Pretext Turns on the Decisionmaker’s Actual Belief; Temporal Proximity Alone Cannot Overcome Documented, Pre‑Existing Nonrenewal Plans

Introduction

In this unpublished decision, the Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) on Dr. Muthoni Imungi’s Title VII retaliation claim. Dr. Imungi, a Kenyan-born Black professor in VCU’s School of Social Work, alleged that the nonrenewal of her supplemental administrative role as Director of Field Education in June 2020 was retaliation for her February–March 2020 complaints of race discrimination. The central issues were whether temporal proximity could establish causation and, more importantly, whether she adduced evidence that VCU’s nonretaliatory reasons were pretext for retaliation.

Writing for the majority, Judge Harris (joined by Judge Benjamin) held that the record—viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff—could not support a finding that retaliation was the “real reason” or but-for cause of nonrenewal, because the university had long-documented performance and “vision alignment” concerns predating any protected activity and because the plaintiff failed to identify evidence that the decisionmaker did not actually believe those reasons. Judge Wynn dissented, emphasizing that summary judgment is “seldom appropriate” in retaliation cases and pointing to HR emails after the nonrenewal that, in his view, could allow a reasonable jury to infer retaliatory animus and shifting options chosen to minimize litigation risk.

Case Snapshot

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Unpublished)
Panel: Judges Wynn, Harris, and Benjamin
Opinion by: Judge Harris; Judge Benjamin joined
Dissent: Judge Wynn
Decision Date: September 10, 2025
Disposition: Affirmed summary judgment for VCU on retaliation claim
Parties: Dr. Muthoni Imungi (Appellant) v. Virginia Commonwealth University (Appellee)
Procedural posture: Appeal from grant of summary judgment on Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims (plaintiff appealed retaliation only)

Summary of the Opinion

The majority affirmed, concluding that—even assuming temporal proximity could initially suggest causation—Dr. Imungi failed at the pretext stage. VCU articulated two legitimate, nonretaliatory rationales for nonrenewal of the Director appointment: (1) long-standing performance deficiencies documented by complaints and evaluations; and (2) lack of alignment with the new dean’s “vision” for the Office of Field Education, including collaboration, autonomy for staff, and participation in online programming. The court emphasized that the question is not whether the dean was correct, wise, or fair, but whether she actually believed those reasons and whether a jury could find them false pretexts for retaliation. On this record, the court held, no reasonable jury could.

Key to the majority’s reasoning:

Documented concerns predated the February–March 2020 protected activity: staff complaints in 2018; dean’s concerns beginning in 2018; HR consultations in fall 2019; and a direct request in fall 2019 that Dr. Imungi step down as Director.
Positive assessments from 2017–2018 (peer committee and Interim Dean) did not undercut the dean’s 2020 beliefs; nor did the dean’s 2019 “Excellent” rating, which used prior goals and largely tracked a self-evaluation during a period the new dean had only recently begun.
Subjective “vision alignment” is not inherently pretextual in academic administration; absent record evidence it masked an improper motive, it is a legitimate criterion.
No material “shifting explanations”: performance and vision rationales were consistently documented; differences in emphasis were not probative of pretext; the rationales were not post hoc.
No evidence of procedural irregularities: the Director role was a one-year administrative appointment in the dean’s discretion; others’ supplemental appointments were also not renewed.

Judge Wynn dissented, arguing that a jury could find causation and pretext based on the timing, the dean’s testimony that the final decision occurred in spring 2020 after the protected activity, and HR emails post-dating the June 4 nonrenewal that discussed terminating the professor or reducing her pay and referenced whether those options posed “risk” or would “flag” her as being singled out. In his view, a reasonable jury could infer the employer sought a retaliatory option least likely to generate evidence of animus.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Foster v. Univ. of Md.-E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 250–52 (4th Cir. 2015): The majority leaned on Foster to frame the retaliation standard: plaintiff bears the ultimate burden to prove she was the “victim of intentional retaliation,” requiring proof that the employer’s stated reasons are false and that retaliation was the real, but-for cause of the adverse action. The court used this to focus the inquiry on pretext and the decisionmaker’s true motive.
Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 279–80 (4th Cir. 2000): The majority cited Hawkins for the principle that courts do not second-guess the correctness or wisdom of an employer’s evaluation; the question is whether the employer actually believed the reasons given. This anchored the court’s rejection of arguments that merely dispute performance critiques on the merits.
Francis v. Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 452 F.3d 299, 309 (4th Cir. 2006): Used to discount temporal proximity where the employer’s adverse trajectory began before protected activity. The majority noted the dean’s fall 2019 request that the plaintiff step down as Director, weakening any inference drawn solely from timing.
Adams v. Trs. of the Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 566 (4th Cir. 2011): Supports that subjective criteria—common in academia—are not inherently pretextual, absent particularized evidence that they were used to mask improper motives.
Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 647 (4th Cir. 2002): Acknowledges that shifting post hoc explanations can indicate pretext. The majority distinguished that line of cases, finding the record consistently documented both performance and vision rationales well before the protected activity.
Ham v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 158 F. App’x 457, 466–67 (4th Cir. 2005): Cited to clarify that employers’ use of subjective criteria, standing alone, does not prove discrimination; it may be relevant where it concerns qualities not pertinent to the job (not shown here).
Summary judgment standards: Cosey v. Prudential Ins. Co., 735 F.3d 161 (4th Cir. 2013); Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954 (4th Cir. 1996); Ballengee v. CBS Broad., Inc., 968 F.3d 344 (4th Cir. 2020); Ray v. Roane, 93. F.4th 651 (4th Cir. 2024). These frame the de novo review and Rule 56 standards applied by the majority.
District court’s discrimination analysis (background): Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187 (4th Cir. 2010) for prima facie discrimination elements; although discrimination was not appealed, this context supported the long-running performance concerns.

The dissent added doctrinal emphasis from cases cautioning that summary judgment is “seldom appropriate” in discrimination/retaliation cases, especially where motive must be inferred (Ballinger v. N.C. Agric. Extension Serv., 815 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1987); Ray v. Int’l Paper Co., 909 F.3d 661 (4th Cir. 2018); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); and other circuits’ like-minded precedents). That body of law underwrites Judge Wynn’s view that the late-breaking June 2020 emails create triable issues on intent.

Legal Reasoning: How the Majority Reached Its Decision

The court applied the Title VII retaliation framework requiring: (1) protected activity; (2) adverse action; and (3) causal link. Even assuming the temporal proximity between protected activity (February–March 2020) and nonrenewal (June 2020) could create an initial inference of causation, VCU prevailed at the pretext stage because the plaintiff failed to show that the university’s reasons were false and that retaliation was the real reason.

The majority’s pretext analysis proceeded in two tracks:

Performance rationale: The dean identified multi-year concerns about leadership, supervision, collaboration, and online program engagement. Pre-protected-activity evidence included 2018 staff complaints, the dean’s 2018–2019 feedback and monthly supervision, fall 2019 HR consultations, and a fall 2019 request that the plaintiff step down as Director. The plaintiff’s reliance on earlier (2017–2018) positive assessments and her June 2019 “Excellent” rating did not undermine the dean’s 2020 beliefs: the earlier feedback was from different evaluators and time periods; the 2019 review used prior goals and largely mirrored a self-evaluation; and by June 2020, the dean issued a 2.2/4.0 “Satisfactory” rating, documenting the concerns. Disagreeing with the dean’s assessments on the merits could not establish pretext under Hawkins; the question was the dean’s genuine belief, which the record supported.
Vision-alignment rationale: The dean wanted a Director who would collaborate across units, grant staff autonomy, teach while directing, and advance online and international field initiatives. The court held that using such criteria is not intrinsically suspect in academic leadership decisions and the plaintiff had not adduced evidence that these subjective aspects were deployed as a mask for retaliation. The court also rejected the argument that VCU offered “shifting explanations,” finding the record consistently reflected both rationales long before the protected activity; differences in emphasis did not constitute the kind of inconsistency probative of pretext under Dennis.

The court also found no evidence of procedural irregularities: the Director role was an annually renewable administrative appointment within the dean’s discretion; it was not unusual for a new dean to reconfigure administrative appointments; and others’ supplemental appointments were also not renewed.

Finally, the majority addressed (in a footnote) the dissent’s reliance on June 12–15 HR emails contemplating a terminal contract or conversion to a nine-month appointment and referencing “risk” and whether changes would “flag” the plaintiff as singled out. The majority noted that these emails were not developed as a distinct argument on appeal by the plaintiff and, in any event, were not shown to be departures from standard practice or probative of retaliatory intent, particularly since VCU did not ultimately take those contemplated steps and needed only to justify the action it actually took (nonrenewal of the administrative appointment).

The Dissent’s Perspective

Judge Wynn would have reversed and remanded for trial. Emphasizing Rule 56’s command to view all evidence and inferences in the nonmovant’s favor and the reticence courts should show in disposing of motive-driven cases at summary judgment, he identified two triable clusters of fact:

Timing and decision finality: The dean testified she “made the final decision” to nonrenew during spring 2020, after the protected activity, and VCU’s designee testified that the reassignment decision was made “around” June 4. A jury could credit that testimony on when the adverse decision was made despite prior discussions in fall 2019.
Post-nonrenewal HR emails: June 12 and June 15 messages explored a terminal contract or nine-month salary conversion and weighed whether those steps would present “risk” or appear to “single out” the professor “given everything going on with this situation.” Because the stated nonrenewal reasons (performance and vision for the Director role) did not bear on the plaintiff’s teaching (for which prior feedback was positive), the dissent believed a jury could infer that the employer cycled through retaliatory options and selected the one least likely to generate direct evidence of animus. That pattern, he argued, could support a pretext finding.

In sum, for Judge Wynn, the combination of the post-complaint timing, testimonial ambiguities about when the final decision was made, and the HR “risk” emails create genuine disputes of material fact as to motive, rendering summary judgment improper.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although unpublished and nonprecedential, the opinion reinforces several recurring themes in Fourth Circuit retaliation jurisprudence and offers practical guidance, particularly in academic settings:

Documented, pre-complaint concerns can neutralize temporal proximity. Where the employer’s adverse trajectory (HR consultations, counseling, and requests to step down) began before the protected activity, timing alone will rarely carry the causation or pretext burden.
Pretext is about the decisionmaker’s actual belief. Plaintiffs must marshal evidence that undermines the decisionmaker’s genuine belief in the stated reasons, not merely dispute the correctness of the evaluation or offer past positive reviews from different time frames or evaluators.
Subjective leadership criteria in academia are not inherently suspect. Absent particularized evidence that “vision” or collaboration criteria were weaponized as a proxy for retaliation, courts will credit them as legitimate.
“Shifting explanations” require real inconsistency. Differences in emphasis among overlapping rationales—performance and alignment—especially if documented before protected activity—are unlikely to show pretext.
Administrative appointments differ from tenured or base faculty roles. Annual, discretionary nonrenewals of supplemental administrative posts (which may carry stipends and duties distinct from core faculty appointments) give deans latitude to reconfigure leadership teams. Plaintiffs must tailor their pretext evidence to the specific role and the decisionmaker’s expectations for it.
Cautionary note from the dissent: Employers should be mindful that post-complaint internal discussions about alternative punitive options—especially framed in terms of “risk” and optics—can be used to argue pretext in close cases. Even where not outcome-determinative here, those communications can supply powerful circumstantial evidence for a jury in other records.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Retaliation under Title VII: An employer may not punish an employee for engaging in protected activity (e.g., complaining about discrimination). The plaintiff must prove protected activity, adverse action, and a causal link.
But-for causation: The adverse action would not have occurred in the absence of the retaliatory motive. In other words, retaliation must be the decisive reason, not just one factor among many.
Pretext: The employer’s stated legitimate reason is a cover for retaliation. To show pretext, plaintiffs must produce evidence that the reason is false and that retaliation was the real reason—often by showing inconsistencies, implausibilities, or departures from normal practice.
Temporal proximity: Close timing between protected activity and adverse action can support an initial inference of causation but is usually insufficient if the employer shows it was already moving toward the adverse decision before the protected activity.
Subjective criteria: Qualitative judgments (e.g., leadership style, alignment with vision) often play a legitimate role in managerial/academic decisions. They can support liability only if evidence shows they were wielded as pretext for unlawful motives.
Administrative appointment vs. faculty appointment: A supplemental administrative role (e.g., Director) may be term-limited, discretionary, and come with extra pay/duties. Nonrenewal of such a role, while adverse, is distinct from terminating or nonrenewing the underlying faculty position.

Key Facts and Timeline

2016–2018: Hired as non-tenure-track faculty; appointed Director of Field Education; positive reviews; some subordinate complaints by spring 2018.
July 2018: New Dean (Angell) arrives; receives negative feedback about leadership; begins monthly supervision.
June 2019: Dean rates performance “Excellent” under prior goals and self-evaluation; advises changes to align with her vision.
Fall 2019: Dean consults HR about position changes; asks plaintiff to step down as Director; plaintiff declines.
Feb–Mar 2020: Plaintiff speaks at anti-racism assembly and self-evaluates referencing race-based marginalization; Dean refers her to Equity and Access.
Mar 2020: COVID-19 disruptions; disagreements on online field education; May 2020 HR consult regarding possible nonrenewal.
June 3, 2020: Annual review “Satisfactory” 2.2/4.0 with documented concerns.
June 4, 2020: Nonrenewal of Director appointment; faculty appointment renewed (without $10,000 stipend).
June 12 & 15, 2020: HR emails (highlighted by dissent) discuss terminal contract and salary conversion, referencing “risk” and avoiding “singling out.”

Practical Guidance

For Employers (especially academic institutions)

Contemporaneously document performance concerns and role expectations, particularly during leadership transitions.
Engage HR early and memorialize nonrenewal rationales before any protected activity occurs to avoid temporal proximity pitfalls.
Use subjective criteria transparently and tie them to concrete role requirements (e.g., collaboration, teaching while directing).
Be mindful that internal communications referencing legal “risk” or optics around adverse actions can be read, in context, as probative of pretext; maintain a record focused on substantive business reasons.

For Employees and Counsel

At pretext, target the decisionmaker’s actual belief: look for inconsistencies in their own statements over time, contemporaneous praise inconsistent with later critiques, or deviations from established procedures.
Temporal proximity helps but rarely suffices if the employer shows pre-complaint momentum toward the adverse action.
Distinguish between evaluation of the role at issue (e.g., administrative leadership) and base duties (e.g., teaching); where adverse actions cross those lines, consider how that supports or undermines pretext arguments.
Identify “shifting explanations” with care: courts look for substantive inconsistencies, not merely different emphases on overlapping rationales.

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s unpublished decision in Imungi v. VCU underscores a demanding pretext burden in retaliation cases involving administrative nonrenewals in academia. Even where temporal proximity exists, a plaintiff must produce evidence that undermines the decisionmaker’s actual belief in the stated reasons and shows retaliation was the but-for cause. Here, multi-year documentation of performance concerns and lack of alignment with a new dean’s articulated vision—well before protected activity—proved decisive. The court also reaffirmed that subjective leadership criteria, common in academic settings, are legitimate absent evidence of misuse as a mask for unlawful motives, and that differences in emphasis across overlapping rationales do not, without more, evince pretext.

The dissent reminds litigants and institutions that retaliation claims often turn on nuanced inferences about motive and that internal deliberations—especially those referencing “risk” and optics—can generate triable issues in closer records. Together, the opinions offer a clear roadmap: plaintiffs must bring forward evidence that strikes at the credibility of the decisionmaker’s stated beliefs, while employers should document role expectations and concerns in real time and communicate in ways that reflect genuine business considerations rather than perceived litigation optics.