Ratification, Not Mere Approval: Eleventh Circuit Clarifies Monell Pleading Against Florida School Boards and Confirms Supplemental Jurisdiction Discretion After Dismissal (Post‑Royal Canin)

Introduction

In Mr. Ernesto Lontoc v. School Board of Palm Beach County, No. 24‑12386 (11th Cir. Oct. 27, 2025) (non‑argument calendar) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed three key district court rulings: dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 race discrimination claim against a Florida school board, denial of remand of the remaining state claim, and summary judgment for the board on the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA) claim. Although unpublished, the decision offers practical guidance on two recurring issues:

What it takes to plead municipal liability against a multi‑member school board under Monell when the alleged discrimination stems from personnel decisions made by subordinate officials.
Whether, after federal claims are dismissed (as opposed to voluntarily excised), district courts retain discretion to keep supplemental state‑law claims in federal court in the wake of the Supreme Court’s recent Royal Canin decision.

The case arises from a failed lateral transfer within the Palm Beach County school system. Plaintiff‑appellant Ernesto Lontoc, a Grant Compliance Specialist II and “man of Asian/Filipino ancestry,” alleged he was denied the opportunity to apply for a “Non‑Public” grants compliance role on account of race and that the School Board later filled the role through internal placement with an African‑American woman, Dr. Fenee Russ. After the federal § 1983 claim was dismissed and the district court retained supplemental jurisdiction over the FCRA claim, the court entered summary judgment for the School Board because Lontoc never applied for the posted position.

On appeal, Lontoc challenged: (1) the § 1983 dismissal (pleading/Monell), (2) the denial of remand (supplemental jurisdiction), and (3) the FCRA summary judgment (adverse employment action). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit held:

Monell/§ 1983 Pleading: Under Florida law, the School Board—not the superintendent—is the final policymaker for personnel appointments. A plaintiff cannot state a Monell claim by merely identifying the superintendent or deputy superintendent as the “decisionmaker.” To hold a multi‑member board liable under a ratification theory, the complaint must plausibly allege that the board ratified not just the decision but the unconstitutional basis for it—i.e., that a majority voted for the action for an unconstitutional reason. The complaint here lacked such allegations; dismissal affirmed.
Cat’s Paw and Monell: The panel expressly declined to decide whether “cat’s paw” causation applies in the Monell context. Even assuming it does, the complaint failed because it alleged no facts impugning the School Board’s independence or showing it merely rubber‑stamped a biased subordinate’s recommendation.
Supplemental Jurisdiction After Dismissal: The district court did not abuse its discretion in retaining the FCRA claim after dismissing the federal claim. The court emphasized judicial economy (discovery complete, summary judgment briefed, trial near) and minimal comity concerns (FCRA tracks Title VII). The Supreme Court’s 2025 decision in Royal Canin requires dismissal of state claims only when the plaintiff amends to excise all federal claims; it does not disturb discretionary retention of state claims after federal claims are dismissed.
FCRA Summary Judgment: No adverse employment action occurred where the position was posted, the plaintiff was encouraged to apply, and he did not apply. A failure‑to‑hire claim generally requires a timely application; later “internal placement” did not retroactively negate the plaintiff’s obligation to apply during the posted window, and plaintiff’s contrary “clerical error” theory was both inadequately raised and unsupported.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978): Municipal liability hinges on an official policy or custom. The panel applied Monell to require that the alleged constitutional violation be caused by a policy, custom, or a decision by a final policymaker—or by the final policymaker’s ratification of an unconstitutional basis.
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986): A single decision by an official with final policymaking authority can constitute municipal policy. Used here to frame the policymaker inquiry.
Scala v. City of Winter Park, 116 F.3d 1396 (11th Cir. 1997), Quinn v. Monroe County, 330 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2003): Clarify that if a superior retains meaningful review authority, the subordinate is not the final policymaker; distinguish “final policymaker” from “official decisionmaker.” The district court conflated these concepts; the panel corrected that error but affirmed on alternative grounds.
Chabad Chayil, Inc. v. School Board of Miami‑Dade County, 48 F.4th 1222 (11th Cir. 2022); Fla. Stat. § 1012.22(1): Under Florida law, the school board is the district’s policymaking body; the superintendent recommends, but the board approves or rejects personnel appointments. This state‑law framework anchored the final policymaker analysis.
Matthews v. Columbia County, 294 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002); McCarthy v. City of Cordele, 111 F.4th 1141 (11th Cir. 2024): Ratification requires that the final policymaker adopt both the decision and its unconstitutional basis; for a multi‑member body, a majority must act for an unconstitutional reason. The complaint here lacked such allegations.
Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 1999); Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411 (2011): “Cat’s paw” theory allows a biased subordinate’s intent to be imputed to an unbiased decisionmaker in certain statutory discrimination cases. The panel noted the Eleventh Circuit has not resolved whether cat’s paw applies to Monell; it did not decide the issue because the pleadings failed anyway.
Naumovski v. Norris, 934 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2019); Waters v. City of Chicago, 580 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2009); Lawrence v. School Dist. No. 1, 560 F. App’x 791 (10th Cir. 2014): Sister‑circuit authority reflecting reluctance to extend cat’s paw to Monell claims; cited to show the unsettled landscape.
Carruth v. Bentley, 942 F.3d 1047 (11th Cir. 2019): Absent facts undermining a board’s independence, courts will not infer it merely rubber‑stamped a biased recommendation. Applied here to reject cat’s paw styled pleading.
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989): A municipality is liable only when it itself causes the constitutional violation. Used to anchor the ultimate affirmance of dismissal.
Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Industries America Corp., 314 F.3d 541 (11th Cir. 2002): No obligation to grant sua sponte leave to amend when represented plaintiff never seeks it; used to reject the request to amend on appeal.
Supplemental jurisdiction line: 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)–(c); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); Palmer v. Hospital Authority of Randolph County, 22 F.3d 1559 (11th Cir. 1994); L.A. Draper & Son v. Wheelabrator‑Frye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414 (11th Cir. 1984); Baggett v. First National Bank of Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 1997).
Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22 (2025): When a plaintiff amends to remove all federal claims, § 1367(a) never attaches; state claims must be dismissed. The panel distinguished that scenario from dismissal of federal claims, where § 1367(c) discretion remains.
FCRA/Title VII framework: Alvarez v. Royal Atlantic Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2010); Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2008); Holland v. Gee, 677 F.3d 1047 (11th Cir. 2012).
Failure to apply defeats adverse action: Walker v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 286 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2002); Smith v. J. Smith Lanier & Co., 352 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 2003); Perryman v. Johnson Products Co., 698 F.2d 1138 (11th Cir. 1983).
Summary judgment procedure and admissions: Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 1993); Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2008); Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2009).

Legal Reasoning

1) § 1983/Monell: Distinguishing “Final Policymaker” from “Decisionmaker” and Pleading Ratification

The panel agreed the School Board is the final policymaker on personnel appointments under Florida law (Fla. Stat. § 1012.22(1)), because the Board reviews and may reject superintendent recommendations. That meant the deputy superintendent (Oswald) and superintendent (Fennoy) were not final policymakers as a matter of law because their decisions were subject to meaningful Board review (Scala; Quinn).

The district court erred by assuming that because the superintendent was not the final policymaker, merely alleging the superintendent’s discriminatory decision doomed the Monell claim. The Eleventh Circuit clarified that “final policymaker” and “official decisionmaker” are distinct inquiries: a municipality can be liable under a ratification theory where a subordinate makes the decision and the final policymaker ratifies both the decision and its unconstitutional basis (Matthews).

Nevertheless, the complaint failed because it alleged only that the Board “approved” the appointment. It did not allege:

That the Board knew of, endorsed, or shared the alleged discriminatory motive; and
That a majority of the Board members voted to approve the placement for an unconstitutional reason (McCarthy; Matthews).

The court also rejected a late‑breaking “custom and practice” theory: newly raised on appeal and unsupported by well‑pleaded facts (Ireland v. Prummell; American Dental Ass’n v. Cigna).

2) Cat’s Paw in the Monell Context: Unresolved and Unnecessary Here

The panel noted the circuit has not decided whether “cat’s paw” liability (bias by a recommender imputed to an actual decisionmaker who fails to investigate) transfers to Monell claims—particularly where the final decisionmaker is a multi‑member board. Several circuits have expressed skepticism. The panel declined to decide the issue because, even assuming cat’s paw applies, the complaint did not allege that the School Board failed to conduct an independent review or that its review authority was illusory (Carruth).

3) Supplemental Jurisdiction After Dismissal of Federal Claims: Discretion Retained Post‑Royal Canin

After dismissing the § 1983 claim, the district court kept the FCRA claim. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed under § 1367(c). It emphasized:

Judicial economy and convenience: Discovery was complete, summary judgment fully briefed, and trial near (Taylor).
Comity: Limited concerns because FCRA claims mirror Title VII standards (Alvarez) and presented no novel state-law issues.

The court distinguished the Supreme Court’s Royal Canin decision: when a plaintiff amends to excise all federal claims, supplemental jurisdiction never attaches under § 1367(a), leaving no discretion to exercise. By contrast, when federal claims are dismissed, § 1367(c) applies and retention remains discretionary.

4) FCRA Summary Judgment: No Adverse Action Without an Application

Applying Title VII’s framework, the court held there was no adverse employment action because Lontoc did not apply for the posted position during the ten‑day window, despite being told to apply. Under Eleventh Circuit law, absent exceptions not applicable here, a failure‑to‑hire claim fails if the plaintiff knew of the opening and did not apply (Walker; Smith; Perryman).

The panel also endorsed the district court’s reliance on the plaintiff’s own summary‑judgment admissions and rejected efforts to inject new, unsupported factual theories (e.g., “position numbers were switched”) too late in the process (Mann; Reese; Fitzpatrick).

Impact

A. Pleading Monell Against Florida School Boards

Board as final policymaker: In Florida, the school board’s statutory review authority makes it the final policymaker for personnel actions. Complaints must be framed with that in mind.
Ratification demands motive allegations: It is not enough to allege the board “approved” a recommendation. Plaintiffs must plausibly allege that the board ratified the unconstitutional motive and, for multi‑member bodies, that a majority acted for discriminatory reasons.
Practical pleading pointers:
- Identify the meeting, agenda item, and vote tally; quote or summarize statements revealing motive, if any.
- Plead facts showing the board knew of the alleged bias and chose to adopt it, or that it conducted no meaningful independent review.
- Consider alternative Monell theories (custom/practice; failure to train/supervise) only if supported by concrete facts suggestive of widespread practices or deliberate indifference.
Cat’s paw remains unsettled: Until resolved, plaintiffs should not rely solely on cat’s paw. They should plead board‑level knowledge, participation, or a rubber‑stamp process.

B. Strategic Choices About Forum After Federal Claims Fall Out

Royal Canin clarified: If you amend the complaint to remove federal claims, state claims must be dismissed (no § 1367(a) tether). If your federal claims are dismissed, the district court still has discretion to retain state claims under § 1367(c).
Timing matters: The closer a case is to resolution (discovery complete, summary judgment ripe, trial imminent), the more likely a federal court will retain the state claims for reasons of economy and convenience.
Practice tip: Parties seeking remand should move early. Plaintiffs intent on state‑court adjudication might consider strategic amendment (if appropriate and ethical) before substantial federal proceedings, cognizant of Royal Canin.

C. Employment Discrimination Litigation: The Application Requirement

General rule: A failure‑to‑hire theory typically fails without proof that the plaintiff applied for the position. “Internal placement” after a posting closes will not cure failure to apply during the posting period absent evidence the employer prevented the application.
Employer practices: Employers should preserve clear posting records, proof of application windows, and communications encouraging candidacies.
Litigant caution: Summary‑judgment admissions are binding; ensure Response Statements of Material Facts are accurate and avoid concessions that eliminate essential elements.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Monell liability: A city, county, or school board is not vicariously liable for employees’ constitutional torts. The plaintiff must tie the violation to an official policy, custom, or an act (or ratification) by a final policymaker.
Final policymaker vs. decisionmaker: The “decisionmaker” is who made the on‑the‑ground choice (e.g., the superintendent). The “final policymaker” is who has the legal authority to set policy for the entity on that subject or to give final approval (e.g., the school board). Municipal liability attaches to the latter’s policy, custom, or ratification.
Ratification (multi‑member boards): To hold a board liable for ratification, a plaintiff must allege the board adopted not just the outcome but the discriminatory reasoning, and that a majority of members did so.
Cat’s paw: A theory from employment law where a biased subordinate’s animus is imputed to an ostensibly neutral decisionmaker who relies on the subordinate’s recommendation without independent inquiry. Whether this theory fits Monell claims is unsettled in the Eleventh Circuit.
Supplemental jurisdiction: Federal courts can hear related state claims tethered to federal claims (same nucleus of facts). If federal claims are dismissed, the court may—but need not—dismiss or remand the state claims. If the plaintiff amends to remove all federal claims, the state claims must be dismissed because there is no supplemental jurisdiction to exercise.
Adverse employment action (failure‑to‑hire context): Generally requires proof the plaintiff applied for the position and was rejected under circumstances suggesting discrimination. If the plaintiff knew of the opening and did not apply, there is ordinarily no adverse action.

Conclusion

Although unpublished, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision delivers two important practice lessons. First, Monell pleading against Florida school boards must focus on the board’s role as final policymaker and, for ratification, must allege that a majority of board members adopted the discriminatory motive—not merely the outcome. The court’s correction of the district court’s conflation of “final policymaker” and “official decisionmaker” is a useful reminder: municipal liability hinges on policy or ratification by the final policymaker, not the mere involvement of powerful subordinates.

Second, the opinion clarifies the post‑Royal Canin landscape in the Eleventh Circuit: after federal claims are dismissed, district courts retain discretion under § 1367(c) to continue with related state claims, especially when adjudication is advanced and state law is settled. Royal Canin compels dismissal only when federal claims are excised by amendment and thus no supplemental jurisdiction attaches in the first place.

Finally, the FCRA holding reinforces a foundational point in failure‑to‑hire cases: if a job is posted and the plaintiff does not apply, absent employer interference, there is no adverse employment action. Together, these rulings underscore the premium on precise pleading, careful summary‑judgment admissions, and strategic timing in forum selection.

Case Snapshot

Court: Eleventh Circuit (unpublished, Non‑Argument Calendar)
Date: October 27, 2025
Parties: Appellant Ernesto Lontoc; Appellee School Board of Palm Beach County
Holdings: § 1983 Monell claim dismissed; remand denied; FCRA summary judgment affirmed
Key Takeaways:
- Florida school boards are final policymakers for personnel appointments; ratification requires pleading board‑level unconstitutional motive.
- Cat’s paw applicability to Monell remains unresolved; in any event, plead independent‑review facts.
- Post‑dismissal supplemental jurisdiction remains discretionary; Royal Canin governs only when federal claims are excised by amendment.
- No adverse employment action where the plaintiff fails to apply for a posted job.