Pro Se, Non-Specific Sworn Denials Aimed at Testing the Government’s Proof Do Not Support U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 Obstruction at Sentencing

1. Introduction

Case: United States v. Belmar, No. 24-2041-cr (2d Cir. Dec. 30, 2025) (summary order).
Parties: United States (Appellee) v. Joseph Belmar (Defendant-Appellant).
Charge of conviction: Felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), via guilty plea.

The appeal targeted only sentencing. After the plea, the district court conducted a Fatico hearing to resolve Guidelines-related fact disputes about the firearm’s use (attempted murder vs. reckless endangerment). Following that hearing, Belmar sent a series of uncounseled handwritten submissions—some signed “under penalties of perjury”—asserting he had been “persuaded” by prior counsel to admit the gun was his and challenging the government’s evidence, including the officer’s credibility.

The key issues on appeal were:

Sixth Amendment autonomy claim: whether McCoy v. Louisiana required a hearing based on Belmar’s later statements of innocence, despite his guilty plea and decision not to seek plea withdrawal.
Guidelines issues: whether the district court properly applied (i) a two-level obstruction enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 based on Belmar’s submissions, and (ii) denied acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit affirmed the conviction but vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing.

Sixth Amendment: No relief under McCoy v. Louisiana because Belmar personally conceded guilt on the record in his guilty plea and did not seek to withdraw that plea; the claimed distinction between admitting possession but not being the shooter was implausible on this record.
Obstruction (U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1): The district court clearly erred in applying the enhancement; Belmar’s uncounseled, non-detailed submissions were closer to exercising the constitutional right to challenge the government’s proof than to the kind of detailed perjury supporting § 3C1.1.
Acceptance (U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1): The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the reduction because Belmar’s submissions disavowed responsibility for relevant conduct.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

United States v. Fatico, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979)
The case supplies the procedural framework for resolving disputed sentencing facts through an evidentiary hearing. Here, the Fatico hearing was pivotal to determining whether the firearm was used in attempted first-degree murder (government’s theory) or, as the district court found, reckless endangerment in the first degree.
McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414 (2018)
McCoy protects a defendant’s autonomy to insist on maintaining innocence where counsel seeks to concede guilt at trial. The panel treated Belmar’s failure to seek withdrawal of his guilty plea as dispositive: having personally admitted guilt in open court, he could not leverage McCoy to obtain a sentencing-stage remedy untethered from plea withdrawal.
United States v. Gershman, 31 F.4th 80 (2d Cir. 2022)
Cited for the review framework: factual findings underpinning obstruction are reviewed for clear error, but whether those facts constitute obstruction is reviewed “without deference to the district court’s reasoning.” This structure enabled the panel to reject the obstruction enhancement even while engaging with the district court’s view of Belmar’s intent and materiality.
United States v. Woodard, 239 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2001)
Defines “willful” obstruction as requiring “specific intent to obstruct justice.” The panel used this principle in assessing whether Belmar’s submissions were purposefully obstructive versus an effort (even if misguided) to contest the government’s evidence.
United States v. Hendron, 43 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 1994)
Establishes that false statements to the court made in anticipation of sentencing can justify § 3C1.1. The panel did not dispute this general proposition but distinguished Belmar’s submissions as insufficiently “detailed” and too close to constitutionally protected denials and challenges.
United States v. Lewis, 62 F.4th 733 (2d Cir. 2023)
Supplies the key limiting principle: § 3C1.1 commonly applies where a defendant provides a “detailed account that is demonstrably false,” and courts must balance deterring perjury against chilling “colorable” constitutional claims. The panel treated Lewis as reinforcing the caution against extending obstruction to broadly worded or advocacy-like sworn claims.
United States v. Lincecum, 220 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2000)
Example of obstruction where the defendant filed a false affidavit with a detailed fabricated narrative (multiple requests for counsel). Lincecum represented the “detailed perjury” end of the spectrum.
United States v. Agudelo, 414 F.3d 345 (2d Cir. 2005)
The contrasting example: a general and vague sworn claim (asking for a lawyer) did not justify § 3C1.1, because extending Lincecum would deter arguably meritorious Fourth Amendment claims. The panel analogized Belmar’s submissions to the Agudelo side of the line—insufficiently specific to be treated as perjurious obstruction.
United States v. Chu, 714 F.3d 742 (2d Cir. 2013)
Provides that denial of acceptance of responsibility is reviewed for abuse of discretion and that the defendant bears the burden. The panel relied on that deference in affirming the denial of § 3E1.1 even while rejecting obstruction.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) Sixth Amendment / McCoy claim fails without plea withdrawal

The panel’s core move was to link McCoy to the defendant’s chosen objective in the adjudicative process. Belmar personally admitted the elements of the § 922(g)(1) offense during the guilty plea, and he expressly did not seek vacatur of the conviction or withdrawal of the plea on appeal. Under those circumstances, the court treated his later proclamations of innocence as incapable of generating a McCoy-type remedy at sentencing.

The panel also rejected as unrealistic Belmar’s attempted distinction between (i) admitting possession of the gun and (ii) denying he fired it for sentencing purposes, given the officer’s account that Belmar fired and then fled while dropping the gun during the chase, and given that Belmar’s own submissions did not consistently maintain such a narrow concession.

(b) Obstruction enhancement reversed: non-detailed pro se sworn denials are not “Lincecum-style” perjury

Applying U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 required willfulness (specific intent) and materiality (capacity, if believed, to influence the sentencing issue). The district court viewed Belmar’s sworn submissions—especially his statements that he was “persuaded” to admit the gun was his and that he “never stated that he shot a gun”—as a willful, material attempt to obstruct sentencing.

The Second Circuit disagreed, emphasizing the Guidelines’ express caution that § 3C1.1 is “not intended to punish a defendant for the exercise of a constitutional right,” and that denial of guilt (short of perjury) is not enough. The opinion located Belmar’s conduct closer to:

testing the government’s proof (challenging evidence sufficiency, officer credibility, legality of search), and
vague or non-particularized assertions rather than a detailed fabricated factual narrative.

Invoking the Lincecum/Agudelo line as refined by Lewis, the panel held Belmar’s statements did not cross the threshold into “detailed account demonstrably false” perjury. Thus, the district court clearly erred in finding that the submissions supported the obstruction increase.

(c) Acceptance of responsibility denial affirmed despite reversal of obstruction

The panel separately upheld the district court’s denial of U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. Even though a defendant need not affirmatively admit all relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction, the Guidelines permit denial where the defendant “falsely denies, or frivolously contests, relevant conduct that the court determines to be true.”

Belmar’s submissions disavowed responsibility for relevant conduct intertwined with the offense conduct. Given the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard under United States v. Chu, the panel held the district court acted within its discretion in denying acceptance credit.

3.3. Impact

Confining § 3C1.1 at sentencing: The decision reinforces that not every sworn inaccuracy or pro se submission warrants an obstruction enhancement. Courts must distinguish between (i) detailed, demonstrably false factual narratives (classic perjury) and (ii) less specific, advocacy-like attempts to challenge the government’s evidence—especially where applying § 3C1.1 risks chilling constitutional litigation.
Separation of obstruction and acceptance: The order underscores that a defendant can avoid § 3C1.1 yet still lose § 3E1.1. A court may find a defendant’s post-plea denials insufficiently perjurious to punish as obstruction, yet sufficiently inconsistent with acceptance to deny the reduction.
Practical sentencing consequences: On remand, the Guidelines range will likely decrease absent the two-level obstruction enhancement, but the defendant may still remain ineligible for acceptance credit—illustrating how post-plea communications can materially affect sentencing even when they do not amount to obstruction.
Limiting McCoy arguments post-plea: Defendants who personally plead guilty and do not seek withdrawal face a steep barrier to reframing later innocence claims as a McCoy autonomy violation at sentencing.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary order: A nonprecedential disposition in the Second Circuit; it resolves the parties’ dispute but (as the order states) does not create binding precedent for future cases, even though it may be cited under specified rules.
Fatico hearing: A sentencing evidentiary hearing (from United States v. Fatico) used to decide disputed facts that affect the Guidelines calculation—often including witness testimony and credibility determinations.
Pimentel letter: A pre-plea letter from the government estimating the likely Sentencing Guidelines calculation (named after Second Circuit practice), intended to inform plea decisions even without a plea agreement.
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (Obstruction of justice): A two-level increase if the defendant willfully (purposefully) obstructed or attempted to obstruct the case, and the conduct was “material”—i.e., capable of affecting the issue being decided (here, sentencing).
Materiality: A statement is “material” if, if believed, it would tend to influence or affect the matter being decided (for § 3C1.1, the sentencing issues).
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 (Acceptance of responsibility): A potential reduction for clearly accepting responsibility. A guilty plea helps but does not guarantee the reduction; inconsistent denials of relevant conduct can justify denial.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Belmar draws a careful sentencing line: a defendant’s uncounseled, non-specific sworn submissions that largely function as challenges to the government’s proof do not, without more, constitute the kind of detailed perjury that warrants a U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 obstruction enhancement—especially given the Guidelines’ warning against punishing the exercise of constitutional rights. At the same time, those same denials and contests of relevant conduct may still justify denying acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. The result—affirmance of the conviction, vacatur of the sentence, and remand—highlights how the federal sentencing process polices perjury-like obstruction while preserving space for defendants to press (even imperfectly articulated) challenges to the government’s case.