Presumption of Public Access to EAJA Net‑Worth Exhibits in OSHA Adjudications: Commentary on Riverdale Mills Corp. v. Chavez‑DeRemer

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the First Circuit’s decision in Riverdale Mills Corporation v. Chavez‑DeRemer, No. 24‑1575 (1st Cir. Nov. 20, 2025). The case arises from an Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) refusal to seal a corporate balance sheet filed in support of an Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) fee application.

The decision sits at the intersection of three areas of law:

the common-law right of public access to “judicial records”;
the EAJA regime for fee awards against the federal government, as implemented by OSHRC regulations; and
administrative law principles of issue exhaustion and waiver under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act).

Riverdale Mills, a Massachusetts manufacturer of wire mesh fabrics, prevailed in part before an OSHRC ALJ in challenges to OSHA safety and health citations issued in 2019. It then sought over $220,000 in fees and costs under EAJA. To prove it qualified as an EAJA “party” (i.e., a sufficiently small entity), Riverdale needed to file an exhibit showing its net worth at the start of the adjudication. It chose to submit a 2019 comparative balance sheet—but moved to file that document under seal, asserting that competitors could glean sensitive financial and competitive information from it.

The ALJ denied the motion, holding that the balance sheet is a “judicial record” to which a strong presumption of public access attaches, and that Riverdale’s generalized claims of competitive harm did not overcome that presumption or OSHRC’s regulatory presumption that such exhibits will “ordinarily” be public. Riverdale sought interlocutory review from the Commission, which was automatically denied for lack of a quorum, and then petitioned the First Circuit.

On appeal, Riverdale reframed its argument, invoking for the first time OSH Act § 664, which directs OSHRC to protect trade secrets, and asserting that this statute “preempted” the common‑law access analysis applied by the ALJ. The First Circuit:

assumed, without definitively deciding, that interlocutory review was proper under the collateral order doctrine;
held that Riverdale had waived its statutory argument by failing to raise it before the ALJ, as required by 29 U.S.C. § 660(a); and
affirmed the denial of sealing as a proper exercise of discretion under the common‑law right of access and OSHRC’s EAJA regulations.

The new and important practical principle emerging from the case is this:

In OSHA adjudications, EAJA net‑worth exhibits—such as corporate balance sheets—are presumptively public “judicial records.” An employer seeking to seal them must provide concrete, specific evidence of harm sufficient to overcome both the common‑law presumption of public access and OSHRC’s regulatory presumption that such exhibits will ordinarily be part of the public record. Attempts to rely instead on OSH Act trade‑secret provisions must be clearly raised and developed before the ALJ, or they are waived.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural Background

OSHA conducted two investigations into Riverdale’s Northbridge, Massachusetts facility in 2019, resulting in:

a September 2019 citation alleging multiple safety standard violations; and
a December 2019 citation alleging multiple health standard violations.

Riverdale contested the citations, and an OSHRC ALJ conducted a consolidated hearing in June and August 2021. In July 2022, the ALJ affirmed three citation items and vacated or saw withdrawn the remainder.

In December 2023, Riverdale applied for $223,064.74 in fees and costs under EAJA, 5 U.S.C. § 504, which permits “eligible” small entities to recover fees when they prevail in agency adjudications unless the agency’s position was “substantially justified” or special circumstances make an award unjust. Under OSHRC’s EAJA rules:

An “eligible” business must have a net worth not exceeding $7 million and no more than 500 employees when the adjudication commenced. 29 C.F.R. § 2204.201.
An EAJA applicant must file a “detailed exhibit” showing net worth at that time. Id. § 2204.302(a).
“Ordinarily, the net worth exhibit will be included in the public record,” but an applicant may move to seal or otherwise treat it as confidential if it believes there are “legal grounds for withholding” it. Id. § 2204.302(b).

Riverdale moved to file its 2019 comparative balance sheet under seal, asserting it contained confidential business information (current liabilities, long‑term liabilities, shareholders’ equity) whose public disclosure would “affect [its] business prospects and may impact future opportunities.” It cited Doe v. Public Citizen, 749 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2014), and SMD Software, Inc. v. EMove, Inc., 2013 WL 1091054 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 15, 2013), to argue that corporate proprietary and trade secret information can justify overriding the public access presumption.

The Secretary opposed, arguing Riverdale had not shown “legal grounds” for sealing because it failed to identify specific harms from disclosure of specific information. Riverdale replied, supplying a short declaration from its CFO asserting that line items such as accounts receivable, inventory, equipment value, accounts payable, available credit, and long‑term liabilities would reveal its financial status and vulnerabilities to competitors.

The ALJ denied the motion, finding:

the balance sheet is a “judicial record” because the ALJ would rely on it to determine EAJA eligibility;
the common‑law presumption of public access applies, strengthened by § 2204.302(b)’s statement that net‑worth exhibits will “ordinarily” be public; and
Riverdale had not shown “compelling reasons” or legal grounds to overcome that presumption.

In doing so, the ALJ applied:

the D.C. Circuit’s six‑factor balancing test from United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293 (D.C. Cir. 1980); and
the First Circuit’s balancing framework in FTC v. Standard Financial Management Corp., 830 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1987), which itself relies on Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).

The ALJ also held that a First Amendment right of access applied, relying on media-access cases, though the First Circuit later declined to reach that constitutional ground.

Riverdale then:

Filed a petition for interlocutory review with OSHRC (April 5, 2024), and for the first time argued that OSH Act § 664 requires protection of trade secrets and displaces the common‑law analysis.
Faced an automatic denial (May 6, 2024) due to the Commission’s lack of a quorum, as required by 29 U.S.C. § 661(f) and 29 C.F.R. § 2200.73(b).
Petitioned the First Circuit for review on June 13, 2024.

B. Issues Before the First Circuit

The court confronted three central questions:

Interlocutory jurisdiction: Does the court of appeals have jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review an ALJ’s interlocutory denial of a motion to seal an EAJA exhibit, particularly where OSHRC itself lacks a quorum?
Issue exhaustion and waiver: Did Riverdale preserve its argument that OSH Act § 664 and the Trade Secrets Act (18 U.S.C. § 1905) require sealing or otherwise displace the common‑law access analysis?
Merits of the sealing decision: Did the ALJ abuse her discretion in denying the sealing motion under the common‑law presumption of public access and OSHRC’s regulations?

C. Holdings

The First Circuit (Judge Lynch, joined by Judges Rikelman and Aframe) held:

Assumed jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. The court did not definitively decide whether orders denying sealing are categorically appealable or whether this particular order satisfied all collateral-order factors. Instead, it assumed jurisdiction because the statutory jurisdiction question was complex and the merits were easily resolved against the petitioner, citing Cowels v. FBI, 936 F.3d 62, 67 (1st Cir. 2019).
Riverdale waived its statutory argument that OSH Act § 664 displaces the common law of access. Under 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) and P. Gioioso & Sons, Inc. v. OSHRC, 115 F.3d 100 (1st Cir. 1997), an aggrieved party must raise objections before the ALJ and clearly in its petition to the Commission to preserve them for judicial review. Riverdale’s arguments before the ALJ invoked the common law (via its cited cases) and never mentioned § 664, so the statutory “preemption” argument was not preserved.
The ALJ did not abuse her discretion in denying the motion to seal. Applying deferential abuse‑of‑discretion review, the court held that:
- the balance sheet is a judicial record;
- a strong common‑law presumption of public access applies, reinforced by OSHRC’s “ordinarily public” rule for EAJA exhibits; and
- Riverdale’s generalized fears of competitive harm did not outweigh the public interest in transparency, particularly regarding eligibility for public fee awards and given Riverdale’s status as a large industry participant.

The petition for review was therefore denied, and the ALJ’s order leaving the EAJA net‑worth exhibit unsealed stood.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Equal Access to Justice Act and Its Purpose

The court reaffirmed the basic purpose of EAJA, citing Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401 (2004):

“to eliminate the barriers that prohibit small businesses and individuals from securing vindication of their rights in civil actions and administrative proceedings brought by or against the Federal Government.”

Under 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1)–(2), an “eligible” party that has “prevailed” in an agency adjudication may recover attorney’s fees and expenses unless the agency’s position was “substantially justified” or “special circumstances make an award unjust.”

OSHRC implements EAJA through 29 C.F.R. pt. 2204:

Eligibility criteria (29 C.F.R. § 2204.201): business with net worth ≤ $7 million and employees ≤ 500 at the time the adjudication began.
Net worth exhibit (id. § 2204.302(a)): applicant must submit a detailed exhibit disclosing assets and liabilities sufficient to determine eligibility.
Presumption of publicity (id. § 2204.302(b)): the exhibit “will be included in the public record” ordinarily, but sealing or confidential treatment is available upon motion if the applicant can show “legal grounds for withholding.”

The court treated these rules as creating a regulatory presumption in favor of public access to net‑worth exhibits, paralleling the common‑law presumption.

2. Common‑Law Right of Access to Judicial Records

The First Circuit rooted its analysis in its established jurisprudence on public access to judicial records:

In re Gitto Global Corp., 422 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005): Recognizes a “long‑standing presumption of public access to judicial records.” Public disclosure “helps safeguard the integrity, quality, and respect in our judicial system, and permits the public to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies” (quoting In re Orion Pictures Corp., 21 F.3d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1994)).
FTC v. Standard Financial Management Corp., 830 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1987): Adopts a balancing test in which courts “weigh the presumptively paramount right of the public to know against the competing private interests at stake,” assessed in light of the “relevant facts and circumstances,” with reference to Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
United States ex rel. Nargol v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 69 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2023): Confirms abuse‑of‑discretion review of sealing decisions.
Siedle v. Putnam Investments, Inc., 147 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 1998): Defines abuse of discretion in this context as ignoring a material factor, relying on an improper factor, or committing a serious judgment error while weighing proper factors.

The ALJ, anticipating that OSHRC’s decisions are reviewable by either the First Circuit or the D.C. Circuit (see 29 U.S.C. § 660(a)), also applied:

United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293 (D.C. Cir. 1980): a six‑factor test for sealing or unsealing records, considering:
1. the need for public access;
2. prior public access;
3. the fact and identity of the objector;
4. the strength of property/privacy interests;
5. the possibility of prejudice; and
6. the purpose for which the documents were introduced.

The First Circuit did not disapprove of the ALJ’s use of Hubbard; on the contrary, it treated that approach as compatible with its own Standard Financial framework.

3. Collateral Order Doctrine and Interlocutory Agency Review

Because the ALJ’s order denying sealing was interlocutory, standard “final order” principles under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 29 U.S.C. §§ 659(c), 660(a)–(b) would ordinarily bar immediate review. The court therefore considered the collateral order doctrine, as articulated in:

Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 83–84 (1st Cir. 2010): collateral orders must be conclusive, separate from the merits, raise important questions, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment.
Rhode Island v. EPA, 378 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2004): the collateral order doctrine applies to judicial review of administrative determinations.
In re Boston Herald, Inc., 321 F.3d 174 (1st Cir. 2003): used a case‑specific approach to examine collateral order jurisdiction over a sealing order; did not adopt a categorical rule.
Abdelhady v. George Washington Univ., 89 F.4th 955 (D.C. Cir. 2024): notes a circuit split on whether orders denying motions to seal are categorically appealable and declines to resolve it absent necessity.
Awuah v. Coverall North America, Inc., 585 F.3d 479, 482 (1st Cir. 2009): finds that certain discovery orders involving routine commercial sensitivity determinations do not raise “important” issues satisfying the collateral order test’s third requirement.
Cowels v. FBI, 936 F.3d 62, 67 (1st Cir. 2019): allows courts to “assume” statutory jurisdiction when the jurisdictional question is complex but the merits are easily resolved against the party invoking jurisdiction.

The Riverdale panel, following Cowels, assumed for purposes of decision that it had collateral‑order jurisdiction without deciding whether:

all denials of sealing orders are categorically appealable; or
this particular denial met the doctrine’s “importance” requirement in light of Awuah.

4. Issue Exhaustion, Waiver, and OSHRC Review

The waiver holding rests on two sources:

29 U.S.C. § 660(a), which provides:
“No objection that has not been urged before the Commission shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances.”
P. Gioioso & Sons, Inc. v. OSHRC, 115 F.3d 100 (1st Cir. 1997), which interprets § 660(a) to require that a party:
- raise the issue before the ALJ;
- articulate it clearly in its petition for discretionary Commission review; and
- support it with at least a “modicum of developed argumentation.”

Additionally, a footnote invokes general appellate waiver principles:

United States v. Muñoz‑Gonzalez, 145 F.4th 21, 25–26 (1st Cir. 2025), quoting Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 299 (1st Cir. 2000): issues first raised in an appellant’s reply brief are deemed waived.

Applied here:

Riverdale did not raise any argument based on OSH Act § 664 or the Trade Secrets Act before the ALJ.
Its ALJ briefing affirmatively relied on common‑law access cases such as Doe v. Public Citizen and SMD Software, implicitly accepting the common‑law framework.
It did reference § 664 for the first time in its petition to the Commission, but that was too late to cure failure to present the theory to the ALJ.
Riverdale also failed to attack the ALJ’s application of Standard Financial in its opening brief before the First Circuit, raising such objections only later; under Muñoz‑Gonzalez, those arguments were independently waived.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Jurisdiction Assumed Under Collateral Order Doctrine

While acknowledging that the ALJ’s order is interlocutory, the court:

noted the absence of a categorical rule in the First Circuit that all sealing orders are immediately appealable; and
expressed doubt whether this particular dispute—essentially fact‑specific, routine business confidentiality concerns—raises the requisite “important issue” for collateral‑order review (citing Awuah).

Nevertheless, drawing on In re Boston Herald, Abdelhady, and Cowels, the court chose the pragmatic path: it assumed it had collateral‑order jurisdiction, because:

the jurisdictional question was complex and unsettled;
the merits, by contrast, were straightforward and clearly adverse to Riverdale; and
assuming jurisdiction avoided an extensive jurisdictional discussion that would not change the outcome.

This approach preserves flexibility for future cases to address the collateral‑order status of sealing decisions on a more fully briefed record.

2. Waiver of OSH Act § 664 / Trade‑Secret Argument

The court next addressed Riverdale’s core appellate contention—that the ALJ applied the wrong legal framework by relying on common‑law access doctrine and should instead have treated OSH Act § 664 as displacing that common‑law regime.

Section 664 (not fully quoted in the opinion) essentially directs OSHRC, in the context of OSHA enforcement, to protect trade secrets as defined by the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (which criminalizes unauthorized disclosure of certain confidential commercial information by federal employees). Riverdale’s theory was that this statute creates a statutory command overriding the ordinary balancing under the common law.

The First Circuit did not reach the merits of that statutory question. Instead, it held that § 660(a) and P. Gioioso barred consideration because Riverdale:

never cited § 664 to the ALJ;
never argued that the ALJ was bound to apply § 664 rather than common‑law balancing; and
indeed, cited cases (Doe, SMD Software) whose entire analysis depends on the common‑law presumption of access and its exceptions.

Issue exhaustion thus operated in a familiar way: the ALJ was entitled to address the sealing motion under the framework the parties actually presented. Riverdale could not pivot to a new statutory theory on appeal, especially not one that, if correct, might have shaped how the ALJ gathered and evaluated evidence.

The court also emphasized that no “extraordinary circumstances” excused this failure, as § 660(a) allows. The opinion gives no hint that the Commission’s lack of a quorum sufficed to excuse the failure to present statutory arguments at the ALJ stage; rather, the Commission’s dysfunction affected only the availability of administrative appeal, not the requirement to tee up legal theories before the ALJ in the first instance.

3. Abuse‑of‑Discretion Review of the Sealing Decision

Turning to the merits, the First Circuit applied traditional abuse‑of‑discretion review to the ALJ’s denial of sealing:

Did the ALJ ignore any material factor that deserved significant weight?
Did the ALJ rely on any improper factor?
Did the ALJ commit a serious judgment error in weighing proper factors?

Riverdale did not claim the ALJ ignored relevant factors or used improper ones. It criticized only how the ALJ weighed the evidence. That starting point significantly limited Riverdale’s chances of success because appellate courts give substantial deference to trial‑level balancing in this area.

a. Judicial Record and Presumption of Access

The court accepted the ALJ’s threshold determination that the balance sheet is a “judicial record” because:

the ALJ would rely on it to decide Riverdale’s EAJA eligibility—a substantive rights question; and
it was not a mere discovery or background document, but central to the adjudicative decision on whether public funds should be paid.

As a result, the common‑law presumption of public access applied. This presumption is grounded in:

public oversight of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings;
transparency in the expenditure of public resources (here, EAJA fee awards); and
the integrity and legitimacy of adjudicative institutions.

Furthermore, OSHRC’s own regulation (29 C.F.R. § 2204.302(b)) explicitly states that EAJA net‑worth exhibits will “ordinarily” be public, affirming that OSHRC itself treats these materials as core components of the public case file.

b. Public Interest in Riverdale’s Balance Sheet

The ALJ, and the First Circuit in affirming, emphasized that the balance sheet is “foundational” to the question whether Riverdale qualifies as a small entity eligible for EAJA fees. The public has a particularly strong interest in:

understanding how and why public funds are awarded to private litigants;
verifying that the entity receiving money from the government genuinely fits within the class of small businesses EAJA is meant to help; and
scrutinizing the relationship between a company’s size claims and its public self‑description.

The court highlighted this last point by noting that Riverdale’s own website touted it as “one of the largest manufacturers of welded wire mesh in the world.” That marketing claim arguably intensifies the public interest in seeing the financial data underlying its claim to be a qualifying small entity under EAJA.

c. Weight Given to Riverdale’s Private Interests

The ALJ viewed Riverdale’s private interests as comparatively modest for several reasons:

The objector was the company itself, not a third party whose information appeared in the record involuntarily. Under Hubbard, third‑party objections are often entitled to greater weight because third parties did not choose to thrust themselves into public litigation.
The information was corporate financial data, not more acutely sensitive personal information such as:
- medical records;
- identifying customer data; or
- trade secrets in the strict sense of proprietary formulas or technical know‑how.
Riverdale’s CFO declaration was brief and generalized, asserting that competitors “could” use various line items (accounts receivable, inventory levels, equipment value, credit availability, long‑term debt) to assess Riverdale’s vulnerabilities and competitive position, but lacking:
- specific explanations of how those figures would translate into actionable competitive harm; or
- evidence that similar information was consistently and rigorously guarded in other contexts.

The First Circuit underscored another key fact: Riverdale did not submit the balance sheet itself for in camera review. Without being able to see the document, the ALJ could not realistically tailor protection (e.g., by redacting particular line items) or verify the claimed sensitivity. This omission undercut Riverdale’s plea for complete sealing.

d. Balancing Under Hubbard and Standard Financial

Applying Hubbard and Standard Financial (as the ALJ had), the First Circuit concluded the ALJ reasonably:

gave substantial weight to:
- the public’s right to scrutinize EAJA eligibility determinations; and
- OSHRC’s regulatory default of including net‑worth exhibits in the public record;
discounted the weight of Riverdale’s privacy and property interests (given their generalized nature and the corporate‑only context); and
found the alleged prejudice speculative and unsubstantiated.

Because Riverdale did not show that the ALJ ignored any relevant Hubbard or Standard Financial factor, or relied on improper considerations, the only plausible appellate argument would be that the ALJ’s weighing was so lopsided as to constitute a “serious mistake in judgment.” The First Circuit rejected that suggestion.

The panel also noted in a footnote that Riverdale had failed to challenge the ALJ’s application of Standard Financial in its opening brief, thereby independently waiving such a challenge.

e. First Amendment Grounds Not Reached

Although the ALJ also held that a First Amendment right of access applied (based on cases involving traditional media entities), the First Circuit explicitly declined to reach the constitutional issue. Because the common‑law right of access and OSHRC’s own regulations sufficed to affirm the denial of sealing, the court followed constitutional avoidance principles and left the First Amendment issue undecided.

IV. Impact of the Decision

A. Practical Consequences for OSHA Litigants Seeking EAJA Fees

Riverdale has clear practical ramifications for employers and other parties who:

litigate OSHA citations before OSHRC; and
later seek EAJA fees as prevailing parties.

Key implications:

EAJA net‑worth exhibits are presumptively public.
The decision cements the principle that documents filed to establish EAJA eligibility—especially corporate balance sheets and similar financial statements—are:
- “judicial records,” triggered by their central role in adjudicating rights; and
- subject to a strong presumption of public access under both common law and 29 C.F.R. § 2204.302(b).
Employers should assume that EAJA net‑worth documents will be visible to the public unless they make a robust and specific showing to the contrary.
Generalized competitive harm is not enough.
Parties cannot rely on vague assertions that competitors “could” glean information from standard financial line items. Courts are increasingly demanding:
- detailed explanations of how particular data points would create concrete, non‑speculative harm; and
- evidence that the information has been closely guarded in other contexts (e.g., internal policies, NDAs).
Redaction and in camera review should be seriously considered.
Rather than seeking to seal entire documents, litigants may be better served by:
- proposing targeted redactions of genuinely sensitive fields; and
- submitting the full document for in camera inspection to facilitate nuanced judicial protection.
Riverdale’s failure to provide the balance sheet itself in camera weakened its position. Future litigants should not repeat that mistake.
Trade‑secret / statutory confidentiality arguments must be raised early and explicitly.
If parties want to rely on OSH Act § 664 or the Trade Secrets Act, they must:
- specifically cite those provisions in their motions to the ALJ;
- explain why the documents at issue qualify as “trade secrets” or other protected categories; and
- present evidence tailored to those statutory standards.
Failure to do so at the ALJ stage will generally preclude judicial review under § 660(a).
No relaxation of exhaustion due to OSHRC’s quorum problems.
Even though OSHRC lacked a quorum and could not review the ALJ’s decision, the First Circuit did not relax the requirement that issues be preserved before the ALJ. Structural or institutional dysfunction at the Commission level does not excuse a party from making its arguments at the earliest adjudicative stage.

B. Doctrinal Significance for Access‑to‑Records and Administrative Law

Beyond OSHA practice, the case contributes to broader doctrines:

Common‑law access in administrative adjudications.
Riverdale reinforces that the common‑law presumption of access attaches not only in Article III courts, but also in agency adjudications where materials play a central role in deciding parties’ rights and public expenditures.
Use of both D.C. Circuit and First Circuit sealing frameworks by ALJs.
The First Circuit implicitly endorsed an ALJ’s use of the D.C. Circuit’s Hubbard factors alongside its own Standard Financial test. This flexibility is particularly important for agencies like OSHRC whose orders may be reviewed in multiple circuits.
Unresolved tension between statutory confidentiality mandates and common‑law access.
The court declined to decide whether OSH Act § 664 and 18 U.S.C. § 1905 displace or modify the common‑law access analysis for certain categories of information. This remains an open question. Future litigants who properly preserve the issue could force courts to clarify:
- whether certain statutory confidentiality commands trump the common law; or
- whether they are simply factors within the overall balancing framework.
Collateral order doctrine and sealing orders remain unsettled.
By assuming (rather than deciding) collateral-order jurisdiction, the First Circuit leaves open:
- whether orders denying sealing are categorically appealable under the collateral order doctrine; and
- how to reconcile that question with concerns about fragmentary appeals and the “importance” requirement illustrated by cases like Awuah.
This preserves space for more thorough treatment of the issue in future cases.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Common‑Law Right of Access to Judicial Records

At common law, courts treat many documents filed in judicial or quasi‑judicial proceedings as “judicial records.” The public is generally entitled to see these documents because:

courts and agencies exercise public power;
transparency builds legitimacy and accountability; and
secret decision‑making undermines confidence in the legal system.

However, the right is not absolute. Courts can seal or redact records if:

strong privacy, property, or security interests are at stake; and
those interests clearly outweigh the public’s interest in access.

The balancing is context‑specific. For example:

medical records or confidential informant identities often justify sealing;
routine business embarrassment usually does not.

B. EAJA Net‑Worth Exhibits in OSHRC Proceedings

To claim EAJA fees before OSHRC, a party must prove it is a small enough entity. That requires disclosing assets and liabilities at the time the case began. OSHRC’s rules:

require a “detailed exhibit” of net worth; and
say this exhibit will “ordinarily” be in the public record.

Riverdale’s case confirms that courts see these exhibits as central to the adjudicative decision whether to transfer federal funds to a private party—for that reason, they are presumptively public.

C. Collateral Order Doctrine (Interlocutory Appeals)

Normally, appeals must wait until the end of a case. The collateral order doctrine is a narrow exception allowing immediate appeal of certain non‑final orders that:

conclusively decide an issue;
are separate from the merits of the underlying dispute;
involve an important question; and
would be effectively unreviewable if parties had to wait for final judgment (for example, the right not to stand trial).

Whether orders denying sealing fit this doctrine is disputed among circuits. Riverdale does not resolve that dispute; it assumes, without deciding, that the doctrine applies.

D. Issue Exhaustion and Waiver in OSHA Cases

“Issue exhaustion” means that a party must present its legal arguments to the agency adjudicator—in this context, the OSHRC ALJ and Commission—before raising them in court. Under 29 U.S.C. § 660(a):

if a party fails to raise an objection before the Commission, a court cannot consider it later (absent extraordinary circumstances).

P. Gioioso elaborates that:

arguments must be presented to the ALJ;
then clearly articulated in the petition for Commission review; and
supported by actual reasoning, not merely lip‐service references.

In Riverdale, this rule meant Riverdale could not pivot on appeal to a new argument under OSH Act § 664 when its ALJ briefing had been entirely grounded in the common‑law access framework.

E. Trade Secrets and Statutory Confidentiality (18 U.S.C. § 1905 and 29 U.S.C. § 664)

Two statutes were invoked (though too late) by Riverdale:

18 U.S.C. § 1905 (Trade Secrets Act): Criminalizes disclosure by federal officials of certain confidential commercial or financial information obtained in the course of their work.
29 U.S.C. § 664: Directs OSHRC and related entities to protect trade secrets as defined by § 1905 when handling information from OSHA inspections and enforcement.

The unresolved question is how these provisions interact with:

the common‑law right of access to judicial records; and
agency rules that presume certain filings are public but allow sealing for “legal grounds.”

Riverdale leaves this question for another day because the argument was waived.

VI. Conclusion

Riverdale Mills Corp. v. Chavez‑DeRemer is a significant decision in the niche but important area of transparency in administrative adjudications, especially where public money is at stake under EAJA. The key takeaways are:

EAJA net‑worth exhibits filed in OSHRC proceedings are presumptively public judicial records. The combination of common‑law access principles and OSHRC’s “ordinarily public” rule sets a high bar for sealing.
Parties must make a concrete, evidence‑based showing of harm to justify sealing. Vague references to competitive disadvantage are insufficient, particularly where the information concerns corporate finances rather than more sensitive personal or third‑party data.
Issue exhaustion is enforced strictly in OSHA cases. Arguments based on OSH Act § 664 and the Trade Secrets Act must be clearly raised and developed before the ALJ; failure to do so waives them for judicial review, notwithstanding subsequent Commission inaction due to lack of quorum.
The interplay between statutory trade‑secret protections and the common‑law right of access remains unresolved. Riverdale defers that important question to a future case where it is properly preserved.
The collateral order status of sealing decisions is left open. The First Circuit pragmatically assumed jurisdiction, signaling that the question warrants fuller treatment another day.

By affirming the ALJ’s denial of Riverdale’s sealing motion, the First Circuit reinforces a robust culture of openness in agency adjudications involving fee‑shifting and public funds. It also sends a clear procedural message: litigants must present their best legal theories and supporting evidence at the ALJ stage, or risk losing them altogether on appeal.