Post-Wilkinson Deference in Cancellation of Removal: Sixth Circuit Reaffirms That Economic/Educational Setbacks and Low-Grade Medical Issues Are “Expected,” Not “Exceptional”

Introduction

In Miriam Garcia Contreras v. Pamela Bondi (6th Cir. No. 24-4051, Nov. 4, 2025) — a nonprecedential decision — the Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review challenging the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) rejection of an application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). The decision is notable for its faithful implementation of the Supreme Court’s recent guidance in Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024), confirming that the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” inquiry is a mixed question of law and fact subject to deferential review. The court harmonizes its own articulation in Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland, 124 F.4th 416 (6th Cir. 2024), with long-standing BIA benchmarks (Monreal-Aguinaga, Andazola-Rivas, and Gonzalez Recinas), and emphasizes that commonly arising consequences of removal — diminished economic prospects, reduced educational opportunities, and low-grade or undiagnosed medical concerns — generally remain insufficient, even in combination, absent truly extraordinary circumstances or proof of unavailability of needed care.

The case involves a long-resident Mexican national and former DACA recipient, the sole provider for two U.S.-citizen sons, arguing that relocation to a rural ranch in Mexico would cause her children exceptional and extremely unusual hardship due to distance to schools and medical services, poor job prospects, and safety concerns. The immigration judge (IJ) and BIA accepted credibility and many background facts, but ultimately concluded the hardships, whether considered singly or cumulatively, were the kind “normally expected” from removal — not the “extremely rare” circumstances the statute demands.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit:

Affirmed that, after Wilkinson, application of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard is a reviewable mixed question, but because the inquiry is primarily factual, review is deferential.
Rejected claims that the IJ and BIA ignored material evidence or failed to apply or aggregate hardship factors under BIA precedent; both decisions expressly stated they considered all factors individually and cumulatively and compared the case to the canonical BIA trio (Monreal, Andazola, Recinas), finding Andazola the closest match.
Approved reliance on In re J-J-G- (BIA 2020) to hold that low-grade, asymptomatic, or undiagnosed medical concerns, without evidence of necessary and unavailable treatment, do not satisfy the heightened hardship threshold.
Concluded that the record did not compel a finding that the children would face hardship beyond economic strain, reduced educational opportunities, and more difficult access to medical care — all within the range of “expected” consequences of removal.

The petition for review was denied; voluntary departure (reinstated by the BIA) was unaffected.

Factual and Procedural Background

Petitioner, a Mexican national who entered the U.S. as a child, lived in Michigan with her parents, sister, and two U.S.-citizen sons (ages 13 and 6). She had prior DACA (2012–2017), no current status, and no ongoing custody or support order from the children’s fathers (one a U.S. citizen incarcerated intermittently; one an LPR recently incarcerated). She worked remotely in a temporary customer-service job earning $19/hour; her children received Medicaid.

DHS initiated removal proceedings in 2016. Petitioner conceded removability and sought cancellation of removal based on hardship to her children, alternatively requesting voluntary departure. At a 2022 merits hearing, she testified that if removed, she and her children would likely live at a rural family ranch near Guadalajara, hours from schools, health care, and reliable employment; the ranch lacked an internet connection. She identified the younger child’s congenital kidney enlargement (described by his urologist as “as low-grade as it gets”), possible speech delay, and chronic constipation; the older child had a past throat issue (now asymptomatic) and was otherwise healthy and successful in school.

The IJ found her credible and that she met all cancellation requirements except the hardship prong, denied cancellation, and granted voluntary departure. The BIA dismissed her appeal but reinstated voluntary departure, relying on the same hardship analysis and BIA precedent. Petitioner sought review in the Sixth Circuit.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit

Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024): Establishes that application of the cancellation-of-removal hardship standard to established facts is a mixed question of law and fact, reviewable under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Yet, because the inquiry is “primarily factual,” courts accord deference to agency determinations.
Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland, 124 F.4th 416 (6th Cir. 2024): Interprets the statutory phrase to require an “extremely rare” hardship that is significantly different from or greater than the hardships normally accompanying removal (e.g., loss of income, separation, and diminished education).
Ceniceros v. Bondi, No. 24-3345, 2025 WL 1012712 (6th Cir. Mar. 31, 2025): Reinforces post-Wilkinson framing of the hardship inquiry as a mixed question and confirms deferential review.
Singh v. Rosen, 984 F.3d 1142 (6th Cir. 2021): Emphasizes deferential review and limits on second-guessing the agency’s weighing of facts.
Umaña-Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 667 (6th Cir. 2013) and Hachem v. Holder, 656 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 2011): Clarify that courts review the BIA’s opinion as the final agency action and may look to the IJ’s reasoning insofar as adopted by the BIA.
Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221 (2020): Interprets § 1252(a)(2)(D) to permit review of “questions of law,” including mixed questions involving application of law to undisputed facts.
Cisse v. Whittaker, 759 F. App’x 449 (6th Cir. 2019) and Kilic v. Barr, 965 F.3d 469 (6th Cir. 2020): Caution against recasting factual disputes as legal errors and reiterate the presumption that the agency considered the evidence.

BIA Framework

In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56 (BIA 2001): Establishes the baseline for “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” requiring hardship substantially beyond what is ordinarily expected following removal, and instructs adjudicators to consider the totality of factors (ages, health, circumstances) cumulatively.
In re Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319 (BIA 2002): Denies relief to a single mother of two U.S.-citizen children despite economic detriment and diminished educational opportunities — an anchor case for the proposition that these hardships, without more, typically do not meet the statutory threshold.
In re Gonzalez Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467 (BIA 2002): Grants relief to a single mother of six with no meaningful support in Mexico, illustrating the kind of extreme constellation of factors that can satisfy the standard.
In re J-J-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 808 (BIA 2020): Clarifies medical-hardship claims: the child’s condition must be serious, and the applicant must show an inability to obtain adequate treatment in the country of removal.

The panel explicitly identified “little daylight” between its own articulation in Moctezuma-Reyes and the BIA’s Monreal-Andazola-Recinas framework, reinforcing that these authorities operate in harmony post-Wilkinson.

Legal Reasoning

1) Standard and Scope of Review

Relying on Wilkinson, the court confirmed that it has jurisdiction to review whether the agency correctly applied the hardship standard to established facts, but it owes deference because the assessment is primarily factual. The court declined to fix a precise degree of deference (e.g., whether a “compelling evidence”/substantial evidence standard should formally govern), because the outcome was the same under any deferential posture.

2) No Legal Error in Evidence Handling or Precedent Application

The petitioner argued the IJ and BIA “ignored” evidence (especially on the inability to find any employment in rural Mexico), misapplied precedent, and failed to aggregate hardships. The court rejected each contention:

Ignored evidence: Both IJ and BIA acknowledged reduced employment prospects and explicitly discussed remote location, lack of internet, and expected wage reductions. The IJ found no showing that petitioner would be unable to obtain “any type of employment” or deprived of all support. The BIA recognized likely financial hardship but correctly deemed it legally insufficient by itself.
Misapplication of precedent: The agency invoked Monreal, Andazola, and Recinas — a correct legal framework that petitioner conceded. It also invoked J-J-G- for medical hardship. The IJ reasonably compared petitioner’s facts to Andazola (a “pretty square” match), distinguishing Recinas (fewer children; family support in Mexico and the U.S.). Under Aburto-Rocha, the court asks only whether the BIA reasonably applied its own precedents; it did.
Aggregation: Both decisions stated they weighed all hardship factors “individually and cumulatively.” The IJ’s analysis addressed remoteness, medical and educational access, single parenthood, and family support in both countries. The BIA likewise affirmed on an aggregated basis. No legal error was shown.

3) Substantive Hardship Determination

Applying the deferential review contemplated by Wilkinson:

Economic hardship: The IJ credited financial strain and worsened prospects but found no evidence of total inability to work or total lack of support. Andazola and Sixth Circuit precedent treat such detriment as “expected” and generally insufficient.
Educational hardship: Long commutes to higher-level schools and overall diminished quality are recognized “expected” hardships and, absent proof of deprivation of all schooling or demonstrable special educational needs, do not meet the threshold.
Medical hardship: The younger child’s kidney condition was asymptomatic, low-grade, improving, and without a current treatment regimen; constipation was managed over-the-counter; the speech concern lacked a diagnosis. Under J-J-G-, a viable claim needs evidence of a serious condition and inability to access adequate care in the destination country. The IJ/BIA found neither.

Given these findings, the panel held the agency reasonably concluded the hardships, even taken together, did not rise to the “exceptional and extremely unusual” level.

Impact and Significance

1) Consolidation of Post-Wilkinson Review in the Sixth Circuit

The decision further embeds Wilkinson’s mixed-question/deference paradigm into Sixth Circuit cancellation-of-removal jurisprudence. While not precedential, it signals that panels will:

Review for legal error in the application of standards and precedent,
Defer to the agency’s factfinding and weighing, and
Decline to remand absent a clear misapplication or overlooked material facts.

2) Continued Centrality of the Monreal–Andazola–Recinas Axis

The court’s endorsement of comparing the case against these BIA guideposts underscores their ongoing relevance. Andazola remains a powerful benchmark to deny relief where a single parent with U.S.-citizen children demonstrates economic and educational harms but lacks proof of extraordinary factors (e.g., total deprivation of schooling, absence of all family support, or severe medical needs).

3) Medical Hardship Must Be Robustly Documented

In line with J-J-G-, successful medical-hardship claims need:

Clear diagnoses, treatment regimens, and prognosis indicating seriousness; and
Evidence that comparable treatment is unavailable or practically inaccessible in the country of removal.

Generalized difficulties or travel distances to care, without evidence of serious conditions and treatment unavailability, will rarely suffice.

4) Practical Guidance for Future Cases

Aggregation matters — but the underlying components must be exceptional in magnitude or kind. Simply combining commonplace hardships will not cross the threshold.
Evidence of “total” deprivation (of work, schooling, or care) carries weight; assertions of reduced quality or increased difficulty typically do not.
Factual claims that an IJ or the BIA “ignored” evidence face the presumption that the agency considered the record; litigants should identify genuinely overlooked, material facts and explain their legal significance.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Cancellation of Removal (Non-LPR): A discretionary form of relief allowing certain non-permanent residents to avoid removal if they meet statutory criteria, including 10 years’ continuous presence, good moral character, no disqualifying convictions, and proof that removal would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative.
“Exceptional and Extremely Unusual Hardship”: A very high bar requiring hardships well beyond the expected consequences of removal. The BIA and courts look to severity in the real world: serious medical needs without accessible care, total deprivation of education, or a complete absence of support structures coupled with compelling family circumstances.
Mixed Question of Law and Fact: An issue that asks how a legal standard applies to established or undisputed facts. After Wilkinson, courts can review such applications, but defer to the agency because the standard is heavily fact-intensive.
Aggregation of Hardships: Decisionmakers must consider all hardship factors together rather than in isolation. However, combining ordinary hardships does not necessarily become “exceptional.”
Presumption of Regularity: Courts presume that administrative bodies considered the evidence presented. To overcome this, a petitioner must show that material evidence was actually overlooked or mischaracterized.
Medical-Hardship Showing (J-J-G-): Requires proof both of a serious medical condition and that adequate treatment is unavailable or inaccessible in the country of removal.

Key Takeaways

Post-Wilkinson, the Sixth Circuit treats the hardship determination as a reviewable mixed question, but the review remains deferential because the inquiry is primarily factual.
Andazola remains the default comparator: economic adversity and reduced educational opportunities, even for a single-parent family, are generally “expected” and insufficient.
Medical claims must be backed by concrete diagnoses and proof of treatment unavailability; low-grade, asymptomatic, or undiagnosed conditions will not ordinarily carry the day.
Stating and showing that all factors were weighed “individually and cumulatively” is sufficient to defeat claims that the agency failed to aggregate hardships.
Practitioners should marshal evidence of true exceptionalism: detailed medical records, expert testimony on treatment unavailability, documentation of total lack of schooling access, or proof of uniquely compelling family circumstances without support in the country of removal.

Conclusion

Garcia Contreras reinforces a steady throughline in cancellation-of-removal jurisprudence: despite broad post-Wilkinson review of mixed questions, courts will defer to agency determinations that are rooted in the Monreal–Andazola–Recinas framework and supported by reasoned consideration of the record. The Sixth Circuit’s emphasis on “little daylight” between its own articulation in Moctezuma-Reyes and the BIA’s precedents underscores the continuity of the standard: relief is reserved for truly exceptional, well-documented situations. Economic strain, diminished educational opportunities, and difficulties accessing routine or low-grade medical care — even when aggregated — typically remain “expected” hardships and therefore inadequate under § 1229b(b)(1)(D). While nonprecedential, the decision signals to future litigants the evidentiary rigor and exceptional factual predicates required to prevail on this demanding statutory standard.