Presence-Only Standing & Non-Element Evidence: Third Circuit Narrows Fourth Amendment Standing and Constructive Amendment in § 1956(h) Conspiracies – Commentary on United States v. Womack (3d Cir. 2025)

Introduction

In United States v. Alan Womack, No. 24-2263, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit confronted two recurrent but unsettled questions:

1. When, if ever, does a defendant who is merely found outside a residence during a drug raid have Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the interior search?
2. Does trial evidence of un-indicted laundering methods “constructively amend” a money-laundering-conspiracy indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)?

Affirming the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the panel (Judge Shwartz, joined by Judges Freeman and Rendell) answered “rarely” to the first and “no” to the second, thus tightening both Fourth Amendment standing doctrine and the contours of constructive amendment in money-laundering conspiracy prosecutions.

Summary of the Judgment

• Fourth Amendment Standing. The court held that Alan Womack had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a Philadelphia house used as a marijuana stash location. His mere presence outside, coupled with unsubstantiated claims of having a key, failed to establish either subjective or objective privacy expectations.
• Protective Sweep & Warrant. Because Womack lacked standing, the panel did not need to reach the merits of the warrantless entry, but it nevertheless noted that exigencies and later-obtained warrant independently justified the seizure.
• Constructive Amendment. Introducing proof of bank “funneling” transactions not recited in the indictment did not alter an essential element of § 1956(h) conspiracy, because overt acts are not elements of the crime after Whitfield v. United States.
• Sufficiency of the Evidence. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, phone records, travel logs, and structured bank deposits amply supported the jury’s finding that Womack knowingly joined a dual-purpose laundering conspiracy (promotion and concealment).
• Disposition. Convictions for conspiracy to distribute marijuana and conspiracy to commit money laundering were affirmed in full.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The panel’s reasoning interwove a series of Supreme Court and Third Circuit authorities:

• Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990) & Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998) – drew the overnight-guest/short-term-business visitor distinction. The Womack panel leaned heavily on Carter to classify Womack as a mere business visitor.
• United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2010) – reiterated that standing is personal; echoed to underscore Womack’s burden.
• Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209 (2005) – confirmed that § 1956(h) conspiracies require no overt act, allowing broad evidentiary latitude without amending the indictment.
• United States v. Fallon, 61 F.4th 95 (3d Cir. 2023) – supplied standards for sufficiency review and the two-prong conspiracy test.
• United States v. Omoruyi, 260 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 2001) – articulated elements of promotional and concealment laundering; relied on to confirm that structured deposits and third-party accounts satisfy intent to promote/conceal.

B. Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. No Standing Without Concrete Ties. The panel emphasized two factual deficits: (i) no proof Womack ever stayed overnight or had a possessory interest; (ii) his presence was tied exclusively to illegal business. Invoking Carter, the court held that such “presence-only” status yields no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.
2. Government’s Late Standing Argument Not Waived. Because the prosecution raised standing in a post-hearing brief before the District Court ruled, any waiver argument failed (citing United States v. Dowdell, 70 F.4th 134).
3. Constructive Amendment Doctrine Narrowed.
   • Only essential elements matter. Overt acts are not elements of § 1956(h) after Whitfield.
   • Therefore, introducing proof of additional laundering acts (bank funneling) merely supplied evidentiary detail; it did not widen or modify the charged crime.
   • The court analogized to Vosburgh and First Circuit precedent to reinforce that new overt-act evidence cannot constitute constructive amendment where no overt act is required.
4. Sufficiency of Evidence.
   • Promotion: Cash flights, tractor-trailer monitoring, and cash deliveries proved intent to advance drug trafficking.
   • Concealment: Third-party accounts, sub-$10k structuring, and phone-record coordination demonstrated a design to conceal and Womack’s knowledge.
   • Under plain-error review, the record was far from “devoid of evidence.”

C. Impact of the Decision

Although captioned “Not Precedential,” the panel’s analysis will likely be persuasive in the Third Circuit and beyond because it clarifies two gray areas:

• Fourth Amendment Standing in Drug-House Cases. Defense counsel will struggle to establish standing for couriers or lookouts who cannot show residency, overnight presence, or a demonstrated possessory nexus.
• Scope of Constructive Amendment Post-Whitfield. Prosecutors may confidently introduce evidence of laundering methods beyond those recited in indictments so long as (i) the charge is conspiracy under § 1956(h) and (ii) the new evidence merely reflects additional overt acts rather than a different substantive offense.
• Litigation Strategy Effects.
  • Defendants may be incentivized to litigate factual ties to a property early and thoroughly during suppression hearings.
  • Indictments for money-laundering conspiracies may remain streamlined, with less pressure to enumerate every laundering channel—bolstering prosecutorial flexibility at trial.
  • District courts may increasingly permit late-raised standing arguments by the Government, citing Dowdell and now Womack.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Fourth Amendment Standing. The right to complain about a search belongs only to people whose own privacy was invaded. Being caught near (or even inside) a place is not enough; one needs a privacy expectation society recognizes as reasonable.
• Constructive Amendment. An indictment “constructively amended” means the jury heard a different crime than the grand jury charged. It is forbidden because it violates the Fifth Amendment’s Indictment Clause. But if the new evidence concerns non-element details (e.g., overt acts not required), no amendment occurs.
• § 1956(h) Conspiracy. Unlike many conspiracies, it requires no overt act—just an agreement and knowing membership. Thus, prosecutors need not spell out each laundering step in the indictment.
• Promotional vs. Concealment Laundering.
  • Promotional: money transactions intended to keep the illegal business running or expanding.
  • Concealment: transactions designed to hide the source, nature, or control of criminal proceeds.
• Structuring. Breaking up deposits into sub-$10,000 increments to avoid bank reporting requirements—often evidence of concealment intent.
• Plain-Error Review. A tough appellate standard: reversal only if the error is clear, affects substantial rights, and seriously undermines the fairness or integrity of proceedings.

Conclusion

United States v. Womack fortifies two doctrinal pillars. First, it reaffirms that physical proximity to contraband premises, without more, rarely confers Fourth Amendment standing—reminding defense counsel to assemble concrete ties if suppression is to succeed. Second, it narrows constructive-amendment arguments in § 1956(h) prosecutions by treating uncharged laundering methods as mere evidentiary elaboration, not elemental modification. Although non-precedential, the opinion offers a clear, logical roadmap that lower courts and litigants will likely cite whenever questions of “presence-only” standing or laundering-conspiracy pleadings arise.

© 2025 – Analytical commentary prepared for educational purposes only.