Qualified Immunity for Government’s Outside Counsel: Commentary on James A. DeLanis v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County

I. Introduction

The Sixth Circuit’s published decision in James A. DeLanis v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville (Nos. 23‑5939/5948, decided Nov. 24, 2025) addresses two interlocking questions at the intersection of constitutional torts, First Amendment retaliation, and the expanding use of private actors to perform public functions:

When can a private law firm, serving as outside counsel to a government, invoke qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?
What constitutes clearly established First Amendment retaliation when a government official pressures a private employer to fire someone for their public, political role?

The plaintiff, attorney and Davidson County Election Commission chair James A. DeLanis, alleges that a Nashville councilmember, Robert Mendes, and his law firm-employer, Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC (“Baker Donelson”), retaliated against him for his support of a property-tax repeal referendum. Mendes allegedly threatened to pull city business from Baker Donelson; the firm allegedly responded by demanding that DeLanis resign from the Election Commission or leave the firm, and then fired him when he refused to step down from his public role.

The district court denied qualified immunity to both Mendes and Baker Donelson at the motion-to-dismiss stage. The Sixth Circuit, in an opinion by Chief Judge Sutton (joined by Judge Gibbons), reverses in part and affirms in part:

It holds that both a public official (Mendes) and a private law firm (Baker Donelson), when acting in connection with public functions, are eligible to invoke qualified immunity.
It then applies the “clearly established law” standard differently:
- Mendes: No qualified immunity – existing First Amendment retaliation precedent clearly prohibits using governmental leverage to cause an individual’s firing for protected speech.
- Baker Donelson: Qualified immunity – no clearly established law put private law firms on notice that firing an employee under client pressure from a government entity violates the First Amendment.

Judge Clay dissents as to the law firm, arguing that the majority improperly extends qualified immunity beyond “individual government officials” to a private corporate actor and misreads Supreme Court precedent, especially Filarsky v. Delia and Richardson v. McKnight.

Doctrinally, the opinion is most significant for its treatment of qualified immunity for private law firms acting as government counsel and its articulation of when government pressure on private employers constitutes clearly established First Amendment retaliation.

II. Background and Procedural History

A. Factual Setting

The dispute arises from a 2020–21 battle over property taxes in Nashville:

The Nashville Metro Council adopted a property tax increase of more than one-third.
A citizen group mounted a charter amendment referendum to repeal the increase and limit future hikes.
The Davidson County Election Commission had to determine whether to certify the referendum for the ballot under Tennessee law (Tenn. Code § 2-5-151(c)).
James DeLanis:
- Served as chair of the five-member Election Commission; and
- Worked as an attorney at Baker Donelson, which served as Nashville’s outside counsel.

The first referendum effort was rejected by a Tennessee state court as legally defective. The citizen group then cured those defects and submitted a second petition. The Election Commission, chaired by DeLanis, concluded the revised initiative was valid and voted to certify it for the ballot. Nashville’s political leadership remained opposed.

Councilmember Mendes, a strong supporter of the tax increase, spearheaded opposition:

He proposed a “poison pill” resolution that would have placed a countermeasure on the ballot barring future tax referenda if the citizens’ measure went forward.
He publicly criticized the Election Commission, allegedly “berating” its members at a meeting, calling their actions a “sham” and “political theater,” and warning “we see you … and it’s not going to stand.”

Meanwhile, Nashville officials contacted Baker Donelson, seeking “aid and assistance” in keeping the referendum off the ballot, specifically by “influencing” DeLanis in his role as Commissioner and Chair. Baker Donelson’s general counsel, John Hicks, told DeLanis:

His actions at the Commission had created a “mess” for the firm’s representation of Nashville.
Nashville and its school board—“two major clients of the firm”—were threatening to “pull their business.”
The firm’s partners were distressed over these threats.

Although conflict-of-interest concerns were initially raised, Hicks soon told DeLanis there was no actual legal conflict between his firm employment and his commission role.

After a state court again ruled the second referendum invalid, the Election Commission scheduled a meeting to decide whether to appeal. Nashville officials, including allegedly Mendes, did not want an appeal and again contacted Baker Donelson “to ensure” that the Commission did not pursue one. On the eve of that meeting:

Hicks asked DeLanis to abstain from voting on the appeal.
Mendes sent an email to the Commission and council members, accusing DeLanis of running a “pre-baked political circus,” being “hyper-partisan,” and firing the Commission’s attorney to push the referendum “no matter what.” He distributed this letter publicly and to the press.

On the morning of the meeting, Hicks summoned DeLanis to the office. Concerned about legal impropriety, DeLanis demanded the purpose of the meeting in writing and declined to meet without that. Hicks responded that DeLanis’s time at the firm was ending and offered him two choices:

Resign from the Election Commission and remain at the firm through the fiscal year; or
“Retire now” from the firm and remain on the Commission.

When DeLanis asked for more time, Hicks terminated him immediately. Hicks said he had “no choice,” which DeLanis understood to mean that Nashville had pressured the firm to retaliate.

B. The Lawsuit

DeLanis filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against:

Robert Mendes, individually and in his official capacity as a Metro Council member;
Baker Donelson, as a private law firm acting as Nashville’s outside counsel; and
The Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County itself (not directly at issue in this appeal).

He alleged, among other claims:

First Amendment retaliation: firing / causing his firing because of his protected speech and actions regarding the referendum as Election Commission chair;
Conspiracy under § 1983 to violate his free-speech rights; and
Violations of various Tennessee constitutional and statutory provisions.

Each defendant moved to dismiss, invoking qualified immunity (for the individual-capacity claims) and related defenses. The district court:

Held Mendes not entitled to qualified immunity at the pleading stage.
Held Baker Donelson not eligible for qualified immunity because it was a private law firm rather than a government official.

Mendes and Baker Donelson appealed the denial of qualified immunity under the collateral order doctrine.

III. Summary of the Sixth Circuit’s Opinion

A. Appellate Jurisdiction

The court first confirms jurisdiction to hear an immediate appeal from the denial of qualified immunity:

Denial of qualified immunity is an immediately appealable collateral order because the immunity protects officials from the burdens of litigation and discovery, not only from liability (Mitchell v. Forsyth).
Johnson v. Jones (limiting appeals that challenge factual determinations) does not bar review at the motion-to-dismiss stage because the appellate court must accept all well-pled allegations as true; there are no fact disputes yet (Ashcroft v. Iqbal).

B. Core Holdings

Eligibility for qualified immunity
- Mendes: Clearly eligible as a public official (Metro councilmember) accused of misusing his government position.
- Baker Donelson: Also eligible as private outside counsel performing governmental functions on Nashville’s behalf, consistent with Filarsky v. Delia and Cullinan v. Abramson.
Qualified immunity outcome
- Mendes: No qualified immunity. Accepting the complaint as true, Mendes used threats of economic retaliation to cause a firing in response to protected speech, which violated clearly established First Amendment law in this circuit (e.g., Paige v. Coyner, Thaddeus-X v. Blatter).
- Baker Donelson: Qualified immunity granted. Even if firing DeLanis violated the First Amendment, no clearly established case law put private law firms on notice that terminating an employee under government-client pressure was unconstitutional.

The case is remanded for further proceedings against Mendes (and other defendants as appropriate), but Baker Donelson is dismissed from the § 1983 damages claims on qualified immunity grounds.

C. The Dissent

Judge Clay dissents on the question whether Baker Donelson may claim qualified immunity at all. He argues:

Sixth Circuit precedent has consistently confined qualified immunity to “individual government officials” sued in their personal capacities and has rejected its application to entities, especially private ones (citing Scott v. Clay County, Benison v. Ross, United Pet Supply, Nugent v. Spectrum Juvenile Justice Services).
Filarsky extended immunity to a single private attorney acting as an investigator, not to a law firm as an institution or to internal employment decisions motivated by its own business interests.
Cullinan is distinguishable: that law firm’s alleged wrongdoing arose directly from its role litigating on the city’s behalf, not from private HR decisions about its own employees.

In Clay’s view, Baker Donelson was not performing a public function in firing DeLanis, was motivated by private economic self‑interest, and thus should not receive qualified immunity.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Jurisdiction and Procedural Posture

The jurisdictional discussion, though brief, clarifies two recurring points in § 1983 litigation:

Collateral order review of qualified immunity denials
Appeals lie from a denial of qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage because immunity is from the burdens of litigation itself, not merely from liability. Thus:
- Even on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, an official can seek immediate appellate review when the denial turns on legal questions (e.g., whether the alleged conduct violates clearly established law).
Limited role of Johnson v. Jones
Johnson prohibits immediate appeals where the sole dispute is whether the evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact. At the pleading stage, however:
- The court presumes all factual allegations are true and draws inferences in the plaintiff’s favor (Iqbal), so there are no factual disputes yet.
- The only questions are legal (e.g., eligibility for immunity; whether the alleged facts amount to a clearly established violation).

This reinforces a practical takeaway: defendants should raise qualified immunity as early as possible, and denials at the pleading stage are typically immediately reviewable.

B. Qualified Immunity: Who May Invoke It?

1. The general doctrine

Qualified immunity shields certain defendants from § 1983 money damages unless:

They violated a federal constitutional (or statutory) right; and
The right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.

The second prong is often decisive. A right is “clearly established” if precedent has put the constitutional question “beyond debate,” such that every reasonable official would understand that the conduct is unlawful. It typically requires:

a prior case with materially similar facts; or
in rare situations, conduct so egregious that its illegality is obvious even without a case “on all fours” (e.g., Hope v. Pelzer).

Crucially, qualified immunity is:

personal (it protects individuals, not government bodies); and
function-based (it applies when an official, or a private actor, performs discretionary functions for the government).

2. Application to Mendes

The majority has little difficulty concluding that Mendes is eligible for qualified immunity:

He is an elected Metro Councilmember.
The complaint alleges he misused his governmental position and influence to punish protected speech.
His acts—proposing resolutions, speaking in council-related settings, leveraging the city’s business with outside counsel—are quintessentially governmental, discretionary functions.

Mendes’s eligibility is uncontroversial and aligns with longstanding doctrine.

3. Application to Baker Donelson: private law firm as public actor

The more consequential and contested holding is the court’s conclusion that Baker Donelson is also eligible for qualified immunity.

The majority reasons as follows:

Nashville had retained Baker Donelson as its outside counsel and remained a client “at all times relevant.”
The firm allegedly acted “pursuant to” Nashville’s “demands and requests” to implement an anti-referendum policy by:
- attempting to “influence” DeLanis in his capacity as Election Commission chair; and
- terminating him when he refused to accede, with the firing being “so intertwined” with Nashville’s policy that it should be “attributed” to the city.
Under Filarsky and Cullinan, private attorneys performing governmental functions at the sovereign’s behest may claim qualified immunity.

The court underscores a key conceptual move: if a private actor is a “state actor” for purposes of § 1983 liability because its conduct is attributable to the government, it should ordinarily share the government actor’s defenses as well:

“If a private actor is liable to a lawsuit as a state actor, it should also benefit from a state actor’s defenses.” – citing Filarsky.

Function, not formal status, controls. A “city’s outside counsel” performing work for the city is treated, for immunity purposes, much like an in-house city attorney.

4. Precedents cited and distinguished

a. Cullinan v. Abramson

In Cullinan, plaintiffs sued Louisville’s outside counsel and its firm for claims arising from litigation the firm conducted on the City’s behalf. The Sixth Circuit held the law firm could claim qualified immunity:

The firm’s lawyers “performed services at the behest of the sovereign.”
The rationales for qualified immunity applied to them similarly to in-house government counsel.

DeLanis leans heavily on Cullinan to support extending immunity to Baker Donelson.

b. Filarsky v. Delia

In Filarsky, the Supreme Court held that a private attorney temporarily retained by a city to conduct an internal investigation was entitled to qualified immunity. Key points:

The common law historically granted immunity to private individuals (doctors, lawyers) performing public functions at the sovereign’s direction.
Immunity should not turn on the payor or employment arrangement (full-time employee vs. outside contractor).
Denying immunity to private individuals working alongside public employees would deter them from accepting government assignments.

The DeLanis majority quotes Filarsky to stress that immunity extends to “private individual[s],” “though not a public employee,” when they perform government responsibilities. It emphasizes that Richardson’s limitation on private prison guards’ immunity was narrow and does not foreclose all private-actor immunity.

c. Richardson v. McKnight

Richardson held that prison guards employed by a private, for-profit company running a state prison under contract were not entitled to qualified immunity. The Court emphasized:

The firm was “systematically organized” to perform a major administrative task “for profit and potentially in competition with other firms.”
Common-law history did not support immunity for such private prison operators.

The DeLanis majority acknowledges Richardson but, following Filarsky, treats it as a narrow holding not generally barring private-actor immunity. It sees Baker Donelson as more analogous to the private attorney in Filarsky than to the prison operator in Richardson.

d. Nugent and United Pet Supply

The plaintiff and dissent rely on Sixth Circuit language stating that qualified immunity is “available only to individual government officials sued in their personal capacity” (United Pet Supply) and is unavailable to private entities even when acting in a governmental capacity (Nugent).

The majority responds:

Nugent addressed Monell-type and official-capacity liability; qualified immunity is never available to governmental entities or official-capacity defendants.
The references to qualified immunity in Nugent were brief, not central to the holding, and did not deal with private attorneys providing government legal services.
United Pet Supply likewise concerned official-capacity claims and reaffirmed that government entities (including cities) cannot claim qualified immunity—but it also explicitly recognized earlier cases granting qualified immunity to private actors in individual-capacity suits.

Thus, the majority reads these cases as consistent with, not contrary to, Cullinan and Filarsky when properly confined to their contexts.

5. The dissent’s critique

Judge Clay advances three principal objections to extending qualified immunity to Baker Donelson:

Sixth Circuit precedent confines immunity to individual government officials
He cites a line of cases stating that:
- Qualified immunity is a “personal defense” available only to natural persons sued in their individual capacities, not to public entities, and generally not to private parties.
- Even private entities acting “in a governmental capacity” (e.g., in United Pet Supply) cannot invoke qualified immunity as entities.
Baker Donelson was acting for its own business interests, not carrying out a public function
Clay emphasizes that:
- The alleged wrongful act here is an internal employment decision—firing an associate.
- At oral argument, Baker Donelson admitted it was motivated solely by its own business interests (keeping a major client), not by pursuit of public policy or governmental objectives.
- That distinguishes this case from Filarsky (investigative function on behalf of the government) and Cullinan (litigation decisions on the city’s behalf).
The majority fails to apply the required two-step test for private-actor immunity
Drawing on post-Filarsky Sixth Circuit law (e.g., McCullum v. Tepe), Clay notes that when a private actor seeks qualified immunity, courts must ask:
- Was there a firmly rooted history of immunity for similarly situated parties at common law?
- Would granting immunity be consistent with the purposes of § 1983 and the rationales of qualified immunity?
He asserts the majority never meaningfully applies this test to a law firm making an internal HR decision driven by economic self-interest.

Clay concludes that because Baker Donelson was not “working in the pursuit of government objectives” or “principally concerned with enhancing the public good,” but rather protecting its own revenue stream, it should remain subject to ordinary § 1983 liability without the shield of qualified immunity.

C. First Amendment Retaliation Analysis

1. Elements of retaliation

To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege:

He engaged in protected speech or conduct under the First Amendment.
He suffered an adverse action that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing that speech.
There is a causal connection between the speech and the adverse action.

The court assumes, for appellate purposes, that DeLanis’s actions as Election Commission chair—supporting the referendum and voting to certify it or consider an appeal—were protected. Mendes and Baker Donelson do not contest the “protected speech” element in this appeal, and the court expressly declines to delve into the complexities of “official-capacity” or employee speech (e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, Doe v. Reed, Nevada Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan).

The focus is therefore on adverse action and causation, and whether those actions violated clearly established law.

2. Mendes: clearly established First Amendment violation

a. Adverse action and causation

The court holds that Mendes’s alleged conduct, as pled, easily satisfies the “adverse action” and causation elements:

Threatening that a major government client will withdraw business from an employee’s law firm because of that employee’s protected public role would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing that speech and activity.
It is “reasonably foreseeable” that such economic pressure could result in the employee’s firing.
The complaint alleges that the city’s threats, which “included” Mendes and were made “at the direction of or in concert with Mendes,” led directly to Baker Donelson terminating DeLanis.

The court finds it plausible—indeed, a reasonable inference at the pleading stage—that Mendes was involved in or directed the threats:

He was the leading political opponent of the referendum.
He had publicly attacked and attempted to delegitimize DeLanis’s actions at the Commission.
He was a member of the same government whose “officials” allegedly pressured Baker Donelson.

b. Clearly established law

On the clearly established prong, the court relies on several strands of Sixth Circuit law:

Firing as paradigmatic adverse action
Thaddeus-X v. Blatter (en banc) identified discharge or termination as a textbook adverse action in retaliation cases.
Third-party employment retaliation
In Paige v. Coyner, a county official, angered by an accountant’s public opposition to a highway project, contacted the accountant’s private employer and falsely reported her statements with the intent to have her fired. The employer did fire her, and the Sixth Circuit held this constituted actionable First Amendment retaliation:
- “Losing one’s job and accompanying benefits” is severe enough to deter speech.
- The official reasonably foresaw that contacting the employer in that manner would lead to termination.

The majority sees Paige as squarely analogous: a government official leveraging influence over a private employer to induce termination in response to protected expression. Even though DeLanis concurrently held a public position (Commission chair), the court reasons that his firing from a private job is still a prototypical adverse action:

Existing law clearly prohibits firing an employee for protected speech when the employer is public.
Paige shows that officials cannot evade liability by acting through private employers.
There is no doctrinal reason to treat retaliation through a private law firm as less constitutionally problematic simply because the employee also holds a public office.

Therefore, Mendes is not entitled to qualified immunity: a reasonable official in his position would have understood that pressuring a private law firm to fire a government election official for his role in approving a referendum violates the First Amendment.

3. Baker Donelson: no clearly established violation

For Baker Donelson, the court assumes—without deciding—that its firing of DeLanis might violate the First Amendment (if attributed to the state), but concludes that any such violation was not clearly established.

a. A “unique situation”

The court characterizes the scenario as novel:

A private law firm, serving as outside counsel to a government, fires one of its lawyers because a government client threatens to pull its business over that lawyer’s actions in a public office.
The firm’s motivating concern, according to the complaint, was to “maintain and increase” client revenue and avoid loss of two major clients (the city and its school board).
The firm itself did not take a public position on the referendum; instead, it was reacting internally to client pressure.

The court finds no case—nor does DeLanis cite one—holding that in this precise fact pattern, a private employer’s termination decision violates the clearly established First Amendment rights of an employee.

b. Distinguishing relied-on precedents

Paige v. Coyner
Helps establish Mendes’s liability, but not the firm’s. In Paige, the official (not the private employer) was the defendant, and he acted with the intent to suppress speech; the case did not address whether the employer’s decision to fire, under pressure, violated the Constitution.
Anders v. Cuevas
Involved a private towing company punished by public officials (removed from a rotation) for reporting wrongdoing. The private company was the victim, not the alleged perpetrator; the case sheds little light on a private employer’s obligations when caught between an employee’s speech and a government client’s threats.
Zilich v. Longo
Concerned retaliation by elected officials against a political opponent, not private employment decisions.

Thus, while clear rules exist for government officials punishing speech and for public employers firing employees, the court sees a gap in the case law regarding:

Private for‑profit entities,
Serving government clients,
Making internal HR decisions under threat of losing government business.

C. Rejecting an “obviousness” argument

DeLanis invokes Hope v. Pelzer and Sexton v. Cernuto to argue that some constitutional violations are so obvious that no case is needed. The court disagrees:

Hope involved extreme Eighth Amendment abuse—handcuffing an inmate to a post in the Alabama sun for hours.
Sexton involved egregious sexual misconduct in a work-release program.
By comparison, the question whether a private law firm must risk losing a major government client rather than terminate an employee is far from “obviously unconstitutional.”

Accordingly, even if Baker Donelson’s conduct ultimately proves unconstitutional, the absence of materially similar precedent entitles it to qualified immunity.

D. The Internal Tension Highlighted by the Dissent

An interesting tension emerges in the majority’s reasoning, which the dissent emphasizes:

To justify Baker Donelson’s eligibility for qualified immunity, the majority stresses that it was acting as a public actor, at the city’s behest, performing public functions—as alleged by the plaintiff himself.
To justify that its conduct did not violate clearly established law, the majority highlights that the firm’s decisions were driven by private business interests—protecting its client revenue—and that it was not obviously acting in the pursuit of public objectives.

The dissent argues that both cannot be fully true simultaneously:

If Baker Donelson’s conduct is fundamentally private and profit‑motivated, it should not be considered a public function warranting immunity.
If it is sufficiently “public” to justify immunity, then the rationales for limiting public officials’ retaliation should arguably apply with equal force.

The majority’s response is that qualified immunity turns on the formal attribution of conduct to the state (for § 1983 purposes) and the functional role an actor plays, not on the actor’s subjective motive. That is consistent with Harlow v. Fitzgerald, which abandoned a subjective “good faith” standard for immunity.

E. Practical and Doctrinal Implications

1. For government officials and political actors

The decision underscores that:

Government officials cannot evade First Amendment constraints by acting through private intermediaries (e.g., law firms, contractors).
Threatening economic retaliation (loss of government business) against private employers to induce the firing of critics remains clearly established as unconstitutional retaliation (Paige logic applied).
Political speech and action by individuals in public roles—especially in election administration—receive robust protection; efforts to chill or punish such conduct invite personal liability.

2. For private law firms and government contractors

For private law firms and other contractors:

State-actor risk: When a firm accedes to government pressure or acts “pursuant to” government policies, it may be deemed a state actor for § 1983 purposes—exposing it to constitutional tort claims.
Immunity benefit: Under DeLanis, such firms may also be able to invoke qualified immunity, at least when they are acting closely in concert with government clients on matters bound up with public functions.
Uncertainty on the merits: The opinion notably does not resolve whether Baker Donelson’s conduct actually violated the First Amendment; it resolves the case solely on the “clearly established” prong, leaving the substantive contours of private-actor retaliation liability unsettled.

Contractors thus face a nuanced environment:

They can be sued as state actors when their conduct is attributable to the government.
They may in some circumstances gain qualified immunity, but that depends on role, function, history, and the clarity of existing law.

3. For § 1983 doctrine and circuit precedent

Doctrinally, the decision:

Reinforces a functional approach to immunity for private actors, aligning the Sixth Circuit with Filarsky and its emphasis on history and functional parity between public employees and private individuals performing the same work.
Pushes against earlier, broad-sounding Sixth Circuit statements that qualified immunity is “only” for individual government officials, narrowing those to contexts of:
- official-capacity suits; and
- entity liability (Monell and analogous suits).
Creates intra-circuit tension highlighted in the dissent, which may encourage en banc review or future clarification.

Substantively, the First Amendment portion of the opinion:

Confirms and extends prior retaliation caselaw to scenarios where the speaker’s livelihood is at a private firm but the leverage is governmental.
Signals that threats to professional careers via third parties remain an actionable form of retaliation when causally linked to protected political speech.

V. Key Legal Concepts Explained (Simplified)

1. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity is a legal doctrine that:

Applies in suits for money damages under § 1983;
Protects certain defendants (traditionally, individual government officials) unless:
- They violated a constitutional right; and
- The right was clearly established at the time.

“Clearly established” usually means there is existing precedent with sufficiently similar facts that would put a reasonable official on notice that the conduct is unlawful.

2. State Action and Private Actors

Section 1983 applies only to conduct “under color of” state law. A private entity may become a “state actor” if:

It performs a function traditionally reserved to the state;
It acts jointly or in concert with state officials; or
The state effectively directs or compels its conduct.

In DeLanis, Baker Donelson is treated as a state actor for pleading purposes because:

It served as outside counsel to the city; and
According to the complaint, it fired DeLanis “pursuant to” the city’s policy and demands, in a way that should be “attributed” to Nashville.

3. Individual vs. Official Capacity; Entity Liability

Individual-capacity suits target the personal liability of the official (or sometimes a private actor) for his own conduct. Qualified immunity may apply.
Official-capacity suits are essentially suits against the government entity itself. Qualified immunity is not available; instead, Monell standards govern.
Entity (Monell) liability holds a municipality liable for constitutional violations caused by official policies, customs, or practices—not on a respondeat superior basis.

In DeLanis, qualified immunity is considered only for:

Mendes (individual capacity); and
Baker Donelson, treated functionally as an individual-capacity party in its role as outside counsel performing public functions.

4. First Amendment Retaliation

Retaliation claims protect individuals from government punishment or adverse treatment because of their protected speech. The basic test:

Protected speech (e.g., political speech, advocacy, voting on public matters);
Adverse action (e.g., firing, demotion, threats that would deter a typical person);
Causal link (the adverse action was motivated, at least in substantial part, by the speech).

Government officials cannot sidestep this by:

Acting through private employers (Paige); or
Using economic threats such as loss of government contracts.

5. Collateral Order Doctrine and Johnson v. Jones

The collateral order doctrine allows immediate appeals from certain interlocutory orders, including denials of qualified immunity, because they involve rights that would be irreparably lost if review waited until final judgment.
Johnson v. Jones limits such appeals where the defendant merely disputes the facts—e.g., arguing that the plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient.
At the motion-to-dismiss stage, however, the court assumes the complaint’s facts are true, so appeals focus on purely legal issues (eligibility for immunity; clearly established law), and Johnson is not triggered.

VI. Conclusion: Significance of DeLanis in the Broader Legal Landscape

DeLanis v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville is a notable Sixth Circuit decision for at least two reasons:

Clarifying qualified immunity for private law firms acting as government counsel
The majority reaffirms and extends the principle that private actors performing governmental functions—here, a law firm serving as outside counsel—may invoke qualified immunity in § 1983 suits. It does so despite prior broad statements that immunity is limited to “individual government officials,” narrowing those to Monell and official-capacity contexts. The dissent flags a serious, unresolved tension in how far this logic reaches, especially when the private actor’s conduct is motivated by its own business interests rather than public objectives.
Reinforcing First Amendment protections against indirect government economic pressure
The decision strongly reasserts that government officials cannot use their control over public contracts and economic leverage to retaliate against critics by pressuring private employers to fire them. Relying on Paige and related cases, the court treats Mendes’s alleged conduct as a classic and clearly established First Amendment violation.

At the same time, by granting qualified immunity to Baker Donelson on “clearly established” grounds, the court leaves open difficult questions about the substantive First Amendment obligations of private contractors under government pressure. These unresolved issues will likely surface in future litigation involving:

Government contractors and vendors;
Professional service firms whose employees serve in public roles (e.g., boards, commissions); and
Efforts by governments to influence or punish private actors for employee speech through the threat of lost business.

In sum, DeLanis is a significant step in the ongoing project of defining the contours of § 1983 liability and immunity for private actors intertwined with government functions, while simultaneously reinforcing robust First Amendment protection against retaliatory use of governmental economic power.