Prejudgment Interest as a Question of Law for the Court: Commentary on Russ & Debi Ropken v. YJ Construction, Inc. (2025 WY 131)

Prejudgment Interest as a Question of Law for the Court:
Commentary on Russ & Debi Ropken v. YJ Construction, Inc., 2025 WY 131

I. Introduction

The Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision in Russ Ropken and Debi Ropken v. YJ Construction, Inc., 2025 WY 131, squarely addresses two recurring practical questions in civil litigation:

  1. Who decides prejudgment interest when a case has been tried to a jury—the judge or the jury?
  2. What process is constitutionally required before a court can add prejudgment interest to a jury’s verdict?

The case arises from a residential construction dispute. The homeowners (the Ropkens) entered an oral agreement with YJ Construction for construction of a custom home. After initially paying YJ’s invoices, the Ropkens stopped paying in May 2022 and expelled YJ from the jobsite in July 2022. YJ then sent a demand letter in October 2022 for three unpaid invoices totaling $276,169 and later sued when payment was not forthcoming.

A jury ultimately found that a valid contract existed, the Ropkens breached it without excuse, and YJ’s damages for unpaid work were $258,587.70. The district court entered judgment on that verdict and, on YJ’s post-judgment motion, awarded $33,473.25 in prejudgment interest at the statutory rate of 7% per annum. The homeowners appealed only the interest award, raising:

  • a substantive challenge to the availability and calculation of prejudgment interest; and
  • a constitutional due process challenge to the procedure used (no evidentiary hearing).

The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed, issuing an opinion that clarifies Wyoming’s law of prejudgment interest and appellate procedure in several important ways. Most notably, the Court expressly holds for the first time that:

a district court in Wyoming has authority to consider and award prejudgment interest even when it is not the trier of fact.

This commentary explores the opinion’s reasoning, its reliance on and development of prior case law, its doctrinal and practical implications, and the way it consolidates Wyoming’s approach to prejudgment interest in contract disputes.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Case Background and Procedural Posture

  • Parties: Russ and Debi Ropken (homeowners/defendants-appellants) and YJ Construction, Inc. (contractor/plaintiff-appellee).
  • Contract: Oral agreement for construction of a custom home starting September 2021.
  • Nonpayment: After paying invoices for some time, the Ropkens stopped paying beginning with a May 2022 invoice; they removed YJ from the project in July 2022.
  • Demand: On October 24, 2022, YJ sent a demand letter specifying that three specified invoices (Nos. 88, 91, and 94) remained unpaid, totaling $276,169; the invoices were attached.
  • Litigation: YJ sued to recover the unpaid invoices. At summary judgment and in pretrial filings, the Ropkens admitted owing at least $176,870.21.
  • Jury trial: A five-day jury trial resulted in a verdict that:
    • found a valid contract;
    • found a breach by the Ropkens without excuse; and
    • awarded YJ $258,587.70 to "fully and fairly" compensate it for unpaid work.
  • Judgment: On August 28, 2024, the district court entered judgment for $258,587.70. The order expressly allowed a post-judgment motion for costs and/or prejudgment interest within 21 days.
  • Prejudgment interest motion: YJ timely moved for prejudgment interest; the Ropkens objected. They paid the principal judgment amount on November 4, 2024.
  • Interest award: The district court awarded YJ $33,473.25 in prejudgment interest, calculated at 7% per annum on the $258,587.70 from October 24, 2022 (the demand letter date) to the date of judgment (675 days).

B. Issues on Appeal

The Supreme Court consolidated the homeowners’ arguments into two issues:
  1. Prejudgment Interest: Did the district court err in awarding prejudgment interest—specifically
    • (a) did it lack authority to award prejudgment interest because it was not the trier of fact, and
    • (b) did YJ fail to meet its burden under Wyoming’s two-part test for prejudgment interest?
  2. Due Process: Did the district court violate the homeowners’ due process rights by awarding prejudgment interest without holding an evidentiary hearing?

C. Holdings

  1. Authority and Entitlement to Prejudgment Interest:
    • The district court did have authority to consider and award prejudgment interest even though a jury was the trier of fact on liability and damages.
    • YJ met Wyoming’s two-part test:
      • its claim was liquidated (based on three invoices totaling a fixed, undisputed sum); and
      • the homeowners had notice of the amount claimed no later than the October 24, 2022 demand letter.
    • The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest, nor did it err in its calculation methodology (7% on the jury’s $258,587.70 award for 675 days).
  2. Due Process:
    • The homeowners’ due process argument was not raised in the district court and therefore was not preserved.
    • Even on the merits, the procedure was adequate: YJ’s written motion supplied notice, and the homeowners’ written objection provided a meaningful opportunity to be heard; no evidentiary hearing was constitutionally required.

D. Key Precedential Contribution

The Court resolves an open procedural question in Wyoming law and makes explicit what earlier decisions had only implied:

Newly clarified rule: In Wyoming, prejudgment interest is a question of law and equitable adjustment for the court, not a question of fact for the jury. A district court may consider and award prejudgment interest by post-judgment motion, even when a jury determined the underlying damages.

This doctrinal clarification, along with the Court’s reaffirmation of the two-part prejudgment interest test and its insistence on a sufficient appellate record, significantly shapes future civil practice in the state.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Prejudgment Interest in Wyoming: Purpose and Framework

1. Purpose of Prejudgment Interest

The Court situates prejudgment interest within a consistent line of Wyoming cases. Its core characteristics are:

  • Compensatory, not punitive: Prejudgment interest is "an accepted measure of damages to compensate for the lost use of money."
    • Lew v. Lew, 2019 WY 99, ¶ 20, 449 P.3d 683, 688;
    • Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Tilden, 2008 WY 46, ¶ 28, 181 P.3d 94, 103–04.
  • Economic rationale: Money has "the ability to reproduce in terms of earning interest," so withholding owed funds causes economic harm through the loss of their productive use.
    • Rissler & McMurry Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 559 P.2d 25, 32 (Wyo. 1977).
  • Time period covered: It compensates for the period "between the accrual of the claim and the date of judgment."
    • Universal Drilling Co., LLC v. R & R Rig Serv., LLC, 2012 WY 31, ¶ 46, 271 P.3d 987, 1000 (Wyo. 2012);
    • Pennant Serv. Co. v. True Oil Co., 2011 WY 40, ¶ 36, 249 P.3d 698, 711.

In short, prejudgment interest "fills the gap" created when a defendant wrongfully withholds a sum certain for a period of time. It ensures the plaintiff is made whole, not just for the principal amount due, but for the time-value of money lost during the litigation and pre-litigation delay.

2. The Two-Part Wyoming Test Reaffirmed

The Court reiterates the now-settled two-part standard, drawn from Fuger v. Wagoner and earlier cases:

Prejudgment interest is available when:
  1. The claim is liquidated—i.e., "readily computable via simple mathematics"; and
  2. The debtor received notice of the amount due before interest begins to accrue.
Fuger v. Wagoner, 2024 WY 73, ¶ 30, 551 P.3d 1085, 1094 (quoting KM Upstream, LLC v. Elkhorn Constr., Inc., 2012 WY 79, ¶ 45, 278 P.3d 711, 727).

In the absence of a contract specifying the interest rate, the applicable prejudgment interest rate is 7% per annum under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-14-106(e). Lew, ¶ 20, 449 P.3d at 688.

The opinion also emphasizes:

  • Prejudgment interest is appropriate for compensatory claims, such as contract damages (Thorkildsen v. Belden, 2012 WY 8, ¶ 8, 269 P.3d 421, 423; Pennant; Stewart Title).
  • Wyoming has "approved the award of prejudgment interest on liquidated sums in breach of contract actions" (Pennant, ¶ 39, 249 P.3d at 711; Wells Fargo Bank Wyoming, N.A. v. Hodder, 2006 WY 128, ¶ 60, 144 P.3d 401, 420–21; Millheiser v. Wallace, 2001 WY 40, ¶ 11, 21 P.3d 752, 755).

B. Who Decides Prejudgment Interest After a Jury Trial?

1. The Earlier Hint: Rissler & McMurry

The central doctrinal pivot in Ropken is the Court’s interpretation and extension of Rissler & McMurry Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 559 P.2d 25 (Wyo. 1977).

In Rissler, a jury awarded damages on a breach of oral contract claim. Post-verdict, the plaintiff sought prejudgment interest from the district court. The trial court refused, reasoning (inter alia) that the jury verdict had not included interest. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Rissler was entitled to prejudgment interest as a matter of law, even though:

  • the jury was not instructed on interest;
  • neither party requested such an instruction; and
  • nothing in the record indicated the jury had included interest in its award.

Crucially, the Court wrote:

"The right to interest followed as a matter of law and did not involve any question of fact." Rissler & McMurry, 559 P.2d at 34 (quoting Wyoming Constr. Co. v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 275 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 976).

It also cited a California case (Engelberg v. Sebastiani, 207 Cal. 727, 279 P. 795 (1929)), emphasizing that prejudgment interest is "incident to an award of the contract price" and involves no factual questions for the jury to resolve.

Although Rissler did not squarely pose the "who decides" question, it strongly suggested that prejudgment interest is:

  • a matter of law; and
  • properly awarded by the court even after a jury verdict.

2. Implicit Recognition in Later Cases: Cargill, Stocki, Hanft

The Ropken Court also surveys several later decisions where:

  • the underlying case was tried to a jury;
  • the plaintiff moved for prejudgment interest after the verdict; and
  • the district court—not the jury—ruled on the prejudgment interest question.

Key examples:

  • Cargill, Inc. v. Mountain Cement Co., 891 P.2d 57 (Wyo. 1995):
    • After a jury verdict, the plaintiff moved for prejudgment interest.
    • The district court denied interest because the damages were unliquidated, not because the court lacked authority.
    • The Supreme Court affirmed on that basis, again implicitly assuming the trial judge could award or deny interest post-verdict.
  • Stocki v. Nunn, 2015 WY 75, 351 P.3d 911:
    • Following a jury verdict, the plaintiff included a request for prejudgment interest in a proposed judgment.
    • The trial court denied interest, not for lack of authority, but because it was impossible to determine from the general verdict how much of the award corresponded to liquidated medical expenses versus non-liquidated components.
    • The Supreme Court affirmed, again treating the trial court as the proper decision-maker on interest.
  • Hanft v. City of Laramie, 2021 WY 52, 485 P.3d 369:
    • A jury awarded the plaintiff substantial damages for lost wages and benefits.
    • The plaintiff then moved for prejudgment and post-judgment interest, as well as fees and costs.
    • The district court denied prejudgment interest. On appeal, the Supreme Court:
      • held it was error to treat prejudgment interest as waived merely because it was not pleaded in the complaint (citing Halling v. Yovanovich, 2017 WY 29, ¶ 33, 391 P.3d 611, 622); but
      • ultimately affirmed the denial because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate which components of the verdict were liquidated and from when.
    • Critically, the Court never suggested that the district court lacked authority to address prejudgment interest because a jury decided damages. The analysis presupposed judicial authority to award or deny interest.

These cases create a consistent pattern: Wyoming trial courts routinely resolve prejudgment interest via post-verdict motions, even in jury trials, and the Supreme Court reviews those rulings without questioning that allocation of responsibility.

3. The Express Holding in Ropken

The Ropken Court notes that until now, no Wyoming case had squarely addressed whether prejudgment interest must be submitted to the jury as trier of fact. Nor had any statute imposed such a requirement. Against that backdrop, the Court:

  • recognizes that Wyoming precedent has long treated interest as a matter of law and a judicial function; and
  • explicitly rejects the homeowners’ attempt to require jury determination of prejudgment interest absent statutory mandate.

The Court concludes:

"From the foregoing, it is evident we have never suggested that prejudgment interest must be determined by the trier of fact. Instead, we have implied that a district court in Wyoming has authority to determine a party's eligibility for prejudgment interest, even when it is not the trier of fact. ... We further take this opportunity to expressly state that a district court has authority to and may consider and award prejudgment interest even when it is not the trier of fact."

This resolves the procedural question definitively and harmonizes Wyoming practice with the principle announced in Rissler: "The right to interest follow[s] as a matter of law and [does] not involve any question of fact."

4. Out-of-State Authorities and Wyoming’s Choice Not to Follow Them

The homeowners cited cases from Rhode Island, Louisiana, Florida, and Virginia to argue that prejudgment interest is for the jury where the jury decides damages. The Court is unpersuaded for two reasons:

  1. Statutory and procedural differences: Other jurisdictions’ allocation of responsibilities between judge and jury often rests on particular statutory schemes or procedural rules. Those are absent in Wyoming.
  2. Existing Wyoming path: Wyoming’s own case law already establishes a contrary course, viewing prejudgment interest as incident to the judgment and governed by common-law principles plus the statutory rate.

Accordingly, the Court declines to adopt a foreign rule that would:

  • upend consistent Wyoming practice;
  • introduce avoidable jury complexity (separate interest questions and instructions); and
  • risk under-compensating plaintiffs where juries are not instructed on interest but courts then refuse to add it.

C. Application of the Two-Part Test in Ropken

1. Liquidation of YJ Construction’s Claim

The first prong asks whether the claim is "liquidated"—i.e., easily ascertainable and readily computable by simple mathematics without the need for opinion, discretion, or fact-finding about the amount itself.

The Court emphasizes several principles already settled in Wyoming law:

  • A "mere difference of opinion as to the amount due or as to liability does not preclude prejudgment interest if the amount sought to be recovered is a sum certain, and the party from whom payment is sought receives notice of the amount sought." (Pennant, ¶ 40, 249 P.3d at 712 (citing Laramie Rivers Co. v. Pioneer Canal Co., 565 P.2d 1241, 1245 (Wyo. 1977))).
  • A dispute over liability does not make the claim unliquidated. Bueno v. CF & I Steel Corp., 773 P.2d 937, 940 (Wyo. 1989).
  • Were liquidated status postponed until judgment, "there would be no such thing as a liquidated claim, and prejudgment interest could never be imposed." Stewart Title, ¶ 27, 181 P.3d at 103.
  • The existence of an unliquidated counterclaim or setoff does not prevent prejudgment interest on the liquidated component of the plaintiff’s claim. Fuger, ¶ 32, 551 P.3d at 1094 (citing Holst v. Guynn, 696 P.2d 632, 635 (Wyo. 1985)).
  • Amounts "readily computable from invoices" are routinely treated as liquidated. Bowles v. Sunrise Home Ctr., Inc., 847 P.2d 1002, 1006 (Wyo. 1993).

Applying these principles, the Court notes:

  • YJ consistently claimed $276,169 in unpaid contract balance, based upon three invoices.
  • This figure appeared:
    • in the original complaint;
    • in amended complaints;
    • in the October 24, 2022 demand letter;
    • at the summary judgment stage; and
    • as the amount sought at trial.
  • The homeowners never disputed that the three invoices totaled $276,169 as a mathematical matter.
  • They did, however, contend that they did not owe the full amount, admitting liability for only $176,870.21.

Thus, the claim was a textbook "sum certain"—the amount due could be extracted from the invoices via simple addition. Any disagreement was about how much of that sum was legally recoverable, not about the arithmetic. Under Wyoming doctrine, such disagreements do not alter the liquidated nature of the claim.

2. Does the Jury’s Reduction Make the Claim Unliquidated?

The homeowners argued that because the jury did not award the full $276,169 demanded, but instead awarded $258,587.70 (a reduction of $17,581.30), the claim could not have been liquidated.

The district court reasoned that the difference functioned effectively as a "set-off." The Supreme Court observes that this label is "imprecise" because "set-off" typically refers to an amount owed by the plaintiff to the defendant on some counter-obligation (see Mantle v. N. Star Energy & Constr., LLC, 2020 WY 125, ¶ 27, 473 P.3d 279, 286). Here, the jury made no finding that YJ owed anything to the homeowners.

However, the key point is not how the reduction is characterized but whether it transforms a sum certain into an unliquidated claim. The Court holds it does not, and gives two reasons:

  1. Substantively: A jury’s choice to award less than the maximum claimed amount does not mean the original claim was not arithmetically fixed. Many factors might explain the reduction (e.g., rejection of specific line items, minor workmanship concerns, or adjustments based on testimony), but none erase the fact that the claimed amount was ascertainable from invoices.
  2. Procedurally: The homeowners failed to provide an adequate appellate record—no trial transcript and no copies of the invoices—leaving the Court unable to assess why the jury reached exactly $258,587.70.

Because appellants bear the burden of presenting a record sufficient to demonstrate error, the absence of the invoices and trial transcript is fatal to this argument. The Court accordingly presumes the district court’s ruling was correct.

This reliance on record sufficiency ties into a well-established line of Wyoming cases:

  • Vogt v. MBNA Am. Bank, 2008 WY 26, ¶¶ 12–13, 178 P.3d 405, 409 (sufficient record required for review);
  • Pokrovskaya v. Van Genderen, 2025 WY 50, ¶ 36, 567 P.3d 1172, 1182; Rush v. Golkowski, 2021 WY 27, ¶ 16, 480 P.3d 1174, 1178; Adams v. Gallegos, 2025 WY 71, ¶ 9, 571 P.3d 337, 339; Knezovich v. Knezovich, 2015 WY 6, ¶ 9, 340 P.3d 1034, 1036; Freer v. Freer, 2024 WY 118, ¶ 7, 558 P.3d 951, 953–54; Martin v. DeWitt, 2014 WY 112, ¶ 5, 334 P.3d 123, 126.

These decisions uniformly hold: when the record is incomplete, appellate courts assume that the district court’s orders and rulings are correct and will summarily affirm.

3. Notice and the Start Date for Interest

The second prong of the prejudgment interest test concerns "notice"—the point at which the debtor learns (or reasonably should learn) the amount claimed, such that it can decide whether to pay or contest.

Wyoming law typically looks for:

  • a demand specifying the amount due; or
  • a billing statement or invoice for a fixed sum.

See Fuger, ¶ 31 n.3, 551 P.3d at 1094 n.3; Pennant, ¶ 40, 249 P.3d at 712 (citing Laramie Rivers, 565 P.2d at 1245).

The Court finds that the homeowners had notice no later than October 24, 2022, when YJ sent:

  • a written demand letter addressed to their counsel; and
  • copies of invoices 88, 91, and 94, showing a total balance of $276,169.

The homeowners did not dispute receipt of the letter or invoices in the district court or on appeal. Thus:

"The district court did not err in finding that the Ropkens had notice of the liquidated damages as of the October 24, 2022, demand letter."

The Court underscores that calculating interest from the date of judgment—rather than from notice—would contradict the very purpose of prejudgment interest, which is to compensate for the loss of use of money before judgment, not after.

4. The Calculation of Interest

Because the contract was oral and lacked an agreed interest term, the district court properly applied the statutory rate in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-14-106(e): 7% per annum.

The calculation accepted by the Supreme Court is straightforward:

  • Principal: $258,587.70 (the jury’s award, not the full $276,169 originally demanded).
  • Rate: 7% per annum (0.07 per year).
  • Period: 675 days from October 24, 2022 (demand letter) to the date of judgment.

So: 

Interest = Principal × Rate × (Days / 365)
         ≈ 258,587.70 × 0.07 × (675 / 365)
         ≈ $33,473.25

The Court finds:

"The district court did not abuse its discretion" in computing prejudgment interest on this basis.

Importantly, the judge calculated interest on the amount ultimately awarded by the jury, not on the larger sum initially claimed, which avoids awarding interest on amounts the jury implicitly declined to include in the verdict.

D. The Due Process Challenge and the Absence of an Evidentiary Hearing

1. Preservation and the "Fundamental Rights" Exception

The homeowners argued on appeal that their due process rights were violated because the district court awarded prejudgment interest without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court does not reach the merits because:

  • The due process challenge was not raised below in the district court.
  • Wyoming appellate courts generally refuse to consider issues first raised on appeal, except for:
    • jurisdictional questions; or
    • issues so "fundamental" they warrant review despite waiver.
  • "Simply asserting that there is a constitutional violation does not make an issue fundamental in nature." (Matter of Guardianship of DEP, 2021 WY 122, ¶ 19, 497 P.3d 928, 931; Rush, ¶ 35, 480 P.3d at 1182; Crofts v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 2016 WY 4, ¶ 24, 367 P.3d 619, 625; Womack v. Swan, 2018 WY 27, ¶ 11 n.2, 413 P.3d 127, 133 n.2.)

The Court concludes that the homeowners’ complaint about the lack of an evidentiary hearing is not of such a fundamental character as to justify an exception to the usual waiver rules. On that ground alone, the claim fails.

2. What Process Is Due?

The Court also briefly addresses the merits, assuming arguendo that the issue were properly preserved. The general due process framework is summarized from:

  • In the Interest of JF, 2025 WY 14, ¶ 31, 562 P.3d 853, 863;
  • Matter of NRAE, 2020 WY 121, ¶ 12, 472 P.3d 374, 377–78;
  • Matter of Gustke, 2024 WY 38, ¶ 22, 545 P.3d 863, 869;
  • Tracy v. Tracy, 2017 WY 17, ¶ 30, 388 P.3d 1257, 1264;
  • Womack, ¶ 20, 413 P.3d at 136.

From these authorities, the Court draws several points:

  • Due process’s "touchstones" are notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
  • The process "must be appropriate and proportional to the nature of the case."
  • What is "due" depends on the context; not every issue necessitates an evidentiary hearing.

In this case:

  • The district court’s judgment order explicitly invited a motion for prejudgment interest within 21 days, putting all parties on notice that interest remained an open issue.
  • YJ filed a detailed motion and brief requesting prejudgment interest.
  • The homeowners filed a written objection (essentially a brief) making the same arguments later advanced on appeal.
  • Nothing in the record indicates the homeowners ever requested an evidentiary hearing or claimed that written briefing was insufficient at the time.

The Supreme Court characterizes this as a classic case in which:

YJ’s motion was "notice" to the Ropkens ...; the Ropkens' objection and brief was its "meaningful opportunity to be heard."

Given that:

  • the issues were legal and documentary (e.g., whether the claim was liquidated, when notice was given);
  • no new factual disputes requiring live testimony were identified; and
  • the homeowners never asked for a hearing,

the Court finds no basis to conclude that fundamental fairness required an evidentiary hearing. Thus, even on the merits, there would be no due process violation.

E. Precedents Cited and Their Doctrinal Role

The opinion is heavily footed in existing Wyoming doctrine. Key precedents and their roles include:

1. Prejudgment Interest Doctrine

  • Rissler & McMurry Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 559 P.2d 25 (Wyo. 1977):
    • Establishes that prejudgment interest on a liquidated contract claim is a matter of law, not fact.
    • Supports the idea that courts can add interest post-verdict even when juries are silent on the issue.
  • Lew v. Lew, 2019 WY 99, 449 P.3d 683, and Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Tilden, 2008 WY 46, 181 P.3d 94:
    • Describe prejudgment interest as compensatory.
    • Confirm use of the statutory 7% rate where no contract controls.
  • Universal Drilling Co., LLC v. R & R Rig Serv., LLC, 2012 WY 31, 271 P.3d 987 and Pennant Serv. Co. v. True Oil Co., 2011 WY 40, 249 P.3d 698:
    • Articulate the economic rationale (lost use of money).
    • Reaffirm the two-part liquidated claim/notice test.
  • KM Upstream, LLC v. Elkhorn Constr., Inc., 2012 WY 79, 278 P.3d 711:
    • Provides the two-part test quoted in Fuger; cited for both the test and the statutory rate.
  • Thorkildsen v. Belden, 2012 WY 8, 269 P.3d 421:
    • Clarifies liquidated/unliquidated distinction.
    • Emphasizes that some unliquidated claims can become liquidated if the amount can eventually be determined without discretion or opinion.
  • Wells Fargo Bank Wyoming, N.A. v. Hodder, 2006 WY 128, 144 P.3d 401 and Millheiser v. Wallace, 2001 WY 40, 21 P.3d 752:
    • Illustrate prejudgment interest in contract and loan contexts.
    • Millheiser also supports computing interest from the time notice is given.

2. Liquidation, Disputes, and Counterclaims

  • Laramie Rivers Co. v. Pioneer Canal Co., 565 P.2d 1241 (Wyo. 1977) and Bueno v. CF & I Steel Corp., 773 P.2d 937 (Wyo. 1989):
    • Make clear that disputes over liability and partial disputes over amount do not automatically unliquidate a claim.
  • Holst v. Guynn, 696 P.2d 632 (Wyo. 1985):
    • Confirms that an unliquidated counterclaim does not destroy the plaintiff’s right to interest on the liquidated portion.
  • Bowles v. Sunrise Home Ctr., Inc., 847 P.2d 1002 (Wyo. 1993):
    • Holds that amounts readily computable from invoices are liquidated.

3. Jury Verdicts and Post-Verdict Interest Motions

  • Cargill, Inc. v. Mountain Cement Co., 891 P.2d 57 (Wyo. 1995); Stocki v. Nunn, 2015 WY 75, 351 P.3d 911; Hanft v. City of Laramie, 2021 WY 52, 485 P.3d 369:
    • Each involves a jury verdict followed by a judicial determination (or denial) of prejudgment interest.
    • Collectively, they support treating prejudgment interest as a post-verdict legal question for the court.
  • Halling v. Yovanovich, 2017 WY 29, 391 P.3d 611:
    • Clarifies that prejudgment interest is not waived merely by omitting it from the prayer for relief in the complaint.

4. Appellate Record and Presumption of Correctness

  • Vogt v. MBNA Am. Bank, 2008 WY 26, 178 P.3d 405; Rush v. Golkowski, 2021 WY 27, 480 P.3d 1174; Pokrovskaya v. Van Genderen, 2025 WY 50, 567 P.3d 1172; Adams v. Gallegos, 2025 WY 71, 571 P.3d 337; Knezovich v. Knezovich, 2015 WY 6, 340 P.3d 1034; Freer v. Freer, 2024 WY 118, 558 P.3d 951; Martin v. DeWitt, 2014 WY 112, 334 P.3d 123:
    • Uniformly stress that appellants bear the burden of providing a record adequate for review.
    • Absent such a record, the appellate court presumes the trial court’s decisions are correct.

5. Due Process and Procedural Fairness

  • In the Interest of JF, 2025 WY 14, 562 P.3d 853; Matter of NRAE, 2020 WY 121, 472 P.3d 374; Matter of Gustke, 2024 WY 38, 545 P.3d 863; Tracy v. Tracy, 2017 WY 17, 388 P.3d 1257; Womack v. Swan, 2018 WY 27, 413 P.3d 127:
    • Set out the fundamental due process framework: notice, a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and proportionality of process to the interests at stake.
  • Matter of Guardianship of DEP, 2021 WY 122, 497 P.3d 928; Crofts v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 2016 WY 4, 367 P.3d 619; Rush, 2021 WY 27; Womack, 2018 WY 27:
    • Limit appellate review of unpreserved issues to jurisdictional or fundamental matters.
    • Reject the idea that labeling an issue "constitutional" automatically makes it fundamental.

F. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

1. Litigation Strategy in Contract and Construction Disputes

For practitioners, Ropken brings clarity and a roadmap:

  • Prejudgment interest is for the judge: There is no need to craft jury instructions or special verdict questions on prejudgment interest in ordinary contract cases. Instead, counsel should:
    • develop the record on the liquidated nature of the claim (e.g., invoices, billing schedules, fixed contract prices); and
    • document clear notice (demand letters, billing statements, emails).
  • Plead and preserve: While prejudice is not waived by failing to plead it, best practice is still:
    • to mention prejudgment interest in the complaint; and
    • to specifically request it in a post-verdict motion, with supporting calculations and dates.
  • Contract drafting: Parties may now more carefully negotiate interest terms in contracts, knowing that:
    • if they do not, the statutory 7% will likely apply; and
    • courts are empowered to enforce prejudgment interest on unpaid, invoiced balances.

For construction practitioners specifically, the opinion confirms that unpaid progress invoices—if arithmetically fixed—are strong candidates for prejudgment interest once the owner is put on notice and refuses to pay.

2. Jury Instructions and Verdict Forms

The decision implicitly validates a cleaner division of labor between judge and jury:

  • Juries:
    • decide liability;
    • decide principal damages (e.g., amount of unpaid work, cost of completion, etc.);
    • are not necessarily tasked with computing interest.
  • Judges:
    • apply the law to determine whether the claim is liquidated;
    • identify the date of notice; and
    • perform the mathematical calculation of interest.

This separation promotes consistency and reduces the risk that juries will inconsistently or inequitably apply interest concepts, especially in complex commercial cases.

3. Appellate Practice and Record Preparation

Ropken is also a cautionary tale about appellate records. The homeowners’ failure to include:

  • the trial transcript; and
  • the invoices central to the liquidated-damages analysis,

prevented the Supreme Court from examining in detail whether the jury’s $17,581.30 reduction was consistent with liquidated status.

The Court therefore applied the standard presumption of correctness and affirmed. For appellants, this underscores:

  • the critical importance of designating all material transcripts and exhibits; and
  • the difficulty of challenging fact-sensitive rulings (like the liquidated/unliquidated distinction) without a complete record.

4. Broader Implications for Damages Law in Wyoming

Doctrinally, Ropken consolidates Wyoming’s prejudgment interest jurisprudence by:

  • making explicit that prejudgment interest is a judicial, not a jury, determination;
  • reaffirming that disputes over liability or partial amounts do not automatically unliquidate a claim; and
  • re-emphasizing the compensatory nature of prejudgment interest and its role in making plaintiffs whole.

Over time, this may:

  • encourage earlier settlement by defendants facing substantial prejudgment interest exposure once a detailed demand is sent;
  • prompt more precise documentation practices by creditors, who see that clean invoices and formal demand letters directly support an interest award; and
  • align Wyoming more closely with jurisdictions that treat prejudgment interest as a routine adjunct to judgment in clear-sum contract cases.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

The opinion uses several legal terms of art that are worth unpacking in plain language:

  • Prejudgment interest:
    • Interest added to a money judgment to compensate a plaintiff for being kept out of money that should have been paid before trial and judgment.
    • Covers the period from when the claim accrues and is made known (e.g., via a demand) until judgment is entered.
  • Post-judgment interest:
    • Interest that accrues on a judgment after it is entered until it is paid.
    • Distinct from prejudgment interest and often governed by separate statutes or rules.
  • Liquidated claim:
    • A claim for a specific sum of money that can be calculated using basic math, without needing a jury or judge to exercise discretion about the amount.
    • Examples:
      • An unpaid invoice for $50,000 of delivered materials.
      • A promissory note with a clear principal balance and due date.
  • Unliquidated claim:
    • A claim where the amount cannot be determined simply by arithmetic and requires judgment or opinion.
    • Examples:
      • Pain and suffering damages;
      • Loss of future earning capacity;
      • Uncertain repair costs where estimates vary widely.
  • Notice (for prejudgment interest):
    • The point at which the debtor is informed of the specific amount owed, such as by a written demand letter or invoice.
    • From that date forward, if the claim is liquidated and remains unpaid, prejudgment interest can accrue.
  • Set-off:
    • A legal concept where one party reduces what it owes another by the amount the other party owes it.
    • Example: If Party A owes Party B $100,000, but Party B owes Party A $20,000 on a different transaction, A may assert a set-off, paying only $80,000.
    • In Ropken, the district court loosely described the jury’s reduction as a "set-off," but the Supreme Court clarified that this was not technically accurate, as the jury did not find any affirmative liability by YJ to the homeowners.
  • Standard of review:
    • De novo: The appellate court gives no deference to the trial court’s legal conclusions and decides the issue anew (used for legal questions like whether prejudgment interest is available and for constitutional due process issues).
    • Abuse of discretion: The appellate court defers to the trial court’s decision unless it is unreasonable in light of the evidence (used for whether to award prejudgment interest and in what amount once eligibility is established).
  • Due process:
    • A constitutional guarantee that the government will not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without fair procedures.
    • Typically requires:
      • notice of what is at stake; and
      • a meaningful opportunity to present one’s side of the story to a decision-maker.
    • Not every issue requires a full trial or evidentiary hearing; written submissions can suffice where no material facts are in dispute and only legal questions remain.

V. Conclusion

Russ & Debi Ropken v. YJ Construction, Inc., 2025 WY 131, is a significant decision in Wyoming civil practice because it resolves an important procedural question and consolidates prejudgment interest doctrine in a clear, practical way.

The Court expressly holds that:

  • prejudgment interest is a matter of law for the court, not an issue of fact for the jury, even in jury-tried cases; and
  • a district court may consider and award prejudgment interest on a post-judgment motion irrespective of whether it served as the trier of fact on liability and damages.

Applying established principles, the Court:

  • finds that YJ’s claim was liquidated, based on three invoices totaling a fixed amount;
  • concludes that the homeowners had notice of the amount due no later than the October 24, 2022 demand letter; and
  • upholds the district court’s calculation of prejudgment interest at the statutory 7% rate from the date of notice until judgment.

The opinion also reinforces two practical lessons:

  1. appellants must provide a complete record—including transcripts and key exhibits—if they hope to overturn fact-sensitive determinations such as whether a claim is liquidated; and
  2. due process in post-judgment interest disputes is ordinarily satisfied by notice in the form of a written motion and a meaningful opportunity to respond in writing, absent a timely request and justification for an evidentiary hearing.

In the broader legal context, Ropken furthers the compensatory objectives of contract law by ensuring that prevailing parties in liquidated claims are not "mulcted" of part of their rightful recovery simply because a jury was not instructed on interest. It aligns Wyoming with the view that prejudgment interest is a routine adjunct to judgment in sensible cases, firmly under judicial control, and governed by clear rules of liquidation and notice.

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