Rational-Basis Review and Proof of Primary Residence in Mitchell‑Lama Succession:
Commentary on Matter of Mantilla v. New York City Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev.

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I. Introduction

The New York Court of Appeals’ decision in Matter of Mantilla v. New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development, 2025 NY Slip Op 07079 (Dec. 18, 2025), sits at the intersection of administrative law deference and the remedial goals of the Mitchell‑Lama housing program.

The case involves a highly sympathetic factual setting: a low‑income senior who moved from Florida to New York to care for his terminally ill brother, a long‑time tenant of a Mitchell‑Lama apartment at Manhattan Plaza in Hell’s Kitchen. After the brother’s death, the surviving brother, Kermit Mantilla, sought succession rights to the apartment. The New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) denied the application, finding that Mantilla had not proven that the apartment was his “primary residence” for the one‑year period immediately preceding his brother’s death, as required by HPD’s Mitchell‑Lama regulations.

The key legal issues were:

• What constitutes adequate documentary proof of “primary residence” for Mitchell‑Lama succession?
• Whether being listed on income affidavits and recertification documents is enough, by itself, to prove primary residence.
• How far courts may go in second‑guessing HPD’s assessment of the evidence in a CPLR article 78 proceeding under the “arbitrary and capricious”/“rational basis” standard.
• Whether reviewing courts may uphold an agency determination on a ground the agency itself did not invoke (here, missing tax returns).

The Court, in a majority opinion by Judge Cannataro, held that HPD’s denial of succession rights had a rational basis and must therefore be upheld, notwithstanding the harsh consequences for Mantilla. Judge Rivera, joined by Judge Troutman, dissented, characterizing HPD’s decision as irrational in the face of substantial evidence of residency and inconsistent with the remedial purpose of succession rules.

The opinion does not revolutionize New York administrative law, but it meaningfully clarifies and reinforces several points of doctrine, particularly for Mitchell‑Lama succession cases:

• Listing on income affidavits is a baseline eligibility requirement and a relevant factor, but does not by itself establish primary residence.
• Courts must give very strong deference to HPD’s weighing of evidence in determining primary residence, even where the record would support a contrary conclusion.
• HPD may reasonably attach weight to both what is present and what is absent from the documentary record.
• Under the “record rule,” a reviewing court may not uphold an agency determination based on a requirement (here, tax returns) that the agency itself did not invoke as part of its decision.

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II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Procedural Background

In 2018, Kermit Mantilla traveled from his home in Florida to New York City to care for his brother Ray Mantilla, a well‑known Latin jazz percussionist, who was suffering from lymphoma and required extensive care. Ray lived in a Mitchell‑Lama apartment in Manhattan Plaza.

Key facts relevant to Kermit’s application for succession:

• By late 2018, Ray had executed a health care proxy and durable power of attorney in favor of Kermit.
• Beginning in September 2018, Kermit was listed on Manhattan Plaza’s income recertification forms as part of Ray’s household.
• The apartment’s rent was increased in November 2018 and June 2019 to account for Kermit’s income as part of the household.
• Kermit, a low‑income senior, obtained New York public benefits (Medicaid, SNAP, HEAP) in 2018–2019, with correspondence sent to the Mitchell‑Lama apartment.
• Ray died on March 21, 2020; his death certificate listed Kermit as the informant and gave the apartment address as Kermit’s address.

Under HPD’s regulations (28 RCNY § 3‑02(p)), a senior‑citizen family member seeking succession must show:

1. They are an “eligible family member” (e.g., sibling) (28 RCNY § 3‑02(p)(2)(ii)(A));
2. They were listed on required income documentation (income affidavits/recertifications) during the relevant period;
3. They used the Mitchell‑Lama apartment as their primary residence for at least one year immediately before the tenant permanently vacated (here, March 21, 2019 – March 21, 2020).

There was no dispute that Kermit was an eligible family member and was listed on the income documents. The sole disputed issue was whether he proved one year of primary residence.

The housing company denied his succession application. On administrative appeal, HPD invited Kermit to submit additional documentation and gave a list of suggested items (tax returns, Social Security or other public benefits correspondence, DMV records, utility bills, bank statements, etc.), cautioning that this was his “only opportunity” for administrative review and specifically telling him to either submit New York State tax returns or explain why he was not obligated to file.

Kermit, represented by counsel, submitted:

• Income recertifications and owner’s certificates of compliance (Sept. 2018–Nov. 2019);
• Health care proxy and POA (August 2018) listing his address in Miami, Florida;
• Ray’s checking account statements (Dec. 2018–Mar. 2020) listing Kermit as POA, with numerous ATM/debit transactions in New York City;
• Public benefits letters (Medicaid, SNAP, HEAP) addressed to Kermit at the Manhattan Plaza apartment before March 2019, and SNAP letters dated April and May 2019 to the same address;
• A February 2019 Social Security Administration letter and Wells Fargo bank statements for Kermit (Oct. 2018–Jan. 2019), all listing his Florida address;
• Proof that he held a Florida driver’s license during the co‑residency period (New York license obtained July 2020).

The HPD hearing officer (HO) denied the appeal, concluding that Kermit had not met his burden to show that the apartment was his primary residence for the full one‑year period. The HO emphasized:

• Documentation listing a Florida address during and around the relevant period (Social Security letter, Wells Fargo statements, earlier proxy/POA documents);
• The limited number of documents in Kermit’s own name listing the Manhattan Plaza address within the exact one‑year window (essentially, only two SNAP letters from April and May 2019);
• The absence of other typical proofs (tax returns, personal bank statements addressed to the New York apartment, DMV records from New York, voter registration, utilities, etc.);
• The fact that Kermit still held a Florida driver’s license during the entire co‑residency period.

Supreme Court annulled HPD’s determination, finding it irrational and granting succession. The Appellate Division reversed, upholding HPD’s decision, emphasizing both Kermit’s failure to produce stronger documentation and his failure to submit New York tax returns or explain their absence. Two Justices dissented, finding no rational basis for the denial given the documentary record. Kermit appealed as of right to the Court of Appeals under CPLR 5601(a).

B. The Majority’s Holding

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, but with an important caveat about the scope of judicial review. The majority held:

1. Rational basis existed for HPD’s determination that Kermit failed to prove primary residence, despite the sympathetic facts and evidence supporting his caregiving role.
2. Listing on income affidavits and recertification forms, while required, does not alone establish primary residence; it is merely a baseline condition under 28 RCNY § 3‑02(p)(3), and, if absent, triggers a presumption against primary residence.
3. Given the mixed record (some documents tying Kermit to the apartment, others to Florida, and relatively few items squarely within the one‑year window in Kermit’s own name), it was not irrational for HPD to find that he had not met his burden.
4. HPD’s reliance on the absence of additional documentation that the agency specifically suggested was permissible under its rules, which explicitly list such items as relevant to determining primary residence (see 28 RCNY § 3‑02(n)(4)(iv)).
5. The Appellate Division, however, erred in relying on Kermit’s failure to submit New York State tax returns (or to explain why he did not file) as part of its rational‑basis analysis, because HPD’s HO had not cited that omission as a ground for denial. Under the “record rule” of Matter of Rizzo v DHCR, judicial review is limited to the grounds actually invoked by the agency.

Despite that doctrinal correction regarding tax returns, the Court concluded that HPD’s decision was supported by a rational basis on the grounds actually articulated, and thus must be sustained.

C. The Dissent

Judge Rivera, joined by Judge Troutman, would have reversed and granted succession rights. The dissent stressed:

• The remedial purpose of Mitchell‑Lama succession rules—to prevent displacement of low‑income family members on a tenant’s death or departure.
• The reality that Kermit, an elderly, low‑income caregiver, had:
  • Moved from Florida to New York to provide round‑the‑clock care to his terminally ill brother;
  • Been recognized by the housing company as part of the household for over a year, resulting in increased rent and additional federal subsidies based on his presence;
  • Obtained New York benefits (Medicaid, SNAP, HEAP) tied to New York residency and subject to fraud penalties if misrepresented;
  • Submitted substantial documentation that, in the dissent’s view, could only reasonably be reconciled with the conclusion that the apartment was his primary residence.
• HPD’s focus on what documents Kermit did not submit, rather than on the probative value of what he did submit, was irrational given his circumstances and the non‑exhaustive nature of the regulatory list of acceptable proofs.

The dissent concluded that HPD’s determination lacked a sound basis in reason or regard for the facts and thus was arbitrary and capricious under the Murphy/Pell standards, particularly in light of the agency’s obligation to consider the remedial purpose of succession rules.

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III. Analysis

A. Regulatory Framework and the Burden of Proof

1. Mitchell‑Lama Succession Rules (28 RCNY § 3‑02(p))

New York City’s Mitchell‑Lama program, governed in part by 28 RCNY § 3‑02, allows certain family members to “succeed” to a tenant’s apartment when the tenant dies or permanently vacates. For HPD‑supervised cooperatives and rentals, the key provisions are:

• Eligibility as “family member”
  Siblings are expressly listed as eligible family members. (28 RCNY § 3‑02(p)(2)(ii)(A))
• Income documentation requirement
  The successor must be listed on income affidavits or income recertifications for the relevant period (28 RCNY § 3‑02(p)(3)), failing which a presumption arises against primary residence.
• Primary residence/co‑residency requirement
  A senior citizen (62+) must prove that the Mitchell‑Lama apartment was their primary residence for at least one year immediately preceding the tenant’s permanent vacatur (here, the date of death, March 21, 2020).

2. Primary Residence Factors (28 RCNY § 3‑02(n)(4))

Section 3‑02(n)(4) specifies what HPD should examine when deciding whether a dwelling is an individual’s primary residence. It directs HPD to consider “all relevant factors,” including but not limited to:

• Whether the individual lists another address as their residence on:
  • Tax returns;
  • Motor vehicle registrations;
  • Driver’s licenses;
  • Other documents filed with public agencies (28 RCNY § 3‑02(n)(4)(i)).
• Objective documentary proof such as:
  • Certified New York State income tax returns;
  • Utility bills;
  • Voter registration data, etc. (28 RCNY § 3‑02(n)(4)(iv)).
• Whether the individual spent at least 183 days in the unit during the preceding calendar year (also part of the primary residence analysis).

The rule is explicit that the list is non‑exhaustive—these are examples, not rigid requirements. At the same time, it places the burden squarely on the applicant to provide proof that the apartment is their primary residence.

3. The Role of Income Affidavits

In Matter of Murphy v DHCR, 21 NY3d 649 (2013), the Court of Appeals described the “principal purpose” of income affidavits in the succession context as providing proof of primary residence. The dissent in Mantilla relies heavily on this statement to argue that the income recertifications listing Kermit as a household member should have been powerful proof of his primary residency.

The majority in Mantilla recalibrates this understanding in the HPD Mitchell‑Lama context. It treats inclusion on income affidavits as:

• A necessary threshold requirement (failure triggers a presumption against primary residence under § 3‑02(p)(3));
• Not sufficient, standing alone, to prove primary residence.

This distinction is one of the most important doctrinal takeaways of the case: income documentation is essential to open the door to a succession claim, but it does not carry the evidentiary weight that the dissent, and arguably Murphy, might otherwise suggest.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Administrative Law Standard: Arbitrary and Capricious / Rational Basis

The majority reiterates the deeply deferential standard applied in CPLR article 78 review of administrative action:

• An agency determination will be upheld if it has a rational basis or is not arbitrary and capricious (Peckham v Calogero, 12 NY3d 424, 431 [2009]).
• An action is arbitrary and capricious when taken “without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts.”
• This is an “extremely deferential” standard (Beck‑Nichols v Bianco, 20 NY3d 540, 559 [2013]).
• Even if the court would have reached a different result, it must uphold the agency’s determination if a rational basis exists (Peckham, 12 NY3d at 431).

The majority emphasizes its limited role: it is not permitted to reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the agency (Matter of Jennings v OMH, 90 NY2d 227, 239 [1997]).

2. Application to Kermit Mantilla’s Evidence

The majority analyzes Kermit’s evidence through this deferential lens, focusing on how the HPD HO might reasonably view the record:

• Income recertifications: Necessary, but not conclusive proof of primary residence.
• Public benefits letters:
  • Some addressed to Kermit at the Manhattan Plaza apartment prior to March 2019;
  • Two SNAP letters in April and May 2019 during the co‑residency period.
  • The HO treated these as probative but limited in scope—evidence of residency in spring 2019, but insufficient by themselves to prove primary residence for the full March 2019–March 2020 period.
• Power‑of‑attorney bank records (Ray’s account):
  • Showed numerous New York transactions, but were in Ray’s name, with Kermit only as POA.
  • The HO reasonably found these insufficiently “credible, sufficient and reliable” to prove where Kermit himself resided, as opposed to where he carried out financial transactions for his brother.
• Out‑of‑state connections:
  • Documents (health care proxy, POA, Social Security letter, Wells Fargo statements) listed a Florida address for Kermit in 2018–early 2019;
  • Kermit retained a Florida driver’s license through the co‑residency period, obtaining a New York license only in July 2020.
  • Under 28 RCNY § 3‑02(n)(4)(i), listing another address in official documents is a relevant factor HPD must consider.
• Absence of other typical documents:
  • Kermit did not submit bank statements in his own name addressed to the New York apartment; nor did he submit credit card statements, New York DMV documents from the relevant period, utility bills, voter registration, or tax returns.
  • Given that HPD had specifically identified these categories as useful proofs and the regulations explicitly list such items as relevant (28 RCNY § 3‑02(n)(4)(iv)), the HO could reasonably treat the lack of such documents as weakening Kermit’s case.

Importantly, the majority stresses that the HO’s job is to weigh conflicting indications: some documents support New York residency; others still tie Kermit to Florida; and critical categories of corroborating documentation are missing. That type of “mixed record” is precisely where deference to the agency’s fact‑finding is at its height.

The majority explicitly addresses the dissent’s view that the evidence, considered holistically, compels the conclusion that Kermit was a New York resident. It acknowledges that the HO “could have reached the opposite determination”, but underscores that “it is not our role to reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the agency.” This sentence is a pointed restatement of institutional role: even if another factfinder (a court, or another HO) might have reasonably granted succession, that does not make HPD’s denial irrational.

3. Treatment of Documents Outside the One‑Year Window

Kermit argued that the HO unfairly disregarded documents outside the strict one‑year co‑residency period when they helped his case, while giving weight to out‑of‑period documents that hurt him (e.g., older documents showing a Florida address). The majority rejects this characterization:

• It reads the HO’s opinion as having reviewed undated/out‑of‑window documents but found them “insufficiently probative” to establish primary residence during the key period.
• The majority does not read the opinion as categorically excluding favorable out‑of‑window documents while selectively relying on unfavorable ones. Rather, it characterizes the HO as drawing distinctions based on probative value.

This is another instance where the Court reframes what might appear as uneven treatment of the record as permissible agency judgment about evidentiary weight.

4. The “Record Rule” and the Tax Returns Issue

One of the more doctrinally significant aspects of the decision is the Court’s treatment of the tax‑return issue. HPD’s notice to Kermit had stressed that he should submit New York State tax returns or explain why he was not obligated to file, and even provided a form to seek certified copies. However:

• The HO’s written determination did not mention Kermit’s failure to submit tax returns.
• The Appellate Division majority nonetheless relied on that failure as a “necessary component” of the application and a basis for finding HPD’s denial rational.

The Court of Appeals corrects this:

• “Judicial review of an administrative determination is limited to the grounds invoked by the agency” (Matter of Rizzo v DHCR, 6 NY3d 104, 110 [2005]; Matter of Scherbyn, 77 NY2d 753, 758 [1991]).
• Because the HO’s reasoning did not rely on missing tax returns, courts may not use that omission as a basis for upholding HPD’s decision in this article 78 proceeding.

This is a reaffirmation of the classic “record rule”: a reviewing court cannot supply a post hoc rationale that the agency did not itself articulate. The majority nonetheless finds that, without the tax‑return rationale, HPD’s decision was still rational based on the grounds actually stated.

C. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

1. Matter of Peckham v Calogero, 12 NY3d 424 (2009)

Peckham is cited for the basic articulation of the arbitrary‑and‑capricious standard and the principle that courts must sustain an agency determination if a rational basis exists, even where the court would have reached a different outcome. In Mantilla, this framework is central: the Court repeatedly reminds the reader that its task is not to decide de novo whether Kermit proved primary residence, but only whether HPD’s conclusion was rational.

2. Matter of Beck‑Nichols v Bianco, 20 NY3d 540 (2013)

Beck‑Nichols is used to underscore how “extremely deferential” this standard is. The Court cites it to emphasize that agency fact‑finding and discretionary judgments are rarely disturbed, reinforcing why sympathy for Kermit’s plight cannot substitute for deference to HPD’s role.

3. Matter of Murphy v New York State DHCR, 21 NY3d 649 (2013)

Murphy involved succession rights in the Mitchell‑Lama context and is cited for several propositions:

• Succession rules serve an “important remedial purpose” of avoiding displacement of family members of limited means.
• In succession matters, the “principal purpose” of the income affidavit is to provide proof of the applicant’s primary residence.

The dissent leans heavily on Murphy to argue that HPD’s approach in Mantilla contravenes the remedial spirit of the succession scheme and gives too little weight to income recertifications and similar documentation.

The majority acknowledges the remedial purpose but tempers Murphy by emphasizing that:

• Remedial purpose does not eliminate the applicant’s burden to prove primary residence under the regulations.
• Income affidavits, while important, are not dispositive; HPD may still look to other factors and the entire record.

Thus, Mantilla subtly rebalances the weight of income affidavits in succession analysis, especially where other objective indicia of residence (and non‑residence) are present.

4. Matter of Rizzo v DHCR, 6 NY3d 104 (2005) and Matter of Scherbyn v Wayne‑Finger Lakes BOCES, 77 NY2d 753 (1991)

These cases embody the “record rule”—that judicial review of an administrative decision is confined to the grounds invoked by the agency in its own determination. In Mantilla, the Court applies this principle to exclude the tax‑return rationale from the review calculus.

5. Matter of Yarbough v Franco, 95 NY2d 342 (2000)

Cited in the dissent, Yarbough reiterates that judicial review of agency determinations is confined to the facts and record before the agency. Judge Rivera uses it to argue that while courts are limited to the agency record, they are not required to accept an irrational reading or disregard of that record.

6. Pell v Board of Educ., 34 NY2d 222 (1974) and 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176 (1978)

These foundational cases define arbitrary‑and‑capricious review and underscore that deference is not blind. Agencies must base decisions on the whole record and may not ignore relevant evidence. The dissent invokes these cases to argue that HPD’s approach to Kermit’s documentation lacked a “sound basis in reason,” especially given:

• The strong evidence of New York‑based caregiving and benefits;
• The remedial nature of succession rights;
• The applicant’s age, limited means, and practical constraints.

7. Matter of Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 NY3d 1042 (2013)

Cited for the proposition that, if an agency’s determination has a rational basis, it must be sustained “even if a different result would not be unreasonable.” The majority uses it to illustrate that multiple reasonable interpretations of the same record are possible, but only one is needed to sustain the agency’s outcome.

8. State Div. of Human Rights v Wagner, 39 NY2d 865 (1976) and Matter of Jennings v OMH, 90 NY2d 227 (1997)

These cases are cited in connection with the idea that:

• The “inference‑making function” at the fact‑finding level belongs to the agency, not the courts.
• Courts may not reweigh evidence or substitute their judgment for the agency’s.

They support the majority’s insistence that, even if the HO could reasonably have ruled the other way, the fact that she did not does not render the determination irrational.

D. Impact and Practical Consequences

1. For Mitchell‑Lama Successions

Mantilla sends a clear message to would‑be successors in HPD‑supervised Mitchell‑Lama housing:

• Income affidavits are not enough
  Being listed on recertification forms and paying higher rent is critical but not conclusive. Applicants must build a robust record affirmatively tying their life—banking, identification, government records, benefits—to the apartment.
• Documentation in the applicant’s own name is indispensable
  Third‑party documents (e.g., a tenant’s bank statements with the applicant listed only as POA) are less persuasive than items that directly bear the applicant’s name and the apartment’s address.
• Conflicting addresses in official records are dangerous
  Documents that continue to list an out‑of‑state or other address (tax, SSA, DMV, bank, etc.) can weigh significantly against a finding of primary residence and must be addressed proactively.
• “Suggested” documents are functionally quasi‑mandatory
  While HPD’s list of documents (tax returns, DMV records, utilities, voter registration, bank statements) is formally non‑exhaustive, Mantilla confirms that failure to supply at least some of these, without explanation, may permissibly count heavily against an applicant.

2. For Counsel Representing Applicants

Lawyers representing Mitchell‑Lama succession applicants should take several lessons:

• Front‑load the record at the administrative level
  Article 78 review is limited to the existing record. Counsel must assume the agency’s decision will be defended on rational‑basis grounds and that courts will not second‑guess even questionable evidentiary weighing.
• Collect broad, time‑specific documentation
  Focus on:
  • Bank, credit, and other financial statements in the applicant’s name with the apartment address;
  • Public benefits and Social Security correspondence specifically addressed to the apartment during the entire co‑residency period;
  • DMV, voter registration, and tax documents showing the apartment as residence for the relevant years;
  • Employer records, school records (where applicable), and health‑care statements referencing the address.
• Explain gaps and contradictions
  If tax returns were not filed, or out‑of‑state IDs were retained, provide written explanations (e.g., income below filing threshold; COVID‑related delays; cost or logistics of changing license) and corroborate with affidavits or other documentation.
• Highlight caregiving realities, but do not rely on them alone
  Humanitarian circumstances are relevant but, under Mantilla, cannot replace documentary proof. Counsel should weave the caregiving story together with a strong documentary trail.

3. For HPD and Other Agencies

HPD receives judicial confirmation that:

• Its document‑heavy approach to primary residence determinations is permissible under the regulations.
• It may reasonably treat missing documentation—especially categories it has expressly flagged—as a significant negative factor, so long as it grounds its written determination in the evidence and omissions it actually relies upon.
• It must, however, take care to accurately reflect all grounds for a determination in its written findings; future reviewing courts will not fill in omitted rationales (e.g., tax‑return issues) post hoc.

At a policy level, HPD—and perhaps the City Council or State legislature—may face pressure to clarify or soften primary residence evidentiary expectations in cases involving:

• Elderly or disabled caregivers;
• Individuals transitioning from out‑of‑state;
• Applicants living on very limited income who may not maintain extensive financial or utility records.

4. The Tension Highlighted by the Dissent

The dissent in Mantilla is important not only for its outcome, but for how it frames the problem:

• It stresses the practical impact of rigid documentation requirements on the poor and elderly.
• It underscores that public benefits (Medicaid, SNAP, HEAP) are granted only after proving local residency and that falsely claiming residency is criminally punishable.
• It views Manhattan Plaza’s treatment of Kermit—accepting his presence as part of the household for rent and subsidy purposes but denying it for succession—as fundamentally at odds with Mitchell‑Lama’s remedial purpose.

While the majority does not adopt this perspective, the dissent provides a roadmap for future advocacy, either before agencies (in urging more flexible, context‑sensitive approaches) or in legislative/regulatory reform efforts aimed at making succession standards more realistic for low‑income caregivers.

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IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Mitchell‑Lama Housing

The Mitchell‑Lama program is a New York initiative (Private Housing Finance Law §§ 571 et seq.) that incentivizes private developers to build and operate housing for low‑ and middle‑income residents, in exchange for tax benefits and regulated rents. Manhattan Plaza is one such development.

2. Succession Rights

“Succession rights” refer to the right of a family member to take over a regulated tenancy when the original tenant dies or permanently vacates. For Mitchell‑Lama apartments, succession is governed by HPD’s rules (28 RCNY § 3‑02). Not everyone qualifies; the applicant must be an eligible family member and must show that they lived in the apartment as their primary residence for a defined period (one year for seniors).

3. CPLR Article 78 and “Arbitrary and Capricious” Review

CPLR article 78 provides a procedural vehicle for challenging actions by state and local agencies. When a court reviews an agency’s discretionary determination (like HPD’s denial of succession rights), it applies the “arbitrary and capricious” or “rational basis” standard:

• Rational basis: There is some logical, fact‑based reason supporting the agency’s decision.
• Arbitrary and capricious: The decision lacks any reasonable foundation or ignores key facts.

Courts do not ask whether the agency made the “best” or “fairest” decision; they ask only whether the decision is within a zone of reasonableness supported by the record.

4. Primary Residence

“Primary residence” generally means the place where someone actually lives and intends to remain—their true home as opposed to a second home, pied‑à‑terre, or temporary stay. Agencies and courts look at objective evidence: where you receive mail, pay bills, file taxes, vote, hold a driver’s license, and conduct daily life.

5. The “Record Rule”

Under the “record rule,” courts reviewing an agency decision must:

• Limit their analysis to the evidence that was before the agency;
• Evaluate the agency’s decision based only on the reasons the agency actually gave.

A court cannot uphold an agency decision by inventing or relying upon new justifications that the agency never mentioned; if the agency made its decision on an improper or incomplete basis, the remedy is typically remand, not judicial repair.

6. Power of Attorney vs. Residency

A “power of attorney” (POA) authorizes a person to act on someone else’s behalf, for example managing their bank account or signing documents. Possessing a POA and using it in New York shows involvement in the person’s affairs, but it does not necessarily prove that the agent lives at the same address. That distinction is central to why HPD discounted Ray’s bank statements with Kermit as POA as proof of Kermit’s primary residence.

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V. Conclusion: Key Takeaways

Matter of Mantilla v HPD underscores how demanding, and how deferentially reviewed, primary‑residence findings are in Mitchell‑Lama succession cases:

• Succession applicants bear a heavy burden to assemble a comprehensive documentary record tying their lives to the apartment during the entire co‑residency period.
• Being listed on income affidavits and paying increased rent is necessary but not sufficient to prove primary residence.
• HPD may consider both what is present (e.g., benefits letters, recertifications) and what is absent (e.g., bank statements, DMV records, tax returns) in determining whether the applicant has met that burden.
• Courts will rarely overturn HPD’s judgment on such matters so long as the determination has some rational basis in the record, even in cases with compelling equities.
• At the same time, the Court reaffirms that reviewing courts are confined to the agency’s stated reasons for its decision and cannot add new grounds post hoc.

The sharply drawn dissent highlights the human costs of a rigid evidentiary approach when applied to low‑income, elderly caregivers and invites policymakers and agencies to consider adjustments that better reflect the remedial goals of the Mitchell‑Lama program. Unless and until such reforms occur, however, Mantilla stands as a strong signal that New York’s highest court will defer to HPD’s fact‑bound residency determinations in succession disputes where the record is mixed, so long as the agency has articulated a facially reasonable basis grounded in its regulations and the documentary evidence.