaintiffs.
Third, it signals that jury instructions may permissibly employ high-level legal propositions rather than mini-case-studies, so long as they fairly encapsulate the governing standards.

For practitioners, Trabucco is a dual reminder: preserve issues clearly (but do not panic if you forget the exact Rule number), and marshal precedent with surgical factual similarity when attempting to defeat qualified immunity. For courts, it confirms that the fact-intensive nature of excessive-force claims yields broad latitude for jury resolution—and that a finding of unreasonableness does not automatically translate into personal liability.