Provisional Sealing, Not Secret Trusts: New York Times Co. v. Dist. Ct. (Doe 1 Trust) and the Preservation of Nevada’s Presumption of Open Courts

Provisional Sealing, Not Secret Trusts:
New York Times Co. v. Dist. Ct. (Doe 1 Trust) and the Preservation of Nevada’s Presumption of Open Courts

I. Introduction

The Nevada Supreme Court’s en banc decision in New York Times Co. v. Second Judicial District Court (Doe 1 Trust), 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 71, is a major access-to-courts ruling at the intersection of trust law, press freedom, and judicial transparency.

The case arises from a high-profile Nevada trust proceeding—reported to involve Rupert Murdoch and a family trust controlling major media holdings—in which the district court sealed nearly the entire file, concealed the existence of the case (at least initially), anonymized the parties as “Does,” and closed all hearings to the public. Major media organizations (The New York Times, CNN, AP, NPR, Reuters, etc.), organized as the “Access Coalition,” sought to intervene to challenge that secrecy.

Relying on Nevada statutes, NRS 164.041 and NRS 669A.256, which describe certain trust-related information as “confidential,” the district court concluded that the trust parties had a right to keep the entire case shielded from public view, and that hearings must be closed because any public access would compromise statutory confidentiality. The court also held that the First Amendment right of access did not apply to trust proceedings under the “experience and logic” test articulated in Falconi v. Eighth Judicial District Court.

The Nevada Supreme Court rejects that approach. It holds that:

  • NRS 164.041 and NRS 669A.256 create a right to provisional sealing/redaction of certain trust-related information, but they do not mandate automatic or permanent secrecy.
  • Those statutes must be applied consistently with the common-law presumption of public access to court records and proceedings, and do not displace that presumption.
  • District courts must exercise independent judicial discretion and make specific, non-speculative findings to justify sealing—and must consider redaction and other less restrictive alternatives.
  • Closing hearings is not authorized by those statutes and is incompatible with Nevada’s strong tradition of open courts, especially in a state where judges are elected.

The court grants a writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate its sweeping sealing/closure order and to conduct a document-by-document and transcript-by-transcript analysis, applying the common-law presumption of openness and the governing rules on sealing (including SRCR 3).

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Underlying Trust Proceeding

Doe 1’s trust is domiciled in Nevada; its trustee is a Nevada family trust company governed by NRS Chapter 669A. Doe 1 filed a verified petition asking the district court to:

  1. Assume jurisdiction over the trust; and
  2. Seal “confidential” information under NRS 164.041 and NRS 669A.256.

In January 2024, the district court went far beyond sealing individual documents: it sealed the entire file, including concealing the very existence of the case on the docket, and closed all hearings to the public. The rationale was that court filings and proceedings would disclose personal, financial, and business information about the trust and its beneficiaries.

After media inquiries, the court slightly loosened the veil: it made publicly available on its website the existence of the case, its type, case number, a notation that it was sealed, and a document index by date and document code. The parties’ names, however, remained replaced with Doe designations.

B. Falconi and the Constitutional Context

Shortly thereafter, in Falconi v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 8, 543 P.3d 92 (cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 445 (2024)), the Nevada Supreme Court held that:

  • Civil proceedings—including family court matters—are presumptively open to the public under the First Amendment.
  • NRS 125.080 and certain local rules that automatically or routinely sealed divorce proceedings upon request were unconstitutional, because they deprived courts of discretion to weigh compelling privacy interests against the presumption of access.

In Nester v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 4, 562 P.3d 1071 (2025), the court clarified that the First Amendment presumption does not eliminate the possibility of closure; it requires a case-by-case determination whether compelling reasons overcome access.

C. The Access Coalition’s Intervention

In September 2024, the Access Coalition moved to intervene “for the limited purpose of seeking access to court proceedings and the unsealing of, and access to, court records and filings.” Media reports had already identified the case as involving Rupert Murdoch’s efforts to amend a family trust to affect posthumous control of media companies with substantial political and economic influence.

The Coalition argued:

  • The First Amendment presumption of access (as articulated in Falconi) applies and requires openness.
  • The district court’s sealing and closure orders lacked specific findings that any privacy interests outweighed the public interest in access.

The Doe parties opposed, arguing:

  • Equitable trust proceedings are not historically open and do not satisfy the “experience and logic” test; therefore, no First Amendment right attaches.
  • Because no constitutional right applies, the Legislature is free to balance privacy and access through NRS 164.041 and 669A.256, and those statutes justify broad confidentiality.
  • Even under strict scrutiny, compelling privacy, competitive, and safety concerns outweigh the public interest.

D. The Probate Commissioner’s Recommendation and District Court’s Order

The probate commissioner recommended:

  • Allowing intervention by the Coalition, but
  • Denying access to records and proceedings.

The district court immediately adopted the recommendation—without making separate findings—so the commissioner’s report became the operative order.

Key aspects of the district court’s decision:

  • Reading NRS 164.041 and NRS 669A.256 to permit sealing of all filings, because it believed every document fell within “confidential” categories.
  • Deeming even information not expressly covered by the statutes (e.g., broad financial/business information) confidential as part of the parties’ “private, personal life” and of limited public interest.
  • Concluding the statutes protect “important, even compelling, privacy interests,” including identity theft, fraud, business disruption, and embarrassment.
  • Asserting it had no discretion under the statutes to consider redaction instead of full sealing.
  • Concluding that trust proceedings are not subject to the First Amendment right of access under the experience-and-logic test, and thus applying only the common-law presumption.
  • Holding that to comply with statutory confidentiality, all hearings must be closed, since any open hearing would purportedly risk disclosure of confidential information.
  • Finding that the Does’ fame warranted extra security and that closure was “another tool” to ensure safe courthouse access.

The court allowed release of the names of judges, attorneys, and non-beneficiary/settlor parties but otherwise kept virtually everything under seal.

E. Writ Proceeding, Settlement, and Mootness

The Coalition filed a petition for writ of mandamus (and in the alternative, prohibition) challenging the sealing and closures. While the petition was pending:

  • The specific proceedings to which the Coalition sought contemporaneous access concluded.
  • The trust case itself appears to have been settled and dismissed by order dated September 19, 2025.
  • The district court removed even the limited public case information previously displayed on its website.

Doe 1 and Doe 9 moved to dismiss the writ petition as moot in light of the settlement.

The Nevada Supreme Court:

  • Confirms it has jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus when discretion is manifestly abused through a clearly erroneous interpretation or application of law.
  • Finds no adequate alternative remedy for the media (who typically cannot appeal from case merits to challenge access restrictions).
  • Holds the issue is not moot, because:
    • Access problems are “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” as in Falconi—hearings often conclude before review.
    • The public’s right of access extends beyond live hearings to post-judgment ability to inspect records and transcripts.

III. Summary of the Opinion

The Nevada Supreme Court, per Justice Cadish and sitting en banc, grants the writ of mandamus. The core holdings are:

  1. Statutory Interpretation: NRS 164.041 and 669A.256 authorize only provisional sealing/redaction of specified “confidential information” in trust proceedings. They require district courts to:
    • Promptly review sealed/unredacted copies provided in camera;
    • Exercise independent discretion to decide whether continued sealing is justified case-by-case and document-by-document;
    • Consider redaction or less restrictive alternatives.
    The statutes do not mandate blanket or permanent sealing, nor do they strip courts of their supervisory power over records.
  2. Common-Law Presumption of Access: Trust and probate proceedings, like other judicial proceedings, are subject to a strong common-law presumption of openness. Any limitation requires a showing of a significant competing interest, supported by specific evidence, that outweighs public access.
  3. Inadequate Findings: The district court’s reliance on generalized concerns—embarrassment, general business disruption, old kidnapping incident—and on the mere statutory label “confidential” is insufficient to support sealing nearly all records and closing all proceedings. No particularized, non-speculative findings were made about:
    • Concrete risks of harm; or
    • Why sealing is superior to redaction or other alternatives.
  4. Closure of Hearings: NRS 164.041 and 669A.256 deal only with filings, not hearings. The blanket closure order is inconsistent with Nevada’s tradition and rules favoring open proceedings. The court underscores that even in sensitive trust matters, the existence of the case and the parties’ identities generally must remain public absent a demonstrated compelling need.
  5. Remand Instructions: The district court is ordered to:
    • Vacate its order enforcing the probate commissioner’s recommendation.
    • Conduct a proper analysis for each sealed document and hearing transcript, considering:
      • Whether there is a significant, specifically demonstrated privacy/safety interest;
      • Whether that interest outweighs the presumption of access; and
      • Whether redaction or other narrower means can adequately protect that interest.
  6. Mootness and Continuing Relief: Despite settlement, the court rejects mootness and emphasizes that post-judgment access to files and transcripts remains a live issue and part of the public’s right of access.

The court explicitly does not decide whether the First Amendment right of access applies to this trust proceeding. Instead, it resolves the case on statutory and common-law grounds, following constitutional avoidance principles.

IV. Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

A. Statutory Framework: NRS 164.041 and NRS 669A.256

1. Structure of NRS 164.041

NRS 164.041 is central to the opinion. It:

  • Allows “confidential information relating to trusts” to be:
    • Redacted and filed publicly, with unredacted copies submitted in camera; or
    • Placed under seal, again with unredacted copies provided to the court and notice recipients, without prior court order.
  • Defines “confidential information” broadly, including:
    • Trust instruments, inventories, accountings, reports;
    • Names and addresses of settlors and beneficiaries;
    • Dispositive terms;
    • Corporate and company records related to trusts;
    • Personally identifying information; and
    • “Any other information the court deems confidential” when privacy outweighs public access.
  • Provides that, “[u]nless the court orders otherwise”, once confidential information is redacted or sealed, all subsequent related filings and orders must treat that information similarly.
  • Expressly preserves the court’s power to order production of unredacted or previously sealed documents to interested persons or others “for cause shown.”

The Supreme Court emphasizes several textual features:

  • The “unless the court orders otherwise” clause in subsection (2) presupposes judicial discretion to:
    • Maintain sealing;
    • Lift it; or
    • Modify it (e.g., by shifting from sealing to redaction).
  • Subsection (3) confirms the court’s ongoing power to order access “for cause shown,” again underscoring continuing discretion.
  • The statute’s design—allowing filing under seal/redaction without prior court order—is provisional, not permanent. The legislative history explicitly characterizes the protection as “automatic and temporary” until the court can rule.

2. NRS 669A.256 and Family Trust Companies

NRS 669A.256, applicable to Nevada family trust companies, permits trust parties to petition for certain documents to be sealed and states that sealed documents:

  • “May not be made part of the public record,” but
  • “Are available to … interested parties as the court may order upon a showing of good cause.”

Again, the statute presumes judicial control:

  • Access is determined “as the court may order,”
  • On a “showing of good cause,” not as an absolute bar.

3. The District Court’s Misreading

The district court interpreted these statutes as:

  • Conferring on the parties a substantive right to have all filings related to the trust sealed for the duration of the case, without meaningful court discretion.
  • Removing the court’s ability to:
    • Unseal documents;
    • Order redaction instead of sealing; or
    • Balance statutory confidentiality against public access.

The Nevada Supreme Court finds this reading plainly incorrect. It stresses:

  • The statutes:
    • Designate categories of information as “confidential” and
    • Create a procedural mechanism for initial, automatic sealing/redaction,
    but
  • They do not:
    • Transform “confidential” into “permanently sealed”; or
    • Abrogate judicial discretion or supervisory power.

Legislative history supports this interpretation. A key proponent of S.B. 407 (which enacted NRS 164.041) testified that:

“[T]he district court under this section would still have discretion and final say regarding the privacy of information; it just provides an automatic and temporary confidentiality issue until the matter comes before the court.”

Because the district court treated statutory confidentiality as self-executing and largely irreversible, it failed to conduct the required analysis and thereby committed a “manifest abuse of discretion.”

B. Common-Law Presumption of Access and Supervisory Power

1. Howard and the Nevada Tradition

The court draws heavily on its prior decision in Howard v. State, 128 Nev. 736, 291 P.3d 137 (2012), which held:

  • There is a common-law right of public access to judicial records.
  • Sealing is permissible only when the right is “outweighed by a significant competing interest.”
  • The party seeking to seal bears the burden to show “sufficient grounds for denying access.”
  • Courts possess inherent authority and “supervisory power over [their] own records and files.”

That framework applies here. The court emphasizes:

  • General embarrassment or desire for privacy, even in sensitive matters, is not enough to justify wholesale secrecy.
  • Specific, evidence-based threats or harms can justify tailored sealing, but not categorical closure.

2. Trust and Probate Proceedings as Presumptively Public

The opinion situates trust/probate practice within a broader Anglo-American tradition of open judicial proceedings, citing:

  • In re Estate of Hearst, 136 Cal. Rptr. 821 (Ct. App. 1977), involving a prominent publishing dynasty’s trusts and estate, which held probate proceedings are presumptively open and secrecy requires strong justification.
  • Estate of Campbell, 106 P.3d 1096 (Haw. 2005), recognizing a common-law presumption of openness in probate.
  • In re Estate of Zimmer, 442 N.W.2d 578 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989), applying a right-of-access presumption to settlement documents resolving a trust dispute.

Those cases reinforce that:

  • Trust and probate proceedings are not some quasi-private domain immune from public scrutiny.
  • The common-law presumption of access applies with full force, subject to case-specific exceptions.

3. No Statutory Abrogation of the Common Law

Under First Financial Bank v. Lane, 130 Nev. 972, 339 P.3d 1289 (2014), statutes are not read to abrogate the common law absent clear legislative intent. NRS 164.041 and 669A.256:

  • Do not expressly displace the common-law right of access.
  • Are better read as supplying procedural tools (provisional sealing/redaction) to manage confidential information while preserving, not eliminating, access principles.

Thus, the party seeking sealing must still show:

  • A significant privacy or safety interest, supported by evidence; and
  • That this interest outweighs the strong presumption of openness.

C. Required Findings for Sealing and Closure

1. Generalized Concerns Are Insufficient

The district court justified secrecy based on:

  • Risks of “identity theft” and “fraud,”
  • Potential “disruption of the trustee’s business,”
  • “Public embarrassment” and other “malicious acts,”
  • A decades-old kidnapping of a person erroneously believed to be Doe 1’s wife.

The Supreme Court finds these rationales inadequate:

  • No specific threats or recent events were shown linking open proceedings to actual risk of harm.
  • Courts have repeatedly rejected vague reputational, competitive, or embarrassment-based fears as grounds to defeat public access:
    • Howard: embarrassment alone insufficient.
    • Kamakana v. City & County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2006): mere possibility of embarrassment, incrimination, or further litigation does not justify sealing.
    • In re Avandia Marketing, Sales Practices & Products Liability Litigation, 924 F.3d 662 (3d Cir. 2019): general concerns about public image or competition are insufficient.

The opinion is especially critical of the district court’s characterization of public interest as “de minimis, at best,” in a case involving a trust that controls a “major, publicly traded, political news conglomerate.” Relying on Hearst, the court notes that when private trusts wield substantial public power, transparency concerns are amplified, not diminished.

2. Specific, Non-Speculative, Document-by-Document Findings

The Nevada Supreme Court mandates a more rigorous approach:

  • Courts must base any sealing or closure on specific, non-speculative findings focused on:
    • Concrete privacy or safety risks; and
    • The relationship between those risks and particular documents or portions of hearings.
  • Courts must also explain:
    • Why sealing is necessary, and
    • Why less restrictive alternatives (redaction, delayed disclosure, enhanced security) are inadequate.

This aligns with:

  • UnitedHealthCare Ins. Co. v. Fremont Emergency Services (Mandavia), Ltd., 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 29, 570 P.3d 107 (2025), requiring more than conclusory assertions to overcome public access.
  • June Medical Services, LLC v. Phillips, 22 F.4th 512 (5th Cir. 2022), which criticized categorical sealing and required document-specific analysis.
  • Nevada SRCR 3(4), which in most civil cases requires:
    “specific findings that the sealing or redaction is justified by identified compelling privacy or safety interests that outweigh the public interest in access.”

The court further notes that while certain personal identifiers (addresses, birth dates, SSNs, bank account numbers) are appropriately redacted as a matter of course, such narrow redactions are different in kind from sealing the substance of court proceedings.

D. Closure of Court Proceedings

1. Statutory Silence Does Not Authorize Secret Hearings

NRS 164.041 and 669A.256 speak only to documents, not hearings. The district court nonetheless extrapolated that hearings must be closed because otherwise “confidential” information might be disclosed. The Supreme Court rejects this:

  • Statutory authority to seal filings does not, without more, authorize closing oral proceedings.
  • Common-law (and potentially constitutional) presumptions of open hearings require a separate analysis, including consideration of alternatives (e.g., sealing only those narrow portions in which confidential data is actually discussed).

2. Public Notice and Opportunity to Object

The court underscores that the very question whether to seal or close must itself be visible:

  • Under SRCR 3(1), motions to seal/redact must reveal in the title that sealing is sought, giving notice.
  • SRCR 3(3) permits courts to require notice to the “general public” and to hold a hearing on the sealing motion.
  • Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. U.S. District Court, 156 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1998), is cited to emphasize:
    • Temporary sealing pending a hearing can be permissible, but
    • Court must provide “sufficient notice” to the public and press and allow them to object or propose alternatives.

By concealing even the existence of the case at the outset, and later limiting information while maintaining broad closure, the district court thwarted this participatory check.

3. Names, Identities, and Pseudonymity

The opinion makes an important doctrinal point: while NRS 164.041 allows the names and addresses of settlors and beneficiaries to be treated as “confidential information” initially, the names of parties and the existence of the case should not remain hidden absent a compelling need.

Relying on:

  • Does I through XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2000), which allows pseudonymity only in narrow circumstances (retaliatory harm, highly personal matters, or exposure to criminal liability).
  • Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320 (11th Cir. 1992), which held embarrassment alone does not warrant anonymity.

The court signals that:

  • High-profile or wealthy status does not by itself justify conducting litigation under pseudonyms.
  • The standard for anonymity tracks the standard for sealing: case-specific, evidence-based, and applied sparingly.

E. Writ of Mandamus, Mootness, and Justiciability

1. Mandamus as the Appropriate Remedy

The court reiterates that mandamus is available where:

  • A public officer (here, a judge) has clearly erred in interpreting or applying the law; and
  • No “plain, speedy, and adequate” legal remedy exists.

Following Falconi, the court recognizes that:

  • The press often lacks standing to directly appeal case merits.
  • By the time an appeal might be possible, the access issue is frequently moot as to live proceedings.
  • Thus, writ review is often the only realistic avenue to vindicate public access rights.

2. Capable of Repetition, Yet Evading Review

Despite settlement and completed hearings, the court relies on the familiar doctrine from Falconi and elsewhere:

  • Access disputes “happen frequently but evade review,” because:
    • Hearings occur and end before appellate courts can review closure orders; and
    • Settlements or dismissals frequently precede review.
  • However, the structural nature of the issue—how Nevada courts handle sealing and closure in trust cases—is “capable of repetition,” and thus merits decision.

3. Continuing Right to Inspect Records After Settlement

The opinion further emphasizes that the public right of access:

  • Extends beyond real-time attendance at hearings to include:
    • Inspection and copying of judicial records;
    • Access to transcripts even after proceedings and cases have concluded.
  • Is recognized by cases like:
    • In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183 (3d Cir. 2001), describing a “pervasive common law right to inspect and copy judicial records.”
    • Grae v. Corrections Corp. of America, 134 F.4th 927 (6th Cir. 2025), applying the access right to sealed documents two years after settlement of a class action.

Consequently, the district court still can (and must) revisit sealing to allow appropriate access to files and transcripts, and the case remains live for purposes of mandamus.

F. Avoidance of the First Amendment Question

An important undercurrent is whether the First Amendment right of access applies to equitable trust proceedings. The district court held that it does not, based on the “experience and logic” test used in Falconi. The Nevada Supreme Court deliberately sidesteps that constitutional question:

  • It notes the strong common-law presumption of access and the supervisory power over records suffice to decide the case.
  • Relying on Doe Dancer I v. La Fuente, Inc., 137 Nev. 20, 481 P.3d 860 (2021), it invokes constitutional-avoidance principles: when a statute is reasonably susceptible of a construction that avoids constitutional issues, courts should adopt that reading.

By clarifying that the trust-sealing statutes are consistent with (and limited by) openness principles, the court:

  • Resolves the dispute on statutory and common-law grounds; and
  • Leaves open for another day the question whether the First Amendment right of access squarely applies to trust cases.

V. Precedents Cited and Their Role

A. Nevada Cases

  • Falconi v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 8, 543 P.3d 92 (2024)
    • Held that civil (including family court) proceedings are presumptively open under the First Amendment.
    • Invalidated statutes and local rules that mechanically closed divorce proceedings, depriving courts of discretion.
    • Here, Falconi:
      • Provides the structural backdrop emphasizing Nevada’s commitment to open courts.
      • Supports using writs to address access issues that evade review.
  • Nester v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 4, 562 P.3d 1071 (2025)
    • Clarified Falconi by emphasizing that the presumption of access does not forbid closure; it requires case-specific balancing.
    • Supports the mandate here that courts weigh access and privacy interests individually.
  • Howard v. State, 128 Nev. 736, 291 P.3d 137 (2012)
    • Articulated Nevada’s common-law access principles.
    • Serves as the primary doctrinal source for:
      • The presumption of openness;
      • The requirement of a “significant competing interest” to justify sealing;
      • The insufficiency of embarrassment.
  • UnitedHealthCare Ins. Co. v. Fremont Emergency Services (Mandavia), Ltd., 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 29, 570 P.3d 107 (2025)
    • Confirmed that district courts have initial discretion to seal but must articulate adequate reasons.
    • Warned that general, conclusory assertions are inadequate to overcome openness.
    • Supports the insistence here on document-by-document findings.
  • Scarbo v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 125 Nev. 118, 206 P.3d 975 (2009) & State v. Eighth Judicial District Court (Armstrong), 127 Nev. 927, 267 P.3d 777 (2011)
    • Define “manifest abuse of discretion” as a clearly erroneous interpretation or application of law.
    • Provide the standard for granting mandamus, which the court finds satisfied here.
  • First Financial Bank v. Lane, 130 Nev. 972, 339 P.3d 1289 (2014)
    • Stands for the rule that statutes will not be read to abrogate the common law absent clear legislative intent.
    • Used to reject any interpretation of NRS 164.041/669A.256 as extinguishing the common-law access right.
  • Doe Dancer I v. La Fuente, Inc., 137 Nev. 20, 481 P.3d 860 (2021)
    • Articulates the constitutional-avoidance canon applied to sidestep the First Amendment question.

B. Out-of-State and Federal Cases

  • In re Estate of Hearst, 136 Cal. Rptr. 821 (Ct. App. 1977)
    • Probate proceedings involving a large media estate are presumptively open; secrecy requires showing of risk to life or property.
    • Used to underscore that high-profile trust/estate litigation affecting public media empires heightens, rather than diminishes, public interest in openness.
  • Estate of Campbell, 106 P.3d 1096 (Haw. 2005) & In re Estate of Zimmer, 442 N.W.2d 578 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989)
    • Reinforce that probate/trust proceedings carry a common-law presumption of openness.
  • Kamakana v. City & County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2006)
    • Often cited in sealing cases for its requirement of “compelling reasons” to seal dispositive materials.
    • Here, it is used to reject general fears of embarrassment, incrimination, or further litigation as insufficient.
  • In re Avandia Marketing, Sales Practices & Products Liability Litigation, 924 F.3d 662 (3d Cir. 2019)
    • Rejects generalized claims of reputational or competitive harm as inadequate to overcome presumptive access.
  • In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183 (3d Cir. 2001) & Grae v. Corrections Corp. of America, 134 F.4th 927 (6th Cir. 2025)
    • Highlight that the right of access includes post-judgment inspection of judicial records—even years after settlement.
    • Support the conclusion that this controversy is not moot.
  • Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. U.S. District Court, 156 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1998)
    • Permits temporary sealing pending a hearing but insists on notice and an opportunity for the press to object.
    • Used to emphasize procedural safeguards around sealing/closure decisions.
  • Does I through XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2000) & Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320 (11th Cir. 1992)
    • Set strict standards for pseudonymous litigation: retaliatory harm, highly personal matters, or risk of self-incrimination.
    • Support the court’s admonition that party anonymity is exceptional, not routine.
  • June Medical Services, LLC v. Phillips, 22 F.4th 512 (5th Cir. 2022)
    • Criticizes blanket sealing orders and requires courts to evaluate each document.
    • Used as persuasive authority for document-by-document analysis.

VI. Impact and Implications

A. On Nevada Trust and Probate Practice

This decision substantially reshapes expectations for confidentiality in Nevada trust litigation:

  • Provisional, not permanent: Trust practitioners must understand that NRS 164.041/669A.256 allow sealing/redaction but require prompt judicial review and do not guarantee enduring secrecy.
  • Evidence-based requests: Parties seeking long-term sealing must marshal specific evidence of concrete harms and tailor their requests to particular documents or passages.
  • Limited anonymity: The default expectation is that:
    • The existence of the trust case;
    • The identities of the parties;
    will be public, absent a compelling, case-specific rationale.
  • Judicial workload: District courts and probate commissioners must undertake the more labor-intensive task of document-by-document review and careful findings, potentially increasing front-end work but promoting appellate defensibility.

B. On Civil Sealing Practices More Broadly

Beyond trust law, the opinion reinforces and extends Nevada’s move (seen in Falconi and Nester) toward:

  • Disfavoring categorical or rule-based closures that bypass judicial discretion.
  • Requiring consistency with SRCR 3 in nearly all civil sealing, particularly:
    • Public notice of sealing motions;
    • Specific, compelling reasons grounded in evidence; and
    • Serious consideration of partial redaction instead of wholesale sealing.

C. On Media, Public Scrutiny, and High-Profile Litigants

The case has major ramifications for high-profile litigants (celebrities, billionaires, large corporations) and the press:

  • High profile ≠ higher entitlement to secrecy: Fame and wealth do not create a separate class of litigants who can quietly resolve disputes in sealed dockets.
  • Structural accountability: In an elected-judiciary state, the opinion underscores that public knowledge of judicial decision-making—including in sensitive financial disputes—is crucial for electoral accountability.
  • Media role validated: The use of mandamus as the vehicle for press challenges to sealing is reaffirmed, ensuring the press can function as an effective institutional check.

D. On Judicial Legitimacy and Public Confidence

The opinion explicitly appeals to broader concerns about declining public confidence in the judiciary, citing contemporary data:

  • Gallup reporting only 35% confidence in the judiciary in 2024.
  • Survey data indicating 70% of respondents believe courts favor wealthy litigants.

In that context:

  • Secret, high-stakes proceedings involving very wealthy parties and control of major media companies exacerbate perceptions that courts serve elite interests.
  • Transparent handling of such disputes—subject to carefully justified, narrowly tailored confidentiality for true safety/privacy concerns—can help restore legitimacy.

E. Potential National Influence

While formally interpreting Nevada statutes, the decision could be influential elsewhere:

  • Other jurisdictions grappling with trust-sealing statutes may adopt the same dichotomy:
    • Statutory “confidentiality” as a trigger for provisional procedures; but
    • Continued supremacy of common-law (and sometimes constitutional) access presumptions.
  • Courts faced with high-profile family or estate disputes may cite this opinion to balance privacy with public institutional interests.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Writ of Mandamus

A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary order from a higher court commanding a lower court or official to do (or stop doing) something. It is used when:

  • The lower court has clearly misinterpreted or misapplied the law (a “manifest abuse of discretion”); and
  • There is no adequate ordinary remedy (like a direct appeal).

Here, it was the only practical way for the media to challenge the secrecy orders.

B. Common-Law Right of Access vs. First Amendment Right of Access

  • Common-Law Right of Access
    • A longstanding judicially created rule that court records and proceedings are open to the public unless a strong reason exists to limit access.
    • Uses a balancing test: does a specific, significant interest (privacy, safety, trade secrets) outweigh openness?
  • First Amendment Right of Access
    • Some courts recognize a constitutional right for the public and press to attend certain proceedings (e.g., criminal trials, some civil hearings).
    • Analyzed using the “experience and logic” test:
      • Experience: Has this type of proceeding historically been open?
      • Logic: Does openness play a positive role in the process?
    • If it applies, closures require more demanding “strict scrutiny” (compelling interest, narrow tailoring, no less restrictive alternative).

In this case, the court relies on the common-law right and avoids deciding the First Amendment question.

C. Provisional Sealing and In Camera Review

  • Provisional sealing:
    • A temporary measure allowing sensitive documents to be filed under seal (or redacted) before the judge can fully evaluate whether sealing is justified.
    • Useful to prevent immediate public disclosure while the court considers the issue.
  • In camera review:
    • Review by the judge privately, in chambers, not in open court.
    • Allows the court to see unredacted content without exposing it to the public while the sealing question is being decided.

D. “Capable of Repetition, Yet Evading Review”

A legal doctrine that allows courts to decide issues that:

  • Are likely to recur in future cases; but
  • Often conclude (e.g., hearing held, case settled) before appellate review can occur.

Access disputes fit this pattern: hearings are held and completed quickly, so unless appellate courts can review them despite mootness, there would be no guidance or correction of errors.

E. Redaction vs. Sealing

  • Redaction:
    • Blacking out or removing only specific sensitive information (e.g., Social Security numbers, account numbers, home addresses) from a document that otherwise remains public.
    • Less restrictive; preserves maximum public information while protecting narrow privacy/safety interests.
  • Sealing:
    • Withholding an entire document (or entire case file) from public view.
    • More restrictive; courts are expected to resort to sealing only when redaction or other alternatives are inadequate.

F. Trust and Probate Proceedings

Trust proceedings typically involve:

  • Disputes over the administration of assets placed in trust.
  • Matters like:
    • Whether a trustee is acting properly;
    • Interpretation of trust terms;
    • Beneficiary rights;
    • Modifications or terminations of trusts.

Although they involve private wealth and family matters, courts treat them as judicial proceedings subject to public oversight, particularly when they affect large businesses or public interests.

VIII. Conclusion

New York Times Co. v. Dist. Ct. (Doe 1 Trust) is a pivotal Nevada decision clarifying that statutes addressing “confidential” information in trust proceedings do not authorize secret justice. NRS 164.041 and NRS 669A.256:

  • Enable provisional sealing and redaction, but
  • Preserve and must be applied consistently with the common-law presumption of open judicial records and proceedings.

The opinion firmly rejects the notion that wealth, fame, or complex trusts justify wholesale sealing and closed courtrooms. Instead, courts must:

  • Engage in careful, evidence-based, document-by-document and transcript-by-transcript analysis;
  • Articulate specific, non-speculative findings of significant competing interests;
  • Consider redaction and other less restrictive alternatives before resorting to sealing or closure; and
  • Maintain public visibility of at least the existence of cases and, absent compelling reasons, the identities of the parties.

In doing so, the Nevada Supreme Court strengthens the state’s emerging access jurisprudence built in Howard, Falconi, and Nester, and it sends a clear message: even in the realm of private wealth and family trusts—indeed, especially when those trusts control enterprises with broad public impact—transparency, not secrecy, is the default in Nevada courts.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

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