Introduction

In United States v. Hoffman, Nos. 24-30184 & 24-30493 (5th Cir. Sept. 11, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed two district court rulings arising from a long-running prosecution over fraudulent claims for Louisiana film tax credits. First, the court rejected Peter M. Hoffman’s collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which alleged the Government suppressed Brady material showing that the Louisiana Department of Economic Development (LED) accepted noncash expenditures and “circular transactions.” Second, in a consolidated appeal, the court upheld the district court’s refusal to terminate Hoffman’s supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), squarely rejecting his argument that five years of previously served probation should count toward the statutory maximum term of supervised release.

The decision reinforces two practical rules. On the collateral-review side, it reiterates that Brady claims raised for the first time in § 2255 proceedings must clear procedural default by showing both suppression and materiality—and that evidence merely cumulative of what the jury already heard is not material. On the post-conviction supervision side, it makes explicit that probation and supervised release are distinct; time on probation does not “offset” or reduce the maximum term of supervised release authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b).

Although the opinion is not designated for publication under Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5, its reasoning offers clear guidance to practitioners on Brady litigation strategy in collateral proceedings and on the statutory architecture governing supervised release.

Background and Procedural History

The prosecution stems from a scheme to obtain Louisiana film tax credits through false invoices and circular financial transfers that were made to appear as legitimate production expenditures. A jury convicted Hoffman of 19 counts of wire fraud, one count of mail fraud, and one conspiracy count. Earlier in the litigation:

• Hoffman I, 901 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2018): The Fifth Circuit affirmed the convictions, reinstated five wire-fraud counts on which the district court had entered acquittals, and vacated Hoffman’s below-Guidelines probationary sentence as substantively unreasonable.
• On remand, while awaiting resentencing, Hoffman filed a Brady motion; the district court deferred ruling. The court resentenced him to concurrent 20-month prison terms and two years of supervised release.
• Hoffman II, 70 F.4th 805 (5th Cir. 2023): A divided panel affirmed the new sentence, without a controlling rationale.
• Hoffman then repackaged his Brady arguments into a § 2255 motion seeking to vacate his convictions; the district court denied the motion but later issued a certificate of appealability sua sponte. Separately, Hoffman moved under § 3583(e)(1) to terminate supervised release, arguing he had already “exhausted” the statutory maximum by serving five years of probation under his original sentence. The court denied that motion as well. The appeals were consolidated.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit affirmed across the board. On the § 2255 Brady claims, the court held that because Hoffman raised them for the first time on collateral review, they were procedurally defaulted unless he showed cause and prejudice—standards that parallel the Brady elements of suppression and materiality. Assuming suppression arguendo, the court found the allegedly withheld evidence cumulative of evidence presented at trial and thus not material. It also emphasized that compliance with state policy or law is not a defense to federal fraud predicated on misrepresentations.

As to supervised release, the court rejected Hoffman’s theory that his prior five-year probation term should be credited against the “not more than five years” cap for Class A/B felonies in § 3583(b)(1). Probation and supervised release are distinct; probation is a substitute for imprisonment, while supervised release follows imprisonment. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying termination under § 3583(e)(1). To the extent Hoffman hinted at a double-jeopardy objection, the court noted such a collateral attack is not cognizable via a § 3583(e)(1) modification motion.

Standards of Review

• Denial of § 2255 relief: de novo; denial of evidentiary hearing/discovery: abuse of discretion (United States v. Allen, 918 F.3d 457, 460 (5th Cir. 2019)).
• Denial of motion to modify or terminate supervised release: abuse of discretion (United States v. Jeanes, 150 F.3d 483, 484 (5th Cir. 1998)).

Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963): The Due Process Clause requires disclosure of favorable, material evidence to the defense.
• United States v. Patten, 40 F.3d 774 (5th Cir. 1994): Issues raised for the first time on collateral review are procedurally barred absent cause and actual prejudice.
• Rocha v. Thaler, 619 F.3d 387 (5th Cir. 2010), citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999): In the Brady context, “cause and prejudice” align with suppression and materiality.
• Turner v. United States, 582 U.S. 313 (2017), citing Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 (2009): Defines materiality—reasonable probability of a different result had the evidence been disclosed.
• Spence v. Johnson, 80 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1996): Cumulative evidence is not material for Brady purposes.
• United States v. Dotson, 407 F.3d 387 (5th Cir. 2005): Misrepresentations used to further a scheme to defraud violate federal law regardless of state-law compliance.
• United States v. Perez-Macias, 335 F.3d 421 (5th Cir. 2003): Distinguishes probation from supervised release; the former substitutes for imprisonment, the latter follows it.
• United States v. Bowe, 309 F.3d 234 (4th Cir. 2002): No statutory authority to credit time served on probation against supervised release.
• United States v. Peters, 856 F. App’x 230 (11th Cir. 2021) and Zimmerman v. United States, No. 07-232-1, 2011 WL 13353396 (S.D. Tex. July 1, 2011): § 3583(e)(1) is not a vehicle for collateral challenges to the validity of the supervised release term.
• Hoffman I, 901 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2018) and Hoffman II, 70 F.4th 805 (5th Cir. 2023): Prior rulings in the same prosecution, including the foundational statement that the government need not prove violations of state law to sustain federal fraud convictions based on misrepresentations.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1) The § 2255 Brady Claims

The court began by identifying a threshold problem: Hoffman raised his Brady theories for the first time on collateral review. That triggers procedural default rules: he must show (i) cause for the failure to raise the issue on direct appeal and (ii) actual prejudice (Patten). In Brady cases, those requirements track the last two elements of a Brady violation—suppression and materiality (Rocha; Strickler).

The panel assumed without deciding that suppression could be shown but held that materiality was missing. The “new” evidence purportedly showed that LED accepted noncash expenditures and circular transactions. But the jury already heard “ample evidence” to that effect at trial, including testimony that LED had knowingly approved circular transactions and accepted such expenditures as qualifying for tax credits. Because the proffered items simply reiterated themes and facts aired at trial, they were “merely cumulative” (Spence), and thus not material under Brady’s reasonable-probability standard (Turner; Cone).

The court then supplied a second, independent reason materiality failed: whether Hoffman acted consistently with LED policy or state law was not determinative of federal wire and mail fraud. As Hoffman I had already made clear, “[t]he government did not have to prove violations of state law,” and the indictment charged misrepresentations about expenditures, invoices, and the purpose of circular transactions. “Using such lies in furtherance of a scheme to defraud violates federal law regardless whether they independently violate state law” (citing Dotson). Thus, even if more state-law-consistency evidence had been admitted, it would not reasonably have changed the verdict, which rested on extensive evidence of knowing misrepresentations and deception.

Finally, because the materiality failure resolved the Brady claim, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying further discovery and an evidentiary hearing. The panel added in a footnote that suppression itself was doubtful: one report post-dated the relevant time frame for meaningful pretrial disclosure, and other LED-related materials were publicly available or already disclosed and discussed at co-defendant trial testimony.

2) The § 3583(e)(1) Supervised-Release Motion

Section 3583(e)(1) authorizes early termination of supervised release “after the expiration of one year of supervised release,” if warranted by the defendant’s conduct and the interests of justice, after considering the § 3553(a) factors. Hoffman’s core argument was not really about those factors, but that his two-year supervised-release term exceeded the statutory maximum because he had already served five years of probation under his original sentence—i.e., that he had, in effect, seven years of “community-based” supervision.

The court rejected this “offset” theory. Probation and supervised release are “different animals.” Probation is an alternative to incarceration; supervised release follows incarceration (Perez-Macias; U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. A). The statutory cap in § 3583(b)(1) applies to supervised release alone, not to the combined total of probation and supervised release. The panel noted it was aware of no statute authorizing crediting probation against supervised release and cited the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Bowe to that effect. Because the statutory-maximum argument failed, and because Hoffman had not made an affirmative case for early termination under § 3583(e)(1)’s conduct-and-justice standard, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief.

In a footnote, the panel observed that to the extent Hoffman gestured at a double-jeopardy argument—i.e., that imposing both probation (originally) and supervised release (after resentencing) amounted to being “double sentenced”—a § 3583(e)(1) motion is the wrong procedural vehicle. Courts have treated such motions as improper vehicles for collateral attacks on the validity of the sentence (Peters; Zimmerman).

Impact and Implications

1) Collateral Brady Litigation in the Fifth Circuit

• Reinforced procedural default barrier: Defendants who wait until collateral review to press Brady claims must prove both suppression and materiality. The panel’s “assume suppression, find no materiality” approach reaffirms that cumulative evidence rarely moves the needle.
• Cumulative evidence will not justify relief or a hearing: Where the trial record already includes testimony or documents establishing the same point, courts may deny § 2255 relief without evidentiary hearings or discovery.
• State-law compliance is not a shield to federal fraud: Defendants in regulatory or subsidy programs should not expect affirmative evidence of state regulators’ tolerance to undercut federal fraud convictions grounded in misrepresentations.

2) Supervised Release Administration

• No “probation credit” against § 3583(b)’s cap: The decision makes explicit in the Fifth Circuit that prior probation does not reduce the maximum term of supervised release. Sentencing courts and probation officers should not aggregate probation and supervised release when checking statutory maxima.
• Stay in the right lane under § 3583(e)(1): Early termination motions should be rooted in post-release conduct and § 3553(a) factors. Legal challenges to the validity or length of supervised release belong in direct appeals or timely § 2255 motions—not in modification proceedings.
• Double jeopardy claims are misfit in § 3583(e)(1) motions: The panel signals alignment with other courts that treat modification proceedings as an improper forum for collateral attacks.

3) Practical Lessons for Trial and Appellate Counsel

• Develop and use Brady themes at trial and on direct appeal: If the defense knows or suspects the existence of regulator-friendly policies, those themes must be pursued contemporaneously; waiting for collateral review risks procedural default and “cumulative evidence” outcomes.
• Materiality demands a trial-changing delta: Counsel should focus Brady disputes on noncumulative, credibility-shifting, or theory-transforming evidence and articulate precisely how the verdict could have reasonably been different.
• For supervised release relief, document conduct: Successful § 3583(e)(1) motions typically show sustained compliance, rehabilitation, and alignment with § 3553(a). Statutory maxima arguments that combine probation and supervised release will fail.

Complex Concepts, Simplified

• Brady materiality: It is not enough that evidence favors the defense. It must be reasonably likely to change the verdict. Evidence that simply repeats what jurors already heard is typically not material.
• Procedural default on collateral review: You generally cannot save an argument for a § 2255 motion if it could have been raised earlier, unless you show a valid reason for the omission (cause) and a real risk of a different outcome (prejudice).
• “Cumulative” evidence: New proof that adds more of the same is cumulative; courts ask whether it truly adds something different in quality, not just quantity.
• Federal fraud vs. state-law compliance: Federal mail/wire fraud turns on deceit—lies, misrepresentations, or schemes to defraud. Whether state regulators tolerated certain practices is beside the point if the federal elements are satisfied.
• Probation vs. supervised release: Probation is an alternative to prison at the time of sentencing. Supervised release is a period of monitoring after prison. The statutes cap supervised release alone; time spent on probation is not subtracted from that cap.
• § 3583(e)(1) motions: These are for early termination based on how the defendant is doing on supervision and whether ending supervision serves justice—after at least one year. They are not a vehicle to attack the legality of the sentence itself.
• Unpublished opinions: In the Fifth Circuit, “not designated for publication” opinions generally are not binding precedent, though they can be persuasive and signal how the court is likely to view similar issues.

What the Decision Does Not Do

• It does not create a new Brady rule; rather, it applies settled principles to deny relief where the asserted evidence is cumulative and state-law compliance is immaterial to federal fraud.
• It does not hold that LED policies are irrelevant in every fraud case—only that, on these facts, such evidence would not likely have changed the outcome given the focus on misrepresentations.
• It does not foreclose all § 3583(e)(1) early-termination motions; it simply rejects an offset theory that aggregates probation with supervised release and confirms that modification proceedings are not a forum for collateral attacks.

Conclusion

United States v. Hoffman delivers two clear messages. First, on Brady claims in collateral proceedings, defendants must demonstrate noncumulative, verdict-altering materiality; evidence that regulators tolerated certain practices, even if true, does not undercut federal fraud convictions rooted in misrepresentations. Second, on supervised release, probation time does not count against the statutory maximum for supervised release, and § 3583(e)(1) is not a backdoor for challenging the sentence’s legality.

While unpublished, the decision persuasively synthesizes Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court doctrine on Brady’s materiality and procedural default, and it clarifies the statutory separation between probation and supervised release. For practitioners, the case underscores the importance of building Brady arguments into the trial and direct-appeal record and tailoring supervised-release termination motions to post-sentencing conduct and the § 3553(a) factors, not to statutory offsets that the law does not recognize.