Presence Is Neither Necessary Nor Sufficient: Minnesota Clarifies the Hawkins Threshold for Alternative‑Perpetrator Evidence and Affirms Voluntariness of Hospital Interviews

Introduction

In State of Minnesota v. Ryan Charles Rooney, 23 N.W.3d 75 (Minn. 2025), the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed Rooney’s convictions for first-degree domestic abuse murder and second-degree intentional murder arising from the shooting death of his wife, Samantha Columbus‑Boshey, in a Residence Inn hotel room. The appeal raised two principal issues:

Whether the district court abused its discretion by excluding Rooney’s alternative‑perpetrator evidence intended to implicate D.G., a friend who had previously stayed with the couple.
Whether Rooney’s post‑Miranda statements to police, obtained in the hospital after he suffered a gunshot wound to the head, were voluntary and therefore admissible.

The Court rejected both challenges. Most notably, the Court offered a clarifying statement about the foundational “Hawkins” threshold governing alternative‑perpetrator evidence: proof that the proposed alternative perpetrator was present at the crime scene is neither necessary nor sufficient to satisfy the foundational requirement, though the absence of such evidence can weigh against admissibility. The Court also upheld the voluntariness of Rooney’s statements under a totality‑of‑the‑circumstances analysis. Two concurring justices signaled openness to replacing the Hawkins threshold with a conventional Rules 401/403 relevancy and prejudice analysis in a future case.

Summary of the Opinion

Writing for the Court, Justice McKeig affirmed the conviction on both grounds:

Alternative‑perpetrator evidence: The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Rooney’s proffer regarding D.G. because the proffer lacked evidence with an “inherent tendency to connect” D.G. to the actual commission of the crime, as required by State v. Hawkins. The Court clarified that presence at the scene is a relevant factor but is neither a mandatory nor a dispositive requirement. The court also indicated that description and motive evidence offered by Rooney was either too vague or insufficient.
Voluntariness of statements: Rooney’s statements during a hospital interview were voluntary. Despite his head injury and the administration of Zofran, the record demonstrated that Rooney was alert, oriented, and able to understand and respond; officers were non‑coercive and administered Miranda warnings. The totality supported voluntariness.

The Court added that even if the alternative‑perpetrator ruling were erroneous, any error would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of overwhelming evidence (including DNA on the firearm and gunshot residue on Rooney’s hand).

Justice Thissen, joined by Justice Procaccini, concurred to reiterate concerns with the Hawkins threshold and to invite reconsideration in a properly presented case, suggesting a return to the ordinary Minnesota Rules of Evidence 401 and 403 framework.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

State v. Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. 1977): The bedrock precedent establishing a two‑step process for alternative‑perpetrator evidence: (1) a foundational showing of evidence having an “inherent tendency to connect” the third person to the actual commission; and (2) if met, admission of motive, threats, or other facts under ordinary evidentiary rules. The Rooney Court applied Hawkins and clarified how “presence at the scene” fits into the foundational analysis: relevant but neither necessary nor sufficient, with the absence of presence evidence allowed to weigh against the foundational showing.
State v. Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. 2010): Reinforces that courts look to the “evidence, not assertions” in the proffer. The Rooney Court used Jenkins to discount Rooney’s speculative theory that D.G. could have accessed the room without a keycard swipe; such speculation is not evidence.
State v. Woodard, 942 N.W.2d 137 (Minn. 2020): Affirms Hawkins and stresses that vague physical descriptions that could fit “any number of people” fail the foundational requirement. Rooney draws on Woodard to find the Residence Inn employee’s description too generic to link D.G. to the murder.
State v. Atkinson, 774 N.W.2d 584 (Minn. 2009) and State v. Flores, 595 N.W.2d 860 (Minn. 1999): Presence alone is not enough. The Court cites these cases to locate “presence” as a non‑dispositive factor in the Hawkins matrix.
Troxel v. State, 875 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. 2016): Limits the probative value of sexual desire as motive absent overt indications of violence, threats, anger, jealousy, or frustration. The Court used Troxel to reject Rooney’s motive theory about D.G.
State v. Larson, 787 N.W.2d 592 (Minn. 2010): Confirms that the lack of presence evidence can weigh against a finding of inherent tendency. Rooney uses this to explain how presence functions as a factor within Hawkins.
State v. Nissalke, 801 N.W.2d 82 (Minn. 2011): Bare assertions about what “could have happened” are not evidence. Rooney relies on Nissalke to exclude speculative access theories.
Carbo v. State, 6 N.W.3d 114 (Minn. 2024): Reaffirms a defendant’s constitutional right to present a complete defense, including alternative‑perpetrator theories, but subject to evidentiary limits. Rooney invokes Carbo to frame the constitutional stakes without overriding Hawkins’s gatekeeping function.
State v. Westrom, 6 N.W.3d 145 (Minn. 2024) and State v. Blom, 682 N.W.2d 578 (Minn. 2004): Provide the harmless‑beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard for evidentiary error and the “surely unattributable” test. Rooney used these to underscore that any alternative‑perpetrator error would not warrant reversal given overwhelming evidence.
State v. Cox, 884 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 2016); State v. Riley, 568 N.W.2d 518 (Minn. 1997); State v. Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 2020); State v. Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d 327 (Minn. 1991): These cases supply the voluntariness framework: totality‑of‑the‑circumstances; focus on whether the defendant’s will was overborne; and standards of review (legal determinations de novo; factual findings for clear error). Rooney applies these to the hospital interrogation.

Legal Reasoning

1) Alternative‑Perpetrator Evidence

The Court reaffirmed the constitutional right to present a complete defense but emphasized that the right is not absolute and operates through evidentiary gatekeeping (Hawkins). The opinion’s central clarifications and applications are:

Presence at the scene—clarified role: The Court explicitly rejected Rooney’s contention that the district court required proof of presence to admit alternative‑perpetrator evidence. Instead, presence is a factor that may support the foundational showing but is neither required nor, by itself, sufficient. Crucially, the Court permitted the absence of presence evidence to weigh against the foundational showing, aligning with Larson, while preserving flexibility where other strong connective evidence exists.
Evidence vs. assertions: The Court insisted on “evidence, not assertions” (Jenkins; Nissalke). Rooney’s theory that D.G. could have entered without a keycard swipe if someone opened from the inside lacked evidentiary support and therefore could not contribute to the foundational showing.
Description and motive evidence: The Residence Inn employee’s description of a man and woman near the room was too vague to link D.G. specifically (Woodard). And Rooney’s motive theory about D.G. was insufficient under Troxel because it alleged, at most, a romantic encounter without evidence of violence, threats, anger, jealousy, or frustration tending to show homicidal motive.
Foundational failure: Considering the proffer cumulatively (presence, motive, description), the district court correctly found no inherent tendency to connect D.G. to the actual commission. Thus, the proffer never reached step two of Hawkins (where otherwise‑admissible motive/threat evidence might be considered under ordinary evidentiary rules).
Harmless‑error backstop: Even if exclusion were error, the Court concluded it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to overwhelming inculpatory evidence: Rooney’s DNA dominated the firearm’s key components; a bullet bore Columbus‑Boshey’s DNA; gunshot residue was found on Rooney’s right hand; and Rooney’s statements tended to self‑inculpate. Under Blom and Westrom, any error was “surely unattributable” to the verdict.

2) Voluntariness of Hospital Interview Statements

Applying totality‑of‑the‑circumstances, the Court held Rooney’s statements were voluntary:

Defendant’s condition and comprehension: Despite a head wound and medical apparatus (including a feeding tube), Rooney was alert, oriented, ambulatory, and able to communicate. Before questioning, officers checked his awareness (date, personal information, vehicle make/model) and confirmed he preferred to write answers. He was Mirandized, said “yes,” and wrote “y.”
Nature and length of interrogation: The interview lasted about 80 minutes, with a non‑coercive, sympathetic tone. A nurse briefly administered Zofran; Rooney’s affect and responsiveness remained consistent. No threats or intimidation occurred; officers even adjusted his feeding tube for comfort. He dozed only in the last five minutes, and the officers stopped.
Legal standard and burden: The question is whether the defendant’s will was overborne (Ezeka; Pilcher). The district court’s factual findings (clear‑error review) supported voluntary, informed participation; the Supreme Court’s de novo legal conclusion matched those facts.

Impact

Near‑Term Effects

Alternative‑perpetrator proffers will continue to face Hawkins gatekeeping: Defendants must marshal concrete, non‑speculative evidence that inherently tends to connect the proposed alternative perpetrator to the actual commission of the offense. Vague descriptions, mere presence, or speculation about access methods will not suffice.
Presence evidence recalibrated: Rooney clarifies that presence at the scene is neither strictly required nor automatically sufficient. However, the absence of presence evidence may significantly erode the foundational showing unless other strong connective evidence is offered (e.g., physical evidence, admissions, direct threats, contemporaneous communications showing homicidal intent).
Hospital interviews remain admissible when done right: Law enforcement may conduct bedside interviews if they confirm orientation and comprehension, provide Miranda warnings, maintain a non‑coercive environment, and are attentive to the suspect’s physical needs. Medication administration (like Zofran) is not disqualifying when responsiveness remains intact.

Long‑Term Doctrinal Trajectory

Potential reexamination of Hawkins: The Thissen concurrence (joined by Justice Procaccini) invites a future challenge to replace the Hawkins threshold with a conventional Rules 401/403 relevancy and prejudice analysis. If adopted, courts would assess alternative‑perpetrator evidence like any other: admit if relevant (tends to make a consequential fact more/less probable), subject to Rule 403’s balancing against unfair prejudice, confusion, or delay. That shift could lower initial hurdles for defense proffers and place more discretion in the trial court’s Rule 403 balancing, though the ultimate gatekeeping role would remain.
Strategic implications for defense counsel: Given the concurring signal, counsel should preserve a challenge to the Hawkins threshold and argue, in the alternative, under a 401/403 framework. Meanwhile, under current law, counsel must build a record with concrete connection evidence—physical, digital, testimonial, or documentary—rather than inference upon inference.
Harmless error realities: Even meritorious evidentiary challenges may fail on appeal where the State’s case is overwhelming. Rooney underscores the importance of undermining key forensic links at trial and developing a robust record showing how excluded defense evidence could have plausibly altered the verdict.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Alternative‑Perpetrator Evidence: Defense evidence suggesting that someone other than the defendant committed the crime. Admissible only after a threshold showing of “inherent tendency” to connect the proposed person to the actual commission.
Hawkins Threshold (Foundational Requirement): The defendant must proffer evidence (not just speculation) that inherently links the alternative perpetrator to the crime’s commission before motive/threats and other details can be introduced.
“Presence at the Scene” Factor: Useful but not decisive. Presence is neither required nor enough by itself. Absence of presence evidence may weigh against admissibility unless other strong connective evidence is offered.
Right to Present a Complete Defense: A constitutional right under the Minnesota and U.S. Constitutions, but constrained by rules of evidence designed to prevent unfair prejudice, confusion, or speculation.
Voluntariness of Statements: Under totality‑of‑the‑circumstances, the question is whether the defendant’s will was overborne by coercive tactics or conditions. Key factors include the defendant’s comprehension, the interrogation’s nature and length, warnings, and physical/psychological state.
Miranda Warnings: Advisements (right to remain silent; anything said can be used in court; right to an attorney, etc.) required before custodial interrogation. A valid waiver and voluntary statements render the statements admissible.
Standards of Review: Abuse of discretion for evidentiary rulings; de novo for the legal question of voluntariness; clear error for the underlying factual findings.
Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Even if the trial court erred, the conviction stands if the verdict is “surely unattributable” to the error given the overall strength of the State’s case.

Practice Takeaways

For defense counsel: Build proffers with concrete connective evidence—e.g., forensic links (DNA, fingerprints, GSR), communications evidencing intent or threats, digital location data, admissions, or eyewitness accounts with specific identifiers. Anticipate attacks on vagueness and speculation. Preserve a Rules 401/403 argument in addition to Hawkins.
For prosecutors: When challenging alternative‑perpetrator evidence, focus on the absence of connective facts, the vagueness of descriptions, and the speculative nature of access or opportunity theories. Develop a robust, multi‑modal evidentiary record to sustain harmless‑error arguments on appeal.
For law enforcement: In medical settings, document a suspect’s orientation and comprehension; offer choice of communication modality (speech or writing where appropriate); avoid coercion; monitor medication effects; and cease questioning upon fatigue or sleep. These steps strengthen voluntariness findings.

Conclusion

Rooney reinforces two important pillars of Minnesota criminal procedure. First, it clarifies the operation of the Hawkins threshold: while presence at the crime scene remains a pertinent factor, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to meet the foundational requirement; nonetheless, its absence can weigh against admissibility unless counterbalanced by other compelling connective evidence. Vague descriptions, speculative access theories, or minimal motive proof will not pass muster.

Second, the decision affirms that bedside interrogations can yield admissible statements when the totality of circumstances demonstrates voluntariness—i.e., the suspect is oriented, Mirandized, and not subjected to coercive tactics—despite injuries or routine medications like anti‑nausea drugs.

The concurring opinions point to an emerging debate about whether Minnesota should retire Hawkins’s distinct threshold in favor of a more conventional Rules 401/403 analysis. Until such a shift occurs, Rooney’s clarifications sharpen the contours of what defendants must show to present alternative‑perpetrator evidence and what process law enforcement must follow to obtain admissible statements in clinical settings.