Public-Information Officers as Non‑Delegable Records Custodians under Ohio’s Public Records Act:
Commentary on State ex rel. Whitfield v. Burkhart, 2025‑Ohio‑5612

I. Introduction

In State ex rel. Whitfield v. Burkhart, 2025‑Ohio‑5612, the Supreme Court of Ohio continued to refine the contours of public-records obligations within the prison context, focusing on the role of public-information officers (“PIOs”) as records custodians under R.C. 149.43. While the court ultimately denied the writ of mandamus as moot because the requested records were produced after suit was filed, it awarded statutory damages and articulated an important rule:

A public-information officer designated to handle public-records requests may not redirect a proper public-records request elsewhere within the institution and thereby avoid the officer’s statutory obligations.

The relator, Caleb Whitfield, is an inmate at the Toledo Correctional Institution (“TCI”), a facility operated by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”). The respondent, Derek Burkhart, serves as a correction warden assistant and TCI’s public-information officer. Whitfield used the prison’s electronic “kite” system to submit five public-records requests seeking copies of prior kites he himself had sent. Burkhart responded that “Kites are not public record” and directed Whitfield to obtain copies from the institutional inspector instead.

After an earlier pattern of internal redirection between the warden’s office and the institutional inspector, Whitfield brought an original action in mandamus in the Supreme Court of Ohio. The key issues before the court were:

Whether Whitfield’s claim for mandamus relief was moot once the requested kites were produced.
Whether inmate kites are public records under the Ohio Public Records Act.
Whether a public-information officer may lawfully redirect a public-records request to another staff member or office within the institution.
Whether the delay in producing the records was reasonable under R.C. 149.43(B).
How statutory damages under R.C. 149.43(C)(2) should be calculated when multiple, closely related requests are submitted separately.
Whether statutory damages should be reduced or denied under the “well-informed custodian” mitigator in R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(a) and (b).

The per curiam majority (joined by DeWine, Brunner, Deters, Hawkins, and Shanahan, JJ.) resolved each of these issues in a way that strengthens inmates’ access to public records and clarifies PIO responsibilities. Justice Fischer concurred except as to statutory damages. Chief Justice Kennedy concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing that damages were owed but disputing the amount.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

On December 3, 2024, within a ten-minute span, Whitfield submitted five electronic kites to Burkhart at TCI. Each kite was itself a public-records request, seeking a copy of a specific earlier kite that Whitfield had sent. On December 10, Burkhart responded in identical language to each request:

“Kites are not public record. You can obtain a copy of your kite by requesting it through the Inspector.”

Prior to this, Whitfield had filed institutional grievances in August and September 2024 complaining that his public-records requests were being bounced back and forth between the warden’s assistant and the institutional inspector. TCI’s internal responses had:

Stated that public-records requests “must be made through the Warden’s Office.”
Rejected Whitfield’s grievance for lack of proof of the warden’s personal violation.

On January 23, 2025, Whitfield filed an original mandamus action in the Supreme Court of Ohio, alleging that:

Electronic kites are public records subject to disclosure.
Burkhart, as PIO, was the proper records custodian for TCI and had a duty to process the requests.
Burkhart’s refusal to treat kites as public records and his redirection to the inspector violated R.C. 149.43.

After Whitfield filed suit, Burkhart obtained the requested kites from the institutional inspector (who had broader system access) and had them delivered to Whitfield on January 30, 2025, five business days after the mandamus complaint was filed. Six pages of records were produced, with no indication of redactions.

B. Holding and Disposition

The court’s principal holdings were:

Mandamus claim moot: Because Burkhart produced the requested kites after the mandamus action was filed, Whitfield’s claim for injunctive mandamus relief was moot.
Inmate kites are public records: Consistent with prior precedent, kites are public records under R.C. 149.43 unless a specific exemption applies to their contents. An inmate may request his own kites via the Public Records Act.
PIO may not redirect a proper request: A PIO who is responsible for handling public-records requests at a correctional institution is the proper custodian and may not redirect a public-records request elsewhere in the institution to escape statutory duties.
Burkhart violated R.C. 149.43(B): By (a) incorrectly asserting that kites are not public records and (b) redirecting Whitfield to the institutional inspector rather than fulfilling the request himself (including by coordinating internally), Burkhart failed to comply with his obligations under the Public Records Act.
Delay was unreasonable: Given the small volume and simple nature of the request (five kites totaling six pages, with no suggested redactions), the five‑business‑day delay between filing of the mandamus action and production was not “reasonable,” particularly following Burkhart’s initial refusal.
Statutory damages awarded: Whitfield satisfied the prerequisites for statutory damages under R.C. 149.43(C)(2). His use of the prison kite system constituted “electronic submission” of a written public-records request, and he fairly described the records sought.
Multiple requests treated as one for damages: Because Whitfield’s five requests concerned “the same general subject matter” and were transmitted to the same custodian on the same day, they were treated as a single request for purposes of statutory damages, yielding $100 per business day, capped at $500 (five days × $100).
No reduction or denial of damages: The court declined to reduce or deny statutory damages under the “well-informed custodian” standard in R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(a)-(b), finding that the existing caselaw did not reasonably support Burkhart’s position, and that his statement that “kites are not public record” misrepresented the law.

Chief Justice Kennedy concurred that statutory damages were warranted but would have treated each separate transmission as a distinct request, awarding $2,400 (four of the five as Whitfield had requested), based on her prior view that the “same transmission” language, not subject matter or timing, controls the damages analysis.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Statutory and Doctrinal Framework

1. Mandamus and the Ohio Public Records Act

The Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, requires public offices to make copies of public records available to any person “within a reasonable period of time.” R.C. 149.43(B)(1). Mandamus is the traditional vehicle by which requesters challenge alleged violations of this statute. As the court reiterates (relying on State ex rel. Wells v. Lakota Local Schools Bd. of Edn., 2024‑Ohio‑3316, ¶ 11):

The relator must prove by clear and convincing evidence a clear legal right to the requested records and a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of the respondent to provide them.
The requester bears the burden to plead and prove both the making of a proper public-records request under R.C. 149.43(B)(1) and the custodian’s failure to make the records available (State ex rel. Ware v. Beggs, 2024‑Ohio‑611, ¶ 11).

2. Mootness and Statutory Damages

Ohio law distinguishes between the equitable remedy of mandamus (to compel production) and the statutory remedy of damages:

Mootness of mandamus: Once the custodian provides the requested records, the claim seeking an order to compel production is generally moot, because there is no longer a live controversy about access to the records (see State ex rel. Mobley v. LaRose, 2024‑Ohio‑1909, ¶ 7).
Statutory damages survive: A claim for statutory damages under R.C. 149.43(C)(2) remains justiciable even when the mandamus claim is moot. The court cites State ex rel. Grim v. New Holland, 2024‑Ohio‑4822, ¶ 5, to reaffirm that the damages remedy stands independently.

Thus, in Whitfield, although production of the kites mooted the request for an order compelling production, it did not moot Whitfield’s claim for statutory damages.

3. Requirements for Statutory Damages (R.C. 149.43(C)(2))

To obtain statutory damages under the version of the statute in effect (2024 Sub. S.B. 29), a requester must show:

A written public-records request was submitted “by hand delivery, electronic submission, or certified mail.”
The request fairly describes the public record or class of public records to the public office or the person responsible for the records.
A court determines that the public office or records custodian failed to comply with an obligation under R.C. 149.43(B).

Statutory damages accrue at $100 per business day from the date the mandamus action is filed until compliance, capped at $1,000 per “request.” The court applies these rules directly to Whitfield’s circumstances.

B. Precedents and Their Role in the Decision

1. Kites as Public Records: Adkins and Griffin

The opinion emphasizes that the legal status of “kites” as public records is settled. A kite is defined (citing State ex rel. Griffin v. Szoke, 2023‑Ohio‑3096, ¶ 3) as “a type of written correspondence between an inmate and prison staff.” The court’s prior cases have consistently treated such inmate communications as public records, absent an applicable exemption.

In particular, the court cites:

State ex rel. Adkins v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. Legal Dept., 2024‑Ohio‑5154, ¶ 15: Recognizing that an inmate may request his own kites as public records.
State ex rel. Griffin v. Sehlmeyer, 2021‑Ohio‑1419, ¶ 21: Holding that use of the prison kite system qualifies as an “electronic submission” for purposes of R.C. 149.43(C)(2), thereby satisfying the written-request requirement for statutory damages.

These precedents undercut Burkhart’s assertion that “Kites are not public record.” The court treats that statement as directly contrary to established law, reinforcing that PIOs must stay abreast of existing caselaw on the status of common prison documents.

2. Allocation of Custodial Responsibility: Clark, Barr, Szoke, and Ware

The court draws a critical doctrinal distinction between two situations:

A public employee who is not the records custodian receives a request and directs the requester to the proper custodian.
The designated records custodian (here, the PIO) receives a proper request and attempts to redirect it elsewhere within the same institution.

For the first scenario, the court cites State ex rel. Clark v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2025‑Ohio‑1611, ¶ 29, which states that no violation occurs when an employee not responsible for responding to a public-records request directs the requester to the proper office or person. Once directed, the burden shifts to the requester to send the request to the correct custodian (see also Griffin v. Szoke, 2023‑Ohio‑3096, ¶ 3‑5, 9‑10).

For the second scenario, the court relies on a line of recent cases clarifying that the public-information officer is ordinarily the appropriate custodian for correctional institutions:

State ex rel. Clark v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2025‑Ohio‑895, ¶ 11: A PIO responsible for responding to public-records requests “cannot redirect an inmate who submits a request.”
State ex rel. Barr v. Wesson, 2023‑Ohio‑3028, ¶ 18‑19: When an inmate is directed to submit requests to the public-information officer, a subsequent request to that PIO is proper.
State ex rel. Adkins v. Cole, 2025‑Ohio‑558, ¶ 2, 17‑18: A PIO assigned to respond to public-records requests cannot direct an inmate to send the request elsewhere.
State ex rel. Ware v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2024‑Ohio‑1015, ¶ 32‑33 (lead opinion): A public employee who is not responsible for public records complies with R.C. 149.43 by redirecting a requester to the proper custodian.

The majority synthesizes these authorities to hold that once a request properly reaches the PIO in his or her capacity as the designated public-records custodian, that officer:

Cannot lawfully refuse responsibility by redirecting the requester internally, and
Must instead take necessary steps to obtain and produce the records, even if that requires coordination with other internal offices (e.g., the inspector’s office with broader system access).

In Whitfield, Burkhart’s own affidavit confirmed that:

He was the public-information officer and oversaw public-records requirements at TCI.
Although he could not directly access all kites in the software system, he could obtain them from the institutional inspector.

The fact that Burkhart later obtained the records from the inspector to comply with the mandamus action demonstrated that he had the ability to fulfill his statutory duties by coordination; he simply refused to do so when the requests were first made. That refusal violated R.C. 149.43(B).

3. Misrepresentation of Public-Records Law: Clark (2023‑Ohio‑4183)

The court also references its earlier decision in State ex rel. Clark v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2023‑Ohio‑4183, ¶ 8‑9, 15, for the proposition that misstatements of law by public officials regarding public-records obligations—such as incorrectly declaring a record “not public”—are problematic. Burkhart’s categorical assertion that “Kites are not public record” falls squarely into this category and weighs against any claim of reasonable, good‑faith noncompliance.

4. Reasonable Time and Volume of Records: Morgan and Shaughnessy

Burkhart invoked two earlier cases to argue that his delay in producing the records was reasonable:

State ex rel. Morgan v. Strickland, 2009‑Ohio‑1901: There, an initial search yielded 74,000 pages of documents, illustrating how voluminous or complex productions can justify longer timeframes.
State ex rel. Shaughnessy v. Cleveland, 2016‑Ohio‑8447: The requester sought numerous police reports spanning a two‑week period, resulting in ongoing productions of 100–300 pages with needed redactions.

The court found these precedents inapposite. Unlike the mass records at issue in Morgan and Shaughnessy, Whitfield sought only five of his own kites—six pages in total—without any indication of sensitive content requiring redaction. The court therefore rejected any analogy that would justify a delay on volume or complexity grounds, emphasizing that:

Even relatively short delays can be unreasonable when small, straightforward requests are first wrongfully denied and then only fulfilled under the pressure of litigation.

5. Aggregation of Requests for Damages: Ware v. Parikh

A key part of the damages analysis is whether multiple related public-records requests should be treated as one request or many for purposes of calculating statutory damages. The majority relies on State ex rel. Ware v. Parikh, 2023‑Ohio‑2536, ¶ 31, which held that:

“When multiple public-records requests concern the same general subject matter and are transmitted to the same public-records custodian on the same day, the requests are viewed as a single request for the purpose of determining statutory damages.”

Applying that rule, the court holds that Whitfield’s five kite-based requests:

Concerned the same general subject matter (copies of his kites), and
Were transmitted to the same PIO on the same day, within minutes of each other.

Accordingly, the five requests counted as a single “request” for damages purposes, and Whitfield’s statutory damages were capped at $500 (five business days × $100).

Chief Justice Kennedy dissents from this aspect, referencing her concurrence in part in Ware v. Parikh, 2023‑Ohio‑2536, ¶ 50–51, where she argued that under the statutory language, what matters is whether the requests were made in the same transmission, not whether they address the same subject or are sent on the same day. Because Whitfield submitted five separate transmissions, C.J. Kennedy would treat them as five requests and would award $500 per request, subject to Whitfield’s self‑limited demand of $2,400.

6. The “Well-Informed Custodian” Mitigator

R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(a) and (b) allow a court to reduce or deny statutory damages if:

Based on the law at the time of the request, a well-informed public-records custodian would reasonably believe that the custodian’s action did not violate R.C. 149.43, and
The custodian reasonably believed that the action served the underlying public policy of the statute.

Burkhart invoked prior cases such as Griffin v. Szoke and Ware v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. to argue that he reasonably believed redirecting Whitfield to the inspector was lawful and facilitated efficient access.

The court rejected this argument for two main reasons:

The cited cases involved non‑custodians appropriately directing requesters to the PIO—the designated custodian—not PIOs themselves redirecting requests away from their office.
Burkhart’s statement “Kites are not public record” misrepresented settled law. A truly “well-informed” custodian could not reasonably believe that statement to be correct given the court’s consistent prior holdings.

This reasoning underscores that ignorance or misinterpretation of clear precedent cannot be invoked to claim “well-informed custodian” status and avoid statutory consequences.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning Applied

1. Mootness of Mandamus

The court straightforwardly applied the standard mootness rule: once Burkhart produced the kites (on January 30, 2025), Whitfield no longer had a live claim to compel production. Both parties agreed that the records had been produced. Accordingly, the writ of mandamus was denied as moot.

2. Violation of R.C. 149.43(B)

Two distinct violations of R.C. 149.43(B) were identified:

Misclassification of records: Stating that kites are categorically “not public record” conflicts with the court’s precedent. Because kites are public records (absent a specific exemption), Burkhart’s blanket denial violated the duty to provide public records.
Improper redirection by a PIO: As the designated PIO, Burkhart had a duty to respond to public-records requests addressed to the warden’s office. Even though he lacked direct system access to all kites, he had institutional means to obtain them, as his later actions showed. Directing Whitfield back to the inspector was not lawful compliance but an abdication of his responsibilities.

Relying on Adkins v. Cole, Clark (2025‑Ohio‑895), and Barr v. Wesson, the court solidified the principle that the PIO’s role as custodian is non‑delegable for requests properly routed to that office.

3. Reasonableness of Delay

The court’s treatment of the “reasonable period of time” standard is fact‑specific. It emphasizes:

The limited size of the request (five kites; six pages total).
The absence of suggested exemptions requiring review or redaction.
The fact that the delay followed an initial, improper denial of the records’ public status.

In this context, even a five‑business‑day delay (counted from the date the suit was filed to the date of production) was deemed unreasonable. Implicitly, the court suggests that once a PIO recognizes—or should recognize—that the records are readily obtainable from another internal office, a prompt request and transfer should occur, particularly for a small, straightforward set of records and especially after litigation is initiated.

4. Statutory Damages Calculation

Having found that Burkhart failed to comply with R.C. 149.43(B), the court turned to statutory damages. It held:

TDI’s electronic kite system qualifies as “electronic submission,” satisfying the written-request requirement for statutory damages.
Whitfield’s descriptions of the kites were adequate to “fairly describe” the requested records.
Because the five requests were deemed one “request” under Ware v. Parikh, damages accrued at $100 per business day from January 23, 2025 (filing date) through January 30, 2025 (compliance), reaching $500 total.

Chief Justice Kennedy’s partial dissent illustrates that the aggregation doctrine remains somewhat contested. Her position focuses tightly on the statutory text’s reference to “transmission,” arguing that each of Whitfield’s five separate transmissions entitles him to a separate damages calculation, without regard to subject-matter overlap.

D. Impact and Prospective Significance

1. Clarifying the Role of Public-Information Officers in Prisons

Whitfield consolidates and extends a series of recent decisions establishing that, within Ohio correctional institutions, the public-information officer is generally:

The central, designated custodian for public-records requests.
Obligated to process requests addressed to the warden’s office or PIO, even when doing so requires internal coordination (e.g., obtaining documents from the inspector).
Not permitted to shift responsibility by telling inmates to send their requests elsewhere within the same institution.

This non‑delegation principle serves important systemic functions:

Prevents “ping-ponging” of requests: Inmates should not be bounced between the warden, the inspector, and other staff, especially when institutional grievance responses themselves direct them to the warden’s office.
Creates a single point of accountability: When the PIO receives a proper public-records request, that office is the accountable entity under the statute.
Promotes compliance and clarity: Staff can still cooperate internally (as Burkhart did after suit was filed), but externally, the requester deals with a single custodian.

2. Reinforcing that Inmate Communications Are Public Records

The decision reiterates and strengthens the principle that inmate kites are public records. This has several implications:

Prison policies and training must treat electronic and paper kites as presumptively disclosable documents, subject only to narrow, specific exemptions (e.g., for security or confidential information).
Statements by staff that broadly classify categories of inmate correspondence as “not public” are legally untenable and risk statutory damages.
Inmates can reliably use public-records law to obtain copies of their own communications with staff, adding a measure of transparency and record‑keeping accuracy.

3. The “Reasonable Time” Standard in Simple Requests

Whitfield underscores that the “reasonable time” analysis is context-specific. Where:

The volume of responsive records is minimal,
No redaction or complex legal review is indicated, and
The custodian initially denies the request on erroneous legal grounds,

even a relatively short timeframe between suit filing and production can be deemed unreasonable. This will likely:

Encourage more proactive and timely production, especially in low‑burden cases.
Limit the ability of custodians to rely on generic “processing time” justifications once litigation commences.

4. Ongoing Debate Over Aggregating Requests for Damages

The split between the majority and the Chief Justice on the aggregation issue, continuing a theme from Ware v. Parikh, has practical and doctrinal implications:

The majority’s approach—aggregating same‑day, same‑subject requests sent to the same custodian—reduces potential exposure to high statutory damages in cases where a requester sends numerous, closely related requests separately.
The Chief Justice’s approach would increase potential damages liability where a requester segments requests into multiple transmissions, regardless of subject matter, creating a strong incentive for custodians to answer promptly and comprehensively.

For practitioners, the current majority rule remains that consolidation is appropriate when requests share subject matter and timing and are directed to the same custodian. But the dissent indicates an ongoing textual and policy debate that could resurface in future cases, particularly if the General Assembly amends the statute again or a new majority revisits the interpretation.

5. The “Well-Informed Custodian” Standard as a Real Constraint

The court’s refusal to invoke the mitigating provisions of R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(a)-(b) signals that:

The “well-informed custodian” standard is not a loose good-faith test; it requires actual legal plausibility based on existing case law.
Where the legal status of a record type (like kites) has been clearly established, custodians cannot credibly claim that a contrary position was reasonable.
Misstatements of law to requesters, especially categorical denials inconsistent with precedent, weigh heavily against mitigation and may themselves be grounds to emphasize statutory damages.

This should prompt public offices—particularly correctional institutions—to ensure up‑to‑date legal training for staff tasked with handling public-records requests.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Key Legal Concepts

Mandamus: An extraordinary judicial remedy used to compel a public official or body to perform a clear legal duty. In the public-records context, it is the primary mechanism for forcing compliance with R.C. 149.43.
Public Record: Under Ohio law, a public record is any record kept by a public office that documents the activities of that office, subject to enumerated exemptions (e.g., for security, privacy, or privileged information). Inmate kites, as documented communications between inmates and staff, fall within this definition.
Public-Information Officer (PIO): A designated official—especially in state agencies and correctional institutions—who is responsible for processing public-records requests and disseminating public information. In Ohio prisons, the PIO is typically the point of contact for R.C. 149.43 requests.
Statutory Damages (R.C. 149.43(C)(2)): A monetary remedy available when a public office fails to meet certain Public Records Act obligations. It is calculated at $100 per business day from the filing of a mandamus action until compliance, capped at $1,000 per request, provided specific statutory prerequisites are met.
Electronic Submission: For purposes of R.C. 149.43(C)(2), an “electronic submission” is any electronic method of submitting a written public-records request (e.g., email, web portal, or, as here, a prison’s electronic kite system), as long as it can be reasonably identified as a written request.
Mootness: A doctrine under which courts decline to decide cases where there is no longer a live controversy. In public-records cases, once the requested records are produced, the mandamus claim is typically moot—but claims for statutory damages and, in appropriate cases, attorney fees may remain.
Well-Informed Custodian: A legal standard in R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(a)-(b) that allows courts to reduce or deny statutory damages if a public-records custodian, acting as a reasonably knowledgeable and legally informed official, could have believed in good faith that his or her actions complied with the law and furthered the public policy of transparency.

B. Practical Takeaways for Non‑Specialists

If a prison tells an inmate “submit public-records requests to the warden’s office,” and the PIO in that office receives such a request, the PIO must handle it and cannot simply say “ask someone else.”
Inmates can use the prison’s electronic kite system to make valid public-records requests and qualify for statutory damages if their rights are violated.
Even small delays, if preceded by an improper refusal, may be deemed unreasonable and trigger damages.

V. Conclusion

State ex rel. Whitfield v. Burkhart is a significant addition to Ohio’s public-records jurisprudence in the correctional context. The Supreme Court of Ohio:

Reaffirms that inmate kites are public records, absent specific exemptions.
Clarifies that prison public-information officers are the proper custodians for public-records requests directed to the warden’s office and may not redirect such requests internally to avoid statutory duties.
Signals that even modest delays may be unreasonable when requests are simple and initially rejected on erroneous grounds.
Applies and reinforces the aggregation rule for multiple requests directed to the same custodian on the same day, while acknowledging continuing disagreement on this point.
Construes the “well-informed custodian” mitigator narrowly, declining to excuse conduct that misstates clear law.

Although the mandamus claim was denied as moot once the records were produced, the award of $500 in statutory damages underscores that noncompliance—even when eventually corrected—carries tangible consequences. For correctional institutions and other public offices, Whitfield is a strong reminder that designated records custodians must accept and fulfill their responsibilities, ensure that their legal understanding is current, and handle even routine inmate requests in a manner consistent with the overarching statutory policy of transparency and accountability.

Public-Information Officers as Non‑Delegable Records Custodians under Ohio’s Public Records Act: Commentary on State ex rel. Whitfield v. Burkhart, 2025‑Ohio‑5612