Principles, Not Twins: The Third Circuit’s Sensitive-Places Framework After Bruen and Rahimi

Commentary on Koons v. Attorney General New Jersey (3d Cir. Sept. 10, 2025)

Introduction

In Koons v. Attorney General New Jersey (consolidated with Siegel v. Attorney General), the Third Circuit delivered one of the most consequential post-Bruen appellate opinions on the scope of “sensitive places,” the permissible conditions for public carry, and the evidentiary method courts must use when analogizing modern gun regulations to historical predecessors. The case challenges multiple provisions of New Jersey’s 2022 Chapter 131—a sweeping legislative response to the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, which invalidated “proper cause” licensing and emphasized history and tradition as the metric for Second Amendment regulation.

The challengers—individual permit holders and gun-rights organizations—attacked three clusters of rules:

• New permitting conditions and financial exactions (a $300,000 liability insurance mandate, a $200 application fee with a $50 transfer to the state Victims of Crime Compensation Office (VCCO), and a requirement that four “reputable persons” endorse an applicant).
• A broad set of new “sensitive place” carry prohibitions (including parks, beaches, entertainment venues, casinos, libraries, museums, health care facilities, bars and restaurants serving alcohol, zoos, and permitted public gatherings).
• Ban on carrying loaded and unsecured firearms “in a vehicle,” and challenges to certain fish-and-game regulations.

The District Court had preliminarily enjoined many provisions. On interlocutory appeal, the Third Circuit issued a precedential, principles-forward opinion by Judge Krause (joined by Judges Porter and Chung in part), clarifying the Bruen/Rahimi methodology and setting important limits while upholding most of New Jersey’s sensitive-places scheme. Judge Porter concurred in part and dissented in part, offering a robust critique of the majority’s breadth and its reliance on later historical sources.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court’s holdings can be grouped as follows.

Permitting and Financial Preconditions

• Liability insurance mandate (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58-4.3): unconstitutional. The Court held New Jersey failed to identify a “relevantly similar” historical tradition authorizing a blanket, ex ante financial condition on the right to carry. Surety laws and strict-liability regimes are not close enough matches in how and why they burden the right.
• $50 VCCO portion of the $200 permit fee (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58-4(c)): unconstitutional. While shall-issue licensing and cost-recovery fees remain presumptively lawful, diverting $50 to a victim-compensation fund is not an “expense incident” to licensing under Cox/Murdock First Amendment fee doctrine. The Court remanded to preliminarily enjoin this $50 component.
• “Four reputable persons” endorsements (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58-4(b)): constitutional on its face. The requirement is consistent with a historical tradition of screening dangerous individuals (sureties, affray, and “suitable person” standards) and with Bruen’s express approval of similar shall-issue criteria, though as-applied discrimination challenges remain open.

Sensitive-Places and Location-Based Rules

• Permitted public gatherings within 100 feet (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58-4.6(a)(6)): constitutional. The Court analogized to longstanding prohibitions at polling places, legislative assemblies, and postbellum “public gatherings,” rejecting the District Court’s restrictive reading of Georgia’s statute and emphasizing the Supreme Court’s principles-level analysis in Rahimi.
• Parks, beaches, recreation facilities, playgrounds, zoos, and youth sports events (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58-4.6(a)(9)-(11)): largely constitutional. The Court upheld bans in parks, beaches, recreation areas, zoos, and youth sports events, grounding them in a tradition of restricting weapons at fairs and markets and, later, in parks and places of amusement.
• Public libraries and museums (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58-4.6(a)(12)): constitutional. The Court treated these as modern analogues to institutions of learning and civic culture historically protected from disruptions by weapons (e.g., schools and places of education).
• Bars, restaurants, and locations where alcohol is sold for on-premises consumption (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58-4.6(a)(15)): constitutional. The panel relied on a tradition of disarming intoxicated persons, regulating firearms around drinking, and later specific bans at drinking establishments.
• Entertainment facilities (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58-4.6(a)(17)): constitutional. The Court analogized theaters, circuses, ballrooms, and other places of amusement in the 19th century to contemporary arenas and stadiums.
• Casinos and their integrated retail/restaurant/entertainment spaces (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58-4.6(a)(18)): constitutional. The Court treated casinos as modern places of amusement akin to regulated historical venues, reinforcing the alcohol-analogue as well.
• Health care facilities (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58-4.6(a)(21)): constitutional. Although modern hospitals differ from their Founding-era forebears, the Court identified two supporting principles: (1) longstanding regulation of weapons in places of education and learned/scientific pursuits, and (2) protecting vulnerable populations—historically recognized in school and mental-health contexts. Military hospital practices furnished additional analogical support.
• Public film/TV sets (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58-4.6(a)(23)): challenge dismissed for lack of standing. The record indicated the ban applies to the sets themselves (temporarily private spaces), not to publicly accessible areas where bystanders watch filming.
• Private property default rule (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58-4.6(a)(24)): unconstitutional as applied to property held open to the public. Historic analogues requiring permission to hunt on private lands do not support a blanket no-carry-without-express-consent rule for businesses and other spaces open to the public. The injunction stands.

Vehicles and Public Transportation

• Private vehicles (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58-4.6(b)(1), and N.J.A.C. § 7:25-5.23(f)(5)): unconstitutional. The unlawful-to-carry-loaded-unsecured rule for private cars contradicts a longstanding travel exception and the tradition of armed travel. The associated fish-and-game vehicle rule is likewise enjoined.
• Public transit vehicles (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58-4.6(b)(1)): constitutional. Historically, railroads and governments regulated firearms handling, firing, and security on trains as mass transit proliferated. The panel upheld the restriction as applied to public transit only.

Procedural Disposition

• Affirmed preliminary injunction: liability insurance mandate; private property default rule; playgrounds and youth sports events (as sensitive places); private vehicles rule (and the similar fish-and-game vehicle rule).
• Reversed preliminary injunction: four-reputable-persons endorsements; permitted public gatherings; parks, beaches, and recreation areas; public libraries and museums; alcohol-serving establishments; entertainment facilities; casinos; health care facilities; public transit vehicle applications of the vehicle rule.
• Vacated injunction / no standing or mootness: public film/TV sets (no standing); most fish-and-game rules (moot due to statutory amendments allowing lawful handgun carry while hunting).
• Remand: to preliminarily enjoin the $50 VCCO fee component of the permit application.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Roles

• District of Columbia v. Heller (2008): Recognized an individual right to keep and bear arms, noted “presumptively lawful” bans in “sensitive places such as schools and government buildings,” and rejected the militia-only view. Heller framed the text-and-history orientation that Bruen later hardened.
• McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010): Incorporated the Second Amendment against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, reaffirming Heller’s “sensitive places” language.
• New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (2022): Replaced two-step scrutiny with a single inquiry—whether modern regulation is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition. Emphasized analogical reasoning (“how” and “why”), forbade both a “regulatory straightjacket” and a “blank check,” and cautioned against expanding sensitive places to “all places of public congregation.”
• United States v. Rahimi (2024): Clarified that Bruen’s “relevantly similar” inquiry operates at the level of underlying principles (not “historical twins”). Upheld federal disarmament of respondents subject to domestic violence restraining orders by analogizing to sureties/affray laws: “when an individual poses a clear threat of physical violence to another, the threatening individual may be disarmed.”
• Third Circuit cases:
  • Lara v. Commissioner Pennsylvania State Police (Lara II) (2025): Post-ratification history can be “a critical tool,” used cautiously, to confirm earlier understandings; not decisive if it conflicts with Founding-era meaning.
  • United States v. Quailes (2025): Courts may conduct some independent legal research on historical sources; party-presentation does not prohibit judicial identification of analogues.
  • Range v. Attorney General (en banc, 2024): Cited (in Krause, J., concurrence) for the reality of modern gun violence; context for why principled analogies, not rigid “twins,” are required as technology and society evolve.
• Sister Circuits:
  • Antonyuk v. James (2d Cir. 2024): Upheld numerous sensitive-place provisions (parks, places of amusement, alcohol venues) and rejected New York’s private property default rule; cited for sensitive-place analogies and vulnerable population protection.
  • Wolford v. Lopez (9th Cir. 2024): Upheld many place-based bans; however, the Third Circuit rejects Wolford’s separate proprietor theory (government-as-landowner can exclude firearms without a Bruen analysis). The Third Circuit holds the government cannot sidestep the Second Amendment by wearing a proprietor’s hat—historical analogies still apply.
  • LaFave v. County of Fairfax (4th Cir. 2025): Declined a facial invalidation of a park prohibition, consistent with a trend upholding parks and similar places.

Legal Reasoning: A Principles-Driven Framework

The majority’s core contribution is methodological. Applying Bruen as clarified by Rahimi, the Court expressly embraces analogical reasoning “at the level of principles,” eschewing demands for “dead ringers.” From a “long, unbroken line” of history, the Court distills two overarching principles that guide sensitive-places and conditions on carry:

• Principle 1 — Protection of Discrete Civic Functions and Forums: Legislatures may restrict firearms in locations central to governmental operations and in discrete venues historically set aside for civic functions (e.g., legislative assemblies, polling places, courts) and their close analogues (publicly permitted assemblies, fairs/markets’ modern descendants like parks and places of amusement). The “why” is to prevent breaches of the peace and threats to deliberation, safety, and free association; the “how” is targeted, location-based exclusions.
• Principle 2 — Safety Conditions on Public Carry: Legislatures may impose conditions designed to ensure safe carry, consistent with surety/affray traditions and today’s shall-issue licensing (e.g., background checks, training, limited endorsements), but they may not impose across-the-board ex ante financial barriers untethered to dangerousness or individualized risk (e.g., mandatory liability insurance for all carriers).

The Court then operationalizes those principles across New Jersey’s categories. Where the modern regulation preserves the “how” and “why” of established practice (e.g., keeping weapons out of crowded places of amusement; keeping order in permitted public assemblies; shielding learning environments and vulnerable populations), the law is upheld. Where the regulation significantly expands beyond the tradition’s manner or purpose (e.g., flipping the default to no carry on all property “held open to the public,” or requiring perpetual insurance regardless of any individualized risk), it fails.

Two additional analytic features mark the opinion:

• Cautious but meaningful use of post-ratification history: Echoing Lara II and Bruen, the panel uses Reconstruction-era laws as confirmatory evidence where consistent with Founding-era principles. The Court rejects the dissent’s demand to dismiss such evidence wholesale and explains that excluding it would distort the baseline of “representative tradition.”
• Rejection of a categorical “proprietor” exception: Breaking with the Ninth Circuit, the Third Circuit concludes that government ownership (e.g., of parks, libraries) does not exempt restrictions from Bruen’s analogical test; otherwise, the “right to publicly carry” could be “eviscerated” by state ownership, especially in urban areas.

The Dissent’s Counter-Methodology

Judge Porter agrees with the majority only in part (insurance mandate, VCCO tax, private vehicles, and the private property default rule). He otherwise faults the majority for analogizing “far too broadly,” contending that:

• The majority’s “principles” are so general they could justify prohibitions “nearly everywhere that ordinary human action occurs,” contrary to Bruen’s caution about “all places of public congregation.”
• Post–Civil War laws are overused and often reflect misunderstandings of the Second Amendment or were never subject to constitutional scrutiny; they cannot define original meaning (which he anchors at 1791).
• Historical sources like anti-poaching laws, student codes, and private railroad rules are non-probative for public carry in civic forums; the Statute of Northampton targeted affrays and terror, not peaceful carry.
• Parks, beaches, entertainment venues, and transit are wrongly treated as novel; early American practice already handled large gatherings without disarmament mandates.
• The film-set standing ruling is premature, and the text of the statute is broader than the state’s characterization.

The majority answers many of these objections in the opinion, underscoring Rahimi’s principles-level analogy, rejecting a “law trapped in amber,” and defending careful reliance on post-ratification evidence as a “critical tool” where consistent with earlier meaning.

Impact and Emerging Consensus

Koons cements a maturing, principles-based framework for adjudicating sensitive-place bans and carry conditions post-Bruen/Rahimi. Its practical effects will be felt immediately:

• Financial Preconditions: Mandated liability insurance is unlikely to survive in the Third Circuit (and likely elsewhere) when imposed as a blanket condition on the right to carry. Application fee components unmoored from licensing administration are vulnerable under Cox/Murdock principles.
• Shall-Issue Criteria: “Reputable persons” endorsements survive facial attack where administered as neutral, objective safeguards against dangerousness; discriminatory application remains litigable as-applied.
• Private Property Defaults: Laws flipping the carry default to “no carry without express consent” for all property open to the public are unlikely to stand. This aligns the Third Circuit with the Second Circuit (Antonyuk) and deepens a trend against such defaults.
• Parks, Beaches, Zoos, Entertainment, Casinos, Libraries/Museums: A cross-circuit consensus is forming to treat these as permissible sensitive places, grounded in longstanding restrictions at fairs, markets, and places of amusement/learning, especially where children and crowds are present.
• Health Care Facilities: Koons offers a detailed rationale to uphold bans across the full range of modern medical settings, using educational/learned-pursuit and vulnerable-population principles, supplemented by military hospital analogues.
• Vehicles: A notable split emerges between private vehicles (carry permitted; bans invalid) and public transit (restrictions upheld), grounded in travel traditions vs. mass-transit safety analogues.
• Government-as-Proprietor Theory: The Third Circuit’s rejection of a categorical proprietor exception (and the Ninth Circuit’s acceptance in Wolford) creates a pointed doctrinal disagreement with potential for Supreme Court review.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Bruen’s Two-Step (One Step, Two Parts): Courts ask (1) whether the Amend­ment’s plain text covers the conduct; if yes, (2) whether the regulation fits within the Nation’s historical tradition via analogical reasoning focusing on “how” and “why.”
• Rahimi’s “Principles” Lens: Courts need not find an exact “twin.” The question is whether the challenged law is consistent with principles underlying the tradition (e.g., disarming those who pose threats; protecting delicate civic forums).
• “Sensitive Places”: Heller and Bruen mention courthouses, polling places, and legislative assemblies as examples. Courts may identify new sensitive places by drawing analogies to those, not by declaring all crowded places “sensitive.”
• Post-Ratification History: Later (especially 19th-century) laws can be probative if they confirm, not contradict, Founding-era meaning. Courts must avoid resting on late “outliers.”
• Standing and Mootness: A plaintiff must show a credible threat of enforcement for standing. When a later statute cures a challenged harm (e.g., allowing lawful handgun carry while hunting), that claim may be moot.
• Preliminary Injunction Factors: Likelihood of success and irreparable harm are gateway factors. For constitutional claims outside the First Amendment, irreparable harm is not presumed but may be shown (e.g., sovereign-immunity barriers to refunds, safety harms from categorical carry bans in vehicles).

Key Takeaways and Significance

• Methodology matters: Koons squarely adopts a principles-level analogical approach under Bruen and Rahimi, moving the Second Amendment docket away from “historical twins” and toward carefully framed why/how similarities.
• Limits on financial barriers: Across-the-board insurance requirements and fee diversions not tied to licensing administration are constitutionally suspect.
• Sensitive places are “discrete” and purpose-driven: The Court validates bans where civic functions, historical analogues, and safety rationales converge (publicly permitted assemblies; parks/places of amusement; educational/cultural venues; health care; alcohol-driven risk environments).
• Private property default rejections: Legislatures cannot eliminate public carry across all publicly accessible private spaces via a single default rule; this is becoming a consensus position.
• Transportation split: Expect continued litigation around transit systems; Koons offers a blueprint for sustaining restrictions in mass-transit settings while protecting carry in private vehicles.
• Doctrinal fault lines: The proprietor theory split with the Ninth Circuit stands out as cert-worthy. The health care rationale (education plus vulnerability) is a significant new articulation that other circuits will likely consider.

Conclusion

Koons is a pivotal, precedential blueprint for adjudicating modern gun regulations after Bruen and Rahimi. The Third Circuit clarifies that courts should look for principles—not replicas—when analogizing modern sensitive-places and carry conditions to historical practice. Where a contemporary rule preserves the “how” and “why” of historically recognized restrictions—protecting civic forums, ensuring safety in crowd-dense and education-oriented spaces, disarming in alcohol-saturated venues, and shielding vulnerable populations—it is likely constitutional. Conversely, financial exactions that function as across-the-board preconditions, default rules that invert the carry baseline across all publicly accessible private spaces, or vehicle rules that erase the tradition of armed travel will likely fall.

By upholding most of New Jersey’s sensitive-places matrix yet invalidating key financial and location defaults, Koons both constrains and channels regulatory innovation. It places the Third Circuit at the center of a growing cross-circuit alignment on parks, places of amusement, alcohol venues, and educational/cultural spaces, while setting up an important split on the “proprietor” theory. However the Supreme Court eventually resolves these tensions, Koons offers lower courts, legislatures, and litigants a coherent, principle-grounded path forward for Second Amendment adjudication in a 21st-century landscape.