Prejudgment Interest May Be Awarded on Noneconomic Damages in § 1983 Cases, But Must Be Limited to Past Losses: Seventh Circuit’s Clarification in Bolden v. Pesavento

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Case: Eddie L. Bolden v. Angelo Pesavento, et al., No. 24-1674

Date: November 6, 2025

Panel: Brennan, C.J.; Kolar and Maldonado, JJ. (opinion by Judge Kolar)

Introduction

This appeal arises from a wrongful-conviction case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by plaintiff-appellee Eddie L. Bolden against the City of Chicago and police officers after his murder conviction was vacated and the State dismissed charges in April 2016. A jury awarded Bolden $25 million in compensatory damages for pain, suffering, and loss of normal life, plus punitive damages against two individual defendants. The district court then added $7.63 million in prejudgment interest (PJI), calculated from the date of favorable termination through entry of judgment, compounded monthly at the average prime rate.

The defendants appealed the PJI award, arguing (1) prejudgment interest is categorically unavailable on noneconomic damages; (2) even if available, the district court abused its discretion because the jury’s verdict already accounted for interest, the amount of interest-eligible damages was not ascertainable, and delays were outside defendants’ control.

The Seventh Circuit largely affirmed. It held that prejudgment interest may be awarded on noneconomic damages in § 1983 cases as a matter of law, reaffirming and extending its earlier reasoning from an admiralty case, and it rejected the defendants’ “penalty” and “double-counting” arguments. However, because prejudgment interest cannot be awarded on future damages, the court remanded for the district court to apportion the lump-sum verdict between past (interest-eligible) and future (interest-ineligible) harms and to recalculate interest accordingly.

Summary of the Opinion

Availability of PJI on noneconomic damages: The court held—consistent with its 1984 decision in Hillier v. Southern Towing Co.—that prejudgment interest may be awarded on noneconomic damages (e.g., pain, suffering, and loss of normal life). The rationale for PJI (making the plaintiff whole and offsetting the time value of money) applies equally to intangible harms.
Presumption in favor of PJI in federal-law cases: Under Seventh Circuit precedent, PJI is presumptively available to victims of federal law violations and is compensatory, not punitive (citing Thorncreek, Gorenstein, Milwaukee Cheese, and Frey).
No “double-counting” here: The record did not show that the jury included PJI in its $25 million compensatory award. Thus, adding PJI did not duplicate compensation.
Apportionment required: PJI can only run on past damages from the accrual date through judgment. Because the jury returned a lump-sum verdict that likely included both past and future noneconomic losses, the district court must estimate the portion attributable to past harms and award PJI on that portion only. The court suggested reasonable methods exist in the record (e.g., counsel’s “$2 million per year for 22 years” theme), but left the precise approach to the district judge.
No penalty for pandemic or court delays: Neutral delays attributable to the judiciary or events like COVID-19 do not bar PJI; the point of PJI is compensation, not punishment. The district court’s acknowledgment of settlement choices did not convert PJI into a sanction.
Rate and compounding: Selecting the interest rate and compounding method is within the district court’s discretion. Monthly compounding at the average prime rate was not an abuse of discretion.
Disposition: Affirmed in all respects except for the need to apportion past and future damages for PJI purposes; remanded for recalculation. The court also noted PJI was awarded under federal law, rendering state-law questions unnecessary.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Role

Hillier v. Southern Towing Co., 740 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1984): In an admiralty wrongful death case, the Seventh Circuit held that noneconomic damages are not categorically excluded from PJI; only future damages are ineligible because they are discounted to present value at trial. Bolden extends Hillier’s reasoning beyond admiralty to § 1983 noneconomic damages.
Thorncreek Apartments III, LLC v. Mick, 886 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2018): Establishes that PJI is presumptively available in federal-law cases; also warns against double counting when a jury demonstrably includes interest in its award. The court applied the presumption and found no evidence that the jury included PJI.
Gorenstein Enterprises v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1989): Foundational Seventh Circuit case endorsing PJI as part of full compensation in federal cases; supports the presumption.
Matter of Milwaukee Cheese Wis., Inc., 112 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1997): Articulates the two core functions of PJI: (i) make the plaintiff whole by accounting for the time value of money, and (ii) eliminate an “interest-free loan” to the defendant that could incentivize delay. The court rejects arguments that intangible harms evade the time-value principle.
Frey v. Coleman, 903 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2018): Reiterates the compensatory purpose of PJI and the presumption in federal claims; supplies abuse-of-discretion review standards in awarding PJI.
City of Milwaukee v. Cement Division, Nat. Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189 (1995), and West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305 (1987): PJI runs from the date of accrual to judgment, using damages at accrual as the principal. This anchors the time period and the principal base for interest.
Williamson v. Handy Button Machine Co., 817 F.2d 1290 (7th Cir. 1987): PJI cannot be assessed on future damages; when the verdict is lump sum, the district court should apportion past and future damages using reasonable methods unless doing so is “impossible or hopelessly speculative.” Bolden follows Williamson’s apportionment directive.
Hutchison v. Amateur Electronic Supply, Inc., 42 F.3d 1037 (7th Cir. 1994): District courts should not deny PJI merely because of calculational ambiguities; reasonable estimation is permissible.
Daniels v. Pipefitters’ Ass’n Local 597, 945 F.2d 906 (7th Cir. 1991): An example where PJI was properly denied because the record left the court with “no means to parse” a general verdict at all. Bolden distinguishes Daniels, finding sufficient record support to apportion.
McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109 (2019): For claims akin to wrongful prosecution, accrual occurs upon favorable termination. The Seventh Circuit uses April 19, 2016 (dismissal of charges) as the accrual date for PJI purposes.
Partington v. Broyhill Furniture, 999 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1993): Even if the plaintiff would not have “invested” the money, earlier compensation retains value because it could fund current consumption; this undermines the defense’s “intangible harms can’t be invested” objection.
Amoco Cadiz (Matter of Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz), 954 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1992): A tortfeasor makes the victim an involuntary creditor as of the injury; the obligation dates back to the injury, supporting accrual-based PJI logic.
Out-of-circuit: Barnard v. Theobald, 721 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2013); Thomas v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 297 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2002): Both extend PJI to noneconomic past injuries outside admiralty, aligning with Hillier’s rationale. The Seventh Circuit also canvasses circuit commentary and finds no compelling contrary authority to overturn Hillier.

2) Legal Reasoning

Core premise: the time value of money applies to intangible harms. The court emphasizes that noneconomic damages, though subjective and not precisely quantifiable ex ante, still represent losses for which earlier compensation has greater value than later compensation. Whether funds would have been invested or spent on consumption, money delivered earlier would have benefitted Bolden across the period before judgment. Thus, the compensatory rationale for PJI extends to noneconomic harms.

No categorical bar for noneconomic damages. The defendants’ argument—because pain and suffering are not “investable,” PJI makes no sense—misconstrues PJI’s dual purposes. Uncertainty about the ultimate number is not unique to noneconomic damages; many economic-loss cases involve substantial disputes until verdict. The “unjust enrichment and delay incentive” rationale remains relevant, and the “full compensation” rationale is conclusive.

Guardrails: No PJI on future damages; avoid double counting. The court reiterates that future damages, discounted to present value at trial, cannot also accrue PJI. And if the record shows the jury already included interest in its award, courts must not layer PJI on top. Here, the court found no record support for “baked-in interest.”

Apportionment of a lump-sum verdict. Because Bolden’s verdict likely spans both past (incarceration) and future (post-release) noneconomic harms, the trial court must estimate the past portion and calculate PJI only on that amount. The Seventh Circuit offers practical paths for estimation drawn from the existing record—for example, counsel’s $2 million per year framework across 22 incarcerated years—and underscores that exactitude is unnecessary if a reasonable, evidence-based method can be articulated.

Neutral delays and settlement posture are not disqualifying. PJI is not a penalty; delays attributable to court processes or external events (e.g., COVID-19) do not negate PJI’s compensatory function. Nor does a party’s election to try rather than settle—absent bad-faith conduct—preclude PJI.

Discretion on rate and compounding. The district court acted within its discretion by applying the average prime rate with monthly compounding. The appellate court identifies no authority making that choice unreasonable.

3) What the Court Actually Decided

Holding 1 (legal): In the Seventh Circuit, prejudgment interest may be awarded on noneconomic damages in § 1983 cases. Hillier’s principle is not confined to admiralty.
Holding 2 (application): The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding PJI, by choosing the average prime rate, or by compounding monthly, and delays here did not convert PJI into a penalty.
Holding 3 (limitation and remand): PJI cannot be awarded on future damages. Because the verdict was lump-sum, the district court must apportion the award between past and future harms and recalculate PJI on the past portion only, using any reasonable, record-based method.

4) Impact and Practical Consequences

Clarifies and cements PJI for noneconomic damages in civil-rights cases: Plaintiffs in § 1983 cases within the Seventh Circuit (including wrongful-conviction suits) can seek PJI on past noneconomic harms. This likely increases expected exposure for municipalities and officers in cases with lengthy pre-judgment periods.
Strong incentive to use special verdict forms: To avoid post-trial apportionment disputes, parties should request special verdict forms or interrogatories separating past and future damages. Clear jury allocations simplify PJI and minimize appellate risk.
Record-building during trial becomes critical: Counsel should create an evidentiary foundation for apportionment (e.g., per-year measures of incarceration harms) and clarify whether any suggested figures include or exclude interest concepts.
Settlement dynamics: Because PJI accrues from accrual to judgment, defendants face rising financial exposure over time. This amplifies settlement incentives post-accrual, particularly where trial dates move due to court congestion or external events.
Interest methodology discretion preserved: District courts retain leeway in choosing rates and compounding frequencies appropriate to the case; prime-rate-based awards with compounding will often be sustainable on appeal if reasonably justified.
Alignment with other circuits: Bolden places the Seventh Circuit in step with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits on noneconomic PJI outside admiralty and underscores that any perceived circuit split is overstated or context-bound.

5) A Closer Look at Apportionment on Remand

The court suggests there is adequate record support to estimate how much of the $25 million award is attributable to past versus future harms:

Trial themes: Plaintiff’s closing urged “$2 million for each of those 22 years” of incarceration—i.e., $44 million as a starting point—focused on past confinement harms. Defense counsel similarly referenced “1 to 2 million a year.”
Jury instructions: The jury was instructed to compensate both past and reasonably certain future harms, indicating the $25 million likely includes some future loss component.
Reasonable method: One plausible approach (which the plaintiff conceded would be reasonable) is to treat $22 million as past losses tied to the 22 incarcerated years and the remaining $3 million as future harms. The district court may consider this or another record-based method.
No “hopeless speculation” required: Unlike in Daniels and Gilliam, the record here provides concrete anchors for a reasonable estimate. Exact precision is unnecessary so long as the methodology is tethered to the evidence.

6) Standards of Review and Burdens

De novo review for the legal availability of PJI on noneconomic damages (FDIC v. Chicago Title Ins.). The court held availability exists as a matter of law.
Abuse-of-discretion review for the decision to award PJI and for selecting rate/compounding. The court found no abuse, save for the need to confine PJI to past damages only.
Presumption favoring PJI in federal-law cases places a practical burden on defendants to show why PJI should not be awarded or should be reduced (e.g., double counting, plaintiff-caused delay, or impossibility of apportionment).

Complex Concepts, Simplified

Prejudgment Interest (PJI): Additional money awarded to account for the lost time value of the plaintiff’s damages between the date the claim legally “accrues” and the date of judgment. It ensures the plaintiff is made whole and discourages defendants from benefiting from delay.
Noneconomic Damages: Compensation for intangible harms like pain, suffering, emotional distress, and loss of normal life. Their valuation is inherently subjective but nonetheless compensable.
Accrual Date: The legal date on which the claim is deemed to have arisen. In wrongful-prosecution-type § 1983 claims, this is generally the date of favorable termination (e.g., dismissal of charges).
Present Value Discounting: The process of reducing future damages to their equivalent amount in today’s dollars. Because this already accounts for time value, future damages should not also earn PJI.
Double Counting: If a jury already factors interest into the award (e.g., through explicit instructions or evidence), awarding PJI would pay the plaintiff twice for the same time value; courts therefore look for record indications that interest was already included.
Restitutio in integrum: A remedial principle (not unique to admiralty) that aims to place the injured party in the position they would have occupied absent the wrong—synonymous with full compensation.
Prime Rate and Compounding: The “prime rate” is a benchmark interest rate used by banks; compounding (e.g., monthly) means interest accrues on interest at regular intervals. Courts have wide discretion to select appropriate rates and compounding frequencies.
Special Verdict Form: A jury form that itemizes damages (e.g., separating past and future) to avoid later guesswork. Using special verdicts can streamline or even eliminate PJI apportionment disputes.

Practical Guidance for Litigants and Courts

For plaintiffs: Build an evidentiary record that distinguishes past from future losses (e.g., per-year incarceration impacts) and make clear whether requested amounts include or exclude any interest component.
For defendants: Request special verdict forms separating past and future noneconomic damages. If opposing PJI, develop a record showing the jury likely included time-value considerations, or that apportionment would be truly speculative.
For trial courts: When using a general verdict form, be prepared to apportion based on trial themes, testimony, and counsels’ quantified proposals. Choose interest rates and compounding methods consistent with circuit norms and the compensatory purpose of PJI.
For all parties: Anticipate that neutral delays (e.g., pandemic disruptions) will not defeat PJI; factoring PJI exposure into settlement valuations will be prudent.

Conclusion

Bolden v. Pesavento meaningfully clarifies Seventh Circuit law in two respects. First, it confirms that prejudgment interest may be awarded on noneconomic damages in § 1983 actions—a principle long implicit in the circuit’s compensatory-damages jurisprudence and explicitly endorsed in analogous contexts. Second, it emphasizes that PJI is limited to past damages suffered by the accrual date; when a lump-sum verdict blends past and future harms, courts must reasonably apportion the award and calculate PJI only on the past component.

By rejecting categorical objections to PJI for intangible harms, re-affirming the compensatory function of PJI, and preserving district courts’ discretion on rates and compounding, the Seventh Circuit has provided practical guidance that will influence how wrongful-conviction and other civil-rights cases are tried, valued, and settled. The opinion also highlights trial-management best practices—particularly the use of special verdict forms—to ensure accurate and efficient PJI determinations. In short, Bolden strengthens the “make-whole” principle in federal civil-rights litigation while laying down clear boundaries to prevent overcompensation.