Quo Warranto Revived: The Texas Attorney General’s Constitutional Power to Seek Corporate Charter Forfeiture for Criminal Conduct – Commentary on Paxton v. Annunciation House

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in Warren Kenneth Paxton Jr., in his Official Capacity as Texas Attorney General, and the State of Texas v. Annunciation House, Inc. is a major statement on three fronts:

the constitutional status and scope of the Texas Attorney General’s quo warranto authority over private corporations,
the interaction of that authority with criminal law, religious-liberty protections, and federal immigration law, and
the limits on trial courts’ power to restrain the Attorney General through broad injunctive orders, including regarding record-inspection statutes.

Annunciation House is a long‑standing Catholic-affiliated nonprofit in El Paso providing shelter to migrants and the homeless. The Attorney General (AG) alleged that Annunciation House operates as an illegal “stash house” and illegally “harbors” undocumented immigrants, and he:

served a formal records request under the Texas Business Organizations Code, threatening charter forfeiture and penalties for non-compliance, and
sought leave to file an information in the nature of quo warranto to revoke Annunciation House’s corporate charter and enjoin its operations.

The district court responded by:

declaring several Texas statutes unconstitutional on multiple grounds,
blocking the AG from even filing the quo warranto action, and
issuing a sweeping injunction requiring any future record requests to be pre‑cleared by that same court.

Because the trial court granted and denied injunctions “on the ground of the constitutionality” of state statutes, the case came to the Supreme Court of Texas on direct appeal, well before a typical factual record or appellate path would be developed.

The Court’s core move is to sharply limit what is decided at this early stage: it authorizes the Attorney General to file his quo warranto action and re‑opens access to the pre‑existing statutory records‑inspection framework, but it expressly refuses to opine on:

whether Annunciation House actually violated the alien-harboring statute,
whether its charter should ultimately be revoked, or
how the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) will apply to the developed facts.

Within that narrow procedural frame, however, the Court announces important legal principles about:

the constitutional entrenchment of quo warranto power in Article IV, § 22,
the necessity of an express legislative statement to curtail that power,
the standard for granting leave to file quo warranto,
the non-preempted status of Texas’s alien‑harboring statute,
the limits of vagueness and RFRA challenges at the threshold stage, and
the constitutionally required availability of precompliance review for corporate record inspections.

II. Overview and Procedural Background

A. The Parties

Appellants: Attorney General Warren Kenneth Paxton Jr., in his official capacity, and the State of Texas.
Appellee: Annunciation House, Inc., a nonprofit corporation in El Paso operating Catholic‑inspired shelters for migrants and the homeless since 1976.

B. The Records Request and Initial Litigation

On February 7, 2024, state officials arrived at an Annunciation House shelter with a written “Request to Examine” corporate records under Texas Business Organizations Code §§ 12.151–.152. They:

demanded immediate compliance, and
warned that failure to comply could result in charter forfeiture and criminal penalties under §§ 12.155–.156.

Annunciation House’s counsel asked for up to thirty days; the AG demanded production the next day. Annunciation House then:

filed in district court for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and declaratory relief, alleging constitutional violations, and
obtained a TRO.

The AG responded with a “Plea to the Jurisdiction, Answer, and Motion for Leave to File [Proposed] Counterclaim in the Nature of Quo Warranto.”

C. Shift From Discovery Dispute to Alleged Harboring

The trial court subsequently:

held that the Rules of Civil Procedure superseded the original records request,
converted the records dispute into ordinary discovery, and
treated Annunciation House’s request for injunctive relief from the immediate request as moot.

The live claims then became:

Annunciation House’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against further allegedly unconstitutional records requests; and
the AG’s request for leave to file a quo warranto counterclaim and for an injunction shutting down operations.

The AG amended his pleadings to allege that Annunciation House engaged in “systematic conduct that constitutes illegal alien harboring and operation of a stash house,” and:

sought charter revocation via quo warranto (Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code ch. 66), and
requested a temporary injunction shutting down the shelters.

D. The Trial Court’s Sweeping Rulings

On summary judgment, the trial court:

Invalidated the records‑request scheme (Bus. Orgs. Code §§ 12.151–.152) as facially unconstitutional under the First and Fourth Amendments, and ordered that:
- any future requests to Annunciation House be pre‑filed in that court,
- the court would provide precompliance review, and
- this arrangement would last two years.
Held the AG’s records request was religious harassment under Gov’t Code § 2400.002 (“Save Chick‑fil‑A” law).
Denied leave to file the quo warranto action, ruling that:
- Bus. Orgs. Code § 11.301(a)(5) supplanted quo warranto as the exclusive means of terminating a corporation for criminal violations;
- the AG had not met the statutory grounds in Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 66.001;
- even if alleged facts were true, Annunciation House’s conduct did not constitute “harboring” under Penal Code §§ 20.05(a)(2), 20.07(a)(1), relying on Cruz v. Abbott, 849 F.3d 594 (5th Cir. 2017);
- those Penal Code provisions were preempted by federal immigration law and/or unconstitutionally vague as applied to Annunciation House;
- using them as quo warranto predicates would violate RFRA (Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code ch. 110) by substantially burdening religious exercise.

A final order wrapped up remaining claims, creating a final, appealable judgment. The AG then took a direct appeal to the Supreme Court under Gov’t Code § 22.001(c).

E. Issues Taken Up on Direct Appeal

The Supreme Court granted review of five trial‑court holdings:

That Bus. Orgs. Code § 11.301(a)(5) abrogates the AG’s ability to bring quo warranto actions based on corporate criminal acts;
That the AG failed to adequately allege violations of Penal Code §§ 20.05(a)(2) (alien harboring) or 20.07(a)(1) (stash house);
That these Penal Code provisions are unconstitutionally vague as applied or preempted by federal law;
That the AG’s requested injunction and proposed quo warranto action violate RFRA;
That Bus. Orgs. Code §§ 12.151–.152 are facially unconstitutional because they do not provide precompliance review of records requests.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

A. Narrow Framing: Only the Right to File, Not the Merits

The Court emphasizes that it is not deciding whether Annunciation House:

actually violated the alien-harboring statute, or
should have its charter revoked or operations enjoined.

The only quo warranto question is whether the Attorney General may file an information in the nature of quo warranto—i.e., whether he may start litigation in which those merits questions will later be resolved.

B. Principal Holdings

Constitutional quo warranto power. Article IV, § 22 of the Texas Constitution entrenches the Attorney General’s power and duty to investigate corporate misuse of charter rights and to seek judicial forfeiture via actions in the nature of quo warranto. That power:
- extends to certain violations of criminal law,
- exists unless “otherwise expressly directed by law,” and
- is not displaced by Bus. Orgs. Code § 11.301(a)(5) or limited by Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code ch. 66 in the manner the trial court assumed.
Standard for leave to file quo warranto. The trial court applied the wrong standard. At the leave‑to‑file stage:
- the court assumes the truth of the AG’s allegations,
- looks only to whether the petition states a cause of action and shows “probable ground” on its face, and
- does not weigh evidence or resolve disputed factual or complex legal merits issues.
The AG’s pleadings, taken as true, adequately allege violations of Penal Code § 20.05(a)(2) as construed in Cruz, so leave should not have been denied on sufficiency-of-evidence grounds.
RFRA cannot bar filing at this stage. RFRA may eventually limit or bar the ultimate relief (e.g., charter forfeiture) if it substantially burdens religious exercise and the State cannot satisfy strict scrutiny. But it is premature to decide RFRA merits now; RFRA does not stop the AG from merely filing a quo warranto action.
No preemption or vagueness bar to filing.
- Texas Penal Code § 20.05(a)(2) (harboring) and § 20.07(a)(1) (stash house) are not field- or conflict-preempted by federal immigration law.
- They are not unconstitutionally vague as applied merely because they are used as predicates for quo warranto.
Records‑inspection statutes are not facially unconstitutional. Bus. Orgs. Code §§ 12.151–.152 survive a facial Fourth Amendment challenge because they can and must be read (using constitutional‑avoidance) to allow precompliance review via existing procedural mechanisms (e.g., Rule 176.6 protective orders). They are unlike the Los Angeles ordinance invalidated in City of Los Angeles v. Patel.
Trial court’s injunction vacated. The permanent injunction:
- blocking the AG from future records requests without pre‑clearance, and
- assigning exclusive ongoing supervision to that court for two years,
AG’s own requested injunction remanded. The trial court’s denial of the AG’s requested injunction to halt Annunciation House’s operations rested on its erroneous view of the AG’s quo warranto authority. That denial is reversed and remanded for reconsideration in light of the Court’s holdings.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Quo Warranto: History, Constitutionalization, and Scope

1. Historical Roots

The Court traces quo warranto back to medieval England, where Edward I used the writ to demand that barons and others justify their exercise of royal franchises—asking “by what warrant” (quo warranto) they claimed powers belonging to the Crown. Over time:

the prerogative writ evolved into “informations in the nature of quo warranto,”
the proceeding shifted from criminal sanctions toward civil remedies, particularly forfeiture of franchises and corporate charters, and
corporations came to be treated as holding their charters on a “tacit condition” that misuser or nonuser could justify forfeiture (Justice Story’s formulation in Terrett v. Taylor).

Texas adopted the English common law in 1840, including the quo warranto remedy and the Attorney General’s common‑law authority to bring such actions. The Legislature quickly codified and reinforced that power.

2. Constitutional Entrenchment in Article IV, § 22

The 1876 Texas Constitution elevated the Attorney General’s corporate-oversight role to constitutional status. Article IV, § 22 provides:

…the Attorney General shall especially inquire into the charter rights of all private corporations, and from time to time, in the name of the State, take such action in the courts as may be proper and necessary to prevent any private corporation from exercising any power…not authorized by law… He shall, whenever sufficient cause exists, seek a judicial forfeiture of such charters, unless otherwise expressly directed by law.

Two key features are crucial:

Substantive mission: monitor “charter rights” and prevent corporations from “exercising any power…not authorized by law.”
Clear‑statement protection: forfeiture duties exist “unless otherwise expressly directed by law”—a constitutional requirement that any legislative limitation be explicit.

Early statutes tracked this understanding, specifying “misuser or nonuser” as grounds for forfeiture and authorizing quo warranto actions when “a corporation…exercises power not granted by law.” This near‑verbatim language persists in today’s Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 66.001(5).

3. Criminal Conduct as “Power Not Authorized by Law”

Annunciation House argued that Article IV, § 22 only covers a narrow band of corporate conduct related to charging unauthorized “taxes, tolls, freight or wharfage,” and not criminal behavior more generally. The Court rejects that narrowing:

Textually, the provision uses a disjunctive list:
…prevent any private corporation from exercising any power or demanding or collecting any species of taxes, tolls, freight or wharfage not authorized by law.
The “series-qualifier” canon means “not authorized by law” modifies each item separately. The “exercise of any power not authorized by law” is a distinct, broad category, not limited to revenue practices.
Historically, other states with similar language treated corporate criminal acts (e.g., illegal liquor sales, antitrust violations) as the “exercise of powers not conferred by law” and valid grounds for charter forfeiture.

The Court therefore holds:

We hold that criminal acts are not categorically excluded as predicates for the invocation of the attorney general’s authority to file a quo warranto action.

It stops short of saying all criminal acts are valid grounds, but firmly rejects the trial court’s categorical bar.

4. Who Decides When “Sufficient Cause” Exists?

Annunciation House contended that only the Legislature can decide what constitutes “sufficient cause” to seek forfeiture, and that, absent explicit statutory authorization for criminal-predicate forfeiture, the AG lacked authority here.

The Court instead adopts and re‑endorses the reasoning of State v. Teachers Annuity Life Insurance Co.:

Article IV, § 22’s “whenever sufficient cause exists” entrusts the determination of sufficient cause to the Attorney General’s discretion, subject to any express legislative limitations.
The AG’s quo warranto authority exists by default; it does not depend on the Legislature pre‑defining every actionable wrong.

This aligns with the Court’s broader, recent reaffirmation in Webster v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline that the AG “has broad discretionary power” and “multifarious” duties rooted in the constitution and common law.

5. The “Unless Otherwise Expressly Directed by Law” Clear‑Statement Rule

The Constitution itself enacts a clear‑statement rule: only when the Legislature “expressly” directs otherwise can it strip or narrow the AG’s constitutional duty to seek forfeiture. The Court stresses:

Ordinary implied‑repeal principles (statutes not presumed to change the common law absent “express terms or necessary implications”) are less demanding than Article IV, § 22’s requirement.
Because the limitation must be “expressly directed by law,” courts must not read statutes as impliedly curtailing or replacing quo warranto where another plausible interpretation exists.

This is a powerful doctrine: it constitutionalizes the AG’s quo warranto role and significantly raises the bar for any legislative attempt—accidental or intentional—to sideline it.

B. Statutory Interplay: § 11.301 and Chapter 66

1. § 11.301(a)(5) Does Not “Supplant” Quo Warranto

Bus. Orgs. Code § 11.301(a)(5) allows a court to order a corporation wound up and terminated if:

the entity or a high managerial agent has been convicted of a felony committed in the conduct of the entity’s affairs;
the entity or agent has engaged in a persistent course of felonious conduct; and
termination is necessary to prevent future similar felonies.

The trial court treated this as a comprehensive, exclusive mechanism for charter termination based on criminal conduct—effectively displacing or “supplanting” quo warranto in that domain.

The Supreme Court rejects this reading:

Section 11.301 does not mention quo warranto, Article IV, § 22, the AG, or any intent to curtail constitutional authority.
Silence is insufficient to overcome the constitutional requirement of an express limitation.
Rather than being absurd, it is entirely consistent for § 11.301 to provide a mandatory winding‑up route in a narrow set of circumstances (felony convictions, particular findings) that can co‑exist with the broader, discretionary quo warranto power.

Accordingly, § 11.301(a)(5) is not an “express” limitation on quo warranto, and cannot be read to preclude the AG’s action.

2. Chapter 66 as an Enabling, Not Restrictive, Scheme

Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code ch. 66, the modern descendant of the 1879 quo warranto act, states in § 66.001 that an action in the nature of quo warranto is available if, among other things:

“a corporation does or omits an act that requires a surrender or causes a forfeiture of its rights and privileges as a corporation” (§ 66.001(4)), or
“a corporation exercises power not granted by law” (§ 66.001(5)).

The trial court appeared to treat the specific grounds listed in § 66.001(1)–(7) as exclusive and to conclude that because those provisions do not expressly list criminal violations, the AG could not rely on alleged harboring or stash-house conduct.

The Supreme Court’s response:

Chapter 66 historically has been understood as authorizing quo warranto in specified situations, not as globally curtailing constitutional authority.
Even if one applied an expressio unius negative implication, § 66.001(5) (“exercises power not granted by law”) tracks the constitutional phrase “exercising any power…not authorized by law.” Since that constitutional phrase encompasses at least some criminal conduct, so must the statutory counterpart.
Therefore, a quo warranto filing premised on alleged violations of the alien‑harboring statute does fit within § 66.001(5), and is not barred.

C. Standard for Granting Leave to File Quo Warranto

1. “Probable Ground” and Pleadings‑Based Review

Section 66.002(d) provides that a court may grant leave to file an information when there is “probable ground for the proceeding.” The Court harmonizes that with precedent:

Hunnicutt v. State ex rel. Witt (1889): an unsworn official statement by the AG is enough to authorize filing; evidence to prove the claims comes later at trial.
More recent courts of appeals: at the leave stage, the trial court must accept the petition’s allegations as true and ask only whether they state a cause of action.

The Court formally endorses this approach:

A motion for leave is therefore not an opportunity to litigate the entire case before it is even filed. Rather, it authorizes a limited facial attack to weed out filings that, due to some legal defect, cannot survive even though the court assumes the truth of the allegations.

Examples of valid bases to deny leave:

the petition admits facts that show no violation of any applicable law, or
the action falls within an explicit statutory or constitutional prohibition (e.g., a statute expressly banning quo warranto in a defined context), or
venue or other clear legal defect appears on the face of the pleadings.

But disputes over:

factual sufficiency,
how a federal constitutional right applies to a specific factual scenario, or
nuanced statutory interpretation (if the allegations fit a reasonable reading),

are reserved for later dispositive motions (Rule 91a, summary judgment) or trial.

2. Application to the Alien-Harboring Allegations

For purposes of this appeal, the Court reads the AG’s pleadings to allege that Annunciation House:

provides shelter to persons the shelter knows to be unlawfully present,
refuses to cooperate with law enforcement or allow entry, not merely asserting ordinary rights but with the purpose of shielding guests, and
“purposefully, knowingly, and systematically shields illegal aliens from detection.”

The Court affirms Cruz v. Abbott’s reading of “harboring”: it requires a level of concealment “well beyond” merely providing a place to live; it means taking steps to hide individuals from detection.

While the State concedes that simply offering shelter to migrants, even those unlawfully present, is not harboring, the Court concludes that the AG’s allegations, as pled, describe Cruz-level concealment. Thus, on their face, the pleadings fit within Penal Code § 20.05(a)(2) and § 20.07(a)(1), satisfying the “probable ground” standard.

Questions about the truth of those allegations, or constitutional defenses such as Fourth Amendment privacy interests in the shelters, are for later.

D. RFRA: Timing and Proper Role

RFRA prohibits the government from “substantially burdening” a person’s free exercise of religion unless the government:

has a compelling interest, and
uses the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.

Annunciation House asserted RFRA as an affirmative defense against:

the records request, and
the proposed quo warranto action and accompanying injunction (on the ground that closing Annunciation House would end its religiously motivated shelter ministry).

The Supreme Court assumes, without deciding, that RFRA applies fully in this context. But it holds it is premature to resolve RFRA’s merits when the only question is whether litigation may commence:

The relevant government action at this stage is filing the quo warranto information, not charter forfeiture or operational shutdown.
RFRA is designed to be litigated within the ordinary course of a case, with factual development and specific tailoring to “the particular claimant.”
Using RFRA to block filing altogether would collapse threshold and merits stages and require premature resolution of highly fact‑dependent issues (sincerity of beliefs, degree of burden, compelling interest, available alternatives).

The Court distinguishes but does not undercut cases like Hensley v. State Commission on Judicial Conduct, where RFRA supported affirmative injunctive relief early in litigation; the critical difference is that there the merits could be reached on a sufficiently developed and essentially undisputed record.

Bottom line: RFRA may still substantially shape this litigation on remand; the opinion leaves that question open. But RFRA cannot, as the trial court held, be used to deny the AG even the right to file his quo warranto action.

E. Federal Preemption and Vagueness

1. Preemption of Texas’s Alien-Harboring Statute

The trial court held that Penal Code §§ 20.05(a)(2) and 20.07(a)(1) were both field‑ and conflict‑preempted by federal law, largely by invoking Arizona v. United States.

The Supreme Court disagrees on both fronts.

a. Field Preemption

Field preemption requires showing Congress intended to occupy an entire regulatory field, leaving no room for states. Annunciation House did not clearly define the field—whether “alien registration,” “immigration enforcement,” or “harboring”—and the Court notes:

Texas’s harboring statute does not regulate “alien registration” (unlike the provision invalidated in Arizona).
Supreme Court decisions like Kansas v. Garcia and De Canas v. Bica explicitly reject the notion that any state law “touching on” aliens is automatically preempted.
Even in the narrower “anti‑harboring” area, at least one federal appellate court (Keller v. City of Fremont) has upheld state measures, finding no pervasive federal scheme ousting states entirely.

Thus, there is no clearly defined, fully occupied federal field that § 20.05 intrudes upon.

b. Conflict/Obstacle Preemption

Conflict preemption arises if:

it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law, or
the state law stands as an obstacle to the “full purposes and objectives” of Congress.

The Court reasons:

Section 20.05(a)(2) mirrors federal § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) in key ways—prohibiting knowing harboring of persons who “remain in this country in violation of federal law.”
This kind of parallel standard is, if anything, less likely to conflict with federal enforcement priorities. The Court draws a close analogy to Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, which upheld an Arizona law parallel to federal hiring prohibitions.
Congress has not expressed a “clear and manifest” intent to bar states from assisting in this area; indeed, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c) affirmatively permits state officers enforcing criminal laws to make arrests for harboring violations.
Differing federal enforcement priorities, standing alone, are not “laws of the United States” for Supremacy Clause purposes (Kansas v. Garcia); state law aligned with federal text does not inherently frustrate congressional objectives.

Accordingly, the Texas harboring and stash-house statutes are neither field‑ nor conflict‑preempted and may serve as valid predicates for quo warranto.

2. Vagueness

The trial court had also held that using the alien‑harboring and quo warranto statutes together rendered them unconstitutionally vague as applied to Annunciation House. Annunciation House argued that:

it lacked fair notice of what “harboring” meant, and
allowing the AG to use criminal predicates for charter forfeiture gave him standardless discretion parallel to the concerns in Kolender v. Lawson.

The Court disagrees:

Notice. By adopting Cruz’s construction of “harboring” as requiring concealment beyond mere shelter, the statute has a concrete, judicially articulated meaning that “the ordinary person” can understand.
Discretion. The AG’s choice between criminal prosecution and civil charter forfeiture is not the kind of unbounded, standardless discretion that vagueness doctrines target. Prosecutorial discretion of this sort is a long‑accepted reality, even when the same facts support both civil and criminal consequences (the Court cites Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri ex inf. Hadley).

Thus, neither Penal Code §§ 20.05 & 20.07 nor Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code ch. 66 are unconstitutionally vague as applied simply because they can be invoked in combination.

F. Records-Inspection Statutes and Precompliance Review

1. Justiciability: Not Moot

The AG argued that:

he had effectively abandoned the original records request,
the trial court had called that specific request “moot,” and thus
the constitutionality of §§ 12.151–.152 was moot.

The Court rejects this. Voluntary cessation of challenged conduct by the government rarely moots a case, because the conduct could easily resume. That concern is especially acute where:

the AG is simultaneously appealing an injunction that forbids future requests,
Annunciation House still faces the possibility of new demands under the same statutes, and
meaningful relief (upholding or invalidating the statutory scheme) remains possible.

2. Patel and the Need for Precompliance Review

In City of Los Angeles v. Patel, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated an ordinance that:

required hotels to produce guest registries “on the spot” to police, and
authorized immediate arrest and criminal penalties for refusal,
while the City insisted there was no opportunity for precompliance review before a neutral decisionmaker.

The Texas records‑inspection statutes at issue here:

grant the AG power to “inspect, examine, and make copies” of a corporation’s records (§ 12.151),
require that the AG “shall make a written request” to a managerial official, who “shall immediately permit” access (§ 12.152), and
impose civil forfeiture and criminal penalties for refusal (§§ 12.155–.156).

The trial court read “immediately permit” as ruling out precompliance review, and therefore held the statutes facially unconstitutional.

3. Constitutional Avoidance: Reading “Immediately” in Context

The Supreme Court instead:

applies the canon of constitutional avoidance: if a statute can reasonably be construed in a way that avoids serious constitutional problems, courts must adopt that reading;
observes that “immediately” cannot be literally instantaneous—a corporation must have minimal time to access and copy documents—and that the key question is what degree of delay is compatible with the statute;
emphasizes that when the Business Organizations Code was recodified (2003), Rule 176.6(e) already allowed any person commanded to produce documents to seek a protective order “before the time specified for compliance.”

Accordingly, the Court construes “immediately” to:

require prompt compliance consistent with the AG’s authority to set aggressive timelines, but
not eliminate the availability of precompliance review through established procedures such as protective orders.

Under this reading, the Texas scheme is materially different from the Los Angeles law in Patel, which offered no review opportunity at all. The statutes are therefore not facially unconstitutional.

4. Rejection of Religious-Harassment Finding Under § 2400.002

The trial court had held the AG’s records demand violated Gov’t Code § 2400.002 (“Save Chick‑fil‑A” law) as religiously motivated harassment. The Supreme Court reverses this, noting:

There is no record evidence that the AG targeted Annunciation House “wholly or partly” because of its Catholic affiliation or religious exercise, as § 2400.002 requires.
Courts must accord a presumption of regularity and good faith to coordinate branches; Von Dohlen v. City of San Antonio applied this presumption in the same statute’s context.

Absent evidence to the contrary, the Court holds the trial court erred in concluding the AG’s conduct was religious discrimination triggering § 2400.002.

5. Scope and Tone of the Trial Court’s Injunction

The Court also comments on two notable aspects of the vacated injunction:

Extraordinary breadth. Requiring the AG for two years to obtain permission from a single district court before exercising a statutory inspection power is difficult to reconcile with the requirement that injunctions be “narrowly drawn and precise” (Holubec v. Brandenberger).
Judicial tone and comity. The trial court repeatedly accused the AG of “harassing” Annunciation House, acting from “personal beliefs or political agenda,” and the like. The Supreme Court reminds the trial court that it must begin with a presumption of good faith and legality for a coordinate branch, and may deviate from that only on the basis of evidence developed in the case.

G. The AG’s Requested Injunction Against Operations

The AG had also sought an injunction to shut down Annunciation House’s operations pending resolution of the alleged harboring violations. The trial court denied that request, largely because it believed the AG lacked any viable quo warranto authority in this context.

Since the Supreme Court rejects that premise, it reverses and remands the denial of the AG’s injunction request for reconsideration under the proper legal framework. It gives no hint whether such relief would be appropriate; that question turns on ordinary injunction factors and the developed merits, including RFRA and other defenses.

V. Impact and Significance

A. Strengthening the Attorney General’s Structural Role

This decision decisively confirms that the Texas Attorney General’s oversight of private corporations via quo warranto is not merely statutory or common‑law but constitutionally entrenched.

Key implications:

Legislative attempts to limit, reallocate, or bypass that oversight must use clear, express language, and even then will be scrutinized against Article IV, § 22’s text.
Courts should be highly cautious about reading statutes to impliedly displace the AG’s quo warranto powers.
The AG enjoys wide discretion to determine “sufficient cause” to seek forfeiture, consistent with historic prosecutorial and statewide‑litigation roles.

In practical terms, the AG now has a formally recognized, constitutionally buttressed tool to police corporate conduct that may go beyond traditional regulatory or criminal enforcement channels.

B. Corporate Exposure to Quo Warranto for Criminal Misconduct

The Court’s explicit recognition that criminal conduct can constitute the “exercise of powers not authorized by law” reanimates charter forfeiture as a potential consequence for serious corporate wrongdoing.

Potential effects:

Corporations engaged in systematic or egregious illegality—particularly where the illegal conduct is intertwined with core operations—face not only criminal penalties and civil suits but also the risk of charter revocation.
Boards and counsel must treat corporate compliance—especially in areas like immigration, antitrust, and regulated activities—as not just an operational risk but an existential threat to the entity’s existence.

C. Framework for Future Quo Warranto Litigation

The clarified “leave to file” standard shapes how future quo warranto matters will unfold:

Trial courts may not use the leave stage to adjudicate contested factual or constitutional merits questions.
Targets of quo warranto actions will need to:
- focus early challenges on facial legal defects, and
- reserve more fact‑intensive or nuanced constitutional defenses (RFRA, vagueness, preemption) for dispositive motions or trial.

This framework increases the likelihood that more quo warranto actions will at least be filed and proceed into the normal litigation funnel, rather than being halted at the courthouse door.

D. Religious Liberty and Immigration Enforcement

The case sits at a sensitive intersection: religiously motivated service to migrants vs. state enforcement of immigration‑related laws. The Court:

does not weaken RFRA’s substantive protection of religious exercise;
emphasizes that RFRA issues demand “granular” factual analysis and fact‑specific balancing;
insists, however, that RFRA cannot be used to stop litigation from starting, particularly where the government’s action is merely filing a case.

Religious nonprofits that serve undocumented immigrants should read this opinion as:

recognizing, but not resolving, a potential RFRA defense to severe remedies (like charter forfeiture), and
signaling that they will likely have to litigate those defenses through ordinary processes, rather than through early, global injunctions blocking state enforcement efforts.

E. Immigration Federalism: Parallel State Enforcement Upheld

By upholding Texas’s alien‑harboring statute against a preemption challenge, the Court reinforces a conception of “immigration federalism” that:

permits states to enact and enforce parallel criminal prohibitions aligned with federal immigration norms,
recognizes explicit congressional invitations to state participation (e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c)), and
refuses to equate federal enforcement preferences with binding “purposes” that automatically nullify state laws.

This is doctrinally significant as states increasingly legislate in immigration‑adjacent areas (employment, housing, transport, harboring) and may face Supremacy Clause challenges.

F. Administrative Subpoenas and Precompliance Review

The Court’s reading of §§ 12.151–.152 has broader implications beyond this case:

Texas agencies and the AG may continue to use swift administrative records requests, but they must accommodate prompt precompliance judicial review when requested.
Trial courts should implement precompliance review mechanisms (protective orders, motions to quash) that are efficient but meaningful, consistent with Patel.
Legislators recodifying inspection schemes must be mindful of Patel and build in explicit references to review procedures where possible.

G. Separation of Powers and Judicial Restraint in Supervising the Executive

Finally, the Court’s critique of the trial court’s broad injunction and accusatory tone towards the AG underscores:

the judiciary’s obligation to respect constitutional functions of coordinate branches,
the impropriety of structural injunctions that effectively place an elected statewide officer under a single trial court’s ongoing supervisory control, absent compelling statutory or constitutional basis, and
the importance of maintaining a presumption of good faith unless and until evidence proves otherwise.

This aspect of the opinion will likely shape how lower courts approach injunctive relief against statewide officers in politically charged matters.

VI. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

1. Quo Warranto

Quo warranto is a special type of civil action historically used to ask:

“By what authority do you claim to exercise this official or corporate power?”

In modern Texas practice, it is used to:

challenge whether someone is lawfully holding public office,
test the validity of a municipality’s annexation, or
seek forfeiture of a private corporation’s charter for misuse or abuse of its powers.

In this case, the AG seeks to use quo warranto to ask why Annunciation House should continue to enjoy its corporate charter if it is using that status to systematically violate state criminal law.

2. Article IV, § 22’s Clear‑Statement Rule

The Texas Constitution says the AG must “seek a judicial forfeiture” of corporate charters “unless otherwise expressly directed by law.” That means:

The Legislature cannot unintentionally, or by implication, take away this duty or power.
Statutes must clearly and explicitly say they are changing the AG’s quo warranto authority; otherwise, traditional powers remain intact.

3. “Leave to File” vs. “Winning the Case”

Think of “leave to file” as a gatekeeping step:

At the gate, the judge checks only whether the complaint, on its face, alleges something that, if true, could amount to a legal violation that quo warranto can address.
The judge does not weigh evidence, decide credibility, or resolve complex constitutional defenses at the gate.
All those matters are for later hearings, motions, and potentially trial after the case is properly filed.

4. RFRA Strict Scrutiny

Under RFRA, if government action substantially burdens religious exercise, the government must:

show a truly important (“compelling”) reason (e.g., public safety, preventing crime), and
use the method that burdens religion as little as possible while still achieving that interest (the “least restrictive means”).

RFRA does not generally stop the government from even starting a case; it gives religious actors a potent defense once the facts and stakes are clear.

5. Federal Preemption (Field vs. Conflict)

Field preemption: Congress so thoroughly regulates an area that states are completely shut out (rare and must be clearly shown).
Conflict preemption: either it is impossible to obey both state and federal law, or the state law seriously frustrates federal objectives.

Here, Texas’s harboring law tracks federal text and is accompanied by a federal statute inviting state enforcement. That combination makes preemption hard to show.

6. Vagueness

A law is unconstitutionally vague if:

people of ordinary intelligence cannot tell what is prohibited (no fair notice), or
it gives officials so much discretion that they can arbitrarily target anyone they dislike, without meaningful standards.

By tying “harboring” to concealment from detection and linking corporate forfeiture specifically to violations of defined criminal statutes, the law here provides enough guidance to avoid these problems.

7. Precompliance Review

“Precompliance review” means:

before you face penalties for refusing a records demand,
you get a chance to go to a neutral judge and argue that the demand is unlawful (for example, too broad, irrelevant, or unconstitutional).

As long as some prompt, effective path to such review exists (like a motion for protective order), an administrative inspection scheme can pass Fourth Amendment muster.

VII. Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Texas’s opinion in Paxton v. Annunciation House is both modest in immediate effect and ambitious in its structural implications.

On the surface, the Court does something seemingly unremarkable: it allows the Attorney General to file a lawsuit and vacates an overbroad injunction that constrained his statutory inspection powers. It repeatedly stresses that it is expressing no view on:

whether Annunciation House has, in fact, harbored undocumented immigrants,
whether its charter should be forfeited, or
how RFRA and other constitutional protections will ultimately affect the outcome.

Beneath that procedural modesty, however, the opinion:

reaffirms and strengthens the constitutional foundations of the Attorney General’s role as corporate watchdog via quo warranto,
enshrines a robust clear‑statement rule protecting that role from implied legislative encroachment,
adopts a deferential, pleadings‑based standard for gatekeeping quo warranto filings,
clarifies that Texas may criminally regulate harboring in parallel with federal law,
tethers “harboring” to concealment from detection, aligning state law with Cruz,
insists that RFRA and other defenses be litigated at the right time, on a developed record, rather than as a jurisdictional bar, and
reinforces the constitutional requirement of precompliance review for administrative record inspections while saving Texas’s corporate‑inspection scheme through reasonable construction.

As the case returns to the trial court, the truly difficult questions—about the factual nature of Annunciation House’s work, the contours of religious liberty in the context of immigration assistance, and the proportionality of charter forfeiture as a remedy—remain open. This opinion ensures those questions will be answered, if at all, through the ordinary adversarial process, under a framework that accords both the Attorney General and religious nonprofits the protections to which they are constitutionally and statutorily entitled.