Introduction

In this memorandum decision, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed a Kanawha County circuit court order denying a post-adjudicatory improvement period and terminating a mother’s parental rights to three children, R.D., P.D., and L.M. The decision underscores a critical principle in West Virginia abuse and neglect jurisprudence: when substantially the same dangerous conditions recur shortly after extensive services and case closure, the rapid recidivism—paired with failure to acknowledge wrongdoing and adverse credibility findings—can support denial of a new improvement period and justify termination without resort to less restrictive alternatives such as guardianship.

Parties included Petitioner Mother S.M. (represented by counsel Sandra K. Bullman), the West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) (represented by the Attorney General’s Office), and a guardian ad litem for the children. The DHS, now a stand-alone agency following state restructuring, pursued termination after a 2022 case had been dismissed as to the mother upon her earlier successful completion of services and reunification.

Key issues on appeal:

• Whether the circuit court erred by denying the mother a post-adjudicatory improvement period under West Virginia Code § 49-4-610(2)(B).
• Whether the circuit court erred by terminating parental rights rather than employing less restrictive alternatives (e.g., guardianship) under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6).
• Whether any claim to post-termination visitation was preserved and properly presented on appeal.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the denial of a post-adjudicatory improvement period and the termination of parental rights. It held:

• The mother did not carry her burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that she was likely to fully participate in an improvement period, particularly given her failure to acknowledge the ongoing safety issues, missed visits, and an adverse credibility finding.
• Termination of parental rights was proper because there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse or neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future, and termination was necessary for the children’s welfare. The Court reiterated that less restrictive alternatives are not required when these statutory findings are made.
• The mother’s skeletal assertion regarding post-termination visitation was inadequately briefed and therefore not addressed.

Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

The Court grounded its analysis in well-established West Virginia abuse and neglect law:

• Standard of Review — Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011): findings of fact reviewed for clear error; conclusions of law reviewed de novo.
• Improvement Period Burden — W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B): a parent must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that they are likely to fully participate in an improvement period.
• Necessity of Acknowledgment — In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 743 S.E.2d 352 (2013) (quoting In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 599 S.E.2d 631 (2004)): failure to acknowledge the abuse/neglect renders the problem untreatable and makes an improvement period futile.
• Deference to Credibility — Michael D.C. v. Wanda L.C., 201 W. Va. 381, 497 S.E.2d 531 (1997): appellate courts do not second-guess credibility determinations made by the trier of fact.
• Discretion to Deny Improvement Period — In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 573 S.E.2d 354 (2002): circuit courts may refuse an improvement period when no improvement is likely.
• Termination Without Less Restrictive Alternatives — Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980)): termination is permissible without intervening less restrictive alternatives if there is no reasonable likelihood conditions can be substantially corrected.
• Statutory Termination Standard — W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6): authorizes termination upon findings of no reasonable likelihood of correction in the near future and necessity for the child’s welfare.
• Appellate Restraint — In re D.S., 251 W. Va. 466, 914 S.E.2d 701, 707 (2025): appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or make credibility determinations.
• Issue Preservation — State v. Kaufman, 227 W. Va. 537, 711 S.E.2d 607 (2011) (quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955 (7th Cir. 1991)): skeletal arguments are insufficient to preserve a claim.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeded in two principal steps: (1) denial of a post-adjudicatory improvement period, and (2) termination of parental rights without less restrictive alternatives.

1) Denial of a Post-Adjudicatory Improvement Period

The mother had previously completed an improvement period in an earlier (2022) case and the matter had been dismissed as to her, with the children returned to her care. Weeks later, in March 2024, the DHS filed a new petition alleging a strikingly similar set of hazards in the home—open gasoline containers, accessible knives, and drug paraphernalia—paired with the mother’s exposure of the children to the previously-terminated father.

At adjudication, the circuit court found the mother’s testimony “evasive and not credible.” At disposition, the court found she minimized the hazards, missed two supervised visits without notice, exhibited deficits in parenting during visits, and repeatedly failed to accept responsibility—facts that, taken together, undercut her claim that she was likely to fully participate in a new improvement period. The Supreme Court held that the mother did not carry her burden under § 49-4-610(2)(B) to show by clear and convincing evidence that she was likely to fully participate. Citing Timber M. and Charity H., the Court emphasized that acknowledgment of the underlying problem is a prerequisite to meaningful remediation; without it, improvement periods become “an exercise in futility at the child’s expense.”

The adverse credibility determination was outcome-determinative: applying Michael D.C., the Court refused to disturb the circuit court’s first-hand assessment of the mother’s credibility. Coupled with Tonjia M. (discretion to decline an improvement period when no improvement is likely), the record supported denying the requested improvement period.

2) Termination Without Less Restrictive Alternatives

On termination, the mother argued for a less restrictive alternative (guardianship), pointing to her prior success in the earlier case. The Court rejected that argument, stressing that the same dangers reappeared mere weeks after dismissal of the earlier case and despite a “plethora of services,” indicating no reasonable likelihood of near-term correction. Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) and Kristin Y./R.J.M., once a circuit court finds (a) no reasonable likelihood of correction in the near future and (b) that termination is necessary for the child’s welfare, it may terminate parental rights without interposing lesser alternatives.

The Court also underscored appellate restraint: consistent with In re D.S., it declined to reweigh evidence or second-guess credibility findings. Finally, the mother’s suggestion of post-termination visitation was undeveloped and unsupported by authority; applying Kaufman/Dunkel, the Court deemed it inadequately preserved and declined to address it.

C. How Prior Precedents Shaped the Outcome

• Timber M./Charity H. (Acknowledgment Doctrine): The Court continued the line of cases holding that failure to acknowledge is antithetical to rehabilitation. Here, the mother’s minimization of hazards and equivocation about exposing the children to the terminated father undercut her eligibility for an improvement period.
• Michael D.C. and In re D.S. (Deference and Non-Reweighing): The circuit court’s observations of evasiveness and lack of credibility were central; the Supreme Court’s deference to these determinations foreclosed the mother’s appellate challenge on participation likelihood and on the “reasonable likelihood of correction” finding.
• Tonjia M. (Discretion to Deny): Even where a parent has participated in services, a new improvement period may be denied if the court finds “no improvement is likely”—especially compelling in a recidivism scenario immediately following case closure.
• Kristin Y./R.J.M. and § 49-4-604(c)(6) (No LRA Requirement): The opinion squarely applies the rule that when statutory prerequisites for termination are met, the court need not attempt less restrictive alternatives such as guardianship.
• Kaufman/Dunkel (Issue Preservation): The post-termination visitation claim failed due to inadequate briefing, signaling the Court’s continued insistence on proper appellate presentation.

D. Impact and Forward-Looking Significance

While issued as a memorandum decision under Rule 21, the Court’s application of settled principles offers clear guidance, especially on “recidivism” after reunification:

• Recency and similarity of relapse matter: When the same hazardous conditions reappear soon after case dismissal despite robust services, courts may infer an entrenched problem and a lack of reasonable likelihood of correction.
• Improvement periods are not serial entitlements: A prior successful improvement period does not entitle a parent to another; the parent must newly show—by clear and convincing evidence—likelihood of full participation and meaningful change.
• Acknowledgment is the gateway: Absent genuine acceptance of responsibility, courts may view additional services as futile and deny improvement periods to avoid delay harmful to children.
• Guardianship is not a mandatory intermediary: Where § 49-4-604(c)(6) findings are made, courts may proceed directly to termination without first imposing guardianship or other less restrictive alternatives.
• Appellate practice: Credibility attacks generally fail; factual reweighing is off-limits. Issues not fully briefed—such as post-termination visitation—will be deemed waived.
• Child-centered outcomes: Evidence that children’s well-being improves when removed—paired with ongoing safety risks—will reinforce the necessity prong for termination.

Practically, this decision may accelerate permanency planning in cases involving rapid post-reunification relapse, especially when the parent minimizes risks or deflects responsibility despite prior services. DHS casework and guardian ad litem advocacy should continue to document not just service offerings and attendance, but meaningful behavioral change and acknowledgment—or lack thereof.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Adjudicatory vs. Dispositional Hearings: Adjudication determines whether abuse/neglect occurred. Disposition determines what happens next (e.g., services, termination).
• Improvement Period: A court-ordered timeframe during which a parent participates in services to correct the conditions of abuse/neglect. It is not automatic; the parent must prove likely full participation by clear and convincing evidence.
• Clear and Convincing Evidence: A high evidentiary standard requiring the parent’s proof to be highly probable—not merely more likely than not.
• Acknowledgment Doctrine: Courts require parents to accept responsibility for the problems; denial or minimization suggests the problems cannot be effectively treated.
• No Reasonable Likelihood of Correction: A statutory finding (W. Va. Code § 49-4-604) that the parent cannot substantially fix the conditions in the near future, often due to failure to respond to or follow through with services.
• Less Restrictive Alternatives (LRAs): Options short of termination (e.g., guardianship). If the court validly finds no reasonable likelihood of correction and that termination is necessary for the child’s welfare, it need not use LRAs.
• Credibility Findings: Trial courts observe witness demeanor; their credibility determinations receive strong deference on appeal.
• Memorandum Decision: A shorter appellate disposition used where oral argument is unnecessary and the law is settled; while concise, it applies governing principles to the case’s facts.

Conclusion

In re R.D., P.D., and L.M. reinforces a child-protective throughline in West Virginia law: after extensive services and a recent reunification, a swift reemergence of the same grave safety hazards—combined with a parent’s failure to acknowledge wrongdoing and an adverse credibility finding—supports denying yet another improvement period and proceeding to termination without less restrictive alternatives. The decision harmonizes the acknowledgment doctrine (Timber M./Charity H.), the discretionary denial of improvement periods (Tonjia M.), and the statutory termination standard with its no-LRA corollary (Kristin Y./R.J.M.; § 49-4-604(c)(6)), all under the appellate posture of deference to the fact-finder (Michael D.C.; In re D.S.).

The key takeaway is clear: prior compliance does not inoculate against termination where rapid recidivism reveals unremedied core issues. Acknowledgment is the threshold to meaningful change; without it, courts may decline further services to avoid prolonging uncertainty for children and may lawfully terminate to secure permanency.

Case Context Notes

• Following state restructuring under W. Va. Code § 5F-1-2, the Department of Human Services (DHS) is now the relevant agency for abuse and neglect proceedings.
• The circuit court also terminated the father’s rights to R.D. and P.D. The permanency plan for those children is adoption by their current foster family. L.M. is in a residential treatment facility; the permanency plan is adoption by a foster family after termination of the father’s rights in a separate action.