Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943): The Supreme Court affirmed a conspiracy conviction based on repeated sales of illicitly vast quantities of morphine to a doctor who further distributed them. The Court emphasized the distinctive “trust” and mutual stake inherent in illegal narcotics transactions, distinguishing them from sales of innocuous goods. This foundation undergirds the buyer-seller doctrine in drug conspiracy law.
• United States v. Page, 123 F.4th 851 (7th Cir. 2024) (en banc): Page reset Seventh Circuit law to align with Direct Sales, overruling prior circuit decisions that demanded “more” beyond repeated distribution-quantity transactions. Page holds that repeated, distribution-quantity drug sales, with knowledge they will be redistributed, are sufficient to establish an implicit conspiratorial agreement.
• Conspiracy framework: United States v. Wright, 85 F.4th 851 (7th Cir. 2023) (elements); United States v. Hidalgo-Sanchez, 29 F.4th 915 (7th Cir. 2022) (describing earlier buyer-seller line displaced by Page).
• Sufficiency standard: United States v. Brown, 973 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2020); United States v. Garcia, 919 F.3d 489 (7th Cir. 2019); United States v. Dessart, 823 F.3d 395 (7th Cir. 2016) (articulating the “heavy, nearly insurmountable” burden on defendants).
• Witness credibility on appeal: United States v. Cruse, 805 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Conley, 875 F.3d 391 (7th Cir. 2017) (finder of fact may credit even compromised witnesses absent impossibility).
• Constructive possession and § 922(g)(1): United States v. Price, 28 F.4th 739 (7th Cir. 2022) (elements and proximity-plus-connection suffices); United States v. Perryman, 20 F.4th 1127 (7th Cir. 2021) (constructive possession theory); United States v. Thomas, 321 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2003) (control over bedroom); United States v. Alanis, 265 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 2001) (bedside nightstand); United States v. Katz, 582 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2009) (personal items linking defendant to room); United States v. Irby, 558 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2009) (IDs and mail establish dominion); United States v. Hampton, 585 F.3d 1033 (7th Cir. 2009) (constructive possession may be joint).
• Joinder and severance: United States v. Pigee, 197 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 1999) (drug–firearm counts closely related); United States v. Blanchard, 542 F.3d 1133 (7th Cir. 2008) (natural inferences from contemporaneous guns and drugs; temporal disconnect can defeat joinder); United States v. Hubbard, 61 F.3d 1261 (7th Cir. 1995) (17-month gap triggered misjoinder); United States v. Berg, 714 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 2013) (two-step analysis: joinder then severance); United States v. Peterson, 823 F.3d 1113 (7th Cir. 2016) (joinder standard de novo; face of indictment); United States v. Jackson, 787 F.3d 1153 (7th Cir. 2015) (Rule 14 abuse-of-discretion review); United States v. Rollins, 301 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2002) (cross-admissibility defeats prejudice); United States v. Ervin, 540 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 2008) (actual prejudice required); United States v. Dixon, 184 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 1999) (mere better odds of acquittal insufficient); United States v. Maggard, 865 F.3d 960 (7th Cir. 2017) and Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534 (1993) (limiting instructions typically suffice).
• Merger of firearms counts: United States v. Parker, 508 F.3d 434 (7th Cir. 2007) (only one conviction may result for a single incident of possession across multiple disqualifying statuses).

Legal Reasoning

1) Conspiracy: Page governs and is dispositive

The court squarely applied Page’s en banc holding that “repeated, distribution-quantity drug transactions alone can sustain a conspiracy conviction” (Page, 123 F.4th at 856–57). The opinion retraces the doctrinal arc from Direct Sales—where repeated sales of illicit morphine were sufficient—to Page’s correction of the Seventh Circuit’s earlier departure that had demanded “more” than repeated distribution-quantity transactions.

Under this standard, the government’s proof was straightforward:

• Coley: Betts supplied Coley with “a few hundred grams of fentanyl every two weeks” from late 2020 to July 2021, and earlier fronted significant quantities (approx. 1.5 pounds of meth and three ounces of fentanyl) in March 2020, with evidence that Coley resold. Betts even advised Coley about distribution practices and helped him secure housing to mitigate risk in hotel-based sales—facts that, while unnecessary after Page, further cement a shared distribution objective.
• Duggar: From at least October 2020 until May 6, 2021, Duggar purchased meth from Betts every day or two, typically 4–8 ounces and sometimes up to a pound per transaction, and resold to his own customers. Even without exclusivity, instructions, or credit (Duggar paid cash), the sheer repetition and quantities—coupled with knowledge of resale—satisfy Page. Their discussions about scheduling, missed meetings, and postponement due to police presence are consistent with an ongoing distribution relationship.

The panel rejected credibility attacks on Betts’s testimony, invoking the deferential sufficiency standard and the principle that credibility determinations are for the jury (Conley; Cruse).

2) Firearm: Constructive possession supported by control over the bedroom and proximity to drug tools

To prove § 922(g)(1), the government had to show, among other elements, knowing possession of a firearm (Price). The shotgun was found behind Coley’s bedroom door. Coley directed officers to that bedroom to retrieve his shirt and sandals, and officers observed a scale and blender with drug residue in the nightstand.

Seventh Circuit law permits the jury to infer constructive possession from proximity plus a link tying the defendant to the area (Price; Perryman). Finding a firearm in a defendant’s bedroom, when the defendant exercises control over that space, is a classic evidentiary route to constructive possession (Thomas; Alanis). The presence of Coley’s clothes and his own directions to the closet showed dominion over the room and, by extension, the shotgun (Katz; Irby). The possibility that roommates could have accessed the room did not preclude a finding of possession because constructive possession may be joint (Hampton). The lack of fingerprint or DNA testing is not dispositive; circumstantial evidence suffices (Price).

3) Joinder and severance: Natural overlap and no actual prejudice

The court first analyzed joinder under Rule 8(a) de novo and then severance under Rule 14 for abuse of discretion (Berg; Peterson; Jackson). The Seventh Circuit presumes drug-trafficking and firearm counts are properly joined because guns and drug distribution commonly go together; contemporaneous possession of both supports inferences about motive and participation (Pigee; Blanchard). A significant temporal disconnect can rebut that presumption (Hubbard), but here the guns were found during the same period and in the same spaces where drug trafficking occurred (bedrooms/hotel room with drugs and paraphernalia).

On severance, the defendants bore a “heavy burden” to show actual prejudice preventing a reliable verdict (Ervin; Dixon). The court emphasized:

• Overlap and cross-admissibility: Evidence that defendants were trafficking drugs is relevant to prove motive for possessing firearms, which in turn, combined with proximity, supports constructive possession (Blanchard; Price; Rollins).
• Spillover speculation insufficient: Generalized worry about jurors inferring criminal propensity from the felon-in-possession counts does not amount to actual prejudice. The court further relied on the district judge’s limiting instruction to consider each count separately (Maggard; Zafiro).
• Strength of the evidence: Where the case is strong on all counts, the risk that joinder undermined the reliability of the verdict is minimal (Berg).

Accordingly, joinder was proper and denial of severance was well within the district court’s discretion.

Impact and Practical Consequences

A. Conspiracy prosecutions in the Seventh Circuit post-Page

This decision cements Page’s sea change in the Seventh Circuit’s buyer-seller jurisprudence: prosecutors may obtain conspiracy convictions based solely on proof of repeated, distribution-quantity drug transactions with knowledge of redistribution, without additional “plus” factors such as fronting, exclusivity, or operational coordination.

• For the government: Evidentiary focus will (and should) center on quantity, repetition, and knowledge that the drugs are destined for downstream sales. Documentary evidence (texts, ledgers), surveillance, and cooperating testimony tracing routine distribution-level purchases are often sufficient.
• For the defense: Traditional “buyer-seller” arguments are substantially narrowed. Effective defense strategies will pivot to:
  • Challenging whether quantities truly qualify as “distribution quantities” (e.g., arguing personal-use amounts);
  • Undermining the proof of repetition (sporadic or isolated transactions);
  • Contesting knowledge that the seller knew of downstream redistribution;
  • Targeting witness credibility with concrete impeachment (as opposed to general bias), recognizing sufficiency review is highly deferential.
• Jury instructions: Post-Page, pattern instructions and buyer-seller instructions should clarify that repeated, distribution-quantity transactions can themselves support the “joint criminal objective” element. The instruction given in Coley & Duggar recited the traditional buyer-seller limitation but did not preclude the Page logic; nonetheless, courts may wish to update language to avoid suggesting that “more” is required beyond repeated distribution-quantity sales.

B. Constructive possession in shared spaces

The opinion reinforces a familiar rule: when a gun is found in a defendant’s bedroom alongside drug-dealing implements and personal effects, constructive possession is readily inferable. Sharing a residence or a room accessible to others is not, by itself, a defense; the key is control over the space and a nexus between the defendant and the location of the firearm. Defendants challenging possession in shared spaces should marshal concrete proof of lack of dominion (e.g., exclusive control by another occupant) and explain away proximity and drug-related context.

C. Joinder of drug and firearm counts remains the default

The court’s reliance on Pigee and Blanchard maintains a robust presumption that drug-trafficking and firearm charges belong together when the guns are found contemporaneously with drug activity. The practical upshot:

• Severance will rarely be granted absent a clear temporal disconnect or truly distinct factual bases; defense claims of “spillover” must demonstrate concrete, uncurable prejudice to the reliability of the verdict.
• Limiting instructions remain the tool of first resort to manage prejudice. Where defendants wish to minimize prejudice from the felon status element of § 922(g)(1), they should consider stipulations limiting prior-conviction details consistent with governing evidence law.
• Because the evidence overlaps and is often cross-admissible—guns corroborate drug dealing, drug dealing supplies motive for gun possession—Rule 14 relief will be the exception, not the norm.

D. Clarifying the merger principle for firearms counts

The court notes the Parker rule: a single incident of possession cannot sustain multiple § 922 convictions pegged to different disqualifying statuses. Prosecutors should charge in the alternative; courts should ensure only one conviction and sentence flow from a single possession episode.