Post-Dismissal Pseudonymity & Open Courts:
John Doe P v. Thurston County Sets Strict Limits on Sealing Litigant Identities

1. Introduction

John Doe P v. Thurston County, No. 102976-4 (Wash. June 12 2025), squarely addresses when—and for how long—Washington courts may hide the real names of parties behind pseudonyms once the merits of a lawsuit are over. At its heart, the case pits two recurrent interests against each other:

• Privacy / safety of level-I sex offenders who sued under pseudonyms to block disclosure of records under the Public Records Act (PRA), ch. 42.56 RCW; and
• The constitutional mandate of open courts in article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution, implemented through General Rule 15 (GR 15) and the five-factor test of Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97 Wn.2d 30 (1982).

After eight years of litigation—including four published/unpublished appellate opinions—the Supreme Court decides two main questions:

1. Is the continued use of pseudonyms “moot” after the underlying PRA claims have been dismissed?
2. Did the trial court validly justify permanent pseudonymity and sealing of a “Disclosure Document” listing the Does’ true names?

The Court answers “no” to mootness and “no” to the adequacy of the sealing orders, thereby reinforcing a vigorous presumption of openness that survives even after a case is dismissed.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court:

• Reverses the Court of Appeals on mootness, holding that the public can still obtain meaningful relief—the replacement of pseudonyms with real names in court indexes—even though the PRA dispute is over.
• Affirms in part that the trial court abused its discretion in sealing the Disclosure Document, because findings did not satisfy GR 15 or Ishikawa.
• Extends that abuse-of-discretion analysis to the continued use of pseudonyms: the trial court’s conclusory findings were inadequate, the first Ishikawa factor (serious, imminent threat) was not met, and the order lacked durational limits.
• Remands with instructions to (1) unseal the Disclosure Document, (2) substitute the Does’ real names in all future filings, and (3) correct the Superior Court Management Information System (SCOMIS) indices.
• Declines to reach Zink’s evidentiary challenges because the sealing issues dispose of the appeal.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa (1982) – Establishes five-factor test for any restriction on public access. The new case applies Ishikawa to post-dismissal pseudonymity.
• GR 15 – Court rule codifying Ishikawa principles for sealing records. Requires “compelling privacy or safety concerns” and narrowly tailored orders.
• John Doe A v. Washington State Patrol, 185 Wn.2d 363 (2016) – Rejected PRA exemption for registration records; illustrates when pseudonymity becomes moot because names already appear in released documents. The Court distinguishes the present case because relief (removal of pseudonyms) is still possible.
• John Doe G v. DOC, 190 Wn.2d 185 (2018) – Held that names in pleadings are subject to article I, § 10 and must meet Ishikawa; directly controls and supplies the legal standard violated by the trial court here.
• State v. Richardson, 177 Wn.2d 351 (2013) – Emphasizes necessity of durational limits on sealing orders; relied on to strike down “permanent” pseudonymity.
• Hundtofte v. Encarnación, 181 Wn.2d 1 (2014) – Notes the open-courts mandate applies to court indexes; supports non-mootness because SCOMIS indices still hid the Does’ names.
• Allied Daily Newspapers v. Eikenberry, 121 Wn.2d 205 (1993) – Reiterates the balancing of competing interests under Ishikawa.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Mootness Doctrine. An issue is moot only if a court cannot provide “effective relief.” Because removal of pseudonyms from SCOMIS remains possible, effective relief is available.
2. GR 15 Analysis.
   The trial court’s order merely recited that “compelling privacy and safety concerns” existed. It failed to:
   • Specify what current privacy interest needed protection; the Does’ identities as sex offenders were already public.
   • Explain how those interests outweighed the constitutional presumption of openness after dismissal.
   Therefore, the findings were insufficient as a matter of law.
3. Ishikawa Factors.
   1. Factor 1 (Serious & Imminent Threat): Unmet. Declarations focused on stigma of being a sex offender—a fact already public— not on linkage to the lawsuit itself.
   2. Factor 2 (Opportunity to Object): Satisfied—Zink objected.
   3. Factor 3 & 4 (Least Restrictive Means / Alternatives): Cannot be reached if factor 1 fails.
   4. Factor 5 (Narrowly Tailored & Time-Limited): Flunked. The order was unlimited in duration, contrary to Richardson.
4. Standard of Review. Abuse of discretion includes using an incorrect legal standard or unsupported findings. Both occurred here.

3.3 Anticipated Impact on Washington Law

• Pseudonymity Limited Post-Dismissal. Litigants cannot rely on prior pseudonym orders to keep names hidden once the merits are resolved. Courts must issue new, specific findings addressing post-dismissal circumstances.
• Heightened Burden for Permanent Sealing. Permanent or indefinite sealing will rarely survive; courts must set expiration or review dates and place the burden on the proponent for renewal.
• SCOMIS and Court Index Transparency. The opinion underscores that electronic docket indices are part of the “court record” subject to open-courts protections.
• Strategic Considerations in PRA Litigation. Plaintiffs seeking to protect privacy should anticipate eventual disclosure or dismissal; settlement or consent orders might be required to maintain anonymity.
• Guidance for Sensitive-Subject Plaintiffs. The decision does not eliminate pseudonymous litigation— especially where constitutional rights are at stake—but demands concrete, case-specific showings.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Article I, Section 10. Washington’s open-courts clause, more stringent than the federal First Amendment, guarantees public access to judicial proceedings and records.
• GR 15. A statewide rule describing procedural steps to seal (or unseal) court records. Key requirement: “compelling privacy or safety concerns” that outweigh the public interest.
• Ishikawa Test. Five-step analysis a judge must walk through—on the record—before sealing:
  1. Serious & imminent threat to important interest?
  2. Any objections heard?
  3. Least restrictive means?
  4. Balancing of interests & consideration of alternatives?
  5. Order narrowly drawn and time-limited?
• Mootness. A court will not decide an issue if it cannot grant effective relief. Here, relief remained available (removing pseudonyms), so the issue was live.
• Abuse of Discretion. Occurs when a lower court bases its decision on the wrong rule, unsupported facts, or makes a decision no reasonable judge would make.

5. Conclusion

John Doe P v. Thurston County cements Washington’s exacting approach to secrecy in judicial records, especially once a case ends. The Supreme Court reconfirms that:

1. The public’s right to know who used the courts does not expire at dismissal.
2. Permanent or indefinite sealing orders must clear the high hurdles of GR 15 and Ishikawa with precise findings, durational limits, and proof of a current, serious, and imminent threat.
3. Pseudonyms are a powerful but limited tool, reserved for circumstances where open courts would otherwise thwart justice—not simply as a lingering cloak of anonymity.

Practitioners should treat the opinion as a roadmap: if anonymity is essential, build a meticulous factual record, revisit the necessity of pseudonyms at each procedural milestone, and be prepared for the curtain to lift when the controversy ends. Courts, in turn, must write specific, time-bound findings—or decline to seal.