Present‑Sense Text Messages and Circumstantial Proof of Homicide: A Commentary on Moss v. State

I. Introduction

In Moss v. State, S25A1239 (Ga. Dec. 9, 2025), the Supreme Court of Georgia addressed two recurring issues in modern criminal trials:

1. When circumstantial evidence, heavily reliant on digital data and forensic inferences, is constitutionally sufficient to sustain convictions for malice murder, first-degree arson, and attempted concealment of a death; and
2. When a homicide victim’s text messages may be admitted at trial over a hearsay objection—specifically, as a present-sense impression and as non-hearsay used to show the victim’s fear and perception of impending danger.

The appellant, Lorenzo Moss, was convicted in Hall County of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, two counts of first-degree arson, and attempted concealment of the death of another, stemming from the shooting and burning of his grandfather, Andrew Donaldson. He received a life sentence for malice murder plus consecutive sentences for arson and attempted concealment. On appeal he argued:

• The evidence was constitutionally insufficient, particularly because it was circumstantial and allegedly showed only his presence at the scene; and
• The trial court abused its discretion by admitting two text messages sent from Donaldson’s phone shortly before the fire.

The Supreme Court affirmed in full. In doing so, it both reaffirmed and refined Georgia law on:

• How circumstantial evidence, including GPS, cell‑site data, surveillance video, forensic arson evidence, and post‑crime conduct, can prove “more than mere presence” and meet the Jackson v. Virginia standard; and
• How electronic communications by a deceased victim can be admitted, either as a present-sense impression under OCGA § 24‑8‑803(1), or as non-hearsay when used to show fear and perceived danger rather than to prove the literal truth of the words used.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court’s key holdings can be summarized as follows:

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

• The evidence, though circumstantial, was constitutionally sufficient under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), to support Moss’s convictions for:
  • Malice murder (OCGA § 16‑5‑1(a));
  • First‑degree arson (OCGA § 16‑7‑60); and
  • Attempted concealment of the death of another (OCGA §§ 16‑4‑1, 16‑10‑31).
• Moss’s argument that the State failed to prove motive, tie him directly to the murder weapon, or show that he was burned in the fire did not render the evidence insufficient; the State is not required to present any particular type of evidence, so long as competent evidence shown to the jury permits a rational finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
• The combination of:
  • His unexpected appearance at the victim’s home;
  • His presence at the home at the relevant times (via GPS, cell-site data, and surveillance description);
  • The multiple fires set with gasoline in different rooms, including where the body lay;
  • Donaldson’s being shot in the head before the fire;
  • Moss’s flight to Milwaukee immediately afterwards; and
  • Discovery of a gasoline‑contaminated glove with Moss’s DNA in his apartment
  allowed the jury to find that he was “more than merely present,” and that he was the shooter and arsonist who attempted to conceal the homicide.

B. Admissibility of the Text Messages

The court upheld the admission of two key text messages Donaldson sent to his son Anthony:

1. 11:39 p.m. text: “Ren is here! He just popped up.”
   • This statement was hearsay (offered for the truth that Moss unexpectedly arrived at the house), but it fell within the present-sense-impression exception (OCGA § 24‑8‑803(1)).
2. 12:29 a.m. text: “I need you to come home!”
   • This statement was held not to be hearsay at all, because it was not offered to show that Donaldson literally “needed” Anthony to come home; instead, it was offered to show that Donaldson feared Moss and believed that “something was about to happen.”
   • Non-hearsay use: the statement was used as circumstantial evidence of Donaldson’s state of mind and perception of danger, not for the truth of the request itself.

The Court thus approved both texts’ admission: one via an exception (present-sense impression), the other as non-hearsay. It also reaffirmed that Georgia’s hearsay statute, OCGA § 24‑8‑801(c), tracks Federal Rule of Evidence 801, and that federal authorities—especially Eleventh Circuit decisions and Advisory Committee Notes—are highly persuasive in applying Georgia’s hearsay provisions.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Events Surrounding the Crime

• Discovery of the fire and body. Around 6:22 a.m. on February 14, 2022, a neighbor reported Donaldson’s house was on fire. First responders entered through locked doors and found Donaldson’s partially burned body on the living room floor.
• Arson findings. The fire investigator determined there were three distinct fires:
  • In the living room (near the body);
  • In a bedroom; and
  • In the garage.
  A gas can with gasoline was found in the living room. Gasoline residue was detected on Donaldson’s clothes and debris from the living room and bedroom.
• Gunshot evidence. A spent .40‑caliber bullet and shell casing were located in the living room. A disassembled .40‑caliber pistol was found in the garage; a firearms examiner determined it had fired the bullet and casing from the living room.
• Cause of death. The medical examiner concluded Donaldson died from a gunshot wound to the head. The bullet path (through his wrist and head) suggested he raised an arm in a defensive position. Lack of soot in the airway showed he was dead before the fire.

B. Moss’s Visits and Movements

• February 11 arrival. Donaldson’s son Anthony testified that Moss—who lived in Milwaukee and had infrequent contact—unexpectedly drove up in a rented Toyota Highlander as Donaldson and Anthony were going to a grocery store. They were surprised because Moss had not been given Donaldson’s address; Anthony thought “it just didn’t seem right.”
• Refused lodging. Moss asked to stay with Donaldson; Donaldson refused, instructing him to stay at a hotel.
• February 12 departure claim. A cell phone associated with Moss texted Anthony that Moss had “decided to head home.”
• Early February 14 texts from Donaldson’s phone.
  • 11:39 p.m., February 13: “Ren is here! He just popped up.”
  • 12:29 a.m., February 14: “I need you to come home!”
  Anthony, asleep, did not see these until the morning after the fire.
• GPS and cell-site data. Records from the rental company showed:
  • The Highlander left Milwaukee early on February 11 and arrived at Donaldson’s home at 6:27 p.m. that day.
  • The Highlander returned to Donaldson’s home around 11:30 p.m. on February 13 and left at approximately 6:20 a.m. on February 14.
  Cell-site location information for Moss’s phone showed parallel movements: near Donaldson’s house at 11:29 p.m. on February 13 and departing the area at 6:20 a.m.
• Surveillance video (described at trial). A neighbor’s camera (though not in the appellate record) showed:
  • 11:18 p.m.: a vehicle pulled into Donaldson’s driveway.
  • 11:35 p.m.: vehicle lights flashed (consistent with locking the doors).
  • 6:18 a.m.: a person walked from the house to the vehicle, got in, and drove away.
  • At the same time, a brightening, “pulsating” light reflected off a truck—soon growing significantly brighter—accompanied by the “sounds of the fire” on the recording.
• Post‑crime conduct and arrest. Around 10:00 a.m. on February 14, while Anthony was still at the scene, Moss called from a restaurant in Marietta, saying he needed money to return to Milwaukee. GPS data later showed the Highlander traveled from Donaldson’s house to a Marietta restaurant and then back to Milwaukee. Moss was arrested in Milwaukee.
• Forensic link to gasoline. A search of Moss’s apartment uncovered a disposable glove in a jacket pocket; testing revealed Moss’s DNA and gasoline on the glove.

C. Procedural History

• Indicted in March 2022 for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, two counts of first-degree arson, and attempted concealment of the death of another.
• Jury trial held April 29–May 3, 2024; guilty on all counts.
• Sentencing: life for malice murder; 20 years consecutive for one arson count; 5 years consecutive for attempted concealment. Remaining counts merged or vacated.
• Motion for new trial (later amended by new counsel) denied in March 2025.
• Appeal filed; docketed to the Supreme Court’s August 2025 term; decided on the briefs.

IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence Analysis

A. Governing Standard: Jackson v. Virginia

The Court applied the familiar constitutional standard from Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979): considering all evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, could any rational juror have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?

Following Arnold v. State, 321 Ga. 434, 442 (2025), the Court emphasized two key principles:

• Appellate courts do not re-weigh evidence or reassess witness credibility; and
• They defer to the jury’s resolution of conflicts and inferences drawn from the evidence.

Moss’s argument that the proof was “only circumstantial” was directly met by the Court’s reliance on Arnold: circumstantial evidence alone can be constitutionally sufficient.

B. From “Mere Presence” to Participation in the Crimes

Moss’s core sufficiency claim was that the evidence showed nothing more than his presence at Donaldson’s house, which by itself cannot support a conviction. The Court rejected this by detailing the cumulative circumstantial proof, tying it to the “more than merely present” standard referenced in Reid v. State, ___ Ga. ___ (2025), S25A0736:

• Opportunity and access: GPS and cell-site records placed Moss at the home when Donaldson was last known to be alive and at the approximate time the shooting and arson must have occurred.
• Temporal nexus to the fire: The neighbor’s video—as described in testimony—showed a person leaving Donaldson’s home and driving away just as the light of the fire began and rapidly intensified. A 911 call followed within about two minutes, at 6:22 a.m.
• Nature of the fires: Three separate fires, with gasoline as an accelerant, strongly suggested intentional arson rather than an accidental blaze.
• Cause of death and timing: The medical examiner’s testimony that Donaldson was shot in the head, likely raising his arm defensively, and was dead before the fire, supported the view that the arson was committed after and to conceal a homicide.
• Flight: Moss’s prompt departure to Milwaukee immediately after the fire, coupled with his money request from Marietta, was classic circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt.
• Forensic evidence of gasoline and concealment: The glove with Moss’s DNA and gasoline residue linked him both to gas use and to the arson effort.

Taken together, this evidence supported more than mere presence:

• Moss had the means (access to the house, proximity to the firearm found there);
• The opportunity (his presence at the critical time frame); and
• Post‑crime behavior consistent with guilt (flight and possession of a gasoline‑contaminated glove).

The Court analogized to:

• Arnold, where circumstantial phone-location data placed the defendant near the victim’s house at the time of the murder, and
• Reid, where surveillance video showing the defendant’s movements around the victim’s house before, during, and after the shooting was sufficient to negate “mere presence.”

C. No Requirement of Particular Types of Evidence

Moss stressed the absence of:

• Evidence of motive;
• Inculpatory admissions;
• Direct proof of when the shot was fired;
• Forensic evidence tying him to the gun; and
• Evidence he suffered burns.

The Court responded by invoking Reid and Pritchett v. State, 314 Ga. 767, 779 (2022):

• The State is not required to prove its case through any particular form of evidence (“there is no requirement that it prove its case with any particular sort of evidence”).
• Motive is not an element of the charged crimes, and thus is not required.
• The absence of certain kinds of proof does not mean the existing evidence is insufficient; the question remains whether a rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the totality of the evidence.

By reframing Moss’s complaints as arguments about “missing” or “preferred” evidence rather than about the sufficiency of the actual trial record, the Court reinforced a recurring principle: appellate sufficiency review is not about whether the State could have presented stronger or different proof, but whether what was presented meets the constitutional threshold.

D. Application to Specific Offenses

The decision implicitly addresses how the evidence fit each offense’s elements:

1. Malice murder (OCGA § 16‑5‑1(a)).
   • Donaldson suffered a single gunshot to the head, with a trajectory suggesting a defensive posture, supporting a finding of intentional killing.
   • The jury could reasonably infer malice from the nature of the act and the use of a deadly weapon.
   • The circumstantial evidence linked Moss to the time and manner of death sufficiently to attribute the shooting to him.
2. First-degree arson (OCGA § 16‑7‑60).
   • Multiple separate fires in different rooms, use of gasoline, and lack of accidental origin indicated intentional burning of the dwelling.
   • His presence at the exact time fire began, rapid departure, and later gasoline-contaminated glove supported the conclusion that Moss intentionally damaged the dwelling by fire.
   • The Court cited Pierce v. State, 319 Ga. 846, 850‑51 (2024), where arson used to conceal a shooting was sufficient for first-degree arson alongside malice murder.
3. Attempted concealment of a death (OCGA §§ 16‑4‑1; 16‑10‑31).
   • Concealment can be established by intentionally burning the site and body to hide evidence of a killing; the gasoline-fueled fires in three locations, targeting the area near the body, fell squarely within this concept.
   • The Court referenced Bennett v. State, 304 Ga. 795, 796‑97 (2018), where spreading fuel near a body and igniting it supported a concealment conviction.

In sum, the Court held the circumstantial case against Moss—a digital, forensic, and behavioral mosaic—met the Jackson standard for all three convictions challenged.

V. Hearsay and the Victim’s Text Messages

A. The Hearsay Framework

Georgia’s hearsay rule is codified at OCGA § 24‑8‑801(c) and § 24‑8‑802:

• Hearsay is:

  “[A] statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”

• General rule: Hearsay is inadmissible unless it fits a statutory exception (OCGA § 24‑8‑802).

Two exceptions were directly implicated:

• Present-sense impression (OCGA § 24‑8‑803(1)):

  A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter.

• Excited utterance (OCGA § 24‑8‑803(2)): A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant is under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition (though the Court ultimately did not need to rely on this exception).

Under Georgia’s Evidence Code, which closely tracks the Federal Rules, statements may also avoid hearsay classification altogether if they are not offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted,” but rather to show their effect on the listener or to infer the declarant’s state of mind.

B. First Text: “Ren is here! He just popped up.” — A Present-Sense Impression

The first text was plainly offered for its truth: to show that Moss (nicknamed “Ren”) had unexpectedly appeared at Donaldson’s house. It was therefore hearsay unless it fit an exception.

The Court applied the present-sense-impression exception, guided by its own precedent in Varner v. State, 306 Ga. 726, 731 (2019):

• The statement must describe or explain an event personally witnessed by the declarant; and
• It must be “essentially contemporaneous” with the event.

Here:

• Donaldson was personally perceiving Moss’s arrival—indeed, the surprise (“he just popped up”) is part of the description.
• The timing (11:39 p.m., shortly after the surveillance-recorded arrival around 11:18 p.m.) was sufficiently close in time to qualify as “immediately thereafter.”

The Court relied on:

• Downer v. State, 314 Ga. 617, 630‑31 (2022), where a declarant’s report that he was on the phone with the defendant while actually speaking with him was admissible as a present-sense impression; and
• Varner itself, where a declarant repeated a wounded victim’s mumbled words to investigators essentially as they were being spoken.

Moss argued that Anthony’s testimony about the timestamp—given that he was asleep when the text arrived—was insufficient to lay a foundation. The Court rejected this, noting that under OCGA § 24‑9‑901(a), authentication can be established by any evidence sufficient to support a finding that an item is what its proponent claims. Anthony’s testimony, combined with the phone’s timestamp and corroborating contextual evidence, satisfied this requirement.

Because the first text fell within a recognized exception, it was admissible hearsay; the Court therefore did not need to reach whether it also qualified as an excited utterance.

C. Second Text: “I need you to come home!” — Not Hearsay

The second text at 12:29 a.m. was treated differently. The Court concluded it was not hearsay at all because it was not offered to prove its literal truth.

The State’s theory was that the message was circumstantial evidence that:

• Donaldson was experiencing fear or concern about Moss’s presence; and
• Donaldson perceived that “something was about to happen” and wanted his son present.

The prosecutor explicitly argued in closing that the text permitted the inference that “things aren’t looking good.” Thus, the relevance of the text lay in what it revealed about Donaldson’s mental state and perception of imminent danger, not in whether he objectively required Anthony’s help at home.

This use of an out-of-court statement fits a well-established non-hearsay category: statements introduced as circumstantial evidence of the declarant’s state of mind or to show the significance of subsequent conduct, rather than for the truth of any factual assertion. In support, the Court cited:

• Henderson v. State, 317 Ga. 66, 82‑85 (2023): Some statements found by the trial court to fall within hearsay exceptions were in fact non-hearsay, thus did not need an exception to be admissible.
• Mosley v. State, 307 Ga. 711, 716 n.3 (2020): A co-indictee’s statement, “If anything happened” to her, someone should care for her child, was not hearsay, because it was probative of her belief she might be unavailable due to involvement in the murder, not of the literal proposition that the addressee should care for the child.
• Blackmon v. State, 306 Ga. 90, 94 (2019): The victim’s statements of love toward relatives may not have been hearsay because they were offered to show her fear and relationship context, not to prove the truth of “I love you.”
• United States v. Cruz, 805 F.2d 1464, 1478 (11th Cir. 1986): A GBI agent’s instruction to “bring her supplier to the next meeting” was not hearsay; it was introduced to show that the person the informant then brought was the supplier.

The Court also relied on the Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(a), which emphasizes that statements are not hearsay when they are “offered as a basis for inferring something other than the matter asserted.” Since Donaldson’s text was offered as a window into his fear and perceptions rather than to prove the existence of an objective “need,” it was properly classified as non-hearsay.

Because the second text was non-hearsay, the Court held that no hearsay exception was required and affirmed its admission over Moss’s objection, regardless of the trial court’s alternative rationale (present-sense impression or excited utterance).

D. Use of Federal Authorities in Interpreting Georgia’s Evidence Code

The opinion closes its hearsay analysis by reaffirming an important interpretive principle:

• OCGA § 24‑8‑801(c) “essentially tracks its counterpart in the Federal Rules of Evidence.”
• Therefore, decisions of federal courts—“particularly the Eleventh Circuit”—and the Advisory Committee Notes are “highly persuasive” in construing the Georgia provisions.

This is consistent with Blackmon and State v. Almanza, 304 Ga. 553, 555‑56, 559 n.6 (2018), and underscores that Georgia’s modern Evidence Code is intended to be read in harmony with federal practice, especially concerning hearsay concepts like “assertion,” “truth of the matter asserted,” and non-hearsay uses of statements.

VI. Precedents Influencing the Court’s Decision

The Court’s reasoning rests on a network of prior cases, both on sufficiency and evidence law.

A. Sufficiency and Circumstantial Evidence

• Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979):
  • Provides the constitutional benchmark for reviewing whether evidence is sufficient to support a criminal conviction.
  • Requires viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and asks whether any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Arnold v. State, 321 Ga. 434 (2025):
  • Reiterates that circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient.
  • Approves reliance on cell-site data placing a defendant near the crime scene around the relevant time.
• Reid v. State, ___ Ga. ___ (2025), S25A0736:
  • Holds that surveillance video showing the appellant driving past the victim’s house shortly before, and moving around it during, the shooting supported a finding that he was “more than merely present.”
  • Moss’s case uses this to frame how video, location data, and timing can transform presence into participation.
• Pritchett v. State, 314 Ga. 767 (2022):
  • Confirms that motive is not an essential element of a crime and need not be proven by the State.
• Pierce v. State, 319 Ga. 846 (2024):
  • Affirms sufficiency for malice murder and first-degree arson where the defendant shot a victim in the head, set multiple fires in the house with the body inside, and fled.
  • Moss’s case closely parallels Pierce factually, underlining that arson used to cover a homicide is powerful circumstantial evidence of guilt.
• Bennett v. State, 304 Ga. 795 (2018):
  • Upholds a conviction for concealment of a death where the defendant spread fuel near a body and ignited it.
  • Supports viewing Moss’s use of gasoline and multiple fires as an attempted concealment of Donaldson’s death.

B. Hearsay and Non-Hearsay Uses of Statements

• Varner v. State, 306 Ga. 726 (2019):
  • Articulates the requirements for present-sense impressions: personal perception and near-contemporaneity.
• Downer v. State, 314 Ga. 617 (2022):
  • Applies present-sense impression to a declarant’s statement about being on the phone with the defendant at the time of the call.
• Nicholson v. State, 307 Ga. 466 (2019):
  • Explains authentication of evidence under OCGA § 24‑9‑901(a): any evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what it is claimed to be will suffice.
  • Used indirectly to support authenticity and timing of Donaldson’s texts.
• Henderson v. State, 317 Ga. 66 (2023):
  • Clarifies that some out-of-court statements admitted by a trial court as hearsay exceptions were actually non-hearsay—showing that if a statement is not offered for its truth, no exception is needed.
• Mosley v. State, 307 Ga. 711 (2020):
  • Holds a co-indictee’s statement “If anything happens…” was not hearsay because it was probative of her belief she might be unavailable due to her role in the murder.
• Blackmon v. State, 306 Ga. 90 (2019):
  • Notes that statements by a victim about affection for relatives might be non-hearsay if they are introduced to show fear or relational dynamics rather than truth.
  • Also underscores that Georgia’s hearsay definitions track the federal rules and that federal authority is persuasive.
• United States v. Cruz, 805 F.2d 1464 (11th Cir. 1986):
  • Used as federal analog: a request to “bring her supplier” is non-hearsay when used to infer who the supplier is, not to prove that the person ought to be brought.
• State v. Almanza, 304 Ga. 553 (2018):
  • Emphasizes reliance on the Federal Rules’ Advisory Committee Notes as highly persuasive in construing Georgia’s Evidence Code.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Constitutional Sufficiency of Evidence (Jackson v. Virginia)

This standard does not ask whether the appellate court itself is convinced of guilt. It asks:

• Assuming the jury believed the State’s evidence and drew reasonable inferences from it, could a rational juror conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?

Importantly:

• Appellate courts do not retry the case; they defer heavily to the jury’s view of the facts.
• Even if another inference (e.g., innocence) is possible, the conviction stands if a rational factfinder could choose guilt.

B. Circumstantial Evidence vs. Direct Evidence

• Direct evidence directly proves a fact (e.g., an eyewitness sees the shooting).
• Circumstantial evidence requires an inference (e.g., the defendant’s fingerprints on a weapon, flight, or GPS showing presence at the scene).

Georgia law—and the U.S. Constitution—do not disfavor circumstantial evidence. A case may be proven entirely through such inferences, as in Moss.

C. “Mere Presence” Doctrine

Being merely present at the scene of a crime, without more, is not enough for conviction. Something additional must tie the defendant to participation—such as:

• Conduct before, during, or after the crime (e.g., coordinating, assisting, fleeing);
• Possession of incriminating items (e.g., weapon, accelerant); or
• Statements indicating involvement.

Moss illustrates how presence plus timing, arson, forensic ties, and flight can collectively surpass “mere presence.”

D. Hearsay vs. Non-Hearsay

A statement is hearsay only if:

1. It is made out of court; and
2. It is offered to prove the truth of what it says.

If it is offered instead:

• To show the speaker’s state of mind (fear, intent);
• To explain subsequent actions of another person (e.g., why Anthony might have responded, or why police acted); or
• As a verbal act (words that themselves have legal significance, like a threat or contract term),

then it may be non-hearsay and admissible without an exception.

E. Present-Sense Impression

This is a hearsay exception for statements made while something is happening, or immediately afterwards, that describe or explain the event. The rationale:

• Because there is little time to fabricate, such statements are considered reliable.

Donaldson’s “Ren is here! He just popped up” qualifies because he was describing Moss’s arrival in real time or very shortly thereafter.

F. Attempted Concealment of a Death

Georgia’s concealing-a-death statute (OCGA § 16‑10‑31) criminalizes efforts to hide a victim’s death. When paired with the attempt statute (OCGA § 16‑4‑1), this covers substantial steps toward burning or otherwise destroying evidence of a corpse or crime scene, even if the concealment is not fully successful. Setting multiple fires around a body is a classic example, as recognized in Bennett and reaffirmed in Moss.

VIII. Doctrinal and Practical Impact

A. Strengthening Circumstantial, Technology-Driven Prosecutions

Moss reinforces the viability of prosecutions built largely on:

• GPS data from rental vehicles;
• Cell-site location information;
• Surveillance video (even when only described, if the jury saw it); and
• Digital communications (texts) and forensic evidence (accelerants, DNA).

The opinion underscores that such evidence, when integrated coherently, may establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt even without:

• Eyewitness testimony;
• A confessed motive; or
• Direct forensic ties to the murder weapon.

B. Clarifying Use of Victim Text Messages in Homicide Trials

The case is particularly important for how it treats a victim’s text messages:

• It confirms that digital communications are fully capable of fitting traditional hearsay categories like present-sense impressions.
• It highlights a crucial distinction:
  • Descriptive texts about what is happening (“Ren is here!”) may be admitted as present-sense impressions.
  • Imperative or request texts (“I need you to come home!”) may be admitted as non-hearsay where they are used to show fear or perceived danger, not to prove a factual proposition.

For prosecutors, this decision provides a roadmap for:

• Framing victim communications as evidence of state of mind and contemporaneous perceptions;
• Drafting proffers and arguments that specify non-hearsay uses; and
• Invoking appropriate hearsay exceptions where necessary.

For defense counsel, Moss signals:

• That hearsay objections must carefully address both what the statement is (assertion vs. request) and how the State proposes to use it (truth vs. inference of fear); and
• That challenges to the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence must engage with the totality of the evidence rather than merely pointing to categories of proof the State elected not to present.

C. Continued Harmonization with Federal Evidence Law

The Court’s explicit reliance on the Federal Rules’ Advisory Committee Notes and Eleventh Circuit precedent confirms Georgia’s commitment to harmonizing its Evidence Code with federal practice. This enhances predictability for practitioners who litigate in both state and federal forums and encourages arguments grounded in federal evidentiary doctrine when interpreting OCGA § 24‑8‑801 and related provisions.

D. Guidance for Trial Judges

Moss offers trial courts practical guidance:

• When faced with electronic statements (texts, emails, chats), courts should:
  • Ask first whether the statement is hearsay at all—that is, whether it is offered to prove the truth of an assertion;
  • If hearsay, identify the correct exception (e.g., present-sense impression, excited utterance, state-of-mind, etc.); and
  • Ensure that timing and personal perception requirements are supported by evidence of authentication and context.
• On sufficiency issues, trial courts can rely on Moss to:
  • Submit circumstantial cases to the jury where technology, forensic evidence, and post‑crime behavior strongly implicate the defendant; and
  • Reject motions for directed verdict that rely solely on the absence of motive or direct evidence when the circumstantial case is robust.

IX. Conclusion

Moss v. State is a significant reaffirmation—and modest refinement—of Georgia law at the intersection of criminal evidence and digital communications. Doctrinally, the case:

• Reaffirms that circumstantial evidence alone, including GPS and cell-site data, surveillance video, forensic arson evidence, and post‑crime conduct, can be constitutionally sufficient to prove malice murder, arson, and attempted concealment of a death; and
• Clarifies that:
  • A text message can qualify as a present-sense impression if it describes a personally perceived event as it unfolds; and
  • A victim’s urgent text request can be non-hearsay when introduced to show fear and perception of imminent harm, rather than to prove the literal truth of the need expressed.

In a criminal justice system increasingly reliant on digital and forensic evidence, Moss provides a careful, structured approach to both sufficiency and hearsay. It emphasizes jury primacy in resolving factual questions, preserves flexibility in the types of evidence the State may rely on, and offers clear analytical tools for trial courts and litigants dealing with electronic communications in homicide prosecutions. As such, it stands as an important precedent in Georgia’s ongoing adaptation of traditional evidentiary principles to the realities of modern criminal investigation and trial practice.