Introduction

In State of New Hampshire v. Matthew Rinaldi (No. 2024-0320), decided August 12, 2025, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed a jury conviction for aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) under RSA 632-A:2, I. The appeal turned on a single, focused evidentiary question: whether the State could introduce evidence of an earlier incident—charged separately in Cheshire County—in which the defendant allegedly threatened to break the victim’s fingers, to explain the victim’s coerced submission during a later assault in Hillsborough County. The trial court admitted this evidence, not under Rule 404(b), but as “intrinsic” to the charged conduct. On appeal, the defendant argued this was error because the indictment alleged a threat “during” the offense, not an earlier one.

The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that where a prior explicit threat constitutes the very coercive force that impels a victim’s submission during the charged assault, that earlier threat is intrinsic to the offense and therefore falls outside the constraints of New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 404(b). In doing so, the Court drew on its recent articulation of the intrinsic-evidence doctrine in State v. Rouleau (2024) and its longstanding AFSA coercion jurisprudence in State v. Kulikowski (1989), as well as the “complete the story” rationale recognized in State v. Martin (1994).

This order, issued pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 20(3), clarifies for practitioners that in AFSA prosecutions premised on coercion “by threatening,” the State may prove the element of a present threat through an earlier explicit threat, and that such proof is not “other act” evidence within Rule 404(b) when it supplies an element of the charged offense and is inextricably intertwined with the charged conduct.

Summary of the Opinion

• The trial court admitted evidence that, during a separate incident charged in Cheshire County, the defendant threatened to break the victim’s fingers when she refused to masturbate him. The State proffered that this prior threat explained why the victim submitted to digital penetration during a later camping incident in Hillsborough County.
• The Supreme Court reviewed the pretrial admissibility ruling under the unsustainable exercise of discretion standard and confined its review to the pretrial record, as required by State v. Nightingale.
• Relying on State v. Rouleau, the Court held that evidence is “intrinsic” when inextricably intertwined with the charged offense—e.g., where it supplies an element, has a causal, temporal, or spatial connection, or completes the story of the crime.
• Drawing on State v. Kulikowski, the Court reaffirmed that a “present threat” may be implicit and can arise from earlier incidents; here, the prior explicit threat was the very coercive force at the time of the charged assault.
• The Court declined to limit its inquiry to the precise indictment language, given the State’s proffer and the absence of any motion to dismiss, bill of particulars, or claim of impermissible amendment.
• Because the prior threat constituted a material part of the “entire course of conduct” and explained the victim’s submission, as in State v. Martin, the trial court did not err in treating the evidence as intrinsic rather than Rule 404(b) “other act” evidence.
• Result: Conviction affirmed; the trial court sustainably exercised its discretion admitting the evidence as intrinsic to the charged AFSA.

Case Background and Procedural Posture

The defendant, Matthew Rinaldi, was indicted in Hillsborough County for a single count of AFSA, alleging that he knowingly engaged in sexual penetration by digital contact and threatened physical violence—specifically, to break the victim’s fingers—if she reported the penetration. The charged assault occurred during a camping trip in which the defendant allegedly entered the victim’s tent. Separate charges for additional sexual assaults were lodged in Cheshire County, including an incident where the defendant purportedly threatened to break the victim’s fingers when she resisted masturbating him.

Before trial in the Hillsborough County case, the State moved under N.H. R. Ev. 404(b) to admit evidence of the Cheshire County incident(s). The trial court conducted a chambers conference and reviewed police interview transcripts of the victim and defendant. While generally denying the 404(b) motion, the court ruled that the specific incident involving the explicit finger-breaking threat was admissible because it was “intrinsic” to the charged offense. The victim later testified consistent with the State’s proffer, i.e., that she submitted during the camping assault due to the earlier threat. The jury convicted.

On appeal, the defense argued that the prior incident was not intrinsic and that the indictment alleged a threat contemporaneous with the charged penetration, not a prior threat. The Supreme Court affirmed.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• State v. Tufano, 175 N.H. 662 (2023): Establishes the standard of review—unsustainable exercise of discretion—for evidentiary rulings. The appellant must show the decision was clearly untenable or unreasonable to his prejudice.
• State v. Nightingale, 160 N.H. 569 (2010): Appellate review of a pretrial evidentiary ruling is confined to the pretrial record to avoid post hoc justification based on trial responses.
• N.H. R. Ev. 404(b): Bars admission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove character propensity, but allows them for other purposes (e.g., motive, intent), subject to tests and balancing.
• State v. Rouleau, 176 N.H. 400 (2024) (2024 N.H. 2): Clarifies the “intrinsic evidence” doctrine. 404(b) “by its terms” excludes only extrinsic evidence—acts whose probative value depends on a propensity inference. Evidence is intrinsic when inextricably intertwined with the crime, part of a single criminal episode, or a necessary preliminary; it typically has a causal, temporal, or spatial connection and “completes the story” of the charged offense.
• State v. Kulikowski, 132 N.H. 281 (1989): In AFSA prosecutions predicated on coercion “by threatening,” the “present threat” need not be explicit; it may be implicit and arise from earlier incidents. Evidence of prior explicit threats can constitute “the very threat” coercing the victim at the time of the charged assault and is not offered for propensity but to prove an element.
• State v. Martin, 138 N.H. 508 (1994): Permits admission of prior acts that are a material part of the entire course of conduct, especially where necessary to explain the victim’s fear and consequent conduct—i.e., to “complete the story” of the charged offense.
• RSA 632-A:2, I(c), (d) (2016; Supp. 2024): AFSA variants concerned with coercion by threatening. The Court noted the indictment appeared to combine (c) and (d), but emphasized that both variants require coercion “by threatening.”

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis proceeded in three related steps: (1) identifying the governing evidentiary framework; (2) aligning the State’s theory of coercion with AFSA’s “threat” element as understood in Kulikowski; and (3) applying Rouleau’s intrinsic-evidence doctrine to the pretrial record and proffer.

1) Governing evidentiary framework: intrinsic versus Rule 404(b) “other acts”

Rule 404(b) excludes only “extrinsic” other-act evidence offered for propensity (or whose probative value exclusively depends on a forbidden propensity inference). Under Rouleau, evidence is “intrinsic” when it is inextricably intertwined with the charged offense—because it is part of the same criminal episode, a necessary preliminary, or has a causal/temporal/spatial connection and completes the story of the crime. Intrinsic evidence is not subject to Rule 404(b).

2) AFSA’s “present threat” element and implicit threats from earlier incidents

AFSA variants under RSA 632-A:2, I(c) and (d) require that the actor coerce submission “by threatening.” Kulikowski teaches that the “present threat” at the moment of the assault need not be uttered contemporaneously or explicitly; it can be implicit, arising from earlier explicit threats. Thus, if the State can show that a victim’s submission during the charged assault was compelled by fear grounded in a prior explicit threat, the earlier threat is not merely background—rather, it supplies the threat element of the charged offense itself.

3) Application to the record: the prior explicit threat as the coercive force

The trial court’s admission ruling rested on:

• The State’s proffer that the victim would testify that she submitted to the charged digital penetration on the camping trip because of the earlier finger-breaking threat.
• Police interview transcripts confirming that in the prior incident the defendant threatened to break the victim’s fingers when she refused to masturbate him.

On this record, the Supreme Court held the earlier explicit threat was “intrinsic” because:

• It was not offered to suggest the defendant’s character or propensity; rather, it constituted “the very threat” that coerced the victim’s submission during the charged assault—i.e., proof of an element.
• It was causally connected to the charged offense and formed a material part of the entire course of conduct—a necessary explanation for why the victim submitted (Martin).
• It “completed the story” of the charged offense in the Rouleau sense by supplying the immediate coercive context of the assault.

The defense argued that the indictment alleged a threat “during” the assault, not an earlier one, and that therefore the prior incident could not be intrinsic. The Court rejected this for two reasons. First, it observed that the indictment appeared to combine variants of AFSA and that the State had, in chambers, clarified its theory (while the defense neither moved to dismiss nor sought a bill of particulars). Second, the Court refused to confine its intrinsic-evidence analysis to the indictment’s phrasing, where the State’s pretrial proffer put the defense on notice that it would rely on the earlier explicit threat to prove the “present threat” element at trial. Notably, the defendant did not argue any impermissible amendment on appeal.

Because the prior threat constituted intrinsic evidence under Rouleau and Kulikowski—rather than 404(b) “other acts”—the trial court’s admission ruling was a sustainable exercise of discretion.

Impact and Implications

On AFSA prosecutions and sexual assault litigation

• Prosecutors can treat prior explicit threats as intrinsic evidence when used to establish the “present threat” element of coercion for AFSA, especially where the victim’s submission is proximately caused by prior intimidation. This lessens the need to navigate Rule 404(b)’s multi-factor admissibility tests for “other acts.”
• Victim testimony that ties a prior explicit threat to later submission can be pivotal. The State should build a clear record via offers of proof and corroborating materials (e.g., interview transcripts), as occurred here.
• Defense strategies must account for the possibility that earlier threats will be admitted as intrinsic. Timely motions (e.g., to dismiss, for a bill of particulars, or challenging constructive amendment) should be considered if indictment language is imprecise. If admissibility is contested, counsel should develop a robust pretrial record that addresses not only 404(b) but also Rule 403 prejudice.

On Rule 404(b) practice and the “intrinsic evidence” doctrine

• Rinaldi exemplifies how Rouleau’s intrinsic-evidence framework can apply to prior episodes in sexual assault cases. Where earlier acts supply an element, causally explain the victim’s conduct, and complete the story, courts may treat them as intrinsic and bypass 404(b).
• The decision underscores that “inextricably intertwined” is not limited to temporally contemporaneous events; a prior act may qualify if it has a strong causal connection to the charged conduct and is necessary to explain it.
• While the opinion focuses on 404(b), practitioners should remember that intrinsic evidence remains subject to general relevance and prejudice balancing (e.g., Rule 403), even if those issues were not outcome-determinative here.

On indictment drafting and pretrial procedure

• The Court’s willingness to look beyond indictment phrasing—given a clear State proffer and absence of defense objections—signals a pragmatic approach: notice and clarity can be provided in pretrial practice. However, this places a premium on defense counsel to preserve objections and seek clarification or narrowing through appropriate motions.
• Trial courts may rely on chambers discussions and documentary submissions (e.g., interview transcripts) to make pretrial admissibility findings. Parties should ensure a record is made or promptly memorialized to facilitate meaningful appellate review.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Intrinsic vs. extrinsic evidence: Intrinsic evidence is part and parcel of the charged crime—it explains, completes, or constitutes the offense itself (e.g., a prior threat that coerces the victim at the time of the assault). Extrinsic evidence is separate “other act” evidence that risks showing propensity and thus implicates Rule 404(b).
• Rule 404(b): A rule that generally bars evidence of other bad acts to show a person’s bad character, but allows such evidence for limited, non-propensity purposes (motive, intent, etc.). It does not apply to intrinsic evidence.
• “Present threat” can be implicit: In AFSA cases premised on coercion “by threatening,” the coercive threat at the time of the assault need not be spoken then. It can be inferred from a prior explicit threat that remains operative in compelling the victim’s submission (Kulikowski).
• “Completes the story” / “material part of the entire course of conduct”: A rationale permitting admission of evidence that is necessary to understand the charged offense, including the victim’s actions and state of mind (Martin).
• Unsustainable exercise of discretion: A deferential appellate standard. The appellant must show the trial court’s ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable and prejudicial.
• Bill of particulars / constructive amendment: Tools and doctrines related to ensuring the indictment fairly informs the defendant of the charges. A bill of particulars seeks clarifying detail; a constructive amendment claim argues that the State effectively changed the charge at trial. In Rinaldi, no such claims were preserved.

Practice Pointers

• For prosecutors:
  • When relying on prior incidents to prove coercion, make a clear pretrial proffer connecting the prior threat to the victim’s submission during the charged assault.
  • Frame the prior incident as intrinsic: show causal necessity, temporal linkage, and how it completes the story or supplies an element.
  • Even if 404(b) is inapplicable, be prepared to argue Rule 403 and propose limiting instructions if appropriate.
• For defense counsel:
  • Do not assume indictment imprecision will constrain the State’s theory; seek a bill of particulars and preserve objections to potential amendment.
  • Challenge the intrinsic characterization by contesting causal necessity and linkage; if unsuccessful, pivot to Rule 403 prejudice and request tailored limiting instructions.
  • Ensure a robust pretrial record; under Nightingale, appellate review will be confined to what was presented pretrial.
• For trial judges:
  • Explicitly articulate the intrinsic-evidence rationale and its connection to elements of the offense to aid appellate review.
  • Consider Rule 403 balancing on the record, even when evidence is deemed intrinsic.
  • Where practical, memorialize chambers conferences and proffers to avoid record gaps.

Concluding Assessment

State v. Rinaldi reinforces and concretizes two important strands of New Hampshire law. First, it underscores that in AFSA prosecutions premised on coercion “by threatening,” the “present threat” need not be contemporaneously voiced; it can be implicit in a prior explicit threat that remains operative and compels the victim’s submission, consistent with Kulikowski. Second, it aligns that AFSA-specific coercion doctrine with the broader evidence law framework in Rouleau: where a prior threat supplies an element of the offense, causally explains the victim’s conduct, and completes the story of the crime, it is intrinsic evidence outside the ambit of Rule 404(b).

The Court’s treatment of the indictment’s imprecision emphasizes practical notice over formalism: absent timely motions to clarify or challenge, a clear State proffer can guide admissibility analysis without confining the court strictly to the charging language. This approach has immediate implications for AFSA and sexual assault prosecutions, where patterns of intimidation often precede and coerce the charged conduct.

The key takeaway is straightforward yet potent: when a prior explicit threat is the very engine of coercion at the time of the assault, that threat is intrinsic to the charged AFSA and admissible to prove the “threat” element without resort to Rule 404(b). Going forward, litigants should expect New Hampshire courts to scrutinize the causal relationship between earlier threats and charged conduct; the tighter and more necessary the link, the more likely the evidence will be deemed intrinsic and admitted.