Introduction

This published decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirms the jury convictions of former Ohio House Speaker Larry Householder and lobbyist Matthew Borges for RICO conspiracy arising out of the now infamous House Bill 6 (HB6) nuclear bailout scheme. The panel (per curiam) rejected a wide array of trial and sentencing challenges; Judge Thapar authored a separate concurrence flagging substantial constitutional and statutory concerns with the Supreme Court’s Hobbs Act bribery doctrine and with using state election-law predicates via the Travel Act.

The case sits at the intersection of public corruption, campaign finance, and criminal conspiracy. It addresses:

• What “quid pro quo” means in the context of Hobbs Act extortion and honest-services fraud, including when the agreement may be proved by implication rather than express words.
• The propriety of the “as opportunities arise” instruction in bribery cases.
• Whether an Ohio bribery instruction lacking a quid pro quo element is constitutional—and whether any error was harmless.
• The scope of RICO conspiracy liability, particularly whether the government must prove that a defendant himself committed predicate acts (it need not).
• Multiple evidentiary rulings, juror removal, Sixth Amendment claims, and sentencing methodology (notably “value of bribe” calculations and harmlessness where the statutory maximum controls).

Against that backdrop, the panel re-affirms and synthesizes Sixth Circuit bribery jurisprudence in election-related settings while preserving, through Judge Thapar’s concurrence, a live debate over the constitutionality and reach of Evans v. United States (Hobbs Act extortion as bribery) and the use of state election-law predicates in federal Travel Act prosecutions.

Summary of the Opinion

• Convictions affirmed. The court found no reversible error in the trials of Householder and Borges and affirmed their RICO conspiracy convictions.
• Quid pro quo clarified and applied to both Hobbs Act and honest-services fraud. The court held that both Hobbs Act extortion “under color of official right” and honest-services fraud require a quid pro quo—an agreement to perform a specific official act in exchange for a thing of value. The agreement need not be express; it can be inferred from words and conduct, so long as the terms are unambiguous to the parties.
• “As opportunities arise” instruction approved. The panel reaffirmed that juries may be instructed that a bribe may involve a promise to take specific official action when the opportunity presents itself.
• Ohio bribery instruction error, but harmless. The Ohio bribery instruction did not expressly require a quid pro quo, raising First Amendment concerns for contributions; the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury necessarily found a quid pro quo under parallel federal predicates, and both sides tried the case on a quid pro quo theory.
• RICO conspiracy does not require personal predicate acts. For Borges, the court held the government needed to show he knew of and agreed to facilitate a scheme that, if completed, would involve two predicate acts; it did not need to prove that he personally committed any predicate offenses.
• Evidentiary rulings affirmed. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting recorded statements to rebut Householder’s trial narrative, allowing testimony about co-conspirators’ guilty pleas to contextualize their cooperation, or limiting “advice-of-counsel” adjacent testimony.
• Juror removal and Sixth Amendment claims rejected. Dismissal of a noncompliant juror was within the court’s discretion; a “no discussion of testimony except with counsel” admonition did not violate the right to counsel.
• Sentencing: Although the district court’s explanation for the “value of bribe” enhancement was cursory, any error was harmless because the court imposed the statutory maximum and stated it would do so regardless of the precise Guidelines calculation.
• Concurrence: Judge Thapar concurred in the judgment but underscored serious First Amendment and federalism concerns with current bribery doctrine (Evans), the Travel Act’s use of state election-law predicates, and unresolved honest-services questions. He suggested that if the Supreme Court revisits Evans or related doctrines, the foundation for Householder’s bribery predicates—and thus Borges’s conspiracy conviction tethered to them—may be destabilized.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Evans v. United States (1992) and McCormick v. United States (1991): The backbone for the court’s quid pro quo framework. Evans requires that a public official receive payment “in return for” a promise to perform “specific official acts,” and McCormick clarifies that in the campaign contribution context, the corrupt agreement is what transforms protected support into a crime. The panel hewed closely to Evans in approving instruction language and timing concepts (“offense is complete upon receipt in return for agreement”).
• Skilling v. United States (2010): Confining honest-services fraud to bribery and kickbacks. The court reasoned that, to provide fair notice and avoid First Amendment problems in the campaign context, a quid pro quo applies to honest-services bribery as well. The opinion relies on circuit precedent and persuasive authority (e.g., Inzunza; Benjamin) to anchor that principle.
• United States v. Hills (6th Cir. 2022): Endorsed the “as opportunities arise” instruction, which the panel applied without reservation. That language bridges timing objections when the official opportunities materialize later.
• United States v. Terry (6th Cir. 2013) and related cases: Establish that a quid pro quo agreement may be formal, informal, written, oral, express, or implied—so long as the understanding is unambiguous to the payor and official—and that circumstantial evidence is admissible to prove the meeting of the minds.
• United States v. Sittenfeld (6th Cir. 2025): The court leveraged Sittenfeld to articulate the “unambiguous to the parties” requirement and to reiterate that the government need not exclude every innocent alternative where the evidence supports guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Salinas v. United States (1997) and Saadey (6th Cir. 2005): RICO conspiracy does not require proof that the defendant personally committed (or that anyone completed) predicate acts; agreeing to further a scheme that, if completed, would involve two racketeering acts suffices.
• Neder v. United States (1999): Harmless-error framework for instructional defects; drove the panel’s conclusion that the Ohio bribery instruction error did not affect the verdict.
• Caperton (2009), Williams (2016): Due process recusal cases—distinguishing extraordinary bias risks (e.g., contemporaneous campaign support from a litigant) from remote, attenuated, or speculative ones. The panel found no analogous risk here.
• Nardello (1969), Rewis (1971), Perrin (1979) (Travel Act): Central to Judge Thapar’s concurrence on how federalism, lenity, and statutory purpose bear on using state election-law “bribery” predicates. The per curiam did not need to decide the Travel Act issues to affirm Borges, but the concurrence maps the doctrinal minefield for future cases.

Legal Reasoning

1) Bribery Instructions and Quid Pro Quo

• Agreement element: The court upheld instructions that mirrored Evans: a public official commits bribery when he solicits or receives a thing of value “knowing” it was given “in return for” performing or agreeing to perform a specific official act. The panel emphasized that the quid pro quo must be unambiguous to the parties but can be proved with circumstantial evidence.
• Timing: The panel rejected a defense request that the agreement must exist precisely “at the time” payment is made; Evans considers the offense complete when the official receives payment in return for the agreement, and “as opportunities arise” language is proper when the promised acts are to be taken when official opportunities present themselves.
• Implied agreements: The court reaffirmed that “explicit” quid pro quo can be implied from words and conduct; express statements are not necessary. The instruction did not permit conviction for “mere expectations” divorced from a specific official action.

2) Ohio Bribery Instruction: Error but Harmless

• Constitutional defect identified: The Ohio instruction permitted conviction if the official “intended” influence, without an express quid pro quo. In the campaign-contribution context, that risks criminalizing protected giving absent a corrupt exchange (see FEC v. Ted Cruz for Senate).
• Harmlessness: Given the parallel federal predicates (Hobbs Act, honest-services) tried and argued on a quid pro quo theory, and the proof presented, the panel found beyond a reasonable doubt the jury would have convicted on a quid pro quo theory even with a corrected Ohio instruction.

3) Sufficiency of the Evidence (Householder)

• Public corruption predicates: The record contained ample evidence that FirstEnergy monies were paid in exchange for Householder’s specific official actions: building a Speaker’s majority, introducing and driving HB6, and defeating a referendum through legislative and political means; the magnitude and targeting of payments, contemporaneous communications, control over messaging funds, and coordinated legislative drafting supported the inference of an unambiguous quid pro quo.
• Money laundering: Stood or fell with bribery proceeds; given sufficient bribery proof, the laundering predicates survived.
• Private-citizen bribery: The government did not rely on this predicate for Householder; the panel did not reach those points as to him.

4) RICO Conspiracy and Borges

• No need for personal predicate acts: The panel reiterated that for RICO conspiracy the government must prove knowing agreement to facilitate a scheme that, if completed, would include two predicate acts; Borges’s deep, continuing involvement in advancing the bailout and anti-referendum strategy met that standard even if specific predicates (Travel Act or private honest-services fraud) were debatable.
• Harmlessness of predicate-specific errors: Because predicates were not required as to Borges personally, any error tied to this or that predicate would be harmless so long as the jury found he knowingly joined the enterprise and agreed it would be furthered by racketeering acts.

5) Sixth Amendment, Evidence, and Trial Management

• Juror dismissal: Rule 24(c) discretion supported removing a juror who defied court protocols and whose availability was uncertain; consultation with counsel was not required.
• Right to counsel: The overnight instruction barred discussing testimony except with counsel; the court’s wording allowed consultation with counsel and thus did not infringe Sixth Amendment rights.
• Recordings: Highly probative to rebut Householder’s trial narrative about bridge-building motives; not unduly prejudicial given the case context and overall record.
• Co-conspirator guilty pleas: Admissible to explain witness posture and allow jurors to assess credibility; not improper “bolstering,” particularly with limiting instructions.
• Advice-of-counsel adjacency: The court reasonably curtailed diffuse references to attorney meetings that risked confusing the jury about a defense the evidence did not establish (full disclosure and good-faith reliance).

6) Sentencing

• Value-of-bribe enhancement: The court criticized the sentencing explanation as cursory but deemed any error harmless because the district court would have imposed the same statutory-maximum sentence irrespective of the loss figure and stated as much on the record.
• Obstruction enhancement: Even if erroneous, it did not affect the ultimate sentence due to the statutory cap and high offense level.
• Substantive reasonableness: The statutory-maximum sentence was supported by the scale, planning, and public harm, and by the court’s reasoned view of deterrence and comparators in similar cases.

Impact and Forward-Looking Considerations

• Bribery prosecutions involving contributions: The decision cements within the Sixth Circuit that (a) honest-services bribery requires a quid pro quo; (b) the quid pro quo may be proved by implication and circumstantial evidence; and (c) “as opportunities arise” language is appropriate when the bargain covers future official opportunities. Prosecutors can charge and try such cases without an express “this for that” statement if the record shows an unambiguous understanding to both sides.
• First Amendment guardrails: The panel recognizes constitutional concerns when campaign contributions are involved and corrects state-law instructions that criminalize mere “improper influence.” District courts should expressly tether state-law bribery instructions to a quid pro quo in campaign contexts.
• RICO conspiracy reach: The opinion underscores how RICO conspiracy can attach to peripheral actors who knowingly join and facilitate the enterprise, even if the evidence of their own predicate acts is debatable. This materially lowers the government’s burden as to individual defendants like consultants or lobbyists who knowingly advance the illicit objective.
• Evidence of cooperator pleas: The decision aligns the Sixth Circuit with other circuits that allow the government to elicit cooperator guilty pleas even if the defense promises not to impeach on that basis—so jurors understand why and how the witness is testifying.
• Sentencing practice: Even where the statutory maximum controls, district courts should make specific findings and tie enhancements to record evidence to promote perceived fairness and provide meaningful appellate review.
• Potential Supreme Court recalibration (Concurrence): Judge Thapar’s concurrence supplies a roadmap for future cert petitions. It questions Evans’s conversion of Hobbs Act “extortion” into a bribery offense, flags the risk of criminalizing protected political giving absent a causal “control” or “but-for” standard, highlights rule-of-lenity and federalism concerns with using obscure state election provisions as Travel Act predicates, and identifies unresolved honest-services issues (property interest, foreseeability of economic harm, and the source/scope of fiduciary duties). Should the Supreme Court narrow Evans or clarify honest-services/Travel Act doctrine, related convictions resting on those predicates may warrant reconsideration.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• RICO conspiracy vs. substantive RICO: Substantive RICO requires proof that the defendant himself conducted the enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering (two predicate acts). RICO conspiracy requires only that the defendant knowingly agreed to further a scheme that, if completed, would involve two predicate acts—even if he personally commits none.
• Quid pro quo in bribery: Latin for “this for that.” In this context, it means an official accepts something of value in exchange for promising to perform a specific official act. The agreement can be implied from conduct but must be unambiguous to the official and the payor.
• “As opportunities arise” instruction: A bribe can involve a promise to take specific official action when the chance appears—jurors need not see an immediate act so long as the bargain covers identifiable official opportunities.
• Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right: Today, under Evans, this functions like a bribery statute: an official commits extortion by obtaining payment in return for promised official action.
• Honest-services fraud: A species of wire/mail fraud that targets schemes to deprive another of the intangible right to someone’s honest services—limited to bribery and kickbacks. In public cases, it tracks bribery doctrine; in private cases, questions linger about fiduciary duty definitions and whether economic harm must be intended or foreseeable.
• Travel Act: Makes it a federal crime to use interstate facilities to carry on “unlawful activity,” including state-law bribery. The concurrence highlights pitfalls when the “unlawful activity” is an obscure state election provision with procedural preconditions that the federal case circumvents.
• Harmless error: Even if a jury instruction or evidentiary ruling was technically wrong, a conviction stands if the appellate court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not affect the verdict.
• Rule of lenity: Ambiguities in criminal statutes are resolved in favor of the defendant, grounded in fair notice and separation-of-powers principles—featured prominently in the concurrence’s critique of expansive Travel Act and bribery theories.
• Guidelines “value of bribe” enhancement (U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)): Offense levels can increase dramatically based on either the amount paid or the benefit obtained, but courts must explain the factual basis for the amount. Where a statutory maximum caps the sentence and the court would impose it regardless, appellate courts may deem calculation errors harmless.
• Co-conspirator guilty pleas in evidence: Admissible to allow juries to assess why a witness is testifying and under what posture, provided limiting instructions make clear that a cooperator’s plea is not evidence of a defendant’s guilt.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s opinion provides a detailed, prosecution-friendly blueprint for trying public-corruption cases that involve campaign giving: quid pro quo can be proved by implication; the “as opportunities arise” instruction is valid; and RICO conspiracy liability attaches to those who knowingly facilitate the enterprise even if they do not themselves commit predicate acts. At the same time, the court acknowledges constitutional sensitivities by calling out the flaw in an Ohio bribery instruction lacking a quid pro quo and by emphasizing that the federal predicates require an unambiguous exchange for specific official acts.

Judge Thapar’s concurrence signals that the last word on these issues likely belongs to the Supreme Court. He invites reconsideration of Evans’s reading of the Hobbs Act, cautions against leveraging rarely used state election laws through the Travel Act, and identifies unresolved honest-services fault lines. For prosecutors, defense counsel, and trial judges in the Sixth Circuit, this decision both stabilizes the current framework for charging and proving public-corruption cases and foreshadows potential doctrinal recalibration at the Supreme Court level.