Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1) Prior written notice requirement

• NYC Admin. Code § 7-201(c)(2) and Katz v. City of New York, 87 N.Y.2d 241 (1995): Katz squarely holds that “prior written notice of a defect is a condition precedent which plaintiff is required to plead and prove” in actions against the City for sidewalk defects. The panel applied this well-settled rule and evaluated whether the City was on written notice of the specific defect location.

2) Specificity of Big Apple Map symbols

• Nieves v. City of New York, 189 N.Y.S.3d 568 (App. Div. 2023): The Appellate Division held that a symbol that runs through one address does not provide notice for another address where the plaintiff fell. The Second Circuit relied on this precise-location principle to reject plaintiff’s attempt to bootstrap notice from a symbol adjacent to, but not at, the accident site.
• Vega v. 103 Thayer St., LLC: The panel cited (parenthetically) the Appellate Division dissent by Andrias, J.P., noting that a symbol appearing in the middle of an intersection does not relate to a pedestrian ramp location where the fall occurred, and referenced that the case was later reversed by the New York Court of Appeals (16 N.E.3d 1255 (N.Y. 2014)). The panel’s reference underscores a general doctrinal theme: mismatched symbol-location alignment undermines notice. The order does not rely on Vega for a new rule but uses it to emphasize the core requirement of locational congruence.

3) Summary judgment standards and evidentiary limits

• Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986): The classic standard—summary judgment is appropriate where no reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant. The Second Circuit conducted a de novo review and concluded the record did not raise a triable issue on prior written notice or permissible amendment.
• D’Amico v. City of New York, 132 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 1998): A party cannot manufacture a genuine issue of fact through speculation or by contradicting prior testimony without evidentiary support. The panel invoked this to discount equivocal testimony about the precise spot of the fall given the plaintiff’s own § 50-h account and photographs.
• Banks v. General Motors, LLC, 81 F.4th 242 (2d Cir. 2023): Confirms de novo review of summary judgment.

4) Notice of Claim scope and amendments under GML § 50-e

• Brown v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 389 (2000): In Brown, photographs and measurement annotations that circled a curb did not limit the claim to the curb where the written notice repeatedly referred to the “sidewalk.” Here, the panel distinguished Brown: Lieder’s notice referred generally to sidewalk “in front of 672,” but his attached photos faced away from the portion of sidewalk associated with the Big Apple symbol, anchoring the alleged defect to a different location. Unlike in Brown, the evidentiary context did not support a broader reading.
• GML § 50-e(6): Allows amendment of a notice of claim in the court’s discretion if the municipality is not prejudiced.
• Ritchie v. Felix Assocs., LLC, 873 N.Y.S.2d 628 (App. Div. 2009): Illustrates amendments may be allowed when discovery has not begun and prejudice is absent.
• Adlowitz v. City of New York, 205 A.D.2d 369 (App. Div. 1994); Canelos v. City of New York, 37 A.D.3d 637 (App. Div. 2007); DiMattia v. City of New York, 183 A.D.3d 823 (App. Div. 2020): These cases support the proposition that misidentifying an accident location in a notice of claim prejudices the City, especially where it results in investigation of the wrong site. The panel relied on this line of authority to affirm the district court’s denial of plaintiff’s post-discovery expansion of the accident location.
• NYC Admin. Code § 7-210: Provides that abutting property owners have a duty to maintain sidewalks, with an exemption for single-family owner-occupied properties used exclusively for residential purposes. The district court’s dismissal of the individual homeowners on this basis was not appealed.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Exactness in prior written notice is mandatory. New York law strictly requires that prior written notice correspond to the specific defect at the specific location where the accident occurred. The plaintiff’s proof—chiefly a 2003 Big Apple Map symbol covering 674 Eastern Parkway, with only slight encroachment toward 672—did not put the City on notice of a defect at the spot nearest 670/672 depicted in the Notice’s photographs and described in the § 50-h testimony. The City also produced record searches and affidavits showing no written notice at that location; plaintiff’s evidence did not genuinely dispute that showing.
2. Interpretive testimony cannot expand the map’s coverage. A declaration by the Big Apple Map producer suggesting that one could reasonably interpret the symbol at 674 to cover the entire sidewalk section up to 670 could not overcome the settled requirement of precision. Courts do not treat Big Apple symbols as generalized alerts for contiguous blocks; they are location-specific.
3. Plaintiff’s own materials fixed—rather than broadened—the location. The Notice referred to “in front of 672,” and the attached photographs faced away from the portion of sidewalk with the map symbol. Unlike Brown (where text references to “sidewalk” supported a broader reading beyond a circled curb), Lieder’s submission effectively limited the locus of the claim.
4. Post-discovery amendment under § 50-e(6) would prejudice the City. The district court acted within its discretion in denying the amendment. Discovery had concluded, and the City had investigated the site delineated in the original notice and photos. Expanding the claim to a wider stretch (670–674) after the fact risks “serious prejudice,” particularly when an erroneous notice causes investigation at the wrong site—precisely the concern identified in Adlowitz, Canelos, and DiMattia.
5. No triable fact via equivocation. The panel invoked D’Amico to reject reliance on speculative or equivocal testimony to manufacture a genuine issue regarding the precise location of the fall, especially where plaintiff’s own representations had already anchored it.

Impact and Practical Implications

Doctrinal impact (persuasive, not precedential):

• Reinforces the rigorous, location-specific application of the prior written notice requirement in NYC sidewalk cases. Big Apple Map symbols must align with the precise accident site; “nearby” or “contiguous” is not enough.
• Clarifies the limits of § 50-e(6) amendments: expanding the accident location after discovery is generally disfavored and often prejudicial, particularly when the original notice and exhibits directed municipal investigation elsewhere.
• Signals caution in using interpretive or expert declarations to stretch the geographic scope of Big Apple notices; New York courts expect the symbol-location match to be exact.

Litigation practice pointers:

• For plaintiffs: Precisely identify the accident location in the notice of claim. Include measurements, cross-street distances, and photos that unmistakably depict the spot. Before filing, reconcile your location with any Big Apple Map symbols or other written notices to ensure exact alignment.
• Move early to amend if there is any ambiguity. Courts are more receptive pre-discovery and where there is no prejudice. Delays risk denial once the City has already investigated.
• For defendants: In sidewalk cases, promptly run and preserve searches of municipal records corresponding to the precise location alleged in the notice. If plaintiff later seeks to expand the location, marshal prejudice arguments grounded in the investigative steps already taken.
• Both sides: Be mindful that § 50-h testimony and attached photographs can concretize the accident location; inconsistencies or speculative “maybe here, maybe there” testimony will not avert summary judgment.

Substantive scope:

• The order does not explore exceptions to the prior written notice rule (e.g., “affirmative negligence” by the municipality or “special use”), suggesting they were not advanced or supported on this record. Future litigants should assess those exceptions where facts permit.
• The ruling leaves intact the § 7-210 single-family homeowner carveout applied by the district court, which remains a significant barrier to claims against individual owners in qualifying properties.