Publication Starts the Clock: Tenth Circuit Confirms Colorado’s One-Year Defamation Limitations and Allows Anti-SLAPP Dismissal on Time-Bar Grounds in Hoid v. Gray Media Group

Publication Starts the Clock: Tenth Circuit Confirms Colorado’s One-Year Defamation Limitations and Allows Anti-SLAPP Dismissal on Time-Bar Grounds in Hoid v. Gray Media Group

Introduction

In Hoid v. Gray Media Group, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of a pro se plaintiff’s defamation-related lawsuit as time-barred under Colorado law. The case arose from news reporting by Gray Media concerning the death of a 71-year-old man, Randall Schubert. The plaintiff, Edward Hoid, alleged that the reporting falsely accused him of murder during an alleged robbery and assault. Hoid filed suit on February 29, 2024, more than three years after the article was posted online on November 18, 2020.

After removal to the District of Colorado based on diversity jurisdiction, Gray Media moved to dismiss under Colorado’s Anti-SLAPP statute, arguing among other things that the claims were untimely. The district court granted the motion, finding the claims barred by the one-year statute of limitations for defamation and rejecting equitable tolling. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that Hoid waived any substantial challenge to the limitations ruling by failing to adequately brief the issue, and further concluding that, even on the merits, the claims were untimely and not subject to equitable tolling.

Though issued as a non-precedential order and judgment, the decision is a clear, persuasive reiteration of three practical rules: (1) Colorado defamation claims must be brought within one year of publication; (2) repackaging defamation-adjacent claims does not evade limitations barriers; and (3) equitable tolling demands specific, well-supported facts—mere incarceration, general assertions of incapacity, or undeveloped accusations of concealment will not suffice.

Summary of the Opinion

  • The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of Hoid’s defamation-related claims against Gray Media as untimely under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-103(1)(a).
  • The court held that Hoid waived any meaningful appellate challenge to the statute-of-limitations ruling by failing to adequately brief the issue in his opening brief.
  • Even if reached, the merits would not change the outcome: the November 18, 2020 publication date started the clock, and the February 29, 2024 filing was well outside the one-year period.
  • Equitable tolling was properly denied. Incarceration and alleged medical incapacity were unsupported by specifics and contradicted by the plaintiff’s own litigation activity during the relevant period.
  • The court also agreed that, even for non-defamation labels (false light and “child endangerment”), the time bar would apply under the two-year general tort limitations period, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(a).
  • The panel reviewed de novo the Anti-SLAPP dismissal and statute-of-limitations questions, and reviewed the equitable tolling determination for abuse of discretion.
  • The court denied oral argument and granted the appellant’s motion to proceed on appeal without prepayment of fees.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

  • Luo v. Wang, 71 F.4th 1289, 1291 n.1 (10th Cir. 2023) — The panel reiterated that while pro se filings are liberally construed, courts will not act as an advocate for a pro se litigant. This framed the court’s approach to Hoid’s sprawling but undeveloped briefing.
  • Kearney v. Foley & Lardner, LLP, 590 F.3d 638, 643 (9th Cir. 2009) — Cited for the proposition that dismissals under Anti-SLAPP statutes are reviewed de novo. While a Ninth Circuit case, it is influential given that court’s extensive Anti-SLAPP jurisprudence and provides persuasive guidance on standards of review.
  • United States v. Piette, 45 F.4th 1142, 1159 (10th Cir. 2022) — The Tenth Circuit reviews de novo the interpretation and application of statutes of limitations. This supported the panel’s fresh look at when the claims accrued and whether they were timely.
  • Nixon v. City & County of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 2015) — The “first task of an appellant” is to explain why the district court erred. The panel relied on Nixon to hold that Hoid’s failure to develop a statute-of-limitations argument in his opening brief resulted in waiver.
  • Sawyers v. Norton, 962 F.3d 1270, 1286 (10th Cir. 2020) — Issues not raised, or inadequately raised, in an opening brief are abandoned or waived. This was the core authority for deeming Hoid’s limitations challenges forfeited on appeal.
  • Braxton v. Zavaras, 614 F.3d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 2010) — Denials of equitable tolling are reviewed for abuse of discretion. The court applied this deferential standard to uphold the district court’s denial given the sparse and inconsistent record on incapacity and diligence.
  • Schell v. Chief Justice & Justices of Okla. Supreme Ct., 11 F.4th 1178, 1186 (10th Cir. 2021) — The appellate court may affirm a dismissal “on any ground supported by the record,” provided the plaintiff had a chance to address the alternative ground. The panel used this to endorse time-bar rulings across all claims, including those labeled other than defamation.

Statutory Framework

  • Colorado Anti-SLAPP, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-1101(3)(a) — Creates a special motion to dismiss claims arising from acts in furtherance of petition or free speech rights in connection with a public issue, unless the plaintiff shows a reasonable likelihood of prevailing. Gray Media invoked this procedure to secure early dismissal.
  • Defamation Limitations, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-103(1)(a) — Imposes a one-year statute of limitations on defamation claims. The panel treated the publication date (November 18, 2020) as the accrual trigger.
  • General Tort Limitations, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(a) — Provides a two-year limitations period for general tort claims. The court explained that even if Hoid’s non-defamation labels applied here, they would still be time-barred.

Legal Reasoning

1) Appellate Waiver and Pro Se Limits

The court began by emphasizing that appellants must meaningfully explain why the lower court erred. While Hoid filed an 83-page brief, his references to the statute of limitations were “few” and “scattered,” consisting of bare assertions that his claims were exempt from any limitations period and vague references to “fraudulent concealment” and prison obstacles. Under Nixon and Sawyers, such undeveloped argumentation constitutes waiver. The court also invoked Luo to clarify that a pro se status does not relieve an appellant of the obligation to coherently present legal arguments.

2) Statute of Limitations: Accrual at Publication and Repackaged Claims

Even setting waiver aside, the panel affirmed on the merits. The opinion straightforwardly applies the one-year limitations period for defamation in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-103(1)(a), measuring from November 18, 2020—the date of the article’s initial posting—until the filing date of February 29, 2024. The elapsed time puts the claims far outside the permissible window.

The court additionally concluded that labeling claims as “false light” or “child endangerment” cannot sidestep the limitations bar. Even if not treated as defamation per se, such claims are governed at most by the two-year general tort limitations period in § 13-80-102(1)(a), and still fail for untimeliness. In short, a plaintiff cannot rebrand a defamation-based grievance to obtain a longer limitations period when the gravamen remains reputational harm from a publication.

3) Equitable Tolling: Specifics, Diligence, and Consistency Required

The denial of equitable tolling was affirmed under the abuse-of-discretion standard. The district court found that Hoid did not establish that either his incarceration or alleged medical incapacity (diabetes-related) actually prevented timely filing. Crucially, the court noted he failed to identify when he became incapacitated, and the arrest occurred after the limitations period began to run. The record also showed active litigation by Hoid during the key period—he filed other actions (including against media defendants in 2023) and referenced still other filings in 2020–2023—undercutting any claim that he was unable to file this case. On those facts, denying equitable tolling was well within the district court’s discretion.

4) Anti-SLAPP Posture and Standards of Review

The district court granted dismissal via Colorado’s Anti-SLAPP mechanism, which screens claims arising from speech on public issues unless the plaintiff shows a “reasonable likelihood” of success. The Tenth Circuit reviewed de novo the grant of that special motion (citing Kearney) and the underlying statute-of-limitations issue (citing Piette). It reviewed the equitable tolling decision for abuse of discretion (Braxton). The court also reminded that it could affirm on any ground supported by the record (Schell), which it did in confirming that all claims were time-barred regardless of label.

Practically, the opinion signals that purely legal defenses, like statutes of limitations, can be decisive at the Anti-SLAPP “likelihood of success” stage. If a claim is untimely as a matter of law, the plaintiff necessarily lacks a reasonable likelihood of prevailing, warranting dismissal.

Impact and Implications

  • For defamation plaintiffs in Colorado: The clock begins at publication. Waiting beyond one year is fatal unless exceptional and well-documented circumstances justify equitable tolling. General hardships, incarceration, or health issues must be linked to specific periods and paired with evidence of diligent efforts to protect rights.
  • On repackaging claims: Relabeling a defamation complaint as “false light” or another tort does not extend the filing window. Courts look to the substance, not the label, and apply the applicable limitations period accordingly.
  • Equitable tolling is rare and fact-bound: Plaintiffs must present concrete timelines, medical or institutional records if relevant, and evidence of diligence. Demonstrated litigation activity in the same timeframe weighs against tolling.
  • Anti-SLAPP strategy for media defendants: The decision endorses using Anti-SLAPP motions to raise threshold legal defenses, including limitations. Where claims arise from reporting on matters of public interest, Anti-SLAPP provides an early, potent vehicle for dismissal when time bars apply.
  • Appellate practice: The opinion reinforces strict compliance with briefing rules. Arguments not squarely and coherently presented in the opening brief are waived—even for pro se litigants.
  • Federal application of Colorado’s Anti-SLAPP: While the order is non-precedential, the panel’s handling of the special motion to dismiss—reviewing it de novo and affirming its use—reflects continued, practical acceptance of Colorado’s Anti-SLAPP in federal diversity cases within the Tenth Circuit.
  • Online publication accrual: The panel pegged accrual to the initial posting date. Plaintiffs should calculate deadlines from first publication unless they can point to a recognized accrual-altering doctrine supported by specific facts and law.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation): A procedural tool allowing early dismissal of lawsuits targeting speech on public issues. In Colorado, once the defendant shows the claim arises from protected speech, the plaintiff must show a “reasonable likelihood” of winning. If the claim is time-barred, the plaintiff cannot meet that burden.
  • Statute of Limitations: A filing deadline. For Colorado defamation, it’s one year. For many other torts, it’s two years. The clock generally starts when the injury occurs—in defamation, when the allegedly defamatory statement is first published.
  • Equitable Tolling: A judge-made doctrine that pauses the limitations clock in rare circumstances (e.g., when a plaintiff diligently tries to file but is prevented by extraordinary obstacles). It requires concrete proof, timelines, and consistency with the plaintiff’s other actions.
  • Waiver on Appeal: Appellate courts review only issues properly presented and developed in the opening brief. Bare assertions, unexplained accusations, or passing references do not preserve an issue.
  • Standards of Review:
    • De novo: The appellate court takes a fresh look, with no deference (e.g., Anti-SLAPP dismissal, limitations questions).
    • Abuse of discretion: The appellate court gives deference to the trial judge’s decision unless it is unreasonable or based on a misapplication of law (e.g., equitable tolling determinations).
  • Removal and Diversity Jurisdiction: A defendant may move a state case to federal court if the parties are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy is met. Here, Gray Media removed the defamation-related suit to federal court on diversity grounds.

Conclusion

Hoid v. Gray Media Group offers a crisp, practical confirmation of Colorado’s strict one-year limitations period for defamation and underscores that the clock starts at publication. The Tenth Circuit’s affirmance—rooted in waiver, statutory text, and the absence of facts supporting tolling—signals that litigants cannot evade time bars by relabeling defamation claims or by invoking generic hardships unmoored from specific proof. It also illustrates how Colorado’s Anti-SLAPP mechanism can dispatch stale claims at an early stage on purely legal grounds.

While non-precedential, the opinion is persuasive authority in the Tenth Circuit for three propositions: (1) the one-year defamation deadline is enforced strictly from publication; (2) equitable tolling requires detailed, consistent, and credible evidence of prevention despite diligence; and (3) Anti-SLAPP motions are an appropriate vehicle to resolve limitations defenses early in litigation. For media defendants, the decision reinforces a robust early-dismissal pathway; for plaintiffs, it is a cautionary reminder—act promptly, brief precisely, and substantiate any tolling with specifics.

Note: The panel observed that the defendant’s corporate name had changed from “Gray Media Group, Inc.” to “Gray Local Media, Inc.” The court’s order and judgment is non-precedential, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel, but may be cited for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

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